Redefining Vicinage and Jury District Composition: Gonzales v. Markland and the Proper Scope of “County or District” under the South Dakota Constitution

Introduction

The case of Donika Rae Gonzales v. Wanda Markland, Warden, South Dakota Women’s Prison (2025 S.D. 14) addresses complex issues that arise from the method of constructing a jury pool for criminal trials. Pivotal in this case is the challenge to a jury district that combined residents from Buffalo County and Brule County, thereby diluting the proportion of Native American jurors available for service. Gonzales argued that this dilution – coupled with the related implications for effective assistance of counsel – resulted in the violation of her constitutional rights to a jury drawn from “the county or district” in which the offense occurred and to a fair cross-section of the community.

The background of the case is rooted in Gonzales’ 2014 conviction for violent crimes committed in Buffalo County. A subsequent habeas corpus petition raised constitutional challenges on two fronts: first, that the inclusion of Brule County residents in the jury pool compromised the local representation of Native Americans and, second, that her legal counsel failed by not objecting to this configuration. Although the habeas court initially granted relief on the basis of a constitutional error in jury composition, the Supreme Court of South Dakota, in reviewing the record, reversed that decision.

Summary of the Judgment

In its comprehensive opinion, the Court held that the creation and use of a blended jury district—in which both Buffalo and Brule County residents were combined—did not violate Gonzales’ constitutional right to a trial by a jury drawn exclusively from the county where the crime occurred. The Court’s analysis confirmed that:

The South Dakota Constitution’s requirement of a jury drawn from the “county or district” is satisfied by the administrative creation of a jury district that encompasses two counties under statutory authority.
The concept of “vicinage,” though discussed in depth during the hearing, does not mandate an absolute separation between different counties when forming a jury pool.
The application of the Supreme Court’s Duren test revealed that, when considering the combined population demographics of the jury district (29% Native American) versus the actual composition of the jury pool (approximately 22–26% Native American), the disparity was minimal and well below the constitutional threshold of 15% required to trigger a fair cross-section violation.
The habeas court erred in treating the jury composition issue as a freestanding structural error and in importing a new vicinage requirement that was not necessitated by either the federal or state constitutional texts.

Based on these determinations, the Court reversed the habeas relief decision, affirming that no deprivation of Gonzales’ constitutional rights occurred.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Opinion cites a number of precedents that guide the interpretation of jury selection principles:

ST. CLOUD v. CLASS (1996 S.D. 64): This case provided a benchmark for assessing jury composition by quantifying the “absolute disparity” (12.5% in St. Cloud’s evaluation) needed to consider a jury pool unrepresentative of the underlying community. In Gonzales, the disparity when considering the overall jury district was found to be only 7%, well below the threshold.
DUREN v. MISSOURI (439 U.S. 357): The Supreme Court’s formulation of the Duren test is central to determining compliance with the fair cross-section requirement. The test requires proof of a systematic exclusion, and in this case, the evidence failed to meet the second prong due to the comparison being more appropriately made against the combined population of the district.
WILLIAMS v. FLORIDA (399 U.S. 78): This decision is discussed in the context of understanding that “vicinage” and the use of defined districts in the federal judicial system do not necessitate strict localism at the county level. The difference between “State and district” and the notion of “vicinage” has been elucidated by the Court to show that broader administrative formations are permissible.
Nelson (1902 S.D. 214): Although this early decision was discussed to indicate a historical reading of the term “district,” the Opinion clarifies that Nelson’s limited elimination of “district” in a specific context does not restrict modern statutory practices.
Other decisions relating to incorporation (such as Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart) support the view that the fair cross-section guarantee applies under the Fourteenth Amendment and that state processes are subject to federally enshrined norms.

Legal Reasoning

The reasoning in the Opinion proceeds through several critical phases:

Constitutional Interpretation: The Court carefully distinguishes between the federal requirement in the Sixth Amendment—specifically the phrase “State and district”—and the historical concept of vicinage. Despite the habeas court’s novel inquiry into medieval English legal principles, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the plain language of the state Constitution’s “county or district” clause is sufficiently broad to include statutory jury districts formed by pairing counties.
Application of the Duren Test: The Opinion applies the Duren test’s three-part analysis. While Native Americans are recognized as a distinct group, the proper measure of representation must be drawn from the jury district’s population as a whole—not solely from Buffalo County. This allowed the Court to conclude that the observed disparity (7% to 26%) is constitutionally acceptable.
Statutory Considerations: Reliance on SDCL 16-13-18.4 is key. The statute empowers the presiding circuit court judge to combine counties with small populations until administrative thresholds are met, thereby justifying the inclusion of Brule County. The Court rejected the notion that a violation occurred by including a county that brought demographic differences, emphasizing that the relevant comparison is the overall jury district.
Structural Error and Procedural Default: The Opinion distinguishes between structural error—often fatal in criminal cases—and errors that can be corrected on appeal. As no constitutional deprivation occurred, the alleged structural error claims arising from ineffective counsel and improper jury composition were dismissed.

Impact

The Gonzales decision has significant implications for future criminal cases in South Dakota and potentially other jurisdictions confronting similar issues:

Clarification of Jury District Formation: The ruling reinforces that the creation of jury districts through the administrative combination of counties is legitimate when consistent with statutory mandates. This provides a more solid procedural ground for lower courts when addressing logistical challenges in jury selection, especially in sparsely populated areas.
Narrowing of Vicinage Claims: By rejecting a broad invocation of historical vicinage principles, the Court narrows the scope for future challenges that allege constitutional violations through the mixing of disparate populations. Future litigants will now have to overcome a higher evidentiary bar to show that such mixing results in a meaningful deprivation of a defendant’s rights.
Affirmation of the Duren Test Application: This decision confirms that the Duren test remains the appropriate standard for evaluating claims concerning the representation of distinct groups in the jury pool. Enforcement of this standard provides clearer guidance on what constitutes sufficient representation to satisfy constitutional demands.

Complex Concepts Simplified

The Judgment deals with several dense legal concepts. Below are simplified explanations for better understanding:

Vicinage: Although the term originally referred to the geographical neighborhood from which a jury was selected, modern usage in this context means that administrative districting for juror selection is acceptable. The Court indicated that as long as the jury is drawn from the defined “county or district,” strict adherence to the old concept is not necessary.
The Duren Test: This test is used to determine if a jury pool fails to represent a fair cross section of the community. It involves checking (1) whether a distinct group exists within the community, (2) whether that group is underrepresented in the pool, and (3) whether this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion. In Gonzales, the underrepresentation was found to be less significant than required to trigger constitutional concerns.
Structural Error: A structural error in the context of criminal trials is an error so profound that it undermines the entire trial process (for example, excluding an entire group from the grand jury). The Court distinguished between such errors and those that could be remedied through conventional appeals.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Gonzales v. Markland firmly established that the creation of a blended jury district drawn from two adjacent counties does not violate the constitutional guarantee of being tried by a jury from “the county or district” in which the offense was committed. The Court’s detailed analysis demonstrates that:

The plain language of the South Dakota Constitution coupled with the statutory allowance under SDCL 16-13-18.4 accommodates the administrative necessity of combining counties to achieve a viable jury pool.
The historical concept of vicinage, while interesting, does not impose an absolute requirement for a strictly local jury drawn exclusively from the county where the crime occurred.
The application of the Duren test shows that the disparity in representation of Native American jurors was minimal when properly comparing the overall jury district demographics.

This decision not only clarifies the bounds of constitutional interpretation regarding jury selection in South Dakota, but also serves as important guidance for future cases. Practitioners and courts will now look to the combined population metrics when evaluating fairness in jury composition, ensuring that logistical concerns do not outweigh the constitutional imperatives for fairness and impartiality.

Ultimately, the Gonzales ruling stands as a key precedent reaffirming that careful statutory construction and a precise application of established legal tests can resolve complex procedural challenges without sacrificing the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.