Limits on Administrative Parole Warrants and Crimes-of-Violence Predicates under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

Introduction

United States v. Coles, Preddy & Jenkins-Armstrong (3d Cir. Apr. 7, 2025) is a consolidated appeal growing out of a deadly retaliation plot against a cooperating informant, Wendy Chaney. Three defendants—Kevin Coles, Nicholas Preddy and Johnnie Jenkins-Armstrong—were convicted on various counts relating to Chaney’s murder, ancillary homicides, witness-tampering, and drug offenses. Important issues included:

• The permissible use of an administrative parole warrant as a basis for arrest and search;
• The propriety of Pennsylvania electronic surveillance orders for cell-site data;
• The scope of “crimes of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and related provisions;
• Rules governing hearsay, impeachment of one’s own witness, and residual hearsay exceptions;
• The procedural and substantive reasonableness of upward sentencing departures.

The Third Circuit, applying well-established precedents, affirmed all convictions and sentences, clarifying when administrative warrants may be used and confirming that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a § 924(c) predicate crime of violence.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel unanimously held:

1. No “bad-faith” misuse of Coles’s New York parole warrant occurred, under Abel v. United States, so suppression of evidence was denied.
2. Electronic surveillance warrants in Pennsylvania satisfied probable cause and fell under the Leon good-faith exception; Franks challenges failed for lack of deliberate falsehood.
3. Hobbs Act robbery and the federal witness-killing statute are valid “crimes of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A), so the related counts stood.
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing prior DEA reports to refresh and impeach a government witness, nor in excluding an out-of-court statement under the residual hearsay exception.
5. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges by Coles lacked merit given his own admissions, corroborating testimony, and exhibits.
6. Sentences for Jenkins-Armstrong and Preddy—life imprisonment and a 360-month upward departure, respectively—were procedurally and substantively reasonable.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Abel v. United States (362 U.S. 217, 1960): Courts may look to officers’ subjective motive when an administrative warrant is used, but suppression requires proof of bad faith or entirely illegitimate purpose.
• Leon (468 U.S. 897, 1984): The good-faith exception protects evidence obtained via a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate.
• Franks v. Delaware (438 U.S. 154, 1978): To attack a warrant, a defendant must show deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard in the affidavit.
• Carpenter (585 U.S. 296, 2018): Obtaining historic cell-site location information constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search.”
• Taylor (596 U.S. 845, 2022): Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not categorically satisfy § 924(c) elements clause; distinguished from completed robbery.
• Stoney (62 F.4th 108, 2023): Completed Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A).
• Stevens (70 F.4th 653, 2023): Conspiracy to commit completed Hobbs Act robbery (via Pinkerton liability) is likewise a crime of violence.
• Pinkerton (328 U.S. 640, 1946): Coconspirator liability for reasonably foreseeable acts in furtherance of a conspiracy.
• Robinson (482 F.3d 244, 2007): Confrontation Clause and strict hearsay constraints do not apply at sentencing hearings.

2. Legal Reasoning

• Administrative Parole Warrant – Applying Abel, the Court found no evidence of bad faith by Maryland officers who arrested Coles pursuant to a valid New York parole warrant. Subjective motives of cooperating police departments do not invalidate an administrative warrant absent proof of entirely illegitimate purpose.
• Electronic Surveillance – Pennsylvania judges issued cell-site and data warrants under state law. Even if state-law technicalities existed, the exclusionary rule does not remedy state-law violations absent federal constitutional breach. Under Leon’s good-faith exception, the warrants were valid pre-Carpenter, and Franks attacks failed without proof of recklessness or deliberate misstatement.
• Predicate Crimes under § 924(c) – A “crime of violence” requires use or threat of force. Hobbs Act robbery’s completed‐conduct prong necessarily involves violence or threat thereof. Post-Taylor decisions (Stoney, Stevens) confirm that completed Hobbs Act robbery qualifies categorically under § 924(c)(3)(A).
• Hearsay & Impeachment – The Government may impeach its own witness to test credibility (Rule 607), so long as it does not introduce hearsay for substantive truth. The Third Circuit deemed the line‐by‐line refreshment and impeachment of a government witness proper. Out-of-court statements from Chaney’s mother failed the “exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness” required by the residual hearsay exception (Rule 807).
• Sentencing Departures – Section 5K2.21 authorizes upward departure for relevant uncharged conduct. The district courts’ findings—credited by live testimony and coconspirator accounts—rested on a preponderance of reliable evidence. No Confrontation Clause or evidentiary rule barred the use of hearsay at sentencing, and no procedural error or abuse of discretion occurred in rejecting mitigation or imposing statutory maximums.

3. Impact

• Confirms that administrative or parole warrants, when used in good faith, need not be suppressed even if shared across jurisdictions for criminal investigations.
• Reinforces the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for electronic surveillance warrants issued pre-Carpenter.
• Settles the Hobbs Act robbery question: completed robbery is a valid predicate “crime of violence” for § 924(c), guiding lower courts on categorical analyses.
• Clarifies that sentencing courts may consider reliable hearsay and co-defendant testimony for upward departures, even when defendants deny the facts and cross-examination is unavailable.
• Demonstrates the strict requirements for admitting residual hearsay under Rule 807, underscoring its narrow application.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Administrative Warrant: A non-judicial order (e.g., parole revocation) authorizing seizure or search—permissible so long as officers do not act in bad faith to gather criminal evidence.
• Good-Faith Exception: Evidence obtained under a warrant later found deficient is still admissible if officers reasonably relied on a neutral magistrate’s authorization (Leon).
• Franks Hearing: A pre-trial challenge allowing defendants to contest the truthfulness of sworn statements in a warrant affidavit; requires showing by a preponderance that misstatements were deliberate or reckless.
• Categorical Approach: Courts compare the statutory elements of a predicate offense (e.g., Hobbs Act robbery) with the generic definition of a “crime of violence” in § 924(c)(3)(A). If every way to violate the statute involves force, it qualifies.
• Residual Hearsay Exception (Rule 807): An extraordinary exception allowing admission of out-of-court statements not covered by other exceptions—but only if they have strong guarantees of trustworthiness and are more probative than any other evidence.
• Upward Departure – § 5K2.21: Allows courts to increase a sentence above the Guidelines range when reliable evidence shows significant uncharged or dismissed conduct that the Guidelines do not capture.

Conclusion

United States v. Coles, Preddy & Jenkins-Armstrong reaffirms key principles in Fourth Amendment, evidentiary, and sentencing law. It holds that administrative parole warrants may be used across state lines without suppression when executed in good faith, clarifies that completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a “crime of violence” for § 924(c) purposes, and underscores the narrow scope of hearsay exceptions and the discretion trial and sentencing courts enjoy in weighing reliable evidence. This decision will guide practitioners on cross-jurisdictional warrant use, predicate-crime analyses, and the boundaries of sentencing departures in complex criminal conspiracies.