Seventh Circuit Clarifies “Intent-to-Harm” Standard for Bystander Deaths in Emergency Police Pursuits – Commentary on Gayl Flynn v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis & Marion County (2025)

1. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Flynn v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis and Marion County addresses the tragic death of Edward Flynn, a bystander killed when a fleeing suspect collided with his vehicle during a high-speed police chase. Edward’s widow, Gayl Flynn, sued five Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) officers for violating Edward’s substantive due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and sued the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services for failure to train.

The central legal issue was which constitutional standard governs police liability when: (1) a suspect initiates a high-speed chase; (2) the police continue pursuit; and (3) the suspect—rather than the officers—causes a third-party fatality. Gayl argued that the officers’ alleged recklessness should be evaluated under a “deliberate indifference” standard, whereas the officers and the City urged the stricter “intent-to-harm” standard reserved for emergencies.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Seventh Circuit (Judges Easterbrook, Kirsch, and Pryor; opinion by Judge Kirsch) affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to all defendants.
• The court treated the pursuit as an emergency under County of Sacramento v. Lewis, triggering the “intent-to-harm” test.
• Because Gayl conceded the officers had no intent to harm and because the suspect, not the officers, struck Edward’s car, no substantive due-process violation occurred.
• Without an underlying constitutional tort, Gayl’s Monell claim against the City necessarily failed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)
   
   Established that police liability in sudden, high-speed chases hinges on conduct that “shocks the conscience,” further refined as “intent to harm” in true emergencies.
   Impact on Flynn: Provided the governing framework; the panel analogized Flynn’s facts to Lewis’s 75-second, 100-mph pursuit.
2. Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017 (7th Cir. 2007)
   
   Applied Lewis to a six-minute, 100-130-mph chase, affirming that “intent-to-harm” governs emergency situations.
   Impact on Flynn: Length and speed of the chase closely paralleled Flynn, reinforcing the emergency characterization.
3. Flores v. City of South Bend, 997 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2021)
   
   Found a non-emergency where an officer raced to a routine traffic stop; applied “deliberate indifference.”
   Distinction in Flynn: Court rejected Gayl’s analogy because the Flynn pursuit involved a suspected stolen truck, an assault on officers, and coordinated pursuit efforts.
4. Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470 (7th Cir. 2023)
   Clarified boundaries of emergency vs. non-emergency and cited Flores as non-emergency exemplar.
5. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
   Foundation for municipal liability; requires underlying constitutional violation.
6. Gaetjens v. City of Loves Park, 4 F.4th 487 (7th Cir. 2021)
   Emphasized that no municipal liability lies absent a constitutional tort by an employee.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel’s logic unfolded in three steps:

1. Characterizing the Situation. Citing the suspect’s violent flight, high speeds (80-100 mph), nighttime conditions, and officer team coordination, the court deemed the pursuit a bona fide emergency.
2. Selecting the Standard. Under Lewis emergencies require plaintiffs to prove that officers acted with an intent to cause harm unrelated to legitimate law-enforcement objectives. Although the officers posited this standard defensively, the court accepted it “without deciding” whether an even stricter test might apply when the police themselves do not strike the victim.
3. Applying the Standard. Gayl conceded no intent to harm. Further, the suspect’s independent collision, rather than police contact, broke the causal chain. Thus, even under deliberate-indifference (a lower mens-rea threshold), the claim would still fail because officers’ split-second pursuit decisions did not “shock the conscience.”

3.3 Anticipated Impact of the Decision

• Clarification for Bystander Fatalities. Although the panel did not definitively announce a new rule, its holding effectively extends the “intent-to-harm” requirement to cases where fleeing suspects—not officers—strike third parties, so long as the pursuit retains emergency characteristics.
• Narrowing the Reach of Flores. Defense counsel will likely cite Flynn to argue that Flores is confined to unusual, non-urgent chases. Plaintiffs will bear a heavier burden in most high-speed-pursuit fatalities within the circuit.
• Municipal Liability Hurdles. By reaffirming that Monell liability cannot attach without an underlying tort, the court underscores the difficulty of proceeding solely on failure-to-train theories after unsuccessful individual-capacity claims.
• Operational Guidance for Police Supervisors. The opinion signals that a supervising officer’s momentary hesitation (weighing termination of a chase) does not transform an emergency into a deliberative, non-emergency scenario.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantive Due Process

Constitutional guarantee (14th Amendment) protecting individuals from egregious government conduct that “shocks the conscience.”

Intent-to-Harm Standard

Requires proof that an officer meant to cause physical injury for a reason unrelated to legitimate law-enforcement goals. It is the most demanding mental-state threshold short of actual malice.

Deliberate Indifference

A lesser standard—akin to criminal recklessness—where officials consciously disregard a known, substantial risk.

Emergency vs. Non-Emergency Dichotomy

• Emergency: Rapidly evolving, perilous situations requiring instantaneous judgment. Courts apply the stricter intent-to-harm test.
• Non-Emergency: Situations allowing “luxury of deliberation,” triggering the deliberate-indifference test.

Monell Liability

Municipal liability for constitutional violations requires (a) actionable misconduct by an employee and (b) that the misconduct flow from official policy, custom, or failure to train. No employee violation, no municipal liability.

5. Conclusion

Flynn v. Indianapolis reinforces and refines Seventh Circuit precedent by situating bystander deaths caused by fleeing suspects within the emergency framework of Lewis. Plaintiffs in similar cases must now overcome the formidable “intent-to-harm” hurdle—an exceedingly rare showing—rather than the more attainable deliberate-indifference standard, except in the narrow circumstances illustrated by Flores. The decision also reiterates that speculative failure-to-train theories cannot bypass the absence of an underlying constitutional tort.

Practitioners should closely analyze: (1) the immediacy and volatility of a pursuit; (2) any evidence of officer deliberation; and (3) whether contact causing injury was directly attributable to police or an intervening actor. These factors will determine doctrinal categorization and, ultimately, viability of substantive-due-process claims moving forward.