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Bapuji Ramji Patel v. Gangaram Madhaorao Deshpande

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Nov 6, 1940
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns a complex question in Hindu law relating to the validity of an adoption made by a grandwidow (the widow of a deceased grandfather) within a Hindu undivided family. The dispute arose over ownership of ancestral property, contested between purchasers claiming under different parties. The core factual issue is whether the grandwidow C could adopt a son to her deceased husband A after A's son B had died, leaving behind a widow D who had remarried and thus was considered as having left the family for adoption purposes. The trial court, lower appellate court, and the court from which this appeal arises all held against the validity of the adoption by the grandwidow, following the traditional view that the power to adopt is linked to property rights and is lost once the estate vests in another. This appeal challenges that view, focusing on the interpretation of adoption as a religious act rather than merely an economic or property-related act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a grandwidow (the widow of a deceased grandfather) can validly adopt a son to her deceased husband under Hindu law after the death of the son and the remarriage (or death) of the son's widow.
  2. Whether the power of adoption by a widow or grandwidow is extinguished or merely suspended upon the vesting of property in the son's widow or other heirs.
  3. The extent to which adoption under Hindu law is a religious act independent of property considerations.
  4. Whether the power of adoption by a grandwidow revives upon the death or incapacity of the son's widow who previously held the power.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
12 Pat 642, (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 Adoption is primarily a religious act for the continuance of lineage, not merely a property act; the widow's power to adopt is suspended while the son is alive and revives on his death. The court relied heavily on this precedent to interpret adoption as a religious duty and concluded that the grandwidow's power to adopt revives upon the death of the son and the son's widow.
59 Bom 360 (’35) 22 AIR 1935 PC 95 The mother (grandwidow) can adopt after the son and widow have ceased to exist for purposes of continuing the line. Supported the view that the grandwidow's power revives when the son's widow is no longer able or willing to adopt.
31 NLR Sup 180 (’36) 23 AIR 1936 Nag 65 The widow's power of adoption is exclusive while she lives; upon her death without adoption, the grandwidow's right revives. Used to affirm that the grandwidow's adoption power is suspended but not extinguished by the widow's existence.
26 Bom 5266 The power of adoption of a former widow is extinguished when the son dies leaving a widow or son to continue the line and cannot be revived. The court noted this dictum but distinguished it as based on property considerations and not fully aligned with the religious conception of adoption.
41 Mad 855 (’18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 74 The widow's power to adopt is limited and ends when her son dies leaving a widow capable of adoption. Referenced to discuss the limits of the widow's adoption power and to contrast with the principle of suspension and revival of adoption power.
39 Bom LR 599 (’38) 25 AIR 1938 Bom 20 Adoption by grandwidow held invalid where the son's widow or grandson existed; differentiated between suspension and extinction of adoption power. Applied to the facts to show the existing uncertainty and to highlight the need for clarifying the revival of adoption power.
10 MIA 279 (1863-66) 3 WR 15 (PC) Adoption power depends on property rights and is extinguished upon vesting of estate in widow or heir. Discussed as representing the "old view" which the court found inadequate for the religious purpose of adoption.
43 Bom 778 (’18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 192 The widow's right to adopt is not dependent on her inheriting the husband's estate. Supported the principle that adoption power is independent of property ownership.
ILR (1939) Nag 88 (’38) 25 AIR 1938 Nag 423 Limits on widow's power to adopt are arbitrary and should be left to the legislature; the limit in 12 Pat 642 is the only recognized limit. Used to underscore the court's caution in restricting adoption powers and to affirm the primacy of 12 Pat 642.
55 Mad 581, (’32) 19 AIR 1932 Mad 227 Summarized the limit of widow's power of adoption consistent with 26 Bom 5266. Noted as inconsistent with some other precedents, highlighting divergent judicial views.
ILR (1937) Bom 508 (’37) 24 AIR 1937 Bom 279 Adoption valid for ceremonial purposes but does not divest property rights after coparcenary termination. Referenced to show intermediate judicial positions on adoption's effect on property.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by recognizing the tension between the traditional property-based view of adoption and the more recent religious conception emphasized in 12 Pat 642. The old view linked the power to adopt strictly with property rights and vested estates, leading to the conclusion that once the son's estate vested in another (such as the son's widow), the grandwidow's power to adopt was extinguished. However, the court noted that 12 Pat 642 reoriented the law by emphasizing adoption as a religious act primarily aimed at ensuring the continuance of the family line through ritual and oblations, independent of property considerations.

Applying this principle, the court reasoned that the grandwidow's power to adopt is suspended (not extinguished) while the son or the son's widow exists and is capable of adopting. Upon their death or incapacity, the grandwidow's power revives, allowing her to adopt a son to her deceased husband to fulfill religious duties. The court distinguished conflicting precedents that had relied solely on property considerations and underscored that the presence of a son who has attained full legal capacity or the presence of a widow capable of adoption suspends but does not permanently extinguish the grandwidow's adoption power.

The court also addressed the anomaly that would arise if the grandwidow's power were extinguished by the mere fact of the son's widow's existence, even momentarily, and held that such a rigid rule would be inconsistent with the spirit of Hindu law and the religious purpose of adoption. The court aligned with decisions such as 59 Bom 360 and 31 NLR Sup 180 supporting revival of the grandwidow's adoption power after the removal of obstacles (death or remarriage of the son's widow).

Balancing these views and following the guidance of the Judicial Committee in 12 Pat 642, the court concluded that the grandwidow's power to adopt had revived in the present case and therefore the adoption in question was valid.

Holding and Implications

Appeal allowed.

The court held that the grandwidow's power to adopt is not permanently extinguished by the existence of a son or son's widow but is suspended and revives upon their death or incapacity. Consequently, the adoption made by the grandwidow in this case was valid. The decision clarifies the application of Hindu adoption law by emphasizing the religious character of adoption over property considerations and resolves conflicting precedents by endorsing the principle of suspension and revival of adoption power. The ruling directly affects the parties by determining the validity of the contested adoption and ownership of the ancestral property. No new precedent beyond the interpretation of existing case law was established.

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal raises a point of difficulty in the Hindu law of adoption. Nearly the whole of this difficulty arises out in 12 Pat 642, (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) a decision of the Judicial Committee that marked a reorientation, if not a definite departure, relating to the factors which have to be considered in determining whether an adoption can be made by a widow. The logical difficulty mainly flows from the consideration that the principle laid down seems to point in one direction whereas certain excerpts from earlier decisions extracted and cited with what appear to be approval seem to point in another direction. For the sake of lucidity, we have invented a word and we shall throughout, so far as possible, use the same letters to describe the following persons:

2. A is the deceased grandfather. B is the deceased father, ??? is the widow of the grandfather termed throughout this judgment the “grandwidow.” D is the father's widow, termed the “widow.” E, E’, E” are the sons natural-born, adopted by widow, adopted by grandwidow respectively. The facts which it is necessary to state before the point can be formulated are as follows: A certain Hindu undivided family included the following members:

3. The appellant is defendant 2, a purchaser of property, parcel of the ancestral property, from Dattu (or Dattoo) defendant 1 and respondent 5. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are purchasers of the suit property from plaintiffs 3 and 4. In essence therefore this is a contest between stranger purchasers of items of joint family property. One says that Dattu is entitled, the others say that Vithal and Kesheo are entitled. That dispute in turn depends on whether Dattu was effectively adopted by Gopibai and that depends on whether A's grandwidow C can adopt a son to A when A had a son B who died leaving widow D who remarried. It is to be assumed that at the date of adoption B was dead and that at that date D had passed out of the family by remarriage so that it was, for all purposes of adoption in that family, as if she were dead. Thus, admittedly, the question can be narrowed down to this: Can the grandwidow adopt to A after A has had a son B who has married, granted B and his wife are dead? It may be said at once that there is a mass of authority supporting a negative answer. A negative answer has been given by the learned Judge from whose decision this Letters Patent appeal has been brought. The lower appellate Court took the same view and the trial Court arrived at the same result but by a line of thought, no longer valid, which may be called the old view. It is as well to observe, however, that the spiritual aspect had been referred to in cases long before 12 Pat 642. (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) It is only necessary to refer to the observations of the Judicial Committee in 3 IA 1542 made as long ago as 1876. The old view was this: The power to adopt was a power relating to property and is lost once the power over property is lost and that power, in so far as it consists in the widow's power by adoption to vest property in an adopted son, is lost once it is acquired by another. The principle established by 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) is that adoption in essence is not an economic but a religious act having for its primary purpose the artificial creation of a son who can, as a real son, offer those oblations necessary for the future well being of the fictional father. One would think that as a logical consequence the question whether C could or could not adopt to A would depend solely on whether there was or could be anyone other than C who could adopt to A. If there is no one else and if A has no son one would have thought that the religious duty or right or power (whichever way one cares to express it) would fall upon or be possessed by C and it would not make the slightest difference that sometime before D (now dead) had the power to adopt to B. The religious need is a son. It is a need divorced from property. Paupers have souls and souls need prayers. That is the fundamental conception. Prayers must be by the living. The living are the more efficacious the nearer they are, and the nearest is the son, natural born or adopted makes no difference. But, aping nature, the power to give a son, actual or fictional, is restricted to a class. There is no need for a grandwidow to adopt to her dead husband if there is a widow to adopt to her dead husband. Obviously there is no need for a grandwidow to adopt at all, if her dead husband has left a son, while the son is living. The purpose of adoption has not arisen.

4. All this follows directly from the reasoning in and the thoughts underlying 12 Pat 642. (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) But what happens if in fact there is neither son nor grandson, the son being dead and his widow not being enceinte, and the grandwidow C wants to adopt to her husband and the widow D does not want to adopt to her husband? The conflict between religious and property considerations is at once brought out. From a religious point of view, of ought to be able to protect her deceased husband from the irreligious D but it is admitted (as it must be on the cases as they stand) that C cannot adopt while D is alive and able, though not willing, to adopt. But it has been very strenuously argued that different considerations apply if D is dead either actually or, for this purpose, in the eye of the law, e.g, by remarrying into another family. We say at once that all the logic seems to be with Mr. Padhye who so argues. The difficulty is that so much authority seems to be the other way. The case mainly relied on by Mr. Padhye was the Privy Council decision in 59 Bom 360 (’35) 22 AIR 1935 PC 95 , 155 IC 493 , 59 Bom 360 , 62 IA 161 (PC) at p. 364. Using the letters already employed the relationships there were:

“E” was adopted after B and D had gone into another family by the adoption of B (who was at the time married: see, 59 Bom 360 (’35) 22 AIR 1935 PC 95 , 155 IC 493 , 59 Bom 360 , 62 IA 161 (PC)). The Judicial Committee, following 12 Pat 642, (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) held that C could adopt E” after B's adoption into another family because the power of a widow to adopt does not depend upon the question of vesting or divesting of the estate. The purpose of an adoption is to secure the continuance of the line, and when the natural son has left no son to continue the line, nor a widow to provide for its continuance by adoption, his mother can make a valid adoption to her deceased husband, although the estate is not vested in her.

5. In 31 NLR Sup 180 (’36) 23 AIR 1936 Nag 65 , 162 IC 571 , 31 NLR Sup 180 (FB), at p. 189 it is pointed out that 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) refers to the doctrine of Hindu law that the husband and wife are one and that in the widow half of the husband survives. Therefore so long as she survives the son is not wholly dead and she alone can adopt and the grandwidow cannot be regarded as sonless and cannot adopt. But when the widow dies actually or notionally the grandwidow's right revives. As the learned Judges there say:

It is on the death of the son's widow without adoption that the mother (the grandwidow of our argument) would have the right to exercise her power to adopt.

6. On the other hand Pollock J., in 17 NLJ 57 (’34) 21 AIR 1934 Nag 183 , 150 IC 1032 , 17 NLJ 57 followed the dictum in 26 Bom 5266 at p. 532 which was quoted without apparent disapproval (Pollock J. says with approval) in 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC):

Where a Hindu dies leaving a widow and a son and that son dies leaving natural born or adopted son or leaving no son but his own widow to continue the line by means of adoption, the power of the former widow is extinguished and can never afterwards be revived.

7. That dictum is expressly based on the reasoning of Lord Kingsdown in 10 MIA 279. (1863-66) 10 MIA 279 , 3 WR 15 (PC) If page 531 of 26 Bom 5266 is read (and it is the page examining what was decided in 10 MIA 279 (1863-66) 10 MIA 279 , 3 WR 15 (PC)) it will be seen that the whole problem is being considered in the light of what we have called the old view—power depending on property. Thus the learned Judge explains Lord Kingsdown's second illustration:

According to it, again, where a Hindu dies leaving a widow and a son, and that son dies leaving his widow and a son, the power of adoption of the former widow is “at an end” the moment the estate passes to the grandson.

8. Illustration 3 also relied on entirely turn, ed on the conception of a vested estate. 39 Bom LR 599 (’38) 25 AIR 1938 Bom 20 , 173 IC 36 , 39 Bom LR 599 is exactly the present case. Purporting to follow 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) a Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the adoption was invalid. The passage relied on at page 603 (from 60 IA 242 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) at p. 256) will be seen on examination to lay down that the grandwidow's power is gone. It leaves open whether it can ever revive. It does however clearly and in express terms differentiate between the case where there is a son (power of grandwidow suspended reviving on son's death) and where there is a grandson or son's widow (power of grandwidow gone). In ILR (1939) Nag 88 (’38) 25 AIR 1938 Nag 423 , 179 IC 82 , ILR (1939) Nag 88 at p. 98, a Bench decision of this High Court to which one of us was a party, it was observed:

Any limit to the widow's power of adoption that may be laid down to avoid practical difficulties would in its nature be arbitrary. It is therefore advisable to leave it to the Legislature to amend the law. In the meantime the limit indicated in 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) may be regarded as the only limit.

9. In 41 Mad 855, (’18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 74 , 46 IC 481 , 41 Mad 855 , 45 IA 156 (PC) a case we shall have to return to when examining 12 Pat 642, (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) the relationships were:

10. B died “after attaining full legal capacity to continue the line of descent either by a natural born son, or by the adoption to him of a son by his widow who was not proved to have no power to adopt.” It was held by the Judicial Committee that c's power to adopt was gone. In 55 Mad 581, (’32) 19 AIR 1932 Mad 227 , 138 IC 170 , 55 Mad 581 , 62 MLJ 187 the limit of the widow's power was regarded as correctly summarized in the passage from 26 Bom 5266 already quoted. So far as we can see, this case, 55 Mad 581, (’32) 19 AIR 1932 Mad 227 , 138 IC 170 , 55 Mad 581 , 62 MLJ 187 is not in agreement with the majority decision in ILR (1937) Bom 508. (’37) 24 AIR 1937 Bom 279 , 170 IC 393 , ILR (1937) Bom 508 , 39 Bom LR 382 (FB) This important case was referred to in ILR (1939) Nag 88 (’38) 25 AIR 1938 Nag 423 , 179 IC 82 , ILR (1939) Nag 88 at p. 92. It takes up an intermediate position where the coparcenary has terminated. It was there held that the adoption is valid for ceremonial purposes but does not divest the property which devolved on the heir of the last surviving coparcener (other than the widow) or those claiming through him or her. We do not feel ourselves bound by 25 NLR 144. (’29) 16 AIR 1929 Nag 98 , 116 IC 499 , 25 NLR 144 (FB) It proceeded on the old view and it was regarded as overruled in 31 NLR Sup 180. (’36) 23 AIR 1936 Nag 65 , 162 IC 571 , 31 NLR Sup 180 (FB) Bose J., in the present case has taken the view he has because, to use his own words: whatever else their Lordships in 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) at p. 650 may have meant they clearly decided that she mother cannot adopt when the son dies leaving a widow who can. We are inclined to agree with that observation. The real difficulty lies in the question: Does the power revive if the son's widow dies, or otherwise becomes incapable of adopting, before she (i.e the son's widow) adopts? We fully bear in mind the warning given by the Judicial Committee in 3 IA 1542 that it is the duty of the Court “to keep the power (to adopt) strictly within the limits which the law has assigned to it.” We contrast this with the warning given in 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) at page 650:

Great caution should be observed in shutting the door upon any authorized adoption by the widow of a sonless man.

11. The difficulty is to find the boundary line. We think the best way to approach that is to take 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) as our guide. It should be made plain that as was pointed out in ILR (1939) Nag 88 (’38) 25 AIR 1938 Nag 423 , 179 IC 82 , ILR (1939) Nag 88 at p. 93, the widow who adopted there, (i.e, in the case reported in 12 Pat 642, (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC)) had no estate vested in her. The estate in question was an impartible zamindari passing by inheritance from which females were excluded. The main argument against the adoption was that the adopting widow had no estate. The estate had vested in the plaintiff before the adoption was made, i.e, on the death of the son. This argument was negatived. The suit was apparently (see, 10 Pat 1 (’30) 17 AIR 1930 Pat 417 , 123 IC 770 , 10 Pat 1 , 11 PLT 268 at pp. 5 and 45 and 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC)) one instituted by a person claiming to succeed as heir to the zamindari on the death of the son and claiming as a separated sapinda. The result was that the suit was dismissed. It should further be made clear what their Lordships decided. There the following persons existed:

12. The rules of succession were such that on the death of A the whole estate passed to B and on the death of B, the whole estate passed through Y to z, unless C could adopt to A. If she could, the whole estate passed to such adopted son, as from the death of the son. When B died he was 20, unmarried, and a ward, C adopted E”. The suit was by Z claiming to succeed and it was dismissed. It was dismissed because the Judicial Committee held that C could adopt E”. Her power to adopt was suspended while B was alive and revived on his death. In the above table Y and A are not brothers but both descend from X. We will first examine 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) and then see how the matter is affected by 59 Bom 360. (’35) 22 AIR 1935 PC 95 , 155 IC 493 , 59 Bom 360 , 62 IA 161 (PC) In 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) at pp. 650-651 their Lordships state that the power is not limitless, that a limit must be fixed consonant to the spirit of Hindu law and equities. The exact words are:

The Hindu law itself sets no limit to the exercise of the power during the lifetime of the (donee), and the validity of successive adoptions in continuance of the line is now well recognized. Nor do the authoritative texts appear to limit the exercise of the power by any considerations of property. But that there must be some limit to its exercise, or at all events some conditions in which it would be either contrary to the spirit of the Hindu doctrine to admit its continuance, or inequitable in the face of other rights to allow it to take effect, has long been recognized both by the Courts in India and by this Board, and it is upon the difficult question of where the line should be drawn, and upon what principle, that the argument in the present case has mainly turned.

13. They then examine the first line of argument addressed to them. That proceeded on the old view, once an estate is vested in X, the widow, not being X, cannot adopt. 10 MIA 279 (1863-66) 10 MIA 279 , 3 WR 15 (PC) was regarded as the leading case. They quote the following from Lord Kingsdown's judgment:

The question is whether the estate of his son being unlimited and that son having married and left a widow his heir, and that heir having acquired a vested estate in her husband's property as widow, a new heir can be substituted by adoption who is to defeat that estate.

14. The italics are their Lordships'. The case in 10 MIA 279 (1863-66) 10 MIA 279 , 3 WR 15 (PC) was this:

15. A died leaving B. B married and died leaving D, his widow and heir. C adopted E”. It was held that E” was not validly adopted. It is a Dayabhaga case. That case was, however, used to show that it was “upon the vesting of the property that the determination of the power of adoption depended.” The validity of the same adoption was again considered on the death of D, in a contest between E” and a distant reversioner, in 8 IA 229.15 It was held that immediately the property vested in D, C's power was “at an end”: see, 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) at p. 652. It will be remembered that E” was adopted while D was alive and there was no suggestion that he was again adopted after D died. The same point exactly arose in 14 IA 67.16 There C adopted while D, in whom B's estate had vested, was alive. There was no second adoption after D had died. 14 IA 67 (’18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 192 , 50 IC 457 , 43 Bom 778 , 46 IA 97 (PC) was followed in 16 IA 16617 where the property passed to the son's widow under a will. Their Lordships in 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) at p. 652 after referring to the argument based on the above cases say:

….. it was well established that power of adoption in a mother was extinguished when her son had died leaving a widow to whom the son's estate passed by inheritance.

16. The italics are ours. Then their Lordships, having observed that some passages in the cases relied on stressed property consideration, go on to say:

It is at least material that in each of the other cases it was the existence of the son's widow that stood in the way of the adoption, and that in none of them was there any suggestion that the same rule would apply if the heir in whom the property had vested were someone other than her.

17. Then they observe ??? a number of cases, that vesting in a coparcener does not defeat the right to adopt. Then they point out that the mother's right is not lost merely because a son is born because if the son dies in infancy she may adopt. So the vesting of the estate in a son does not kill, the power. Then they decline to go through’ the mass of case law which had sprung up in India because they treat it as covered by two cases they proceed to consider. These are 26 Bom 5266 and 45 IA 156. (’18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 74 , 46 IC 481 , 41 Mad 855 , 45 IA 156 (PC) Stating, what these cases decided without expressing approval or disapproval at p. 655 their Lordships at p. 664 return to 45 IA 156 (’18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 74 , 46 IC 481 , 41 Mad 855 , 45 IA 156 (PC), and limit what had been regarded as its effect. It is the fact that their Lordships have been considered to have approved Chandavarkar J.'s judgment in 26 Bom 526, (’38) 25 AIR 1938 Bom 20 , 173 IC 36 , 39 Bom LR 599 at least as regards the passage cited, that is the main obstacle in the appellant's way. The passage quoted is as follows:

Where a Hindu dies leaving a widow and a son, and that son dies leaving a natural born or adopted son or leaving no son but his own widow to continue the line by means of adoption, the power of the former widow is extinguished and can never afterwards be revived.

18. The fatal words are, of course, “and can never…. be revived.” In 26 Bom 5266 the following are the material persons:

19. The above citation lays down that if when B dies there survives D, or E, or E’, C cannot adopt E” at any time whatever. Her power is gone and never revives. In 41 Mad. 855 (’18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 74 , 46 IC 481 , 41 Mad 855 , 45 IA 156 (PC) the following are the material persons:

20. In 41 Mad 855, (’18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 74 , 46 IC 481 , 41 Mad 855 , 45 IA 156 (PC) 26 Bom 526 (’38) 25 AIR 1938 Bom 20 , 173 IC 36 , 39 Bom LR 599 was approved. In that case, 41 Mad 855, (’18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 74 , 46 IC 481 , 41 Mad 855 , 45 IA 156 (PC) the Judicial Committee at p. 860 observed:

He (Chandavarkar, J.) interprets earlier decisions of the Judicial Committee as having established conclusively that…….. there is a limit imposed by law to the period within which a widow can exercise a power of adoption conferred on her, and that when that limit is reached the power is at an end….. on the facts of the present case, the principle must be taken as applying so as to have brought the authority to adopt conferred on (A's) widow (C) to an end when (Brojo), the son she originally adopted, died after attaining full legal capacity to continue the line either by the birth of a natural-born son or by the adoption to him of a son by his own widow. That widow was not a party to the suit, and, whether or not she had power to adopt (Brojo), it has not been established against her that she had no such power. Their Lordships think it right to draw attention to this circumstance, but they do not desire to be understood as saying that even in its absence the succession of (Brojo) and his dying after attaining full legal capacity to continue the line would not in themselves have been sufficient to bring the limiting principle into operation, and so to have so determined the authority of (A's) widow, who was not the widow of the last owner, and could not adopt a son to him.

21. In other words: if there is a son Brojo who attains legal capacity and dies, his mother's power is gone because of the application of the principle in 26 Bom 526.6 This would be so even if Brojo's widow had no power to adopt. The factor that divests the grandwidow of her power is not the presence of a widow but the existence of a son who attains “full legal capacity.” This seems to be the plain meaning of what Lord Haldane, on behalf of the Judicial Committee, wrote. In 12 Pat 642, (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) however, it was held that while there was a (natural-born) son the widow's power was not ended but suspended and on his death revived and this is so even though the son arrives at the age of “full legal capacity” or “ceremonial competence” before dying. Their Lordships in 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) at p. 664 observe:

They think that there is no foundation for the contention that a mother's authority to adopt is extinguished by the mere fact that her son has attained ceremonial competence, and they are satisfied that Lord Haldane had no question of this in mind.

22. In 43 Bom 778, (’18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 192 , 50 IC 457 , 43 Bom 778 , 46 IA 97 (PC) strongly relied on in 12 Pat 642, (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) it was to quote from 12 Patna at p. 657,

laid down in clear terms that the right of the widow to make an adoption is not dependent on her inheriting as a Hindu female owner her husband's estate.

23. An adoption resulting in a divesting was there, 43 Bom 778, (’18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 192 , 50 IC 457 , 43 Bom 778 , 46 IA 97 (PC) upheld. Their Lordships in 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) at p. 657 add:

It necessarily follows, their Lordships think, from this decision, that the vesting of the property on the death of the last holder in someone other than the adopting widow, be it either another coparcener of the joint family, or an outsider claiming by reverter, or, their Lordships would add, by inheritance, cannot be in itself the test of the continuance or extinction of the power of adoption.

24. What may be called the first line of thought concerned with property ends there with the conclusion that the fact that property has vested in X does not present an obstacle to C adopting. It ends with a renunciation of the view that the vesting in B, a person who dies after attaining full legal capacity, and whether he leaves a widow with power to adopt or not ends finally the power of C to adopt. It re-states the view that the presence of B or D “ends” the power of C. It leaves in a state of great uncertainty the question whether when E and D die the power of C revives. 41 Mad 855 (’18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 74 , 46 IC 481 , 41 Mad 855 , 45 IA 156 (PC) approving 26 Bom 5266 seems to indicate: (1) the existence of B and his survival to an age of full legal competence “ended” the power of C; (2) once ended, it could never revive. 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) explaining 41 Mad 855 (’18) 5 AIR 1918 PC 74 , 46 IC 481 , 41 Mad 855 , 45 IA 156 (PC) said that c's power in the case put was not ended but suspended and when B died C's power revived. Next, their Lordships deal with the second line of thought, concerned with religious ideas. Now appears the observation at p. 658:

It being clear upon the decisions above referred to that the interposition of a grandson, or the son's-widow, brings the mother's power of adoption to an end….

25. Then is considered the question whether the birth or adoption of a son has that effect. The conclusion is that it has not. If the observation quoted from 12 Pat 642 (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) at p. 658 supra be understood as limited to the case where the widow (D) or the grandson (E) stands between (is interposed) the grandwidow C and her power, everything is clear except for the words “and can never be revived” quoted from 26 Bom 526.6 Strictly the above is the true meaning of their Lordships' words. That amounts to nothing more than this: that while D or E is alive and competent to adopt his or her existence prevents any adoption being made by C. That leaves at large what happens when the “interposition” is ended. Logic says that as the death of the son removes his “interposition” whereupon C's power revives, so the death of D removes her interposition and so c's power revives. Turning now to 59 Bom 360 (’35) 22 AIR 1935 PC 95 , 155 IC 493 , 59 Bom 360 , 62 IA 161 (PC) at p. 364 their Lordships note the departure made by 12 Pat 642. (’33) 20 AIR 1933 PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) They are concerned with a case where B was in existence, became of age, married D and then with D passed, by adoption, into another family. The Judicial Committee observe at p. 364:

In the present case the natural son B with his wife D having ceased to exist for the purpose of continuing the line in the Ahmima family, his mother C was entitled to make an adoption to secure that object.

26. It is, of course, true that D there never became a widow and so never attracted the idea that once a widow the grand-widow's power is forever gone. Can we however have a rule which says that if B and D die together C's power, which was suspended while either of them lived (was interposed), revives, but if B dies on Monday and D on Tuesday (a thing which frequently happens in time of plague) C's power, which was ended by D's becoming a widow for a day, does not revive? The Hindu law has anomalies but this anomaly would be founded entirely on Judge made difficulties. If this is so then the true rule is that the grand-widow's power is suspended by the interposition of various persons: son, son's widow, son's son, and revives with the removal of the obstacle. Balancing as best we can the opposing views and noting that the above is in conformity with the view expressed in 31 NLR Sup 180, (’36) 23 AIR 1936 Nag 65 , 162 IC 571 , 31 NLR Sup 180 (FB) a Full Bench decision of the Judicial Commissioner's Court, we are of the opinion that the appeal succeeds and must be allowed with costs throughout. This being our conclusion the question of ceremonial competence does not arise.

D.S/R.K

27. Appeal allowed.