“Reasonable to Believe” Under Gant Is Less Than Probable Cause: The Fourth Circuit’s Clarification on Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest, Rogers Consistency, and Plain-Error Sentencing

Introduction

In United States v. Turner (No. 22-4055, decided December 4, 2024), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a published decision that clarifies a recurring Fourth Amendment question at the intersection of traffic encounters and custodial arrests: what quantum of suspicion satisfies ARIZONA v. GANT’s “reasonable to believe” standard for a vehicle search incident to arrest? Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Harris confirms that the Gant standard requires less than probable cause and upholds a vehicle search based on a concise but compelling set of facts connecting the crime of arrest to likely evidence in the car.

The court also addressed two additional issues. First, it rejected the defendant’s challenge under United States v. Rogers to minor wording differences between the oral pronouncement of supervised-release conditions and the written judgment—holding that only a “material discrepancy” triggers reversible error and that incorporation by reference to the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) suffices. Second, the court vacated the sentence on plain error because the district court miscalculated the defendant’s criminal history score by counting a juvenile sentence outside the applicable five-year window, which inflated the advisory Guidelines range.

Summary of the Opinion

Fourth Amendment/Search Incident to Arrest: The panel affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. It held that Gant’s “reasonable to believe” threshold is lower than probable cause. On the facts—recent theft of a specific gun, a report that the defendant used that same gun during an apparent carjacking the night before, a shots-fired call at 2:00 a.m. in a gang-activity hotspot, and the defendant’s frisk showing no gun on his person—the officers reasonably believed the stolen gun (evidence of the crime of arrest) might be found in the vehicle.
Automobile Exception: Because the search was valid under Gant’s search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, the court did not reach the government’s alternative automobile-exception argument.
Rogers/Pronouncement of Supervised-Release Conditions: No reversible error. The district court incorporated the PSR’s special conditions at sentencing, and the written judgment matched those conditions. Minor verbal variations during oral recitation were not “material discrepancies.”
Sentencing/Guidelines: The criminal history score was plainly miscalculated. A 2011 juvenile sentence (45 days) was erroneously counted; under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(B), it should count only if imposed within five years of the instant offense, which it was not. The correct score lowers the criminal history category from IV to III and the advisory range from 46–57 months to 37–46 months. The sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing, with the district court free to consider other issues (including potential relief under retroactive Amendment 821) in the first instance.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion situates the search within the Supreme Court’s search-incident-to-arrest doctrine as narrowed for vehicles by ARIZONA v. GANT, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). Under Gant, officers may search a vehicle incident to arrest when it is “reasonable to believe” the vehicle contains evidence relevant to the crime of arrest. The Fourth Circuit’s decision builds on and clarifies its own precedents and aligns with sister-circuit authority:

ARIZONA v. GANT (2009): Limits vehicle searches incident to arrest to two scenarios: (1) arrestee unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment; or (2) it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Only the second prong was at issue.
United States v. Baker, 719 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2013): Explicitly contrasted Gant’s “mere reasonable belief” standard with the automobile exception’s “probable cause” requirement, signaling that Gant’s threshold is lower.
United States v. Davis, 997 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2021): Proceeded to analyze Gant’s standard after concluding probable cause for the automobile exception was lacking, again implying Gant is a less demanding threshold.
United States v. Brinkley, 980 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2020), and PAYTON v. NEW YORK, 445 U.S. 573 (1980): Brinkley held that, in the home-entry context, “reason to believe” equates to probable cause. Turner distinguishes Brinkley due to the heightened Fourth Amendment protection of the home versus the reduced expectation of privacy in vehicles (SOUTH DAKOTA v. OPPERMAN, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)) and because Gant’s formulation is tied to unique vehicle-related circumstances.
ILLINOIS v. GATES, 462 U.S. 213 (1983): Provides the familiar “fair probability” definition of probable cause, which the Fourth Circuit contrasts with Gant’s “might be found” phrasing to underscore the lower threshold.
Sister-circuit support: United States v. Edwards, 769 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2010)—each reading Gant as less demanding than probable cause, avoiding redundancy with the automobile exception.
United States v. Bullette, 854 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2017): Articulates the inevitable-discovery doctrine, which the district court alternatively applied when addressing which officer possessed the requisite belief at the time of the search.
United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Mathis, 103 F.4th 193 (4th Cir. 2024): Govern oral pronouncement of supervised-release conditions and the “material discrepancy” standard for Rogers error; incorporation at sentencing is sufficient.
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016), and Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018): Establish that an incorrect Guidelines range typically affects substantial rights and warrants relief under plain-error review.

Legal Reasoning

1) Fourth Amendment: Gant’s “Reasonable to Believe” Standard

The court squarely embraces the view that Gant’s “reasonable to believe” threshold is less demanding than probable cause. Textually, the Supreme Court used “reasonable to believe” (and even “might be found”), not “probable cause,” a term of art the Court routinely employs when it intends that standard. Structurally, insisting on probable cause would make Gant’s evidentiary rationale redundant with the automobile exception, which independently authorizes a warrantless vehicle search for evidence of any crime upon a showing of probable cause. Functionally, Gant is tailored to the vehicle context, where reduced privacy expectations and officer-safety/evidence-preservation concerns often justify targeted searches tied to the crime of arrest.

Applying that standard, the court affirmed the search:

Officer Flores knew the defendant had stolen a specific gun (a black-and-gray Ruger SR45) from his brother roughly two days earlier, and that he was a validated gang member during a period of gang conflict.
The night before the arrest, a victim reported Turner used that same gun to threaten him during an apparent carjacking.
At 2:00 a.m., officers responded to a shots-fired call at a location known for gang activity; Flores found Turner in the driver’s seat of a parked car outside the store.
A frisk found no gun on Turner’s person, rendering the car the most logical place for the stolen gun (evidence of the crime of arrest) to be found.

Given this sequence, the court found it “eminently reasonable” to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the crime of arrest—namely, the stolen firearm. That satisfies Gant, even though Turner was secured in a patrol car when the search occurred, because the court proceeded under Gant’s evidence-of-crime prong, not the “reaching distance” prong.

The defendant also argued below that the searching supervisor (Corporal Peterson) lacked the requisite belief. The district court alternatively found inevitable discovery: Officer Flores—who plainly had the necessary belief—would have lawfully searched and uncovered the gun in any event. Turner did not pursue this challenge on appeal, and the court saw no error in the district court’s application of inevitable discovery.

2) Rogers Consistency: Oral Pronouncement vs. Written Judgment

Rogers requires district courts to “orally pronounce all discretionary conditions of supervised release” at sentencing, a requirement that can be satisfied by incorporation. Here, the district court incorporated the PSR’s four special conditions after confirming defense review and lack of objection. The written judgment matched the PSR word-for-word.

Although the court went further and read the conditions aloud, its phrasing varied slightly (e.g., “those services” instead of “treatment services”; “any gang member, including the Folk Nation or Gangster Disciples gang, or security threat group” instead of “any Folk Nation/Gangster Disciples gang member/security threat group member”). Under Mathis, not every variance is reversible; only a “material discrepancy” triggers relief. The panel found none: the oral pronouncement and written judgment proscribed the same conduct. The court emphasized that Rogers is not an “empty formality” or a trap for judges who provide additional clarity by reading conditions aloud beyond incorporation.

3) Sentencing: Plain-Error Miscalculation of Criminal History

The parties and the district court mistakenly counted one criminal history point for a 2011 juvenile sentence (45 days), applied under the general 10-year rule. Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(B), because the defendant was under 18 at the time, the conviction should contribute points only if imposed within five years of the instant offense—which it was not. Correct scoring reduces the criminal history score from seven to six, the criminal history category from IV to III, and the advisory range from 46–57 months to 37–46 months.

Even though the defense did not object below, the government conceded plain error affecting substantial rights, and the panel agreed. Under Molina-Martinez and Rosales-Mireles, reliance on an incorrect Guidelines range ordinarily suffices to satisfy the third and fourth prongs of plain-error review. The sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. The panel noted that the district court could also consider, in the first instance, whether Turner may be eligible for additional relief associated with retroactive Amendment 821, and address any other Guidelines issues raised by the parties on remand.

Impact

This decision has several practical and doctrinal implications:

Fourth Amendment Clarity in the Fourth Circuit: The court adopts and cements the view that Gant’s “reasonable to believe” standard is less demanding than probable cause. Officers may, incident to arrest, search a vehicle for evidence of the offense of arrest based on articulable, common-sense facts indicating such evidence might be present—even if they lack probable cause for the automobile exception.
Non-Redundancy with the Automobile Exception: By differentiating the standards, the court preserves doctrinal coherence: Gant’s evidentiary search is tied to the crime of arrest and requires less than probable cause; the automobile exception allows broader searches for evidence of any crime but only with probable cause.
Defense Strategy in Suppression Litigation: Challenges will likely focus on (a) whether the suspected evidence is truly “evidence of the crime of arrest,” and (b) whether facts were too stale or attenuated to establish a reasonable belief at the time of the search.
Rogers Litigation Narrowed: Incorporation of PSR conditions remains a sound practice, and minor oral/written phrasing differences that do not change substantive obligations will not constitute reversible error. Defense counsel should be prepared to identify—and explain—why any variance is materially substantive if seeking Rogers relief.
Sentencing Diligence and Plain Error: The case underscores the need for meticulous criminal-history auditing, especially for juvenile adjudications and youthful offenses subject to § 4A1.2(d)’s five-year window. Even unpreserved mistakes that change the range typically warrant vacatur. The remand directive also signals openness to considering retroactive Guideline amendments (e.g., Amendment 821) as appropriate.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Search Incident to Arrest (Vehicle Context): After a lawful arrest of a recent occupant, officers may search a vehicle without a warrant if (a) the arrestee could access the passenger compartment at the time of the search (officer-safety/escape risk), or (b) it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the specific crime of arrest. Turner involves prong (b).
“Reasonable to Believe” vs. “Probable Cause” vs. “Reasonable Suspicion”:
- Probable cause = a fair probability evidence of a crime will be found; required for the automobile exception.
- Reasonable suspicion = specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity; supports brief detentions (Terry stops).
- Reasonable to believe (Gant) = less than probable cause; sufficient where facts make it reasonable to think evidence of the crime of arrest might be in the car.
Automobile Exception: A separate doctrine allowing a warrantless search of a vehicle if it is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of any crime.
Rogers Rule (Supervised Release Conditions): All discretionary conditions must be pronounced at sentencing, but the court can meet this requirement by incorporating the PSR’s recommended conditions. Minor differences between oral and written versions matter only if they produce a material discrepancy.
Inevitable Discovery: Evidence obtained unlawfully can still be admitted if the government shows it would have been discovered inevitably by lawful means. In Turner, the district court concluded Officer Flores would have lawfully found the gun even if another officer’s knowledge was questioned.
Criminal History for Juvenile Offenses (§ 4A1.2(d)): Prior offenses committed before age 18 count only if they meet specific conditions (e.g., sentence length and timing). A short juvenile sentence imposed more than five years before the instant offense typically should not be scored.
Plain Error (Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)): Relief requires (1) error; (2) that is plain (clear/obvious); (3) affecting substantial rights (often satisfied by an incorrect Guidelines range); and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Turner satisfies all four prongs.

Conclusion

United States v. Turner is a significant Fourth Circuit decision that clarifies the Gant vehicle-search doctrine: “reasonable to believe” means something less than probable cause and authorizes a targeted evidentiary search incident to arrest when grounded in concrete, contemporaneous facts linking the car to evidence of the offense of arrest. The court also reinforces pragmatic administration of Rogers by insisting on materiality before finding an oral/written inconsistency to be reversible error, while affirming that incorporation of PSR conditions satisfies the pronouncement requirement. Finally, the opinion demonstrates the court’s continued adherence to Supreme Court guidance on Guidelines errors: when a miscalculated criminal history score produces the wrong advisory range, plain-error relief is ordinarily warranted.

For practitioners, Turner offers a clear doctrinal roadmap: articulate the nexus between the offense of arrest and likely evidence in the vehicle; scrutinize supervised-release conditions for true material variance; and meticulously verify criminal history scoring—especially juvenile adjudications—at sentencing. In each domain, the court’s analysis favors clarity, proportionality, and fidelity to the distinct purposes of overlapping Fourth Amendment and sentencing doctrines.