Chevron Is Dead, But Stare Decisis Lives:
Statutory Fixity and the Definition of “Sexual Abuse of a Minor” after Garcia Pinach v. Bondi

1. Introduction

On 4 August 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down its consolidated decision in Garcia Pinach v. Bondi, Nos. 22-6421(L) & 24-26 (CON). The case sits at the intersection of immigration law, criminal categorial analysis, administrative deference, and principles of precedent. It arose from the removal proceedings of Joaquin Garcia Pinach, a lawful permanent resident from the Dominican Republic whose 2019 New York conviction for second-degree sexual abuse triggered mandatory deportability as an “aggravated felony.” Garcia mounted a two-front challenge:

• He disputed that his misdemeanor conviction under N.Y. Penal Law § 130.60(2) is categorically “sexual abuse of a minor.”
• He sought equitable tolling of an untimely motion to reopen, claiming new medical evidence regarding diabetes-related mental-health impairments.

While the underlying immigration issues were familiar, the legal landscape had just shifted dramatically: one year earlier the Supreme Court overruled Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). Garcia thus argued that the Second Circuit’s earlier precedent (Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023))—which relied in part on Chevron deference—had lost its stare decisis force. The court rejected that argument, reaffirmed Debique, and clarified how statutory stare decisis constrains lower courts even in a post-Chevron world. The ruling also refined the standard of review for equitable-tolling denials after Guerrero-Lasprilla and Wilkinson.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Petition No. 22-6421 (L) – Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
  The panel (Sack, Nardini, Lee JJ.) held that a conviction under NYPL § 130.60(2) is categorically “sexual abuse of a minor,” an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). Because Garcia is removable “by reason of” an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) stripped the court of jurisdiction to review the removal order beyond that pure legal question.
• Petition No. 24-26 (CON) – Denied.
  The Board of Immigration Appeals reasonably concluded that Garcia had not exercised due diligence in the one-year gap between the 90-day motion-to-reopen deadline and his filing. Thus equitable tolling was unwarranted and the motion to reopen remained time-barred.

3. Analytical Commentary

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Roles

1. Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023) – direct circuit authority declaring NYPL § 130.60(2) an aggravated felony; central to the outcome.
2. Rodriguez v. Barr, 975 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2020) – held first-degree sexual abuse (§ 130.65(3)) is “sexual abuse of a minor.” Provided substantive equivalence reasoning.
3. Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001) and Acevedo v. Barr, 943 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2019) – earlier Chevron-informed cases adopting 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) as a guide to “sexual abuse.”
4. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385 (2017) – Supreme Court baseline that, at minimum, victims under 16 satisfy the “minor” element in statutory-rape context.
5. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) – overruled Chevron; addressed head-on by the panel to test the persistence of Debique.
6. Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020) & Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024) – clarified that mixed questions (like equitable tolling) are “questions of law” for jurisdiction yet demand deferential review.
7. Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2000) and Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2008) – foundational Second Circuit equitable-tolling standards reiterated by the panel.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Categorical Approach & Definition of “Sexual Abuse of a Minor”

Applying the categorical approach (compare statutory elements, not underlying facts), the court found a perfect match:

• Elements of NYPL § 130.60(2): (1) sexual contact; (2) with a person <14 years of age.
• Generic federal offense: sexual conduct with a minor that is abusive by its nature.

Because “sexual contact” in New York requires touching of “sexual or other intimate parts” for sexual gratification, the conduct is intrinsically abusive when the victim is under fourteen. The misdemeanor label and one-year cap are irrelevant under Taylor v. United States and other precedent, which ignore state-law nomenclature.

3.2.2 Stare Decisis after Loper Bright

“The holdings of prior cases … are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive methodology.” – Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 412.

The panel treated that paragraph as decisive. Even if Debique relied in part on Chevron, its holding—that § 130.60(2) matches the INA—remains good law absent congressional change or en banc/Supreme Court reversal. Moreover, Debique rested on multiple interpretive tools independent of Chevron (text, ordinary meaning, Supreme Court cases, legislative context), so Loper Bright did not “break the link” required to overrule it.

3.2.3 Standard of Review for Equitable Tolling

After Guerrero-Lasprilla and Wilkinson, motions to reopen implicate a “mixed question” of law and fact; jurisdiction exists, but the proper appellate lens is deferential. The court reaffirmed its traditional “abuse of discretion” standard: the BIA need only have a “reasonable basis” to find lack of due diligence. Because Garcia knew of his diabetes and potential mental-health link during removal proceedings, the panel saw no abuse in refusing tolling.

3.3 Likely Impact

1. Statutory Stare Decisis Fortified.
   Circuit courts cannot discard Chevron-era precedents solely because Chevron is gone. Litigants must show more—e.g., that earlier holdings cannot be sustained by ordinary tools of statutory construction.
2. Stable Definition of “Sexual Abuse of a Minor.”
   Offenses involving sexual contact with children younger than fourteen in New York (and likely comparable ages elsewhere) will continue to trigger aggravated-felony treatment, even if misdemeanors.
3. Standard of Review Clarified.
   Post-Wilkinson, the Second Circuit explicitly aligns equitable-tolling review with abuse-of-discretion deference, reducing uncertainty for future motions to reopen.
4. Strategic Litigation Guidance.
   Defense counsel should anticipate that Loper Bright will seldom justify reopening Chevron-based immigration precedents; substantive statutory arguments, not deference critiques, will be required.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Categorical Approach – A method where courts compare the text of the state statute with the “generic” federal crime; actual conduct is irrelevant.
• Aggravated Felony – A term of art in immigration law. It need not be a felony under state law; if the INA lists it, removal consequences attach.
• Statutory Stare Decisis – The doctrine that once a court interprets a statute, that interpretation remains binding until Congress or a higher court changes it, even if interpretive philosophies evolve.
• Chevron Deference vs. Loper Bright – Chevron required courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes; Loper Bright discarded that rule, but did not automatically overturn past results reached under Chevron.
• Equitable Tolling – A judge-made doctrine allowing late filings if extraordinary circumstances and due diligence are proven.

5. Conclusion

Garcia Pinach v. Bondi may prove a bellwether for post-Chevron statutory interpretation in the lower federal courts. The Second Circuit’s message is two-fold:

1. Past precedent interpreting statutes—especially immigration provisions—does not evaporate with Chevron’s demise; statutory stare decisis demands continuity unless the earlier result is indefensible under ordinary tools of construction.
2. On procedural questions like equitable tolling, the court will continue to apply a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, harmonizing circuit practice with the Supreme Court’s recent guidance on “mixed questions of law and fact.”

For practitioners, the decision underscores that challenges to aggravated-felony categorizations must engage the merits of statutory text and structure, not merely the deference methodology that previously underpinned them. For scholars, it offers a concrete example of how lower courts will navigate the transition from Chevron to a purely “ordinary-tools” interpretive regime without destabilizing vast swaths of settled immigration jurisprudence.