A Witness’s Prior Letter Is Not Substantive Evidence Unless the Witness Vouches for Its Truth; “Or Otherwise” in the Federal Kidnapping Statute Encompasses Drug‑Debt Recoupment — United States v. Perkins (3d Cir. 2025)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Not Precedential)

Date: April 4, 2025

Case: United States v. John Perkins, No. 24-1109

Panel: Judges Shwartz, Krause, and Chung (Opinion by Judge Shwartz)

Introduction

This appeal arises from a violent drug-related kidnapping that culminated in the victim’s murder across state lines. John Perkins was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c), and aiding and abetting kidnapping involving interstate commerce resulting in death, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1) and 2. On appeal, Perkins advanced four principal arguments: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction; (2) the district court improperly excluded two letters written by a cooperating witness (Perkins’s cousin) as hearsay; (3) the court erred in refusing a jury instruction on justification; and (4) the court abused its discretion by declining to give a curative instruction regarding a detective’s testimony that Perkins characterized as hearsay.

The Third Circuit affirmed on all grounds. Although designated “not precedential” under the Circuit’s Internal Operating Procedures, the opinion provides notable guidance on: (i) the scope of “held for ransom or reward or otherwise” under the federal kidnapping statute; (ii) the requirements for using a testifying witness’s prior written statement as substantive evidence under the hearsay rules; (iii) the narrow availability of the justification defense when a defendant voluntarily enters a criminal setting; and (iv) trial-management discretion concerning whether a curative instruction might amplify, rather than mitigate, potential prejudice.

Summary of the Opinion

Sufficiency of the evidence: The Court held that a rational juror could find that Perkins knowingly aided and abetted a kidnapping and conspired to commit kidnapping. The phrase “or otherwise” in § 1201(a)(1) reaches kidnappings undertaken to recoup a drug debt and to obtain other personal benefits (e.g., access to drugs). Perkins’s role as “muscle,” his presence at planning meetings, and his act of helping load the beaten victim into a vehicle sufficed.
Hearsay letters: Letters written by government witness Robert Favors could be used for impeachment, but not admitted for their truth. Even when a witness acknowledges authorship on the stand, the prior statement is not admissible as nonhearsay for substantive purposes unless the witness testifies that the prior statement was true. The residual exception (Rule 807) also did not apply given the letters’ lack of trustworthiness (unsworn, undated, unsigned, partially disavowed, and contradictory of sworn testimony).
Justification instruction: The defense was unavailable because Perkins voluntarily placed himself in a criminal setting, did not face an immediate unlawful threat, and had ample time (ten days) to withdraw from the scheme.
Curative instruction: The district court acted within its discretion in declining to issue a curative instruction about a detective’s stray testimony, concluding that such an instruction risked highlighting the remark. Any potential prejudice was minimal given the trial record.

Factual and Procedural Background

Drug supplier Salvador Sanchez‑Guerrero and his son Enoch Sanchez sought to recoup a drug debt from Alejandro Ramon. They recruited co-worker Robert Favors, who then brought his cousin, John Perkins. At a planning meeting with others in the drug organization (including Ivan Prieto, Jose Bernal, and Jose Castillo), the group discussed “catching” Ramon to force repayment. Although some witnesses testified that Spanish speakers did not use the English word “kidnapping,” they confirmed that the Spanish term used captured the concept of kidnapping. Perkins and Favors agreed to serve as “muscle,” and were promised benefits including access to drugs and possibly cash.

Ten days later, Ramon was lured to a house via a ruse and brutally assaulted. Perkins and Favors initially waited in a car but were later brought inside, and Perkins helped load the bound, gagged, and beaten victim into a vehicle. The group transported Ramon to Pennsylvania to extort payment from his family and then drove him to Maryland, where he was killed.

Perkins was charged with conspiracy to commit kidnapping and aiding and abetting kidnapping resulting in death. A jury convicted him on both counts. The district court denied his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, and Perkins appealed.

Detailed Analysis

1) Sufficiency of the Evidence: Elements and Application

Legal standards and elements:

Kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1): The government must prove (1) interstate transportation; (2) of an unconsenting person; (3) held for ransom, reward, or otherwise; (4) knowingly and willfully. The Third Circuit cited United States v. Barton, 257 F.3d 433, 439 (5th Cir. 2001) for this formulation.
Aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2: The defendant must take an affirmative act in furtherance of the offense with the intent of facilitating its commission. Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014).
Conspiracy to kidnap, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c): Requires an agreement to violate the law, knowing and intentional participation, and an overt act. The panel cited United States v. Small, 988 F.3d 241, 252 (6th Cir. 2021).

“Or otherwise” reaches benefits beyond classic ransom: The panel relied on the Third Circuit’s early statement in United States v. Parker, 103 F.2d 857, 861 (3d Cir. 1939), that “or otherwise” encompasses “any object of a kidnapping which the perpetrator might consider of sufficient benefit to himself.” Here, the benefit was recouping a drug debt and securing drugs for Perkins and Favors. Thus, the government did not need to prove a traditional ransom demand known to Perkins; it was enough that he knew or could reasonably foresee the victim was being held to recoup a drug debt and that he would benefit.

Evidence supporting the verdicts:

Perkins attended planning meetings where kidnapping to recover a debt was discussed; witnesses explained that the Spanish term used conveyed kidnapping.
Perkins agreed to act as “muscle” and expected drugs (and potentially money) as compensation.
Perkins took an affirmative act by helping load the restrained, beaten victim into the vehicle that would be used to transport him during the ongoing kidnapping.
Interstate transport and the victim’s death were undisputed as to the offense conduct by the co-conspirators.

Result: Applying a “particularly deferential” sufficiency standard, see United States v. Hendrickson, 949 F.3d 95, 97 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020), and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, see United States v. Caraballo‑Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc), the panel held that a rational juror could convict on both counts. Because the aiding‑and‑abetting conviction stood on its own, the panel did not reach Pinkerton co-conspirator liability (Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946)).

2) Admissibility of the Witness Letters: Hearsay, Nonhearsay Adoption, and Rule 807

The proffered letters: Before trial, cooperator Robert Favors wrote letters to Perkins containing exculpatory assertions (e.g., “you don’t have nothing to do with this”) and instructions to align stories. At trial, Perkins used the letters to impeach Favors, but also sought to admit them for their truth.

2.a) Nonhearsay via adoption by a testifying witness (Rule 801(d)(1))

Key holding: Even where a witness acknowledges authoring a prior out-of-court statement on the stand, the statement does not become admissible as nonhearsay for its truth unless the witness also testifies that the prior statement was true. The panel cited United States v. Demmitt, 706 F.3d 665, 672 (5th Cir. 2013), and declined to resolve broader debates in other courts and treatises about “adoption” through in-court testimony. Because Favors did not vouch for the truth of the letters’ contents, the letters remained hearsay when offered for their truth.

Other nonhearsay categories rejected:

Rule 801(d)(1): The letters were not prior sworn statements, not offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or to rehabilitate credibility, and did not identify a person previously perceived.
Rule 801(d)(2): The “party-opponent” provision did not apply because the statements were by a co-defendant/cooperator, not by the opposing party (the government). See United States v. Gossett, 877 F.2d 901, 906 (11th Cir. 1989).

2.b) Residual exception (Rule 807)

Rule 807’s demanding standard: The residual exception admits hearsay only where there are “sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness” and the statement is “more probative” than reasonably obtainable alternatives, a device to be used “rarely, and in exceptional circumstances.” See United States v. Nucera, 67 F.4th 146, 171 (3d Cir. 2023); United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2013).

Application: The letters were unsworn, undated, unsigned, contained disavowed text, and contradicted Favors’s sworn testimony—markers of untrustworthiness. Cf. United States v. Simmons, 70 F.4th 1086, 1089–90 (8th Cir. 2023); United States v. Wright, 363 F.3d 237, 245–46 (3d Cir. 2004). The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in excluding them under Rule 807. Given that conclusion, the panel did not reach Rule 807(b)’s notice requirement. Any error would have been harmless in any event, because the jury saw the letters for impeachment and the government’s case was strong. See United States v. Dispoz‑O‑Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275, 286 (3d Cir. 1999).

3) Refusal to Instruct on Justification

Legal standard: A justification (necessity/duress) instruction is warranted only if the defendant lays a factual foundation for each element: (1) an unlawful, present threat of death or serious bodily injury; (2) no reckless placement into the situation; (3) no reasonable legal alternative; and (4) a direct causal relationship between the criminal conduct and avoidance of the threatened harm. United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 540 (3d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 178 (3d Cir. 2013).

Application:

Recklessness/voluntariness (element 2): Perkins voluntarily agreed to act as “muscle” and actively helped load the victim, placing himself in the criminal milieu. This defeats justification as a matter of law.
Present threat (element 1): Generalized fear that others were armed or dangerous is insufficient. The defense is aimed at split-second, life‑or‑death situations, not protracted plans with opportunity to withdraw. Perkins had roughly ten days between the planning meeting and the offense. See United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91, 96–97 (3d Cir. 2008).

Result: The district court properly declined the instruction.

4) Refusal to Give a Curative Instruction

Context: During cross-examination of a detective, a stray remark suggested someone (unnamed) had mentioned an alternative ruse the conspirators had discussed. Perkins did not object contemporaneously but later sought a curative instruction, arguing hearsay.

Standard: A refusal to give an instruction is reversible only if the proposed instruction was correct, not substantially covered elsewhere, and “so important that its omission prejudiced the defendant.” United States v. Piekarsky, 687 F.3d 134, 142 (3d Cir. 2012). Courts may also consider whether a curative instruction would unnecessarily magnify prejudice. See United States v. DeLucca, 630 F.2d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987).

Application: The district court reasonably concluded that any prejudice from the stray remark was minimal and that a curative instruction would call undue attention to it. Considering the strength of the government’s case, the omission of a curative instruction did not prejudice Perkins. See United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc).

Precedents and Authorities Discussed

Kidnapping elements and “or otherwise”: United States v. Barton (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Parker (3d Cir. 1939) (expansive reading of “or otherwise”).
Aiding and abetting: Rosemond v. United States (U.S. 2014) (affirmative act coupled with intent to facilitate).
Conspiracy elements: United States v. Small (6th Cir. 2021) (agreement, knowledge/intent, overt act).
Hearsay/nonhearsay: Fed. R. Evid. 801–807; United States v. Demmitt (5th Cir. 2013) (witness must attest prior statement is true for substantive use); United States v. Gossett (11th Cir. 1989) (co-defendant’s statement not a party-opponent admission when offered against the government); treatise debates noted (Weinstein; Saltzburg), but the panel avoided resolving them.
Residual exception: United States v. Nucera (3d Cir. 2023); United States v. Turner (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Simmons (8th Cir. 2023); United States v. Wright (3d Cir. 2004).
Justification/duress: United States v. Paolello (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Alston (3d Cir. 2008).
Curative instruction and prejudice: United States v. Piekarsky (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. DeLucca (5th Cir. 1980); Greer v. Miller (U.S. 1987); United States v. Zehrbach (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc).
Standards of review: United States v. Richardson (3d Cir. 2011) (plenary review of Rule 29 denials); United States v. Hendrickson (3d Cir. 2020) (“particularly deferential” sufficiency review); United States v. Caraballo‑Rodriguez (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (light most favorable to prosecution); United States v. Green (3d Cir. 2010) (evidentiary rulings standard); United States v. Leahy (3d Cir. 2006) (instructional rulings standard, abrogated on other grounds).

Legal Reasoning and Its Doctrinal Significance

Hearsay adoption rule clarified: The panel’s most concrete doctrinal contribution is its insistence that, for a testifying witness’s prior out-of-court statement to be used substantively as nonhearsay on a theory of “adoption,” the witness must do more than acknowledge authorship; the witness must attest that the statement was true. This aligns the Third Circuit’s approach with the Fifth Circuit’s Demmitt framework and curbs attempts to bootstrap impeachment material into substantive evidence without a truth-adoption. For trial practice, this creates a clear, workable line: counsel seeking to introduce a witness’s prior statement substantively should ask, “Were those statements true when you made them?” An answer short of “yes” preserves the hearsay barrier.

Residual exception constrained: The decision reinforces the Third Circuit’s restrictive view of Rule 807. Unsworn, undated, or contradictory letters—especially those containing self-serving or coordinated narratives—rarely satisfy Rule 807’s “sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.” Where, as here, the same content is available through live cross-examination and impeachment, necessity and probativeness are lacking as well.

Kidnapping’s “or otherwise” is capacious but principled: By reaffirming Parker, the panel confirms that § 1201(a)(1) encompasses kidnappings undertaken to gain nontraditional benefits, including enforcement of drug debts and establishing a criminal business relationship. This avoids hyper-technical disputes about whether kidnappers uttered the word “ransom” or, in multilingual contexts, employed a precise English term. What matters is that the victim is held to secure a benefit the perpetrators deem valuable.

Conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting thresholds: The opinion illustrates how relatively modest acts—serving as “muscle,” assisting with loading a bound victim—can constitute the requisite overt act and affirmative facilitation. Knowledge and foreseeability can be proved circumstantially through pre-offense meetings, assigned roles, and the obvious condition of the victim.

Justification defense boundaries: The Third Circuit underscores that justification is a narrow defense, typically in real-time, life-or-death situations with no safe alternative. Voluntary entry into a criminal plan, combined with days to withdraw, defeats the defense as a matter of law—even if others in the group are armed or dangerous.

Curative-instruction discretion: Trial courts may sensibly decline curative instructions where they would spotlight a fleeting remark. This is consistent with the pragmatic management of jury trials and the harmless-error framework that weighs the comment’s scope against the whole record.

Impact and Practical Implications

Evidence strategy with cooperators: Defense efforts to introduce cooperators’ letters for their truth will face high hurdles. To cross the hearsay bar, counsel must secure an in-court truth-adoption. Absent that, expect exclusion under Rule 802 and failure under Rule 807.
Charging and jury arguments in kidnapping cases: Prosecutors can rely on “or otherwise” to cover debt-collection kidnappings and similar coercive detentions where defendants seek non-cash benefits (e.g., drugs, market access, reputational enforcement). Defense arguments premised on the absence of a classic “ransom” demand are unlikely to prevail.
Framing duress/justification: Defense teams should carefully assess whether the client truly faced an immediate, unlawful threat leaving no legal alternative, and whether the client’s prior choices were voluntary. Plans hatched over days will usually foreclose the instruction.
Curative-instruction requests: Object contemporaneously, and consider whether the requested instruction might amplify the harm. If the remark is minor and the record strong against the defendant, appellate courts are reluctant to find prejudice.
Nonprecedential but persuasive: While not binding under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7, the opinion’s evidentiary analysis—especially the truth-adoption requirement—will be persuasive to district courts within the Circuit and may be cited for its reasoning.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hearsay: An out-of-court statement offered to prove what it asserts. Generally inadmissible unless a rule allows it.
Adoption by a testifying witness: If a witness testifies and acknowledges making a prior statement, that does not by itself make the statement admissible for its truth. The witness must also testify that the prior statement was true. Otherwise, it can be used only to impeach (attack credibility), not as substantive proof.
Residual exception (Rule 807): A narrow safety valve for highly trustworthy, necessary hearsay when no other hearsay exception fits. It is used sparingly.
Aiding and abetting: Helping commit a crime, with the intent to help, through some affirmative act—such as assisting with transportation or containment of a victim.
Kidnapping “or otherwise”: The statute covers holding a person not just for ransom or reward, but for any benefit the kidnapper seeks—like collecting a debt or obtaining drugs.
Conspiracy: An agreement to commit a crime, joined knowingly and intentionally, plus some overt act by any conspirator to move the plan forward.
Justification/duress: A defense for those who commit a crime only because of an immediate unlawful threat, with no safe alternative, and without having put themselves in the situation. It rarely applies to planned crimes with time to withdraw.
Curative instruction: A judge’s direction to the jury to disregard certain testimony. Sometimes declined if it risks highlighting the problem more than curing it.
Pinkerton liability: A conspirator may be liable for crimes committed by co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, even if not personally committed, provided certain conditions are met.

Conclusion

United States v. Perkins reinforces several key doctrines in federal criminal practice. Substantively, it confirms the breadth of the kidnapping statute’s “or otherwise” language, capturing kidnappings executed to collect drug debts or secure other illicit benefits, and it demonstrates how modest but meaningful acts can satisfy aiding-and-abetting and conspiracy requirements. Procedurally and evidentiary, it clarifies that a testifying witness’s prior written statement remains hearsay unless the witness explicitly vouches in court for the statement’s truth, and that the residual exception demands extraordinary trustworthiness and necessity. The opinion also tightens the boundaries of the justification defense and affirms district courts’ discretion to avoid curative instructions that might do more harm than good.

Although labeled not precedential, Perkins provides practical guidance likely to shape evidentiary rulings and trial strategies in the Third Circuit: counsel cannot convert impeachment material into substantive evidence without an in‑court truth‑adoption; debt-collection kidnappings fall squarely within § 1201; and duress-based instructions will remain rare where defendants voluntarily join violent schemes with time to reconsider. The Third Circuit’s affirmance thus offers a coherent, restrained application of established principles to a grim set of facts, with takeaways that extend beyond this case.