Causal Links Require Evidence: Kentucky High Court Affirms Trial Courts’ Discretion to Bar Speculative Arguments Tying a Third Party’s Suicide to the Charged Crime

Case: Marquess Smith v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky

Date: March 20, 2025

Disposition: Affirmed

Publication Status: Not to be Published (RAP 40(D))

Introduction

This memorandum opinion addresses an evidentiary and advocacy boundary central to alternative-perpetrator defenses: when, if ever, may a defendant argue that a third party’s suicide was caused by guilt for the charged crime? The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirms the trial court’s decision to permit the jury to hear the fact and circumstances of a co-participant’s suicide, yet to prohibit any testimony or argument asserting that the suicide was caused by the underlying robbery and homicide. The ruling underscores a straightforward but often-contested proposition: counsel’s inferences in closing must be grounded in evidence; unsupported causal claims may be excluded as speculation.

The case arises from a 2016 Lexington robbery during which 18-year-old Caleb Hallett was shot and killed and Josh Baker wounded. The Commonwealth’s theory placed three masked perpetrators—Marique Sturgis, Kenyon “Pudge” Hipps, and appellant Marquess Smith—at the confrontation, with two accomplices, Christopher “Mason” Allen and Ricky Auxier, waiting in a vehicle. Ten days later, Hipps died by suicide during a traffic stop in Ohio. Pretrial, the Commonwealth successfully moved to bar any claim that Hipps’s suicide was connected to guilt over the Lexington crimes. Smith’s sole appellate issue challenges that in limine ruling as an impermissible restriction on his right to advance an alternative-perpetrator theory focused on Hipps.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirms, holding that the trial court acted within its broad discretion to control speculative “evidence” and argument. While the jury could hear that Hipps died by suicide in Ohio ten days after the crimes, there was no admissible evidence connecting that act to the Lexington robbery-murder. The Court emphasizes that:

Arguments must be tethered to evidence in the record; mere conjecture about Hipps’s motive for suicide was not evidence.
Trial courts may limit speculative testimony and argument even if they permit underlying facts (here, the occurrence and timing of the suicide) to reach the jury.
Defense counsel still could have highlighted the circumstances of Hipps’s death in closing to invite the jury to draw any reasonable inference supported by the record, but counsel could not state or imply causation without proof.

Given the absence of proof tying Hipps’s suicide to the Lexington crimes—and the additional forensic fact that Hipps’s firearm was inconsistent with the bullets recovered from the murder scene—the Court finds no abuse of discretion in the in limine ruling.

Case Background

On January 9, 2016, after plans to rob a University Avenue house, three masked men—identified at trial as Sturgis, Hipps, and Smith—approached the area where Hallett and Baker were sitting in a car. Sturgis robbed Baker and shot him in the wrist. Two shots were fired on the driver’s side, killing Hallett. Allen and Auxier, who remained in the car, testified that the trio returned, removed masks, and tucked what appeared to be firearms into their waistbands. They described post-event statements by Smith and Sturgis indicating gunfire by both men and that Sturgis had obtained a phone. Hipps was silent.

Ten days later, Hipps died by suicide during an unrelated traffic stop in Dayton, Ohio. The Commonwealth’s pretrial motion sought to prevent defendants from arguing that Hipps acted out of guilt for the Lexington homicide. The trial court permitted the fact of the suicide and its timing/location, but excluded any assertion (through testimony or argument) that the suicide was “the result of or connected in any way” to the Lexington crimes.

A jury convicted Smith of murder (as principal or complicitor), complicity to second-degree assault, and two counts of complicity to first-degree robbery, recommending an aggregate sentence of 40 years. The sole issue on appeal was the scope of the in limine ruling as it affected Smith’s alternative-perpetrator theory.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Daugherty v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.3d 222 (Ky. 2015): Reaffirms the wide discretion afforded trial courts in evidentiary rulings. The Court applies this deferential posture to the in limine decision here.
Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 288 (Ky. 2008): Cited for the general abuse-of-discretion review of evidentiary rulings.
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1999): Defines abuse of discretion as a decision that is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. The Court employs English’s standard to affirm the trial court’s control over speculative argument.
Peacher v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 821 (Ky. 2013), and Southworth v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 32 (Ky. 2014): Clarify that closing arguments may include reasonable inferences grounded in evidence, common sense, and logic. These cases frame the permissible scope of argument—arguments may extrapolate from the record but cannot invent facts.
Miller v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690 (Ky. 2009): Recognizes wide latitude in closing arguments, subject to the evidence-based boundary emphasized here.
Carson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.W.3d 443 (Ky. 2021), citing Commonwealth v. Sego, 872 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1994), and James v. Commonwealth, 681 S.W.3d 60 (Ky. 2023): Lay witnesses may offer opinions about apparent mental or emotional state only if derived from personal observation of specific facts. This underscores why no witness could properly testify that Hipps killed himself out of guilt—there were no personal observations supporting that conclusion.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning rests on three interlocking principles:

Evidence vs. inference: An inference is a conclusion drawn from facts; it is not itself evidence. Without evidence in the record supporting a causal connection between Hipps’s suicide and the Lexington crimes, counsel could not argue causation. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “inference” as a logical conclusion drawn from other facts—a definition the Court quotes to distinguish argument from proof.
Speculation is not admissible and may be controlled: The trial court permissibly allowed the jury to hear the objective facts (that Hipps died by suicide in Ohio ten days later during a police stop) while barring testimony or argument asserting that the suicide was caused by guilt over the crimes. The opinion notes the trial court’s written order framed the point as relevance and prejudice under KRE 401–403, but clarifies that the more precise lens here was the court’s discretion to control speculative evidence and argument when there is no underlying proof to admit.
Wide but bounded latitude in closing: Even assuming ambiguity in the order’s application to argument, the Court emphasizes that defense counsel remained free to emphasize the timing and circumstances of Hipps’s death and to invite any reasonable inference the jury might draw from those facts. What counsel could not do was state or imply a causal link without evidentiary support.

Two factual points further undercut the proposed causal narrative:

Forensic testing showed that Hipps’s handgun was inconsistent with the bullets at the murder scene.
The Commonwealth proffered that discovery materials reflected Hipps’s preexisting depression and suicidality, undermining the claim that the suicide was a post-crime crisis of conscience. No contrary evidence was tendered by the defense.

Given the absence of supporting proof, the Court concludes the in limine ruling was not “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles” under English.

Impact

Although unpublished and non-binding under RAP 40(D), this opinion is instructive for Kentucky trial practice in several respects:

Alternative-perpetrator theories require evidentiary hooks. Defendants retain the right to present an alternative perpetrator, but courts may exclude speculative causation narratives—especially emotionally potent ones like “guilt-driven suicide”—absent concrete evidence (e.g., statements, contemporaneous communications, corroborating forensic links).
Use of third-party suicides at trial will be carefully cabined. Courts may permit the bare facts (occurrence, timing, and context) while barring causal assertions without proof. Practitioners should not assume the fact of suicide, without more, opens the door to motive-based argument.
Argument tethered to record; seek clarity early. If an in limine ruling appears to restrict both evidence and argument, counsel should seek clarification on whether they may still emphasize underlying facts and invite reasonable inferences. Failure to do so can forfeit a persuasive theme within the bounds of the record.
Lay opinion limits matter. Opinions about another person’s mental state or motive must be derived from personal observation of facts. Absent such observations, testimony that a suicide was “because of guilt” is inadmissible speculation.
Framing matters: discretion over speculation vs. KRE 401–403. When there is no proffered evidence to admit, the question is less about traditional relevance/prejudice balancing and more about the court’s authority to control what counsel may claim as causal fact without foundation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Motion in limine: A pretrial request asking the court to admit or exclude certain evidence or lines of argument. It sets boundaries before the jury hears the case.
Abuse of discretion (appellate review): A highly deferential standard. An appellate court will overturn a trial court’s ruling only if it was arbitrary or unsupported by legal principles.
Alternative-perpetrator defense: A defense strategy claiming someone else committed the crime. It must rest on actual evidence linking the third party to the offense, not on conjecture.
Inference vs. evidence: Evidence consists of the facts admitted at trial; an inference is a logical conclusion the jury may draw from those facts. Arguments must build on admitted evidence.
Complicity/principal or complicitor: A defendant can be guilty either as the person who directly committed the crime (principal) or as one who intentionally aided or abetted it (complicitor), resulting in the same culpability.

Conclusion

This opinion crystallizes a practical rule of trial advocacy in Kentucky: counsel cannot convert speculation into argument by labeling it an inference. Where no evidence connects a third party’s suicide to the charged offense, a trial court may admit the fact of the suicide while excluding causal testimony or argument as unfounded. The decision also underscores that defendants may still pursue an alternative-perpetrator theory, but only through evidence that meaningfully links the third party to the offense. While unpublished, the Court’s reasoning offers clear guidance: the line between inference and speculation is policed by trial judges, and appellate courts will defer to that gatekeeping absent a clear abuse of discretion.

Key Takeaways

Arguments about a third party’s guilt-driven suicide require evidentiary support; absent that, courts may bar such claims while permitting the jury to hear the underlying fact of suicide.
Closing arguments enjoy wide latitude but must be grounded in the record; stating causation without proof crosses the line.
Alternative-perpetrator defenses are viable only when supported by concrete evidence that does more than invite conjecture.
Trial courts’ discretion to control speculative evidence and argument will be affirmed under the abuse-of-discretion standard.
Though not precedential under RAP 40(D), this decision provides persuasive guidance on managing speculative causation narratives at trial.