Ramos v. Bondi: Enforcing Clear-Error Review and the Futility-of-Remand Remedy—Tenth Circuit Orders Reinstatement of IJ’s Asylum Grant

Introduction

In Ramos v. Bondi (10th Cir. Oct. 15, 2025), the Tenth Circuit delivered a forceful reaffirmation of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ obligation to adhere to its own clear-error review regulation when assessing immigration judges’ (IJs’) factual findings. After a decade-long odyssey of litigation involving two IJ asylum grants (2014 and 2019), two BIA reversals/remands (2015 and 2023), and two petitions for review (2023 and 2024), a panel led by Judge Rossman granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s 2023 decision, and—critically—remanded with instructions to reinstate the IJ’s asylum grant rather than sending the case back for yet another round of agency proceedings.

The petitioners are Modesta Ramos Ramos and her two minor children, all Honduran nationals, whose claims turn on Ms. Ramos’s asylum application listing the children as riders. The core factual narrative is stark: the gang-connected acquaintance (Jonis) lured Ms. Ramos’s partner outside on New Year’s Eve 2012; the partner was found murdered the next morning; Jonis thereafter surveilled and threatened Ms. Ramos and her two younger children (the decedent’s children), and the police refused to act. The IJ twice credited Ms. Ramos’s account and supporting country-conditions evidence, including expert testimony, and twice granted asylum. The BIA ultimately vacated in 2023, holding the IJ’s findings on (1) nexus to a family-based particular social group (PSG), (2) inability to internally relocate, and (3) state “unable or unwilling to protect” were clearly erroneous.

On review, the government chose not to defend the BIA’s decision and sought a remand to allow reconsideration. The Tenth Circuit refused, holding that the BIA had misapplied its clear-error standard and that remand would be futile because the record compelled reinstatement of the IJ’s findings and asylum grant. Along the way, the court also navigated jurisdictional questions arising from two separate petitions for review, relying on recent Supreme Court precedent to avoid thorny finality and timeliness disputes that did not affect the outcome.

Summary of the Opinion

Jurisdiction and procedural posture: The petitioner filed two petitions for review (after the BIA’s June 2023 order and after the IJ’s March 2024 final removal order). The court held it need not decide which order was the “final order of removal” because one of the two petitions indisputably enabled review; either way, the June 2023 BIA order was properly before the court.
Standard of review error: The BIA misstated none of the law, but misapplied the clear-error standard under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) by reweighing evidence, overlooking or mischaracterizing the IJ’s findings, and effectively conducting de novo review on:
- nexus (threats “on account of” membership in a family-based PSG),
- internal relocation (nationwide reach of gang affiliates and petitioner’s vulnerability), and
- the Honduran state’s inability or unwillingness to protect (police inaction, corruption, and systemic failures).
No ordinary remand: Distinguishing INS v. Ventura and Gonzalez v. Thomas, the court held that remand was unnecessary and futile. The BIA had already addressed the issues; the record was fully developed; the legal errors were clear; and “governing law” would compel reinstatement on remand. Given the decade of delay and the government’s failure to defend the BIA’s decision, the court directed reinstatement of the IJ’s asylum grant.
Disposition: Petition for review granted; BIA’s June 2023 order vacated; case remanded with instructions to reinstate the IJ’s 2019 grant of asylum. The government’s motion to remand was denied as moot.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Clear-error review pedigree (Anderson and progeny):

United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948), and Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985): Define clear error—reversal is proper only when the reviewing body has a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake was made; a “permissible” view of the evidence cannot be clearly erroneous; factfinding is not a “tryout on the road.”
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), and Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986): Confirm clear-error is a fact-review doctrine with broad cross-context salience.
Kabba v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2008): The Tenth Circuit polices the BIA’s adherence to § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) de novo; the BIA cannot reweigh or make new findings; it must defer to “permissible” IJ views.
Estrada-Martinez v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2015); F.J.A.P. v. Garland, 94 F.4th 620 (7th Cir. 2024); Brito v. Garland, 40 F.4th 548 (7th Cir. 2022); Soto-Soto v. Garland, 1 F.4th 655 (9th Cir. 2021); Lin v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2016): Sister-circuit cases reinforcing that the BIA’s clear-error review must not devolve into de novo reweighing, selective reading of evidence, or disregard of key IJ findings.
United States v. Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2011) and Holdeman v. Devine, 572 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2009): Clear error requires more than “possibly or even probably wrong”; existence of another permissible view does not suffice.
Accardi doctrine: United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954): Agencies must follow their own regulations; the BIA is bound by § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).

Asylum elements and evidentiary rules:

INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992): Nexus may be proven through direct or circumstantial evidence; the IJ may draw reasonable inferences from the record.
Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971 (10th Cir. 2011): For fear-based claims, internal relocation must be considered; the applicant generally bears the burden to show relocation is unreasonable or unsafe.
Wiransane v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 889 (10th Cir. 2004) and Batalova v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004): Persecution can be by the state or by non-state actors whom the state is “unable or unwilling” to control.

Ordinary-remand rule and futility exceptions:

INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam); Gonzalez v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per curiam): Ordinarily, courts remand issues the agency has not addressed in the first instance.
Here, the court distinguishes Ventura/Thomas because the BIA had already addressed the disputed issues (albeit under a misapplied standard), and further remand would be futile.
Futility cases: Zapata-Chacon v. Garland, 51 F.4th 1191 (10th Cir. 2022); Granados Arias v. Garland, 69 F.4th 454 (7th Cir. 2023); Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 241 (7th Cir. 2004); Hussain v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2007); Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 650 F.3d 968 (3d Cir. 2011); Kang v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2010); Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); Calle v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007).

Jurisdiction, consolidation, and timeliness:

Final-order and consolidation: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(9); Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983): All issues “arising from” removal must be consolidated; “final order” encompasses more than the bare removability determination.
Timeliness is nonjurisdictional: Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190 (2025) (30-day rule under § 1252(b)(1) is nonjurisdictional and waivable); the government waived any timeliness objection to the second petition.
Exhaustion is nonjurisdictional and waivable: Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023); with nothing left to exhaust after withdrawing CAT, the government agreed exhaustion posed no bar.
Judicial restraint: People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990, 1008 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Judge Roberts’s PDK Labs concurrence): If it’s unnecessary to decide more, it’s necessary not to.

Other Tenth Circuit comparators and agency-remand practice:

Villegas-Castro v. Garland, 19 F.4th 1241 (10th Cir. 2021) and Kabba: Previously, the Tenth Circuit typically remanded after finding the BIA misapplied clear-error. Ramos departs where the record compels one result and delay is extraordinary.
Mickeviciute v. INS, 327 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2003): Remand where the agency’s explanation is too sparse to review; distinguished in Ramos because the BIA’s discussion was lengthy—just legally incorrect.

Legal Reasoning

1) Misapplication of clear-error review under § 1003.1(d)(3)(i): The BIA accurately recited the standard but failed to apply it. The court identified the classic markers of de novo reweighing: ignoring or mischaracterizing key IJ findings, privileging contrary snippets of evidence, and faulting reasonable inferences the IJ drew from circumstantial evidence.

Nexus (family-based PSG): The IJ found that threats began only after the murder; they referenced the murdered partner; they were directed at those within the family-based PSG (the decedent’s immediate family) and not to those outside; and Ms. Ramos credibly explained she was targeted because she and her younger children were “Arturo’s family.” The BIA misconstrued the IJ’s timing finding and who was threatened, and discounted circumstantial proof as “vague.” But under Elias-Zacarias and Anderson, the IJ’s inference is plainly “permissible,” so it cannot be clearly erroneous.
Internal relocation: The IJ did not find Jonis a card-carrying gang member; she found—and the record supported—that he had connections to gangs with nationwide reach and the audacity and ability to track Ms. Ramos. The BIA recast the IJ’s finding as hinging on formal gang membership and labeled the evidence speculative. The panel corrected that misread and stressed the IJ relied on expert reports, testimony, and reasonable inferences about vulnerability and nationwide networks.
State unable/unwilling to protect: The IJ credited Ms. Ramos’s unrebutted testimony that police refused even to hear her complaint, and found systemic corruption and incapacity supported by country-conditions evidence and expert testimony. The BIA conceded evidence of corruption but emphasized contrary material about government anti-gang efforts and declared these were not threats on which police could act. That, the panel held, is forbidden reweighing; the IJ’s finding was at least a permissible view of the record.

2) Remedy—no ordinary remand; futility requires reinstatement: Although agencies are typically given the first pass to correct errors (Ventura/Thomas), the Tenth Circuit held those decisions did not require a remand here because:

The BIA already addressed the disputed issues (clear-error review of the IJ’s findings); the problem was misapplication, not lack of consideration.
The record is fully developed; nothing remains to investigate or explain.
The correct legal standard compels only one outcome: the IJ’s findings are not clearly erroneous.
The government did not defend the BIA’s decision; its only request was for a late, unexplained remand to reconsider—an inappropriate appellate “remedy,” and, in any event, moot given the court’s holding.
Extraordinary delay: Asylum proceedings had exceeded a decade; further remand would perpetuate uncertainty contrary to fairness and judicial economy.

Given those conditions, the court invoked a futility-of-remand line of cases and directed the BIA to reinstate the IJ’s asylum grant. It also noted that discretionary asylum authority resides in the Attorney General but observed that the IJ had twice exercised that discretion favorably and the government advanced no contrary argument.

3) Jurisdiction and procedural housekeeping:

Two petitions; one appeal: With petitions filed within thirty days of each potential final order (the BIA’s 2023 order and the IJ’s 2024 order), the court declined to decide finality because either petition sufficed to consolidate and review the BIA’s decision.
Nonjurisdictional timeliness: Per Riley v. Bondi, the 30-day filing rule is nonjurisdictional; the government waived any timeliness objection to the second petition.
Exhaustion waived: Santos-Zacaria confirms exhaustion is nonjurisdictional; with CAT withdrawn and nothing left to exhaust, the government agreed exhaustion was no bar.
Late remand motion: Although the government’s motion violated the 14-day local rule deadline (10th Cir. R. 27.3) and lacked good cause, the court considered the request as arguments raised in the merits brief, as permitted by the local rule, and rejected them on the merits.

Impact

Immediate doctrinal significance:

Robust enforcement of clear-error: Ramos re-centers the BIA’s role as an appellate body constrained by § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). Where an IJ’s factfinding is a “permissible view” of the record, the BIA cannot substitute its own judgment, discount circumstantial evidence, or cherry-pick contrary facts.
Futility-of-remand remedy: The Tenth Circuit underscores that Ventura/Thomas remands are not automatic. If the BIA already addressed the issue, the record is complete, and the law compels a single outcome, courts may—for reasons of law and economy—order reinstatement of IJ relief without remand.
Institutional message to the BIA and DOJ: Agencies must adhere scrupulously to their own standards; if they do not, and delay is pronounced, courts may end the matter rather than prolong proceedings. Government litigants should timely raise and preserve all issues at the BIA (including via a sufficiently specific Notice of Appeal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(b)), file remand motions on time with “good cause,” and be prepared to defend the BIA’s decision on appeal.

Practical consequences for immigration litigation:

Asylum appeals: Expect increased reliance on Ramos to press for outright reinstatement where the BIA’s clear-error analysis strays into de novo reweighing and the record is fully developed.
Record-building: Expert reports and country-conditions evidence (like Dr. Young’s) that contextualize gang networks, police incapacity, and vulnerability factors can be decisive on internal relocation and “unable/unwilling” elements.
Nexus proof: Circumstantial evidence—timing of threats, references to the decedent, who is targeted (inside vs. outside the family), and the persecutor’s statements—remains sufficient to establish motive, especially in family-based PSG cases.
Procedural strategy: Multiple petitions stemming from complex agency sequences may be consolidated; with Riley and Santos-Zacaria, timeliness and exhaustion defenses may be waived by the government, simplifying jurisdictional skirmishes.
Agency workload and delay: The opinion’s candid criticism of decade-long proceedings and late, unsupported government remand requests may prompt internal reforms, more rigorous BIA articulation, and more cautious DOJ appellate strategy.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Clear error: A reviewing body can reject an IJ’s factual finding only if it is left with a firm conviction that a mistake was made. If the IJ’s view of the evidence is reasonable—even if the BIA would have decided differently—the finding stands.
Particular social group (PSG): One of the five protected grounds for asylum. Family-based PSGs (like a nuclear family) are commonly recognized when properly defined; the Tenth Circuit did not need to revisit PSG cognizability here because it resolved the case on clear-error grounds and the government did not press a contrary argument in this court.
Nexus (“on account of”): The protected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the feared persecution. Circumstantial evidence (timing, statements, target selection) can establish motive.
Internal relocation: An applicant fearing future harm must show she cannot reasonably avoid persecution by moving elsewhere in her country. Nationwide gang reach, ability to track victims, and personal vulnerability may show relocation is not reasonable.
Unable or unwilling to protect: When the persecutor is non-state, asylum requires showing the home government is unable or unwilling to control the persecutor. Police indifference, systemic corruption, and ineffectiveness are probative.
Ordinary-remand rule: Courts usually remand issues the agency has not addressed. But where the agency already decided the issue and the record compels one outcome, remand can be denied as futile.
Final order of removal and consolidation: Courts review final removal orders, and all issues “arising from” removal must be consolidated in a single petition for review. If multiple orders could be “final,” a timely petition from either may suffice to bring all relevant issues before the court.
Nonjurisdictional timeliness and exhaustion: Under Riley v. Bondi and Santos-Zacaria, the 30-day filing deadline and exhaustion are not jurisdictional; the government can waive them.

Conclusion

Ramos v. Bondi is a consequential administrative-law and immigration decision that does three things at once. First, it powerfully enforces the BIA’s self-imposed constraint to review IJ factfinding only for clear error. Second, it articulates and applies a robust futility-of-remand principle: when the BIA has already addressed the issue, the record is complete, and the correct legal framework compels one result, the court may direct reinstatement of relief without further agency proceedings. Third, it pragmatically streamlines jurisdictional wrinkles where multiple petitions protect appellate review, all while recognizing that timeliness and exhaustion are waivable.

For litigants, Ramos is a blueprint for challenging BIA decisions that depart from the clear-error standard: identify mischaracterizations of the IJ’s findings, highlight overlooked record evidence, and argue for reinstatement where a remand would merely replay an already-settled outcome. For the BIA and government counsel, the opinion is a reminder that regulations like § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) are binding and that careful, deferential appellate review is not optional. Above all, Ramos vindicates the principle that justice delayed should not be justice denied—especially in asylum cases where lives hang in the balance.