M.C Desai, J.:— This is a reference made by the Sessions Judge ??? Rae-Bareli against an order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mandal, terminating proceedings under 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the sound that there was no longer any apprehension a breach of the peace. The applicant before us ??? a complaint to the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate to the effect that there existed a dispute ??? to certain plots of land, which was likely to cause a breach of the peace.
2. The learned Magistrate being satisfied that such dispute existed issued a preliminary order under Ss. (1), in response to which he appeared before ??? and led evidence. He then dropped the pro-cedings by the order sought to be revised. He said his order that the question before him was ??? there was any apprehension of a breach of the ??? or not, referred to the statement of the ??? himself to the effect that no quarrel had taken ??? regarding possession, and held that this state ??? proved that there was no apprehension of a each of the peace and that there was no necessity deciding which party was in possession. The order of the learned Magistrate was quite ??? and I cannot help feeling that he adopted the ??? cut in order to prevent further delay in the ??? that had already been pending for more than a ??? This is not the way to do justice. The ??? being aggrieved by the order brought the matter the notice of the Sessions Judge, who referred the ??? to this Court for quashing the order. The refer ??? came before one of us who, on account of a ??? among authorities, referred it to a Bench.
3. It is provided under sub-section (1) that ??? a Sub-Divisional Magistrate is satisfied that a ??? likely to cause a breach of the peace exists ??? any land, he must make an order in writ ??? stating the grounds of his being satisfied, and ??? the parties concerned in the dispute to ??? his court and to put in written statement of ??? respective claims as respects the fact of actual ??? session. Sub-Section (4) is as follows:—
“The Magistrate shall, then without reference to merits or the claims of any of such parties to a ??? to possess the subject of dispute,….decide ??? question whether any and which of the parties ??? at the date of the order before mentioned in such session of the said subject.”
??? the proviso to the sub-section he is empower ??? attach the subject of dispute in case of ??? This sub-section means that after the parties ??? appeared before the Magistrate all that he has ??? is to decide which of them, if any, was in ??? of the subject of the dispute on the date he order made under sub-section (1); he has no ??? jurisdiction, not expressly conferred by ??? clauses, and cannot go into the question ??? the order passed by him under sub-section (1) ??? justified or not. Then comes sub-s. (5) which is ??? follows:—
“Nothing in this section shall preclude any party equired to attend, or any other person interested, ??? showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists ??? as existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall ??? his said order, and all further proceedings ??? shall be stayed, but, subject to such ??? the order of the Magistrate under sub-s. (1) be final.”
??? sub-section confers jurisdiction upon the ??? to cancel the preliminary order (e.g the order ??? under sub-section (1)), but only on the ground ??? the dispute involving a breach of the peace has ceased to exist or did not exist at all. If there existed a dispute at the time of the order but it did not involve a breach of the peace or if no dispute existed at all then, it means that a dispute involving a breach of the peace did not exist.
4. If such a dispute existed then but subsequently it has ceased to involve a breach of the peace, or if it has ceased to exist at all, it is a case of such a dispute ceasing to exist. In either circumstance the Magistrate has the power, coupled with duty, to cancel the preliminary order. In other words when it is proved to the satisfaction of the Magistrate that the dispute has ceased to be likely to cause a breach of the peace, he is obliged to drop the proceedings. But the essential question that arises, and that is frequently overlooked or erroneously answered, is of onus probandi.
5. The onus of satisfying the Magistrate that the dispute has ceased to exist or to be likely to cause an apprehension of a breach of the peace has been laid in clear words upon the opposite-party, i.e the party other than the applicant (the party at whose instance the preliminary order was passed). The onus of satisfying the Magistrate that there existed such a dispute lay upon him and when he discharged the onus and the Magistrate issued the preliminary order, he is no longer required to prove subsequently that such a dispute existed or continues to exist.
6. He is not at all required to lead any evidence to prove that such a dispute existed or continues. If it did not exist or has ceased to exist, the onus is upon the opposite-party to lead evidence about it and it is only when he satisfies the Magistrate about it that the latter would be bound to drop the proceedings. A Magistrate, therefore, acts illegally if he drops the proceedings on the ground that the applicant has not led evidence to move that a dispute involving an apprehension of the breach of the peace existed and still continues.
7. The applicant had the onus of satisfying the Magistrate about the existence of such a dispute in order to confer jurisdiction upon him over the dispute; once the Magistrate assumed jurisdiction, he has only to inquire into the question of possession, but the law confers the right upon the other party to satisfy him that no dispute existed or exists at all or that it did not, or has ceased to, involve an apprehension of a breach of the peace.
8. The learned Magistrate was, therefore, wrong in saying that the question before him was whether there was any apprehension of a breach of the peace or not; the real question was whether the opposite party satisfied him that the dispute did not, or had ceased to, involve an apprehension of a breach of the peace.
9. In re Sambasiva Rao. AIR 1954 Mad 1017 (A), Balakrishna Iyyar J. upheld an order of a Magistrate dropping proceedings on the ground that no breach of the peace could be apprehended in the near future. According to his view proceedings can be dropped on the Magistrate's being satisfied that no breach of the peace is apprehended. The same view was taken by Ramaswami J. in Velnr Devasthanam v. Sambandamurthi Nainer, 1952 Cri LJ 1145 : (AIR 1952 Mad 531) (B), when he upheld a Magistrate's order cancelling the preliminary order on the ground that the dispute was not likely to cause a breach of the peace.
10. In State v. Shiva Ratan Singh, 52 Cri LJ 1 : (AIR 1951 Nag 201) (C), Karunamoy v. Kalka Prosad, 51 Cri LJ 1340 : (AIR 1950 Cal 369) (D), and Babu v. Shyam Singh, ILR 1950 All 543 (E), it was held that the Magistrate's jurisdiction is gone on his finding that there is no apprehension of the breach of the peace. In Abdul Rauf v. Mohd. Shafi, 1956 Cri. LJ 663 : AIR 1956 All 337 (2) (F), Vishnu Datta Bhargava J. observed that a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to go into the question whether the dispute involved or still involves an apprehension of a breach of the peace and that his duty is simply to decide which of the parties was in possession on the date of the preliminary order. With great respect I disagree.
11. The learned Judge has not considered the provisions of sub-s. (5) at all and has not referred to any authority and the view taken by him is erroneous. In Mahadeo Singh v. Sukhdeo, 1956 All LJ 699 (G). Asthana J. held that when the opposite-party denies the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, the Magistrate's duty is to call upon “the parties” to produce their evidence in support of their allegations regarding the likelihoodness.
12. This statement of law also is not borne out by the language of sub-section (5), neither party is to be called upon to produce evidence, certainly not the applicant. The onus lies upon the opposite-party to satisfy the Magistrate about the non-existence of the likelihood and he has to discharge it without being called upon by the Magistrate to produce evidence. In Amritlal v. Nageswara Rao, AIR 1947 Mad 133 (H), referred to by Balakrishna Ayyar J. in the case of Sambasiva Rao (A) (Supra), it was said that continuance of a breach of the peace is not essential to confer power upon the Magistrate to pass a final order.
13. A dispute may not be said to be not likely to cause a breach of the peace simply because there has been no breach of the peace, but if it is no longer likely to cause a breach of the peace, the Magistrate is divested of jurisdiction to proceed further in the case and must drop the proceedings.
14. It must be pointed out that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace cannot be said to cease to exist merely because the Magistrate has attached the subject of the dispute; it can be said to cease to exist only if, after the release of the subject of the dispute from attachment, there will be no rival claims, as for instance when the matter has been settled privately. If the dispute will revive as soon as the subject of dispute is released from attachment, it is not a case of cessation of the dispute and if with the revival of the dispute an apprehension of a breach of the peace also will revive, the Magistrate cannot drop the proceedings.
15. In this case I find that the learned Magistrate placed the onus wrongly upon the applicant, but his finding that there is no apprehension of a breach of the peace does not seem to be wrong; it is supported by the applicants' own admission that no quarrel ever took place between the parties. The order terminating the proceedings cannot be said to be illegal or even improper. I note that the subject of dispute has been released from attachment and though two years have passed, nothing untoward has happened; this confirms the finding of the learned Magistrate.
16. In the result I would reject the reference.
A.N Mulla, J.:— (7) I concur with the order proposed by my learned brother Desai, J. and broadly speaking I am in agreement with the view expressed by him, but there are certain aspects of interpretation of the relevant provisions of Section 145 of the Cr PC with which I do not see eye to eye with my brother and so I am giving the reasons for my conclusions separately.
17. In my opinion in interpreting the provisions of a statute it is always desirable that the purpose of he enactment should be kept in view. Section 145 of the Cr PC is really an incursion of the criminal courts in spheres of these disputes which should be appropriately decided by the civil courts. The only justify cation for this intrusion is that the interests of order and peace are paramount and all other interests including the interests of the owners of immovable property are subservient to it.
18. The State cannot permit that riots should be committed and heads be broken merely because two contending parties hold different opinions about the ??? claims to the possession and ownership of some ??? moveable property. It may be that the owners ??? property are temporarily deprived of possession ??? what is rightfully their property and may also be subjected to other inconveniences, but all these considerations are subservient to the imperative necessity ??? preserving the peace.
19. The purpose for which Section 145 of the Cr PC ??? enacted, if I may say so with profound respect, ??? been admirably illustrated by Hill J. in a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Krishna Kam v. Abdul Jubbar, ILR 30 Cal 155 at p. 195 (I). Hill observed:—
“In entering upon a consideration of the section it is, I think, important to bear in mind the ??? with which it was enacted. It occurs in that ??? of the Code which relates to the prevention of offences, and its object is to bring to an end by ??? summary process disputes relating to land etc. ??? are in their nature likely, if not suppressed, to ??? in breaches of the peace. The maintenance of ??? public peace was the object before the mind of ??? legislature and where that supreme object is in ??? there can be no question but that the convenience and even the rights of individuals must at times ??? sacrificed for its attainment.”
20. It is in the back ground of this purpose that should interpret the provisions of section 145 P.C
21. Another point which should be kept in ??? is that Section 145 of the Cr PC is a comprehensive ??? and not only includes the question that is to be ??? by the Magistrate, but also contains the ??? which should be followed by the Magistrate in coming to his conclusions. The initiation of proceedings depends either upon a police report or ??? information to the effect that a dispute likely to ??? a breach of the peace exists concerning any ??? etc.
22. The Magistrate has to determine at the ??? first stage whether this information or report is ??? able and it is only when he is satisfied that ??? reliable that he can start proceedings. In other ??? the very basis for Magistrate to assume jurisdiction his subjective satisfaction that such a dispute ??? is likely to cause a breach of the peace exists. ??? subjective satisfaction must be his own and not ??? of any other person or authority. As observed ??? learned Judge in 1952 Cri LJ 1145 : (AIR 1952 ??? 531) (B):—
“It is the Magistrate who should be satisfied ??? the apprehension is an existing one and an ??? one for taking action to avert the breach of the ??? Mere apprehension of the party or even of the ??? or by a superior authority namely the District ??? is not sufficient ground for taking action.”
23. It may however be remembered that such a ??? information alleges an emergency which ??? emergent methods to deal with it and, therefore, ??? Magistrate has to act quickly and determine this question on the information which is supplied to him. ??? cannot make an exhaustive inquiry, for if he ??? a breach of the peace might take place before could pass a preliminary order.
24. In the very nature of things his preliminary ??? is almost of an ex parte character for it is either ??? on the report submitted by the police or on the ??? ??? presented by a party. Up to that time he gets ??? opportunity of taking evidence on the point whether the allegation contained in the report or application is maintainable or not. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the preliminary order passed by the Magistrate is only a tentative order based on the information available to him at the time when the order was passed and is therefore open to be revised ??? him when he gets fuller information.
25. If at any stage the Magistrate finds that the ??? placed, before him creates no likelihood of an apprehension of a breach of the peace, there is no reason why he should not cancel his first order and ??? that the criminal courts are not entitled to ??? any question in connection with this dispute. I observed by me above, the very basis of the jurisdiction of the criminal courts is the likelihood of a ??? of the peace and where this condition which necessary to confer jurisdiction is found to be abut, the Magistrate has no option but to drop the ??? and stay his hands.
26. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the legislate did not intend to give any sanctity to the ??? order issued under Section 145(1) of the Cr PC by the Magistrate and it was left to him to revise this order he found on further information or evidence that assumption of jurisdiction was not justified. Sub-section (5) of Section 145 of the Cr PC clearly gives this ??? to the Magistrate. It runs as follows:—
“(5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any ??? so required to attend, or any other person ??? from showing that no such dispute as afore ??? exists or has existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further ??? thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such ??? the order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) shall be final.”
27. A plain reading of this sub-section shows ??? the parties before the Magistrate are entitled prove before him that no such dispute which is ??? to cause a breach of the peace exists or has ??? This right is given not only to the parties ??? the Court, but also to any other person who ??? In my opinion sub-section (5) is only enabling clause and not a disabling clause. It ??? mentions that the parties and interested sons can contend before the Magistrate that no ??? of a breach of the peace either exists as existed.
28. It does not limit the range of the sources of ??? which may induce the Magistrate to come ??? conclusion that the likelihood of a breach of ??? peace does not exist or had not existed. The ??? can act upon information supplied to him other persons apart from the parties who produce ??? before him. As observed by me above, the ??? scheme of Section 145 of the Cr PC is based upon the ??? satisfaction of the Magistrate. This ??? satisfaction may be reached from other ??? information and circumstances apart from the ??? placed before him by the parties.
29. The language of sub-section (5) cited above does restrict the Magistrate from seeking his information from other sources, if he so desires. It was ??? in Narasayya v. Venkiah, AIR 1925 Mad 1259
“Clause (5) of S. 145 provides for a special case ??? as the Magistrate is proceeding with the trial ??? question of possession, the parties to the ??? or even other persons who are interested given the right to show that no dispute likely cause a breach of the peace exists or has existed, existence of this clause does not take away the ??? of the Magistrate himself to drop proceed if he is satisfied that there is no further ??? of the breach of the peace.”
30. This view was again followed in another Madras decision in 1952 Cri LJ 1145 : (AIR 1952 Mad 531) (B). It seems to me that the very basis of jurisdiction is an apprehension of a breach of the peace. It would be against the very purpose of the enactment if the preliminary order passed by the Magistrate is to be treated as final and the Magistrate is stopped from reconsidering the question of fuller information whether there was really an apprehension of a breach of the peace or not.
31. It would amount to make the Magistrate feel an apprehension which as a reasonable person he finds does not exist. In my opinion the ??? order under S. 145(1) is not meant to operate as an ‘estoppel’ and the legislature never intended that the Magistrate should decide the question of possession of disputed property in a case in which he has come to the conclusion that there is no likelihood of any breach of the peace.
32. That a Magistrate can cancel the preliminary order as soon as he finds there is no apprehension of a breach of the peace is a proposition which is accepted by all the High Courts of India. The leading case on this point is ‘Minindra Chandra Nandi v. Barada Kanta Chowdhry’, ILR 30 Cal 112 (K). It is a Bench decision and it has been followed by a large number of subsequent decisions given by the various High Courts of India. The proposition laid down in this decision, to the best of my knowledge, has not been dissented from in any decision. The learned Judges observed:—
“A Magistrate has jurisdiction to cancel an order passed under sub-section (1) of Section 145 of the Cr PC and to stay proceedings if he becomes satisfied, whatever the source of information may be, that the state of things does not exist, which alone would give jurisdiction to proceed with the inquiry.”
33. Proceeding further the learned Judges observed at page 115:—
“The procedure provided by S. 145 is intended solely for the purpose of preventing a breach of the peace where a dispute exists concerning any land, or water or the boundaries thereof, which dispute, if no proceedings were taken, would be likely to cause a breach of the peace. The institution of such proceedings is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Magistrate. The existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace is a condition precedent absolutely necessary to give the Magistrate jurisdiction to enter upon an inquiry as to possession.
There is a current of rulings of this Court by which it has been held that it is a necessary preliminary condition to proceedings under S. 145, that a Magistrate, acting under the provisions of that section, shall record an order stating the grounds of his being satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace in fact exists. Any inquiry as to possession that is made under the provisions of that section is made not for the purpose of strengthening the position of the one party or of the other party in the dispute between them, but because such an inquiry is necessary for the making of an order under sub-s. (6) declaring the party in possession to be entitled to retain possession until evicted from the property in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession, until such eviction.”
34. The observations quoted above bring another important aspect to the front. When a Magistrate starts proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr PC, he is not doing so to decide any question inter se between the parties to the dispute, but he is only concentrating on the question whether this dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace or not. A party to a proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr PC is not in the position of a plaintiff in a civil suit and it has no right that the Magistrate must give a decision upon the question of possession.
35. If the Magistrate finds that there is no apprehension of a breach of the peace, no private party has any locus standi to contest the propriety of his refusal to make an inquiry into the question of possession. I have cited these observations to stress the point that the question of the likelihood of a breach of the peace is a question which can be considered by a Magistrate at any stage of the proceedings and the preliminary order passed by him does not stop him from coming to a different conclusion at any subsequent stage on the basis of better evidence or better information.
36. The view quoted above was followed in another Bench decision in Abdur Rahman Bhuia v. Dinesh Haldar, 33 Cal WN 399 : (AIR 1929 Cal 328) (L). Graham J. at page 402 (of Cal WN): (at p. 330 of AIR) observed:—
“There is nothing in sub-section (5) to Section 145 of the Cr PC, which has the effect of limiting or restricting its operation to the earlier stages of the proceeding. The sub-section appears to empower the Magistrate at any stage to cancel the proceeding if he is satisfied that no likelihood of a breach of the peace exists. I am further of opinion that no private party, whether he be a party before the Court, or not, has any locus standi to contest the propriety of the Magistrate's order.”
37. To the same effect are the observations of Suhrawardy J. at page 401 (of Cal WN): (at p. 329 of AIR):—
“Referring to the wording of Cl. (5) it is clear that the Magistrate shall cancel the order initiating the proceedings if he is satisfied at any stage of the case that no such dispute exists. This the Magistrate is entitled to do at any stage of the case though words are not expressly used in the section…”
38. The view expressed above has been followed in a large number of cases. Some of these cases are: Kamulammal Avargal v. Vavu Rowthar 17 Cri LJ 138 : (AIR 1917 Mad 237 (1) (M), Suryanaravana v. Ankineed Prasad ILR 47 Mad 713 : (AIR 1924 Mad 795) (N), Muhammad Khandu Sarkar v. Sadak Ali Sheikh 25 Cri. LJ 291 (1) : (AIR 1923 Cal 577) (O), AIR 1925 Mad 1252 (J), 1952 Cri. LJ 1145 : (AIR 1952 Mad 531) (B) and Bhaggoosingh v. Sanoman Singh. AIR 1954 All. 13 (P), 52 Cri. LJ 1 : (AIR 1951 Nag 201) (C).
39. To the same effect are the decisions given by our own High Court. These decisions are: ILR 1950 All 543 (E), Gangadhar v. State, AIR 1952 All 580 (Q) and Dulla v. The State. AIR 1953 All 341 (R)
40. In ILR 47 Mad 713 : (AIR 1924 Mad 795) (N) cited above the learned Judge went to the length observing at page 715 (of ILR Mad): (at pp. 795-96 of AIR).
“When the Magistrate is able to act on a police report or other information in starting proceedings under section 145, I do not see why he should not stay further proceedings on similar information without being obliged to record such evidence as the parties may produce with the same formality as he would have done if he had gone on with his inquiry instead of dropping it.”
41. A Bench of this Court in ILR 1950 All 543 (E) made some illuminating observations. The learned Judges observed at page 547:
“Sub-section (5) makes it quite clear that the order under sub-section (1) is final unless it is cancelled. That is say proceedings under section 145 ??? only be terminated if the Magistrate is satisfied that there is no apprehension of a breach of peace and unless the is so satisfied he must carry proceedings to their proper conclusion ‘in the into rests of the state’.”
42. I have underlined (here in) the ??? few words of the extract quoted above, ??? cause earlier in this decision the Judges ??? stated that there can be a reason ??? the applicant no longer wants the court to decide the case as he might have collected ??? force to overawe his opponent and is, therefore, ??? to terminate the proceedings as quickly as ??? He may, therefore, choose to absent hims and urge that there is no apprehension of a ??? of the peace so that the proceedings may be ??? Clearly the applicant cannot be allowed do so.
43. The observations would thus indicate that ??? the applicant can satisfy the Magistrate that an a prehension of a breach of the peace no longer ??? and it is not correct to say that it is only the ??? party who has to satisfy the Magistrate on this ??? As observed by the learned Judges at another ??? (page 548):
“Both parties are exactly on the same foot with regard to the production of evidence. ??? parties, even the applicant may show under sub-section (5) that no apprehension of any breach of peace exists.”
44. I am, therefore, of the opinion that Magistrate is entitled to reconsider the ??? order passed by him in the light of the addition evidence or information that comes to him and may come to him from any source and it cannot confined merely to the evidence produced by contending parties before him. He can do so at stage of the proceeding and merely because power of cancellation is given in S. 145(5) it does follow that the procedure of S. 145(4) must be ??? before this power can be exercised.
45. It is a common rule of prudence where judicial orders are passed on the subject satisfaction of any court, they should be passed reasonable grounds and this subjective satisfaction cannot be permitted to be reached arbitrarily. Therefore, where the record discloses that the satisfaction reached by the Magistrate is justifiable, the High Court should not interfere with the order passed the Magistrate.
46. On the other hand where this subjective ??? faction is reached arbitrarily and the record does indicate any good reason why the Magistrate read a particular conclusion, the High Court would justified in interfering with the order passed by Magistrate. The High Court interfered with order of the Magistrate because it came to the ??? that the Magistrate dropped the proceed without any justifiable cause in the following ??? AIR 1954 All 13 (P), 1956 All LJ 699 (G) and ??? Sahu v. Nathuni Thakur, 26 Cri. LJ 105 : (AIR ??? Pat 689) (S).
47. Randhir Singh, J. observed in AIR ??? All 13 (P) as follows:
“A perusal of these rulings shows the Magistrate has a right to terminate proceedings under S. 145 if he is satisfied that there was no ??? likelihood of a breach of the peace or that there ??? initially no apprehension of a breach of the ??? It should, however, appeal from the record ??? Magistrate had satisfied himself on this point, the present case the order of the Magistrate does show that he had received any information from source or had otherwise satisfied himself that was initially no apprehension of a breach of peace or that subsequently the apprehension breach of the peace had ceased to exist.”
48. The duty of the Magistrate to terminate proceedings as soon as he finds that there is no apprehension of ??? reach of the peace was stressed in AIR 1953 All 341 (R), Beg, J. observed:
“Once it is found that there is no danger of a ??? of the peace the foundation for action under section 145 of the Cr PC disappears. The Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed further and must ??? stay his hand. He cannot convert himself into a Civil Court and go on to decide the case ??? merits or to give a finding either on the question ??? title or on the question of possession for any ??? or subsidiary purpose. The only course open ??? him is to cancel ins initial order and to quash all proceedings under section 145 of the Cr PC”
49. In AIR 1954 Madras 1017 (A), Balakrishna Ayyar J. observed:
“I can see nothing in the section which ??? the Magistrate from dropping proceedings then he is satisfied that no breach of the peace is ??? to occur.”
50. At page 1018 the learned Judge went on to observe:
“It will be noticed in the first part of the sub-section the words used are ‘that no such dispute as ??? exists or has existed.’ The expression ‘has ???’ would relate to a point of time anterior to that on which the party seeks to satisfy the Magistrate order this sub-section. The word ‘exists’ would ??? to the time at which the party seeks to satisfy ??? Magistrate about the absence of a dispute. A ??? may be able to satisfy the Magistrate that no ??? exists in one or more of a variety of ways.
The contention that once proceedings are ??? under section 145, the Magistrate must go ??? to the final end and decide who was in possession ??? be shown to be incorrect by one illustration.”
51. The learned judge then gave the illustration and then ??? the decision given in AIR 1947 Mad 133 (H). ??? this decision Kuppuswami Aiyar J. had observed:
“This is not a case in which matters should have be ??? dropped by reason of S. 145(5). It is only if ??? has been a subsequent settlement or if the ??? agreed to give up the lease hold right and not ??? to get back possession of the property, action ??? be taken under section 145(5)”.
??? was observed by Balakrishna Ayyar J. that the observations of Kuppuswami Aiyar J. restricted the ??? on the basis of which proceedings could be ??? under S. 145(5).
52. Applying the rule of law that emerges from ??? decisions I have only to see whether the Magistrate when he dropped the proceedings in this ??? acted on information or evidence on the record ??? not. When I referred this case to a Bench I had feeling that the Magistrate has acted arbitrarily the sudden termination of these proceedings was ??? justifiable. My brother Desai, J. in his decision ??? given the reasons why the Magistrate dropped, ??? proceedings and I agree with him that the ??? had material on the record to come to ??? conclusion that in these circumstances there was ??? likelihood of any apprehension of a breach of ??? peace.
53. I also agree with my brother that the view ??? by a learned Single Judge of this Court in ??? Cri. LJ 663 : (AIR 1956 All 337 (2) (F) appears to erroneous, with all respect to the Judge. The ??? Judge did not cite any authority in support ??? his conclusions and it appears that tile provisions ??? sub-section (5) escaped his attention.
54. I, would, therefore, reject this reference.
BY THE COURT: For reasons stated in judgments we reject the reference.
???.B.
55. Reference rejected.