Statutory Right of Way Does Not Justify a Directed Verdict in Negligence: Commentary on Sheila Jenot v. Lyman Jenot, Jr. & a. (N.H. 2025)

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1. Introduction

This New Hampshire Supreme Court order in Sheila Jenot v. Lyman Jenot, Jr. & a., No. 2024-0589 (Oct. 28, 2025), arises from a two-vehicle collision on Loudon Road in Concord. The plaintiff, Sheila Jenot, was a passenger in a car driven by her husband, defendant Lyman Jenot, Jr. The other vehicle was driven by defendant Joseph Anderson‑Lopez.

The collision occurred when Mr. Jenot, traveling westbound, attempted a left turn across two eastbound lanes into a business driveway. At the same time, Mr. Anderson‑Lopez was proceeding eastbound. The vehicles collided in the outermost eastbound lane before Mr. Jenot completed his turn. The plaintiff sued both drivers for negligence.

Procedurally:

• At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of Anderson‑Lopez, reasoning that he had the “right of way” as an eastbound vehicle and therefore could not reasonably be found liable.
• The negligence claim against husband‑driver Jenot went to the jury, which found him not liable.
• The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) against her husband and later awarded costs to him.
• The plaintiff appealed, challenging:
  • the directed verdict for Anderson‑Lopez,
  • the denial of her JNOV motion against Jenot,
  • the exclusion of portions of Jenot’s deposition testimony as impermissible lay opinion, and
  • the award of costs to Jenot.

The Supreme Court resolved the case by order under Supreme Court Rule 20(3) (disposition without full written opinion), but with substantive analysis that will guide negligence and evidentiary practice.

The central legal point of lasting importance is this: having the statutory right of way does not entitle a defendant to a directed verdict in a negligence action when there is evidence from which a jury could find that the right-of-way driver failed to exercise reasonable care. The decision robustly reaffirms the jury’s role in evaluating negligence in motor vehicle cases.

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2. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Order

The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, with these key outcomes:

1. Directed Verdict for Anderson‑Lopez (reversed and remanded)
   The Court held that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for Anderson‑Lopez solely on the basis that he had the right of way. There was evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that he negligently passed a braking truck on the right and thereby proximately caused the collision. The negligence claim against him must be retried.
2. JNOV Motion Against Lyman Jenot (not reached)
   The plaintiff argued that if the directed verdict for Anderson‑Lopez were correct, judgment notwithstanding the verdict should enter against her husband. Because the Supreme Court reversed the directed verdict, it found this JNOV argument moot and declined to address it.
3. Exclusion of Deposition Testimony as Lay Opinion (affirmed)
   The Court upheld the trial court’s exclusion of certain deposition statements by husband‑driver Jenot, in which he retrospectively agreed that he had been “wrong” in judging he had enough time to turn and “caused the accident.” Citing Saltzman v. Town of Kingston and Rule 701, the Court held that the plaintiff had not shown that excluding these statements as impermissible lay opinion was an unsustainable exercise of discretion or prejudicial.
4. Award of Costs to Lyman Jenot (affirmed)
   The Court rejected the challenge to the award of costs under Superior Court Rule 45, holding that:
   • any contention that specific items were non‑recoverable was inadequately developed and therefore not preserved for appellate review under State v. Blackmer, and
   • the record showed that the trial court did, in fact, exercise discretion in awarding costs, consistent with Van Der Stok v. Van Voorhees.

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3. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.1 Negligence and the Standard for Directed Verdicts

3.1.1 Elements of Negligence – Vachon v. New England Towing

The Court recited the familiar four elements of negligence from Vachon v. New England Towing, 148 N.H. 429 (2002):

A plaintiff claiming negligence must prove: (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) that the duty was breached; (3) that the plaintiff suffered an injury; and (4) that the defendant’s breach was the proximate cause of the injury.

In motor vehicle cases, the duty is to exercise reasonable care in the operation of a vehicle, which includes observing traffic, obeying traffic control laws, and reacting reasonably to roadway conditions.

3.1.2 Standard of Review and Directed Verdicts – 101 Ocean Blvd., LLC v. Foy Ins. Group, Inc.

Directed verdict motions focus on the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court cited 101 Ocean Blvd., LLC v. Foy Ins. Grp., Inc., 174 N.H. 130 (2021), and applied its standard:

• Questions raised by a directed verdict are questions of law, reviewed de novo (the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusion).
• A party is entitled to a directed verdict only when “the sole reasonable inference” from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is so overwhelmingly in the moving party’s favor that no contrary verdict could stand.
• The court cannot weigh evidence or evaluate witness credibility at this stage.
• If the evidence is conflicting or several reasonable inferences can be drawn, the motion should be denied and the case sent to the jury.

Applying this standard, the Supreme Court evaluated whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, required a finding that Anderson‑Lopez was not negligent, or whether a reasonable jury could find otherwise.

3.2 Right of Way vs. Duty of Reasonable Care

3.2.1 Trial Court’s Error: Treating Right of Way as Conclusive

The trial court directed a verdict for Anderson‑Lopez because it found that he had the statutory right of way as the driver proceeding straight in the eastbound lane, while Jenot was turning left across his path. On that basis it concluded that no reasonable juror could find Anderson‑Lopez liable.

The Supreme Court held this to be a legal error. It emphasized:

“The mere fact that a motorist had the statutory right of way at the time of a collision does not absolve the motorist of the duty to exercise reasonable care in operating the vehicle.” Grimes v. Labreck, 108 N.H. 26, 28 (1967); Powell v. Gagne, 102 N.H. 256, 258 (1959).

In other words, right of way is a relevant factor but not a complete defense to negligence.

3.2.2 Precedents Emphasizing the Jury’s Role – Grimes, Powell, Eckhart, Bissonnette

The Court drew on a line of New Hampshire motor‑vehicle decisions:

• Grimes v. Labreck, 108 N.H. 26 (1967) & Powell v. Gagne, 102 N.H. 256 (1959)
  These cases are cited for the proposition that right of way does not eliminate a driver’s continuing duty to act with reasonable care. A driver with the right of way cannot proceed blindly or ignore obvious hazards.
• Eckhart v. Linaberry, 113 N.H. 652 (1973) & Bissonnette v. Cheverette, 87 N.H. 211 (1935)
  These authorities support the Court’s statement that whether a driver exercised reasonable care under the circumstances is generally a question for the jury, especially in intersection or crossing scenarios where the facts and inferences are contested.

Building on these precedents, the Court concluded that whether:

• Anderson‑Lopez used reasonable care in passing the truck, and
• Jenot used reasonable care in making the left turn,

were fact questions, not legal questions to be removed from the jury simply because one driver nominally had the statutory right of way.

3.2.3 The Evidence That Required Jury Consideration

Crucially, the Supreme Court did not hold that Anderson‑Lopez was negligent; it held that a reasonable jury could find negligence on the following evidence (taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff):

1. When Jenot began his left turn:
   • an eastbound truck in the inner lane was about 200 feet away,
   • the truck was braking to let Jenot turn,
   • Anderson‑Lopez was behind the truck in the same (inner) lane,
   • the outer eastbound lane was clear, and
   • there was time for Jenot to cross both lanes safely under those conditions.
2. Anderson‑Lopez began to pass the braking truck on the right after Jenot had initiated his turn and had already entered the outer eastbound lane.
3. When Anderson‑Lopez started the pass, he was about 200 feet from Jenot’s vehicle.
4. Upon entering the outer lane, Anderson‑Lopez accelerated rapidly, without:
   • considering why the truck ahead was braking, or
   • slowing or taking evasive measures to avoid a collision.
5. The impact occurred in the outer lane, striking the front half of the passenger side of Jenot’s vehicle, with substantial damage and airbag deployment in both cars.

From these facts, a jury could reasonably infer that:

• A reasonably prudent driver would have exercised more caution when passing a braking vehicle in an intersection‑like situation.
• Accelerating into a clear lane without assessing why a vehicle ahead had slowed may fall below the standard of reasonable care.
• This conduct was a proximate cause of the collision and the plaintiff’s injuries.

Because such inferences are available, the case does not present the kind of one‑sided evidentiary picture that justifies a directed verdict.

3.2.4 Reaffirmation of the Jury’s Central Role

The Court summed up the error:

“Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that the jury reasonably could have found from this evidence that defendant Anderson‑Lopez did not exercise reasonable care in passing the truck and proximately caused the collision. Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law by directing a verdict in defendant Anderson‑Lopez’s favor, and we reverse and remand for a new trial of the negligence claim against defendant Anderson‑Lopez.”

The key doctrinal message is clear:

• Right of way is a factor in the negligence analysis; it is not dispositive.
• Where the behavior of a right‑of‑way driver is reasonably debatable, the jury must decide whether that driver acted with due care.
• Courts should be extremely cautious about removing such disputes from the jury via directed verdicts.

3.3 JNOV Against Husband‑Driver: A Conditional Argument the Court Did Not Reach

After losing the jury verdict on her claim against her husband, the plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing essentially:

• She had conceded there was evidence from which the jury could find that Jenot did not violate a duty to yield the right of way (which supported her challenge to the directed verdict for Anderson‑Lopez), but
• If the directed verdict for Anderson‑Lopez was correct (i.e., if he was blameless as a matter of law), then the only reasonable conclusion must be that husband‑driver Jenot’s left turn was negligent as a matter of law, requiring JNOV in her favor.

This was expressly a conditional argument:

“[I]f it is assumed . . . that the Motion for Directed Verdict . . . was correctly granted, then liability must be found against [defendant Jenot] . . . .”

Because the Supreme Court reversed the directed verdict for Anderson‑Lopez, the condition underlying the JNOV argument failed. The Court therefore held that it did not need to address whether the trial court erred in denying JNOV against Jenot. In practical terms, this leaves intact the jury’s defense verdict for Jenot, while reopening only the case against Anderson‑Lopez.

3.4 Exclusion of Deposition Testimony as Impermissible Lay Opinion

3.4.1 The Challenged Deposition Statements

Due to the unavailability of husband‑driver Jenot, portions of his deposition were admitted by agreement at trial under Rule 804 (governing hearsay exceptions when a declarant is unavailable). However, Jenot moved to exclude certain parts of that deposition, particularly exchanges in which he:

• acknowledged that, “in hindsight,” it “turned out” he had been wrong in thinking he had enough time to make the left turn,
• responded “I guess so” when asked if his “wrong” determination had “caused the accident,” and
• stated that he did not disagree with a police officer’s citation for failure to yield the right of way.

He argued that these were not simply factual descriptions but opinions on ultimate legal issues, such as negligence and causation, which under Saltzman v. Town of Kingston, 124 N.H. 515 (1984), are within the exclusive province of the jury.

3.4.2 Rule 701 and the Saltzman Constraint

New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 701 governs lay opinion testimony. It permits a lay witness to offer an opinion only if it is:

“(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”

In Saltzman, the Court limited lay witnesses from opining on questions of law—for example, whether conduct was “negligent,” “caused” an accident in the legal sense, or otherwise satisfied a legal standard. Those determinations belong to the jury, guided by the court’s instructions, not to lay witnesses (even if a party).

3.4.3 Trial Court’s Ruling and the Standard of Review

The Trial Court (Tucker, J.) excluded the challenged deposition portions, reasoning that:

• they reflected Jenot’s retrospective judgment (“in hindsight”) rather than his perceptions at the time of the collision;
• they would not assist the jury in determining whether he actually breached the standard of care or proximately caused the collision; and
• they ventured into expressing a conclusion on causation and violation of legal duties, issues reserved for the jury under Saltzman.

The Supreme Court reviewed this evidentiary ruling under the “unsustainable exercise of discretion” standard, as explained in State v. Racette, 175 N.H. 132 (2022), modified on other grounds by State v. Boudreau, 176 N.H. 1 (2023). Under that standard:

• The appellate court asks whether there is an objective basis supporting the trial court’s ruling.
• It reverses only if the decision is “clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of” the appealing party.
• The burden rests on the appellant to demonstrate reversible error. See Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014).

3.4.4 Supreme Court’s Holding on the Deposition Issue

The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the exclusion of the challenged deposition testimony was clearly untenable or prejudicial. The trial court had a reasonable basis to:

• treat the statements as legal characterizations (“caused the accident,” “wrong” in a way that implies legal fault),
• view them as unhelpful hindsight judgments not grounded in contemporaneous perception, and
• exclude them under Rule 701 and Saltzman.

The Court therefore affirmed the evidentiary ruling. It added that on remand:

“the admissibility of this evidence as part of Anderson‑Lopez’s defense is in the sound discretion of the trial court.”

This underscores that:

• the decision was not a categorical, once‑and‑for‑all ruling on the deposition’s admissibility for any purpose, but
• any renewed attempt to use this testimony at the retrial against Anderson‑Lopez will again be governed by Rule 701 and the trial court’s evidentiary discretion.

3.5 Award of Costs Under Superior Court Rule 45

3.5.1 Costs Under Rule 45

Superior Court Rule 45 governs the award of litigation costs to prevailing parties. The rule both:

• defines which categories of expenses are potentially recoverable, and
• requires that costs be “reasonably necessary to the litigation,” with their award left to the trial court’s discretion. See Rule 45(b).

The plaintiff attacked the cost award to husband‑driver Jenot on two fronts:

1. She asserted—without elaboration—that some of the items allowed by the trial court are not recoverable under Rule 45.
2. She argued that the trial court “failed to exercise its discretion” to assess whether the requested costs were “reasonably necessary to the litigation.”

3.5.2 Inadequately Developed Argument – State v. Blackmer

On the first issue, the Supreme Court invoked State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003), which holds that issues raised without developed legal argument do not warrant appellate review. Because the plaintiff did not identify with specificity:

• which cost line‑items violated Rule 45, and
• why, under the rule’s text or caselaw, those items were non‑recoverable,

the Court deemed the issue insufficiently briefed and declined to consider it further.

3.5.3 Trial Court’s Discretion – Van Der Stok v. Van Voorhees

On the second issue, the plaintiff argued that the trial court did not actually exercise discretion regarding the necessity of the costs. The Supreme Court disagreed, pointing to the record as showing that the trial court:

• considered arguments from both parties, and
• ultimately chose to award the costs requested.

This approach is consistent with Van Der Stok v. Van Voorhees, 151 N.H. 679, 686 (2005), which reiterates that “the award of costs lies within the sound discretion of the trial court” (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court found no abuse of that discretion and affirmed the cost award to Jenot. It further noted that, in light of its primary decision, the plaintiff’s remaining argument concerning costs was moot.

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4. Impact and Practical Implications

4.1 For Negligence Law and Motor Vehicle Litigation

The order is significant for New Hampshire negligence practice, particularly in auto cases:

• No “automatic win” for right‑of‑way drivers.
  Defendants cannot rely on having the statutory right of way as a guaranteed shield from liability. If evidence suggests they could have avoided the collision by acting more cautiously, their conduct must be weighed by the jury.
• Reinforcement of comparative fault.
  The case illustrates a typical comparative negligence pattern: a turning driver and a through driver may both have duties. Even if one driver has right of way, both may share responsibility depending on actual conduct. Here, the jury absolved the turning driver, but the through driver (with right of way) must face a new trial.
• Lower threshold to reach a jury.
  The Supreme Court’s application of the 101 Ocean Blvd. standard underscores that when reasonable minds can differ about what a prudent driver would have done, the matter must go to the jury—even if the defendant has statutory priority on the roadway.

4.2 For Trial Courts Deciding Directed Verdict Motions

Trial judges in New Hampshire should draw several lessons:

• When ruling on a directed verdict in a negligence case, judges must:
  • view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (usually the plaintiff),
  • refrain from weighing credibility, and
  • deny the motion if multiple reasonable inferences exist.
• Having the right of way is not enough, by itself, to warrant a directed verdict.
• Directed verdicts remain appropriate only in those rare cases where the evidence is so one‑sided that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.

4.3 For Lawyers: Evidence, Depositions, and Admissions

From a litigation strategy perspective:

• Deposition questioning and “admissions.”
  Efforts to elicit from a party-witness a concession like “I caused the accident” can backfire. When such a statement is framed as a legal conclusion rather than a factual description (e.g., “I was going 45 mph” vs. “I was negligent”), it may:
  • be excluded as impermissible lay opinion under Rule 701 and Saltzman, or
  • be admitted only in limited ways, subject to trial court discretion.
• Focusing on concrete facts, not legal conclusions.
  Counsel are better served by building detailed factual records (speeds, distances, braking, visibility, traffic conditions) that allow the jury to infer negligence, rather than prompting lay witnesses to opine on ultimate legal issues.
• Appellate briefing.
  The Blackmer reminder is clear: arguments on appeal must be developed with legal reasoning and citations. Bare assertions that certain costs are not recoverable, without analysis, will be deemed waived.

4.4 For Parties and Insurers

Insurers and litigants should recognize that:

• Passengers injured in two‑vehicle collisions may pursue claims against both drivers, even if one had the statutory right of way.
• Settlements that assume a through‑driver is automatically blameless because a turning driver owed a statutory duty to yield may be misaligned with New Hampshire law as reaffirmed here.
• Fault allocations remain fact‑sensitive and highly dependent on evidence of each driver’s behavior.

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5. Key Legal Concepts Simplified

The decision uses several technical terms; a brief glossary follows.

5.1 Right of Way

“Right of way” refers to a driver’s legal priority to proceed, conferred by traffic statutes, signals, or signs (e.g., a vehicle traveling straight generally has right of way over a vehicle turning left across traffic).

This order emphasizes that:

• Right of way does not nullify the general duty to exercise reasonable care.
• A right‑of‑way driver must still keep a proper lookout, adjust speed, and respond reasonably to conditions ahead (like a braking vehicle).

5.2 Directed Verdict

A directed verdict is a trial judge’s ruling that, even if the jury believed all of the nonmoving party’s evidence, that party would still lose as a matter of law. In that situation, the judge takes the case away from the jury and enters judgment for the moving party.

In this case, the trial court directed a verdict for Anderson‑Lopez, but the Supreme Court reversed because reasonable jurors could differ on whether he acted negligently in passing.

5.3 Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV)

JNOV is similar to a directed verdict but is made after the jury has reached a verdict. The moving party argues that the jury’s verdict cannot be supported by the evidence and that the court should enter judgment in the opposite direction as a matter of law.

The plaintiff’s JNOV motion here was conditional on the validity of the directed verdict for Anderson‑Lopez, so once that directed verdict was reversed, the JNOV issue became irrelevant.

5.4 Proximate Cause

“Proximate cause” is a legal concept that asks whether the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently connected to the plaintiff’s injury to justify holding the defendant legally responsible. It includes both causation-in-fact (“but for” the conduct, would the injury have occurred?) and legal limitations on liability (foreseeability, directness).

The Court held that the jury could find that Anderson‑Lopez’s manner of passing the truck—accelerating into a lane when a truck ahead was braking—was a proximate cause of the crash.

5.5 Standard of Review

• De novo review (used for directed verdicts and legal questions): The appellate court gives no deference to the trial court’s determination and decides the issue afresh.
• Unsustainable exercise of discretion (used for evidentiary rulings and costs): The appellate court upholds the trial court unless its decision is clearly unreasonable or untenable in light of the record.

5.6 Lay Opinion vs. Expert Opinion (Rule 701 and 702)

• Lay opinion (Rule 701) is opinion testimony from non‑expert witnesses, allowed when it is based on personal perception, helpful to understanding their testimony, and not grounded in specialized knowledge.
• Expert opinion (Rule 702) is testimony based on scientific, technical, or specialized expertise.
• Lay witnesses generally cannot give opinions on legal standards (for example, “I was negligent” or “I caused the accident”), as such questions are for the jury guided by the judge’s legal instructions.

5.7 Reversible Error

Not every trial error leads to reversal. To obtain reversal, an appellant must usually show:

• that the trial court made an error, and
• that the error likely affected the outcome in a way that prejudiced the appellant’s case.

The Court held that the plaintiff had not satisfied this burden regarding the exclusion of her husband’s deposition statements.

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6. Conclusion

The New Hampshire Supreme Court’s order in Sheila Jenot v. Lyman Jenot, Jr. & a. delivers several important clarifications for negligence practice:

• It strongly reaffirms that statutory right of way does not automatically exonerate a driver from negligence. Even a right‑of‑way driver may be held liable if they fail to exercise reasonable care, and such disputes ordinarily belong to the jury.
• It applies the 101 Ocean Blvd. standard to emphasize that directed verdicts are appropriate only when no reasonable juror could find for the nonmoving party. Here, the presence of conflicting evidence about Anderson‑Lopez’s decision to pass a braking truck required jury resolution.
• It confirms that lay witnesses, even parties, generally cannot give opinions that amount to legal conclusions on negligence or causation, consistent with Rule 701 and Saltzman.
• It reiterates that cost awards and evidentiary rulings fall within the trial court’s broad discretion, and that poorly developed appellate arguments will not be entertained under Blackmer.

By reversing the directed verdict and remanding for a new trial against Anderson‑Lopez, the Court ensures that the plaintiff’s negligence claim will be decided by a jury on a full factual record, rather than foreclosed by an overly rigid view of right-of-way law. The decision thus reinforces the central role of juries in resolving fact‑intensive negligence disputes and cautions trial courts against short‑circuiting that role on the basis of statutory right-of-way alone.