Clarifying the Property-Owner Rule’s Supremacy Over Hearsay Valuation Evidence

Introduction

In State v. Ziegler, 2025 ND 78, the Supreme Court of North Dakota confronted two central issues on appeal: the admissibility of insurer valuation letters over a hearsay objection, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a stalking conviction. Conrad Calvin Ziegler was charged with felony criminal mischief under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-21-05 and misdemeanor stalking under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-07.1 after harassing a couple who had testified against him in a separate domestic-violence proceeding. The district court admitted the victim’s valuation testimony and the insurer’s offer letters over Ziegler’s hearsay objection and convicted him on both counts. On appeal, Ziegler challenged the evidentiary ruling and argued insufficient proof of stalking. The Supreme Court affirmed, clarifying that although the insurer’s letters were inadmissible hearsay, the error was harmless in light of the property-owner rule, and that the stalking conviction was supported by ample evidence of continuous, intimidating conduct.

Summary of the Judgment

Justice Tufte, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the amended judgment. The court held:

The insurer’s offer letters constituted inadmissible hearsay under N.D.R.Ev. 801(c) and 802, and they lacked foundation under the business-records exception, N.D.R.Ev. 803(6).
The victim’s testimony about the Impala’s value, based on her insurer’s letters, was admissible under the property-owner rule, which allows an owner’s opinion of value even if it relies on second-hand information.
The erroneous admission of the insurer’s letters was harmless because they were merely cumulative to the victim’s properly admitted testimony.
The evidence of repeated harassment—ranging from intimidation by circling the block and verbal threats, to dumping human feces, to vandalizing tires and property—was sufficient to prove stalking under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-07.1.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

State v. Vickerman, 2022 ND 184, ¶ 8, 981 N.W.2d 881 – established the standard for abuse of discretion in evidentiary rulings.
Froemke, 2023 ND 154, ¶ 17 – reaffirmed the property-owner rule allowing an owner to testify to property value even when based on information from a third party.
Pfliger v. Peavey Co., 310 N.W.2d 742, 747 (N.D. 1981) – early statement of the property-owner rule.
Imus v. Huber, 71 N.W.2d 339, 341 (N.D. 1955) and Seckerson v. Sinclair, 140 N.W. 239 (1913) – foundational authority on owners testifying to value.
Sanchez, 2023 ND 106, ¶ 12, 991 N.W.2d 71 – discussed harmless error analysis under Crim. Proc. Rule 52(a).
Geiger, 2023 ND 222, ¶ 10, 997 N.W.2d 845 – set forth the deferential standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in two parts:

a. Hearsay and the Property-Owner Rule

Under N.D.R.Ev. 801(c)–802, the insurer’s offer letters—written assertions by an adjuster—were inadmissible hearsay offered to prove the truth of the valuation. The State attempted to admit them without the adjuster’s testimony, and they failed the business-records exception of N.D.R.Ev. 803(6). However, the court held that the victim, as bona fide owner of the damaged Impala, could testify to its pre- and post-damage value without further qualification. The property-owner rule dispenses with hearsay concerns when the owner’s value opinion is based in whole or in part on third-party information. Since the victim’s testimony alone was sufficient to establish the over-$2,000 damage threshold for class-C felony mischief, any error in admitting the insurer letters was harmless.

b. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Stalking

For stalking under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(c)(1), the State had to prove (1) two or more acts evidencing a course of conduct, (2) directed at a specific person, (3) causing reasonable fear, intimidation, or harassment, and (4) serving no legitimate purpose. Viewing every fact in the light most favorable to the jury, the court found ample evidence: repeated circling of the victims’ home with menacing language, dumping of human feces dozens of times, covert vehicle surveillance at the victim’s workplace, puncturing tires, pouring a corrosive substance into the gas tank, carving insults onto the car, and the defendant’s own admissions. These acts showed continuity of purpose and satisfied the statutory elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. Impact

This decision provides several important guideposts for practitioners:

Reinforces that the property-owner rule can override hearsay objections to valuation evidence, reducing the need for third-party witnesses in damage actions.
Clarifies that erroneous admission of cumulative hearsay does not warrant reversal when correctly admitted evidence independently supports the same factual proposition.
Affirms the robust standard for stalking prosecutions—such as documentation of repeated unwanted acts and direct admissions—to secure convictions under the “course of conduct” requirement.
Encourages defense counsel to preserve and challenge hearsay at trial but underscores the difficulty of overturning convictions when harmless-error and sufficiency-of-the-evidence principles apply.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hearsay: A statement made outside of court, offered to prove the truth of what it asserts. Usually inadmissible unless an exception applies.
Business-Records Exception (N.D.R.Ev. 803(6)): Allows admission of records kept in the regular course of business if properly authenticated by a custodian or qualified witness.
Property-Owner Rule: Permits an owner to testify as to the value of owned property without independent expert qualification—even if the owner’s estimate relies on third-party data.
Harmless Error (Rule 52(a)): An appellate test asking whether an error likely affected the outcome; if not, the conviction stands.
Sufficiency of the Evidence: A deferential standard requiring that any reasonable inference of guilt, drawn from the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the conviction.
Stalking Statute (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-07.1): Defines stalking as an intentional course of conduct—two or more acts—directed at a person that causes fear or harassment and serves no legitimate purpose.

Conclusion

State v. Ziegler crystallizes the supremacy of the property-owner rule in valuation disputes and confirms that cumulative hearsay error does not warrant reversal when the verdict rests on properly admitted evidence. Moreover, it reinforces the sufficiency standard in stalking cases, demonstrating that a pattern of targeted intimidation—supported by direct admissions—meets the statutory “course of conduct” requirement. Trial practitioners should note the robust protection afforded to owner testimony on value and the high bar for overturning convictions on harmless-error or insufficiency grounds.