Passive Dissent and the “Pattern-or-Practice” Threshold:
Seventh Circuit Tightens Asylum Standards in Rivas-Jarquin v. Bondi

1. Introduction

In Leonis Amanda Rivas-Jarquin & C.A.C-R. v. Pamela J. Bondi, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confronted yet another claim arising out of Nicaragua’s 2018 political turmoil. The petitioners—Leonis Amanda Rivas-Jarquin and her minor son—sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) after providing humanitarian aid to anti-Sandinista protestors. Although an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Ms. Rivas credible, both the IJ and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) concluded that she failed to demonstrate an objectively reasonable fear of persecution or torture.

The Seventh Circuit (Chief Judge Sykes, with Judges Hamilton and Pryor) denied the petition, generating a carefully reasoned opinion that cements a series of doctrinal points:

• The “pattern-or-practice” standard for future persecution remains extremely demanding and cannot be satisfied with evidence of generalized political repression.
• Family members who remain unharmed in the home country remain a powerful ground for rejecting a well-founded fear.
• Failing to meet the relatively low asylum threshold automatically defeats claims for withholding of removal and CAT, which require yet higher probabilities of harm.

2. Summary of the Judgment

After reviewing the administrative record under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard, the court affirmed the BIA on all fronts:

1. No Past Persecution. Ms. Rivas admitted she had never been threatened, detained, or harmed in Nicaragua.
2. No Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution. The court rejected her pattern-or-practice theory for two proposed social groups—(a) healthcare professionals who aided protestors and (b) all opponents of the Sandinistas— finding insufficient proof of a systematic, state-driven campaign of persecution targeting either group.
3. Withholding of Removal. Because the petitioners could not meet the lower asylum standard, they necessarily failed the higher “clear probability” test for withholding.
4. CAT Relief. Absent individualized evidence that Ms. Rivas personally faced a substantial risk of torture, the claim fell short of CAT’s stringent “more likely than not” requirement.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Gulomjonov v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 601 (7th Cir. 2025). Clarifies that the appellate court reviews both the IJ’s and the BIA’s reasoning “as a whole.” This case provided the template for the court’s integrated review.
• Dai v. Garland, 24 F.4th 628 (7th Cir. 2022). Reiterates the “highly deferential” substantial-evidence standard. The court leaned on Dai to uphold the agency’s factual findings unless the record compelled the opposite.
• Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2009). Establishes that a “pattern or practice” requires a “systematic, pervasive, or organized” effort by state actors, setting a high bar that the petitioners could not clear.
• Halim v. Holder, 755 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2014) and Ahmed v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2006). Both emphasize that finding a pattern or practice effectively grants asylum to every member of the group, justifying the stringent standard.
• Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2011) and N.Y.C.C. v. Barr, 930 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2019). Define “persecution” and explain why sporadic threats or harassment do not suffice.
• Granados Arias v. Garland, 69 F.4th 454 (7th Cir. 2023), and Hernandez-Garcia v. Barr, 930 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2019). Reaffirm that generalized violence, even when severe, is ineffective without evidence of individual targeting or an extreme, state-run campaign.
• Guardia v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2008). Permits the inference that an applicant is safe when similarly situated relatives remain unharmed.
• Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2016) and Ayele v. Holder, 564 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2009). Set the “clear probability” standard for withholding, higher than that for asylum.
• Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2021); Molina-Avila v. Sessions, 907 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 2018); and Mabuneza v. Garland, 16 F.4th 1222 (7th Cir. 2021). Define torture and reaffirm CAT’s rigorous “more likely than not” threshold.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds in two overarching steps:

1. Threshold Factual Findings. Accepting the IJ’s credibility finding, the panel nonetheless noted the total absence of direct threats, arrests, or physical harm to Ms. Rivas, weakening both past-persecution and individualized future-persecution theories.
2. Application of Doctrinal Tests.
   • Pattern or Practice. The petitioners relied on U.S. State Department reports and press articles describing Nicaragua’s sweeping crackdown but could not show a systematic, pervasive, or organized effort targeting either proposed group. The court highlighted the crucial but often overlooked distinction between “oppression” and “persecution”—the former does not automatically establish the latter for asylum purposes.
   • Family Safety Inference. The continuing safety of Ms. Rivas’s mother—an active party member still distributing medicine—was “powerful counter-evidence” that a return posed no reasonable possibility of persecution.
   • Incremental Standards. Because the asylum claim failed, withholding (which demands a higher probability) and CAT (requiring both extreme harm and governmental acquiescence) necessarily failed as well.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Decision

• Asylum Litigation Strategy. Practitioners representing clients who assisted foreign protestors only indirectly will need far more granular evidence—including individualized threats, documented surveillance, or similarly situated individuals actually harmed—to clear the elevated “pattern-or-practice” bar.
• Nicaraguan Claims Nationwide. Thousands of Nicaraguan cases pending before immigration courts may now face tighter scrutiny whenever applicants do not belong to a well-defined, narrowly tailored group or cannot demonstrate personal targeting.
• Family Safety Evidence. Rivas-Jarquin fortifies a line of authority allowing adjudicators to infer safety from unharmed relatives, even when overall country conditions remain dire.
• Judicial Economy. By expressly linking the asylum, withholding, and CAT standards, the panel encourages IJs and the BIA to dispose of higher-threshold claims swiftly once the baseline asylum analysis fails.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Persecution vs. Harassment. Persecution involves serious, life-threatening harm or similarly grave non-physical deprivations. Harassment—insults, sporadic threats, social ostracism—does not qualify.
• Pattern-or-Practice. Think of it as a nationwide policy or campaign: systematic, government-backed, and directed against a discernible group. Isolated or localized incidents, even if frequent, usually fall short.
• Substantial Evidence Standard. On review, the court asks only: Could a reasonable fact-finder have reached the same conclusion? If yes, the court must affirm—even if it personally finds the alternate view more persuasive.
• Clear Probability (Withholding) vs. Reasonable Possibility (Asylum). Imagine rolling dice: a reasonable possibility is any meaningful chance; a clear probability requires odds over 50% (“more likely than not”).
• Convention Against Torture (CAT). Beyond persecution, CAT relief demands proof that (1) the applicant faces at least a 51% risk of severe pain or suffering and (2) that a public official will perpetrate, consent to, or acquiesce in that torture.

5. Conclusion

Rivas-Jarquin v. Bondi is less about Nicaragua than about the evidentiary demands of U.S. asylum law. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion re-energizes a doctrinal framework that:

1. Distinguishes generalized oppression from legally cognizable persecution;
2. Elevates the burden for applicants relying on pattern-or-practice theories, particularly when their own political activity was passive or indirect;
3. Affirms the family safety inference as a potent, sometimes decisive, piece of evidence; and
4. Integrates the escalating standards for asylum, withholding, and CAT into a streamlined analytic cascade.

For immigration advocates, the decision is a cautionary tale: without individualized threats or a narrowly bounded social group, even credible testimony and robust country reports may be insufficient. For the judiciary, the case offers a blueprint for synthesizing precedent while preserving the deferential stance demanded by the substantial-evidence standard.