Retroactive Application of Connecticut Megan’s Law Is Non-Punitive and Does Not Violate Ex Post Facto or Due Process

Introduction

Brown v. Mellekas, decided April 3, 2025, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, addresses whether Connecticut’s sex offender registration statute (Megan’s Law), applied retroactively to a conviction predating the law, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause or due process. Plaintiff–appellant Ralston Brown, convicted in 1993 under an Alford plea of conspiracy to commit third-degree sexual assault, challenged the requirement to register and verify his residence. The defendants—three Connecticut State Police officers sued in their individual capacities—moved to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Second Circuit reviewed de novo the dismissal of Brown’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint and construed Brown’s pro se allegations liberally.
• The court held that Connecticut’s retroactive registration requirement is regulatory, not punitive, and thus does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
• The court rejected Brown’s procedural due process claim—there is no requirement for a dangerousness hearing because the statute bases registration on conviction alone.
• The substantive due process/privacy challenge also failed; the requirement does not “shock the conscience.”
• Brown’s claim against individual officers for involvement in his 1993 plea was dismissed for lack of personal involvement.
• Judicial estoppel was correctly denied because the appellees never took inconsistent positions in the underlying criminal case.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002) – standard for 12(b)(6) review.
• Meadows v. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 2020) – liberal construction of pro se pleadings.
• Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) – plausibility pleading standard.
• North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) – legal effect of an Alford plea as a conviction.
• U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ahmed, 72 F.4th 379 (2d Cir. 2023) – ex post facto analysis requires retrospective effect plus increased punishment.
• Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) – Alaska’s non‐punitive sex offender registry applied retroactively does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause.
• Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014) – New York’s retroactive registry non‐punitive.
• Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997) – Connecticut’s probation office notification policy non‐punitive.
• State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23 (2001); Goguen v. Comm’r, 341 Conn. 508 (2021) – Connecticut Supreme Court held Megan’s Law regulatory.
• Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) – no hearing on dangerousness required.
• Burrell v. United States, 384 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2004) – Alford plea yields conviction for all purposes.
• Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th 19 (2d Cir. 2022) – substantive due process “shock the conscience” test.
• Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023) – personal involvement requirement for individual liability in § 1983 suits.
• Clark v. AII Acquisition, LLC, 886 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2018); Swartz Family Tr., 67 F.4th 505 (2d Cir. 2023) – requirements for judicial estoppel.
• United States v. Gen. Douglas MacArthur Senior Vill., 508 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1974) – breach‐of‐contract standards in plea agreements.

Legal Reasoning

1. Ex Post Facto Clause: To find a violation, a law must (a) be retrospective and (b) increase the punishment. Connecticut’s Megan’s Law applies retroactively but serves a regulatory, public‐safety function—just like Alaska’s and New York’s statutes deemed non‐punitive by the Supreme Court and this Circuit. The Second Circuit thus held the law non‐punitive, satisfying Smith v. Doe.

2. Procedural Due Process: Brown argued he was entitled to a hearing on current dangerousness before being forced to register. The Supreme Court in Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe rejected this for statutes tied to convictions irrespective of present risk. Brown’s Alford plea is a valid conviction, so no hearing is required.

3. Substantive Due Process/Privacy: Brown’s challenge to the privacy implications of address verification and registry was evaluated under the “shock the conscience” standard. The court found no state action so arbitrary or oppressive as to violate substantive due process.

4. Individual‐Capacity Liability: Brown’s complaint failed to allege that any of the three officers played a direct role in his 1993 plea or conviction, a prerequisite under § 1983 for personal liability.

5. Judicial Estoppel: The officers never took a prior inconsistent legal position in Brown’s criminal case, so estoppel principles do not apply.

Impact

This decision reaffirms the broad constitutional shield protecting retroactive sex‐offender registration laws from Ex Post Facto and due process challenges, even when applied to pleas entered before such statutes existed. It signals to state legislatures that Megan’s Law–style registries will likely withstand federal constitutional scrutiny, reducing uncertainty for registrants and enforcement authorities.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Ex Post Facto Clause – Prohibits laws that retroactively make an innocent act criminal or increase punishment for a criminal act after it occurs.
• Alford Plea – A guilty plea in which a defendant maintains innocence but acknowledges the prosecution has enough evidence for conviction. Legally treated as any other guilty plea.
• Megan’s Law – State statutes requiring convicted sex offenders to register their address and other information with law enforcement, often publicly accessible.
• Procedural Due Process – The right to fair procedures (e.g., hearings) before the government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.
• Substantive Due Process – The principle that certain rights (like privacy) are so fundamental that the government may not infringe them except to serve a compelling interest.
• Judicial Estoppel – Prevents a party from taking a legal position inconsistent with one previously asserted in the same or related proceeding.

Conclusion

Brown v. Mellekas solidifies the holding that retroactive sex‐offender registration laws, such as Connecticut’s Megan’s Law, are regulatory measures rather than punishments. Consequently, they do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause or due process—even when imposed on convictions predating the statute and entered via an Alford plea. The decision offers clarity to courts and legislatures on the constitutionality of retroactive sex‐offender registries, ensuring that public safety objectives are balanced against individual rights without running afoul of fundamental constitutional protections.