Reiterated Objections Require De Novo Review: The Second Circuit Clarifies “Proper Objections” to Magistrate Judge R&Rs in Nambiar v. The Central Orthopedic Group, LLP

Introduction

In this precedential decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit clarifies the standard that governs a district judge’s review of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (R&R) in dispositive matters. The core holding resolves a recurring procedural practice in district courts: where a party files timely, specific objections to an R&R, the district judge must conduct de novo review even if the objections reiterate arguments previously presented to—and rejected by—the magistrate judge. The Court holds that it is error to demote such objections to “clear error” review simply because they repeat earlier arguments.

The case arose from the termination of a physician, Dr. Seema V. Nambiar, by The Central Orthopedic Group, LLP (COG) and its partner physicians. Dr. Nambiar alleged sex and age discrimination, retaliation, aiding and abetting, and breach of contract. After the magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment for defendants, the district judge adopted the R&R on clear-error review, reasoning that plaintiff’s objections merely rehashed prior arguments. The Second Circuit held that this was error because the objections were timely and specific; however, it deemed the error harmless since the appellate court itself reviews grants of summary judgment de novo. On de novo review, the Court affirmed summary judgment for defendants on the preserved claims (sex discrimination under Title VII/NYSHRL, NYSHRL aiding and abetting, and retaliation), found age-discrimination claims forfeited by insufficient objections, and recognized an express waiver of the contract claim.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit’s opinion proceeds in three principal parts.

Magistrate Judge R&R Review: The Court holds that a district judge must conduct de novo review of those portions of an R&R to which timely, specific objections are made, even if the objections repeat arguments previously made to the magistrate judge. A contrary district court practice—treating repeated arguments as triggering only clear-error review—is error.
Preservation and Forfeiture: The Court finds that plaintiff preserved her challenges to the R&R’s rulings on sex discrimination and NYSHRL aiding-and-abetting by making specific objections, but forfeited age discrimination by failing to object with sufficient specificity. Her challenge to the denial of reconsideration was not preserved, but she could still appeal the underlying grant of summary judgment on retaliation because that decision was made by the district judge, not the magistrate judge. Plaintiff expressly waived review of her contract claim.
Merits (De Novo Review): On sex discrimination, even assuming a prima facie case, defendants articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination—numerous patient and staff complaints and refusal to sign a revised agreement—and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of pretext. On retaliation, temporal proximity alone could not establish causation where the record showed the termination process was underway prior to any protected activity. The Court affirms summary judgment on all preserved claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Federal Magistrates Act and Rule 72: 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 authorize magistrate judge recommendations on dispositive motions and require de novo review of “properly” objected portions. The Court emphasizes the Article III function preserved by de novo review in dispositive matters.
Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010): Establishes that dispositive matters may be referred “only for recommendation, not for decision,” anchoring the need for robust district judge review.
Mario v. P & C Food Markets, 313 F.3d 758 (2d Cir. 2002): Timeliness and specificity are requisites of a “proper objection”; failure to object can forfeit further judicial review.
Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1988) and Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 2017): Cited for the principle that objections must be specific enough to alert the district judge to the true grounds of dispute; perfunctory “I object” is insufficient.
Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43 F.4th 112 (2d Cir. 2022) and Moss v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 516 (2d Cir. 2017): The Second Circuit had previously expressed skepticism about downgrading to clear-error review just because objections reiterate earlier arguments. Nambiar crystallizes this into a clear rule.
Fischer v. Forrest, 968 F.3d 216 (2d Cir. 2020): Confirms that objections generally may not raise new arguments not presented to the magistrate judge; Nambiar harmonizes this with its acceptance of reiterated arguments.
Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991) and Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665 (2015): The Court underscores the indispensable role of magistrate judges while preserving Article III control—de novo review is “crucial” to the constitutionality of the scheme (see also Taylor v. Farrier, 8th Cir.).
EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2017) and Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th 454 (4th Cir. 2023): Reinforce the constitutional stakes and the necessity of de novo review when proper objections are lodged.
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Framework for burden-shifting in discrimination and retaliation claims permeates the merits analysis.
Walsh v. NYCHA, 828 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2016); Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2004); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133 (2000); Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000): Applied to assess prima facie cases, legitimate reasons, and pretext.
Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2000): On comparators and disparate treatment for pretext.
Henry v. Wyeth Pharms., 616 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2010) and Danzer v. Norden Sys., 151 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998): On the probative value of remarks and “stray remarks.”
Zann Kwan v. Andalex, 737 F.3d 834 (2d Cir. 2013); Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015); Banks v. General Motors, 81 F.4th 242 (2d Cir. 2023); Moll v. Telesector, 94 F.4th 218 (2d Cir. 2024): Retaliation standards and but-for causation.
Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2001): Temporal proximity does not establish causation when adverse actions began before protected activity.
Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000) and Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009): Summary judgment cannot rest on inadmissible evidence; the court explains why admissible testimony sufficed regardless of plaintiff’s authentication/hearsay challenges.

Legal Reasoning

1) The new procedural rule: reiterated, specific objections compel de novo review

The Second Circuit rejected a line of district court decisions that refused de novo review when objections “simply rehashed” arguments made to the magistrate judge. That approach, the Court observed, placed litigants in an “impossible position”: they cannot raise new arguments for the first time in objections, yet are penalized if they repeat the arguments they already made. Proper objections must be timely and specific; when they are, de novo review is mandatory regardless of whether the argument is a re-presentation of earlier contentions. Only nonspecific, perfunctory objections merit clear-error review. This clarification aligns Second Circuit practice with the constitutional structure of the Federal Magistrates Act and reinforces litigants’ access to an Article III determination on dispositive matters.

Applying that rule, the Court held that Dr. Nambiar properly objected to the R&R with respect to sex discrimination and NYSHRL aiding-and-abetting. The district court erred in confining itself to clear-error review. Nonetheless, because summary judgment is reviewed de novo on appeal, the error was harmless in this case.

2) Preservation, forfeiture, and waiver

The Court’s preservation holdings are equally instructive:

Age discrimination forfeited: Plaintiff’s objections did not specifically challenge the R&R’s age-discrimination analysis. A passing mention was insufficient to “reasonably alert” the district court; after clear notice in the R&R that failure to object would waive appellate review, the claim was forfeited.
Retaliation reconsideration ruling forfeited, but underlying summary-judgment ruling preserved: Plaintiff did not specifically object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation denying reconsideration. However, the original summary judgment on retaliation was decided by a district judge at a pre-motion conference, so the appeal could reach that decision.
Contract claim waived: Plaintiff expressly stated she did not object to the recommendation to decline supplemental jurisdiction, preserving the option to refile in state court (CPLR 205(a)). That express statement was a waiver.

3) Merits: no triable issues on sex discrimination, aiding and abetting, or retaliation

On sex discrimination under Title VII and the pre-2019 NYSHRL standard, the Court assumed a prima facie case and focused on the latter McDonnell Douglas stages. Defendants carried their burden by articulating—and supporting with admissible evidence—a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination: an accumulation of patient and staff complaints and plaintiff’s refusal to sign a revised, non-partnership-track agreement. The record included deposition testimony from partner-physicians with personal knowledge of the complaints and staff conflicts, and testimony from a complaining staff member. Much of this testimony was independently admissible both for its truth and, critically, to establish the decisionmakers’ state of mind, which is admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). Even if disputed documentary exhibits were excluded for hearsay or authentication issues, the testimonial record sufficed.

On pretext, the Court held that plaintiff’s evidence—comparator and remarks evidence—was insufficient. The two proposed comparators (Drs. Lee and Mathen) were not similarly situated in the key respects that would indicate discriminatory treatment: Dr. Lee, allegedly less qualified, was hired on less favorable terms without a partnership track; Dr. Mathen was subjected to a probationary extension and only later admitted to partnership after performance issues were addressed. As to remarks, plaintiff described generalized, secondhand comments invoking gender stereotypes, but she did not identify the speaker(s), context, temporal proximity to the decision, or nexus to the decision-making process—factors that limit probative value under Henry. In addition, reports that patients and staff found plaintiff “too unfriendly,” “too demanding,” or “too aggressive” were transmitted by a partner as feedback from others, not originating as the decisionmaker’s own evaluative comments; that dynamic undermined any inference that the termination was driven by gender bias rather than by the reported complaints themselves. The number and timing of complaints did not, by itself, support a finding that defendants contrived pretext; unlike Edelman, there was no evidence of collusion to generate a paper trail.

Because the underlying discrimination claim failed, NYSHRL aiding-and-abetting necessarily failed as well.

On retaliation, plaintiff’s theory relied on temporal proximity between her March 16–17, 2016 EEOC activity and the March 21 termination notice. But the undisputed record showed the termination process had begun well before her protected activity: defendants had conditioned continuation on a revised agreement as early as January; warned in February that refusal would result in termination; advertised for replacements on March 7; and informed plaintiff on March 15 that resumes had already been received. Under Slattery, temporal proximity cannot establish causation where “gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected activity.” Even if a prima facie case were assumed, defendants’ legitimate nonretaliatory reason and the absence of sufficient evidence of pretext compelled summary judgment.

Impact

The decision has immediate and practical consequences across federal practice in the Second Circuit.

District court practice on R&Rs must change: The common district court practice of applying only clear-error review to objections that “rehash” prior arguments is no longer tenable. When objections are timely and specific, district judges must conduct de novo review—even if the arguments are repeats. Only nonspecific, perfunctory objections warrant clear-error review.
Litigants: how to object and preserve issues: Parties should file targeted, issue-specific objections that clearly identify the R&R conclusions being challenged and the grounds. It is both permissible and often necessary to reiterate legal and factual arguments previously made to the magistrate judge, provided the objections are specific and directed at the R&R’s reasoning. New arguments not raised before the magistrate judge remain generally out of bounds.
Constitutional and systemic stakes: The ruling reinforces the Article III role in dispositive decisions and the constitutional architecture of the Federal Magistrates Act. It promotes accuracy and legitimacy by ensuring an Article III judge considers properly challenged recommendations de novo.
Harmless-error caveat: While the error was harmless here because the Court of Appeals reviews summary judgments de novo, that will not necessarily be true in other contexts (e.g., where credibility assessments or factfinding occur, or where the standard of review differs). District judges should not rely on appellate de novo review as a backstop.
Employment law practice: On the merits, the opinion underscores the kinds of evidence that can defeat pretext theories: consistent testimonial proof of complaints, state-of-mind relevance, and the limits of stray or secondhand remarks without identified speakers, temporal proximity, or nexus to decisions. Comparators must be similarly situated in material respects. Temporal proximity alone rarely suffices for retaliation where the termination machinery predated protected conduct.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Report and Recommendation (R&R): A magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations on dispositive motions. The district judge makes the final decision.
De novo vs. clear-error review: De novo means the district judge decides the objected issues anew, with no deference to the magistrate judge. Clear-error review is highly deferential and applies only where no proper objections are filed or where objections are nonspecific/perfunctory.
Proper objection: Must be timely and specific. It may repeat arguments presented to the magistrate judge. It generally may not introduce new arguments not previously raised.
Forfeiture vs. waiver: Forfeiture is the failure to timely assert a right (e.g., by not objecting); waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right (e.g., expressly not objecting to supplemental jurisdiction).
McDonnell Douglas framework: A three-step shift: (1) plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason; (3) plaintiff’s proof of pretext and discriminatory intent.
Pretext: Evidence that the employer’s stated reason is false and that discrimination more likely motivated the action. Requires more than speculation or isolated, non-probative remarks.
Comparators: Employees similarly situated in material respects (e.g., role, performance issues, disciplinary standards). Differences in qualifications or terms of employment can defeat comparator relevance.
“Stray remarks” doctrine: Remarks not tied to the decisionmaker, decision process, or close temporal proximity are weak evidence of discriminatory intent.
Retaliation causation: Plaintiff must show protected activity was a but-for cause of the adverse action; temporal proximity helps but is not enough when the adverse process was already underway.
Hearsay and Rule 803(3): Out-of-court statements offered to show decisionmakers’ state of mind (e.g., they received complaints and acted because of them) can be admissible even if the underlying assertions are hearsay for other purposes.
Supplemental jurisdiction and CPLR 205(a): A federal court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing federal claims. New York’s six-month saving statute (CPLR 205(a)) can allow refiling in state court.
“Magistrate judge” is the correct title: The Court gently but firmly reminds counsel that “magistrate judge,” not “magistrate,” has been the proper title for decades.

Practice Pointers

When objecting to an R&R, lead with headings that mirror the R&R’s structure and specify exactly which findings or conclusions you challenge.
Do not hesitate to reiterate arguments you made below—so long as your objections are specific, they demand de novo review.
Avoid introducing new arguments or evidence in objections unless you can satisfy a recognized exception; otherwise, the district court may disregard them.
Preserve every claim you want to appeal by specifically objecting to the corresponding R&R sections; a passing reference will not suffice.
On summary judgment, marshal admissible (or readily admissible) evidence. Even if documents are contested, deposition testimony from decisionmakers about complaints and their state of mind can carry the day.
For discrimination pretext: identify truly comparable employees and concretely link any remarks to decisionmakers, timing, and the decision process.
For retaliation: develop more than proximity—show that the adverse action was not already in motion and address but-for causation.

Conclusion

Nambiar establishes a clear and important procedural rule for the Second Circuit: timely, specific objections to a magistrate judge’s R&R require de novo district court review even if the objections repeat arguments already made to the magistrate judge. The contrary “rehash equals clear-error” approach is error. The Court simultaneously reinforces preservation doctrine: be specific or forfeit. On the merits, the opinion illustrates how admissible testimonial evidence of complaints and decisionmaker state of mind can sustain an employer’s legitimate reason for termination and why generalized, secondhand remarks and weak comparators may fail to show pretext. It also reiterates that temporal proximity, without more, cannot establish retaliation when the termination process predates protected activity.

Together, these holdings sharpen both the constitutional and practical contours of magistrate judge practice and provide concrete guidance to employment litigants on what kind of evidence and arguments will survive summary judgment. The decision is likely to recalibrate district court R&R practices and improve the precision of objections, with salutary effects on appellate preservation and Article III oversight.