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Ajabrao Domajee v. Atmaram Sadasheorao
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff Ajabrao sued for possession and injunction in respect of two fields (Nos. 148 and 217) in Dahegaon Joshi, Ramtek, Nagpur. The factual history stretches back to an 1879 mortgage by Ganesh in favour of Ajabrao; Ajabrao obtained a decree in 1913 and purchased the fields in execution of that decree, obtaining possession in 1924. A subsequent mortgage in favour of Sadasheorao (the malguzar) led to competing litigation: Sadasheorao obtained a decree and purchased the property subject to Ajabrao's prior mortgage.
Ajabrao later brought a suit (Civil Suit No. 227 of 1925) against Sadasheorao based on his earlier mortgage and obtained a decree allowing Sadasheorao the right to redeem. Upon failure to redeem, Ajabrao obtained possession on 31 March 1933. Sadasheorao dispossessed Ajabrao and leased field No. 217, prompting Ajabrao to file Civil Suit No. 32-A of 1935, which resulted in a decree for possession and a perpetual injunction in favour of Ajabrao; possession was in fact delivered to Ajabrao on 21 May 1939.
The present suit (Civil Suit No. 3-A of 1944) was filed on 7 February 1944 after Ajabrao alleged a further dispossession on or about 1 May 1942 by Sadasheorao and leases to other defendants. Sadasheorao had died before the suit; the suit named his two minor sons and widow as defendants. The trial Court found the facts largely for Ajabrao but dismissed the suit as barred by Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), reasoning that execution of the earlier decree was the available remedy. Ajabrao appeals this decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the present suit (filed 7 February 1944) was within the period of limitation for a suit for possession following dispossession (i.e., whether Ajabrao was dispossessed within three years of filing).
- Whether the suit is barred under Section 47 of the CPC because an execution remedy was allegedly available under the earlier decree (Civil Suit No. 32-A of 1935), in particular whether Order 21, Rule 32(5) permits execution of a prohibitory perpetual injunction decree so as to grant possession.
- Whether the appeal has abated in respect of a deceased respondent (respondent No. 4, Krishnarao) and whether substitution of his widow (Satyabhamabai) on the record was effective or should be permitted despite delay and lack of prior notice.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Ajabrao)
- Ajabrao maintained he had established title against Sadasheorao through prior suits and decrees and that he had been in possession (including acts of cultivation in 1941) prior to the alleged dispossession in 1942, so that the present suit was within the limitation period.
- Implicitly and explicitly in the proceedings on substitution, the appellant argued that since Satyabhamabai's name was placed on the record (pursuant to the Chief Justice's order), substitution had been effected and the appeal had not abated; the appellant also filed an affidavit explaining delay in making the substitution application and asked that the application for substitution and for setting aside abatement be allowed.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents contended that the trial Court's findings were erroneous and that Ajabrao had failed to prove title and dispossession within the three-year limitation period applicable to suits for possession after dispossession (Article 142, Limitation Act).
- Respondents (particularly 1 to 3) argued that Ajabrao's remedy was execution of the decree in Civil Suit No. 32-A of 1935 and therefore the present suit was incompetent and barred by Section 47 CPC. They relied on Order 21, Rule 32 (sub-rule (5)) of the CPC and cited authorities (including Sachi Prasad v. Amar Nath Roy and Arjun Singh v. Sahu Maharaj Narain) to support the proposition that possession could be obtained on execution rather than by bringing a fresh suit.
- Respondents argued that substitution had not been properly effected because no notice of the substitution application had been sent to Satyabhamabai, and thus that the appeal had abated as to the deceased respondent.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sachi Prasad v. Amar Nath Roy, AIR 1919 Cal 674 | Authority relied upon by the trial Court for the proposition that an execution remedy under an earlier decree could render a fresh suit incompetent (suggesting execution could supply possession). | The court held this authority was not persuasive for the proposition applied by the trial Court: the decision contained a dictum by Richardson J. favouring the trial Court's view but Beachcroft J. expressed no opinion. The present Court rejected the application of Sachi Prasad to preclude the fresh suit. |
| Arjun Singh v. Sahu Maharaj Narain, AIR 1950 All 415 | Referred to by respondents supporting the proposition that possession may be treated as ancillary to another decree (in that case, specific performance) and hence executed rather than litigated afresh. | The court distinguished that case: it dealt with specific performance where possession was ancillary. The court held that the reasoning in Arjun Singh did not apply to a decree of perpetual (prohibitory) injunction like the earlier decree in this matter. |
| Hemchandra Naskar v. Narendra Nath, AIR 1934 Cal 402 | Authority dissenting from the Sachi Prasad dictum and supporting a contrary view on the scope of Order 21 R.32(5). | The court cited this decision as supporting the proposition that sub-rule (5) of R.32 applies to mandatory injunctions and does not authorize execution to grant possession in the context of a prohibitory perpetual injunction; it was relied upon in rejecting the trial Court's reliance on Sachi Prasad. |
| Angad v. Madho Ram, AIR 1938 All 416 | Another authority noted as taking a view contrary to the dictum in Sachi Prasad concerning execution of decrees for injunctions. | Used by the court as supporting precedent for the proposition that Order 21 R.32(5) relates to mandatory injunctions and does not permit execution to furnish the possession-relief sought here. |
| Chinnabha Chetty v. Chengalroya, AIR 1950 Mad 237 | Authority cited as part of the line of cases dissenting from or limiting the Sachi Prasad dictum. | Relied on by the court as further authority supporting the interpretation that sub-rule (5) applies to mandatory injunctions and not to prohibitory perpetual injunctions seeking possession. |
| Toon Lal v. Sonoo Lall, AIR 1938 Pat 522 | Authority showing contrary reasoning to Sachi Prasad; cited as part of the body of decisions limiting the application of R.32(5) to mandatory injunctions. | Referenced by the court as additional support for the conclusion that the earlier decree did not afford an execution remedy to obtain possession in the circumstances of this case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in stages, applying the evidence and legal principles strictly as presented in the record:
- Title and prior decrees: The Court accepted the findings of the lower Court that Ajabrao had established his title vis-à-vis Sadasheorao through the sequence of decrees and purchases; because those matters were decided inter partes in prior suits, they could not be reopened. Ajabrao's status as mortgagee and Sadasheorao's failure to redeem were treated as conclusively establishing Ajabrao's title.
- Limitation: The Court reviewed the evidence on possession. It accepted testimony (including receipt of possession documents and witnesses P.W.1 and P.W.2) that actual possession was delivered to Ajabrao on 21 May 1939 and that Ajabrao cultivated the fields in 1941. The alleged dispossession was said to have occurred on or about 1 May 1942 and the suit was filed on 7 February 1944. Given the findings that cultivation and possession continued into 1941 and that there was no evidence of dispossession earlier, the Court concluded the suit was within the three-year limitation period applicable to dispossession suits.
- Section 47 CPC / Execution question: The central legal debate was whether the remedy under the earlier decree (Civil Suit No. 32-A of 1935) could be executed to obtain possession, thereby barring the fresh suit under Section 47 CPC. Respondents relied on Order 21, Rule 32(5) of the CPC and authorities (notably Sachi Prasad) for the proposition that execution could be used to obtain possession.
- Distinguishing injunction types and the scope of R.32(5): The Court analyzed the wording of sub-rule (5) and the authorities and concluded that sub-rule (5) is apposite only to mandatory injunctions (which can be enforced by the court directing action to be done, possibly coupled with possession in an execution context) and not to prohibitory perpetual injunctions (which prohibit action and are enforced by committal for contempt). The earlier decree in the 1935 suit had resulted in a prohibitory perpetual injunction; once that decree had been executed to effect possession, the decree was exhausted and could not be executed again to obtain possession a second time.
- Precedential support and rejection: The Court reviewed conflicting authorities. It noted Richardson J.'s dictum in Sachi Prasad (which had appealed to the lower Court) but observed that other decisions (Hemchandra Naskar, Angad v. Madho Ram, Chinnabha Chetty, Toon Lal) dissented from or took contrary views and supported the narrower reading of R.32(5). The court found the narrower view persuasive and thus rejected the trial Court's reliance on Sachi Prasad to hold the present suit barred by Section 47 CPC.
- Consequence for remedy: Because the earlier decree could not furnish the possession remedy by execution in the present circumstances, a fresh suit for possession was the appropriate remedy after loss of possession. Therefore Section 47 did not bar Ajabrao's suit.
- Abatement and substitution: The Chief Justice had earlier ordered that the widow of the deceased respondent No. 4 be brought on the record, and that the question of abatement be decided at the hearing. Although notice of the substitution application was not given to Satyabhamabai, she had been served with notice of the appeal and did not appear. The appellant filed an affidavit explaining delay in seeking substitution; respondents did not contest it. Considering the circumstances and representations made, the Court allowed substitution, set aside abatement and extended time for the substitution application. The Court also noted that the son (already a party) represented whatever interest the widow might have under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, though the Court did not decide that point.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
APPEAL ALLOWED. The judgment and decree of the Court below are reversed. The plaintiff Ajabrao's claim for possession of the two fields and for a perpetual injunction against the defendants is decreed. Substitution of the widow Satyabhamabai for the deceased respondent No. 4 is allowed; the abatement is set aside; and the respondents are ordered to bear the entire costs of the appeal and of the Court below.
Implications:
- The direct effect is a reversal of the trial Court's dismissal and a decree in favour of Ajabrao for possession and perpetual injunction against the defendants named in the suit.
- The Court held that Section 47 CPC did not bar the present suit because the earlier decree (a prohibitory perpetual injunction) could not be executed a second time to obtain possession; therefore a fresh suit for possession was proper once possession had been lost.
- No broad new legal principle beyond the applied interpretation of Order 21, Rule 32(5) (i.e., that sub-rule (5) is applicable to mandatory injunctions and not to prohibitory perpetual injunctions) is announced as a general precedent beyond the case's reasoning; the decision relies on and aligns with earlier contrary authorities to Sachi Prasad rather than creating an independent expansive rule.
This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add information not present in that text.
1. This appeal is by the plaintiff Ajabrao in a suit for possession of two fields Nos. 148 and 217 situated at mouza Dahegaon Joshi, tahsil Ramtek, district Nagpur, and for injunction. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground that it was barred under Section 47 of the CPC.
2. The facts of the case go back to the year 1879. The plaintiff's case is that he was a mortgagee from one Ganesh in respect of these two fields. This mortgage was executed by Ganesh in the year 1879 and Ajabrao filed a suit on foot of this mortgage and obtained a decree in 1913. Ajabrao then purchased these fields in his own decree and obtained possession in 1924. Ganesh had executed a subsequent mortgage in favour of the malguzar of the village, Sadasheorao. Sadasheorao also brought a suit on his mortgage and obtained a decree and purchased these fields subject to Ajabrao's mortgage. Ajabrao had not joined Sadasheorao, the subsequent mortgagee, in his first suit. Ajabrao thereupon brought a second suit against Sadasheorao on the basis of his mortgage of 1879. That was Civil Suit No. 227 of 1925. In that suit Ajabrao obtained a decree (Ex. P-8) against Sadasheorao. By that decree Sadasheorao was given the chance of redeeming the mortgage on payment of Rs. 1,582/-. On failure to pay that amount, Ajabrao's suit against him for possession was to be decreed. It appears that Sadasheorao did not redeem the mortgage of Ajabrao and as a result, possession of these fields was given to Ajabrao on 31st March 1933. Exhibit P-11 is the receipt of possession in favour of Ajabrao.
3. Sadasheorao thereafter interfered with the possession of Ajabrao and dispossessed him and leased out field No. 217 to one Chindhu. Ajabrao was forced to file another suit (Civil Suit No. 32-A of 1935, decided on 17th December 1936) for possession and injunction. This suit was decreed in favour of Ajabrao. Exhibit P-6 is the judgment of the Court. A warrant for possession was taken out by Ajabrao (Ex. P-9) and on 21st May 1939 possession was again handed over to Ajabrao. Exhibit P-10 is the receipt of possession.
4. We now come to the happenings which furnished the cause of action in the present suit. Ajabrao's allegation is that he was again dispossessed of these two fields by Sadasheorao on or about 1st May 1942. Sadasheorao also leased out the fields to defendants 4 and 5 (Krishnarao and Laxman who are father and son). The present suit (Civil Suit No. 3-A of 1944) was accordingly brought by Ajabrao on 7th February 1944. Before the suit was brought, it appears, Sadasheorao had died and the suit was therefore directed against his two minor sons who are the first two respondents and Sadasheorao's widow who is the third respondent in this appeal.
5. The defendants in the case contested all the facts pleaded by Ajabrao. They also pleaded that the suit was barred under Section 47 of the CPC. A question of limitation was also raised by the defendants.
6. The learned Judge of the Court below found all the facts in favour of Ajabrao but held on the authority of — ‘Sachi Prasad v. Amar Nath Roy’, AIR 1919 Cal 674 (A), that the present suit was incompetent because remedy by way of execution of the decree in Civil Suit No. 32-A of 1935 was available. On the question whether the plaint should be treated as an application for execution, the learned Judge did not allow it to be so treated, holding that the application could only be made to another Court.
7. Against this decision Ajabrao appeals. During the pendency of this appeal the fourth respondent Krishnarao died. An application for substitution of the name of his widow Satyabhamabai was made 790 days after his death. Together with the application for substitution of the name, the appellant applied for setting aside the abatement and also for condonation of the delay in making the application for setting aside the abatement. These applications came for hearing before the Honourable the Chief Justice on 2nd September 1952. The learned Chief Justice passed the following order on all the applications:
“Let the widow of the deceased respondent No. 4 be brought on the record of this case, and the question whether or not in the circumstances of this case the appeal or any portion of it abates will be determined at the hearing of the appeal itself.”
8. Notice of the application for substitution or of setting aside the abatement or of condonation of the delay in making these applications was not sent to Satyabhamabai. Notice of the appeal on merits was, however, sent to her. The office also got the cause title corrected and Satyabhamabai's name is shown in place of the deceased Krishnarao. We mention these facts because the respondents argue that the appeal has abated in so far as Krishnarao is concerned and this has caused a total abatement of the entire appeal. We shall take this question at the end.
9. There can be no doubt that Ajabrao is a very ill-used man. He has been required to bring a succession of suits and has been unable to enjoy the fruits of his decree obtained as far back as 1913. The learned counsel for the respondents argue that the findings given by the first Court are erroneous and Ajabrao has failed to prove his title to these two fields. Their contention is that since the suit is one for possession after dispossession by the defendants, it is incumbent upon Ajabrao to establish his title and also that he was dispossessed within three years of the filing of the suit as in a suit falling under Article 142, Limitation Act.
10. As regards the title of Ajabrao, there can be no doubt that as between him and Sadasheorao, the title is established. Both Sadasheorao and Ajabrao were purchasers of these two fields in their two decrees. Ajabrao had not joined the subsequent mortgagee Sadasheorao in his suit and was thus bound to afford him a chance of redeeming his mortgage. Sadasheorao, on the other hand, had obtained a decree on his mortgage and obtained possession of the property subject to the mortgage of Ajabrao. Ajabrao's suit, therefore, against Sadasheorao on the basis of his mortgage clearly established the title which the learned counsel for the respondents say ought to have been proved in the case. Ajabrao was in the position of a mortgagee and Sadasheorao was set to redeem the mortgage, which he failed to do. As a result, Ajabrao obtained possession from Sadasheorao in 1933. These matters being ‘inter partes’ cannot now be reopened and Ajabrao has, therefore, successfully established his title to the property as against Sadasheorao.
11. Sadasheorao thereafter took the law into his own hands and dispossessed Ajabrao, but Aiabrao established his right to the property in the second suit which he filed in 1935. In that suit again Ajabrao obtained possession in May 1939 and also obtained a perpetual injunction against Sadasheorao.
12. The only questions which arise in this case are whether the present suit is within time and, secondly, whether it is barred under Section 47 of the CPC. The learned Judge of the trial Court has given a finding that the suit is not barred by time. The evidence of Kushaba (P.W 1) who has attested the receipt of possession and of Mahadeo (P.W 2) who was the process server shows that actual possession was delivered to Ajabrao on 21st May 1939. Both these witnesses have stated that Ajabrao obtained possession of these fields by actually ploughing them. We see no reason to doubt their testimony, particularly as it has not been controverted by any evidence on the side of the defendants.
13. It would thus appear that in 1939 Ajabrao obtained actual possession of tnese two fields and Sadasheorao was prohibited by a perpetual injunction from interfering with his possession. The present suit was filed on 7th February 1944. We have therefore to see whether within three years of that date Ajabrao was in possession and was dispossessed by an ace of Sadasheorao and defendants 4 and 5. Ajabrao led evidence on this point. His witnesses are Ramkrishna (P.W 3), Anandrao (P.W 4) and Sardar (P.W 5). These witnesses establish that in 1941 Ajabrao had ploughed these fields and had sown ‘juar’ and ‘tur’ crop in them. The learned Judge of the Court below has accepted the evidence of these witnesses and we find nothing to reject that finding. It is obvious that during the years which followed the grant of possession in 1939 these fields were lying fallow. The defendants have filed Jamabandis up to the year 1936–1937 and from 1942–1943 onwards. They have purposely refrained from filing any Jamabandi or document for the intervening years. The evidence of the defendants' witnesses also shows no act of cultivation or possession by Sadasheorao during these vital years. The possession, which Ajabrao obtained in 1939, thus remained undisturbed till the summer of 1941, when, one of the witnesses for Ajabrao states, the summer operations had been done by some other person.
14. There is no evidence of any act of dispossession on the part of Sadasheorao during the years following the agricultural year 1936–1937 up to the agricultural year 1942–1943. Since we have held that Ajabrao established his title against Sadasheorao in the two suits which had gone before, possession of these fallow lands will be referable to the lawful title in Ajabrao. In the absence of any evidence to show that Ajabrao had been dispossessed, we cannot hold that Ajabrao was dispossessed at any time prior to the summer of 1941. Even if we accept the evidence of the witness who states this, the suit which has been brought in 1944 (February) would be well within limitation. Further, Ajabrao also obtained possession when he cultivated the lands during 1941–1942. The suit is, therefore, not barred by limitation.
15. This brings us to the main controversy in the case, namely, whether the decree which had been passed in Civil Suit No. 32-A of 1935 ought to have been executed by Ajabrao and whether the present suit is barred under Section 47 of the CPC because Ajabrao did not resort to execution but brought the present suit. The learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 argues that Order 21, R. 32, applies to all grants of injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory. His contention is that under sub-rule (5) of R. 32 the Court could, while punishing Sadasheorao, also grant possession, to Ajabrao. He argues, therefore, that Ajabrao ought to have applied for execution of the decree in Civil Suit No. 32-A of 1935 and asked for possession and not brought this suit. He refers to — ‘Arjun Singh v. Sahu Maharaj Narain’, AIR 1950 All 415 (B) and contends that the principle in that case should be applied to the present matter.
16. That case was concerned with a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale and possession was considered as an ancillary matter. The present case is one of perpetual injunction and the reasoning in the Allahabad case does not apply to the present facts. A decree of perpetual injunction can only be executed by looking up the recalcitrant judgment-debtor in a civil jail by proceedings under the law of Contempt of Courts. sub-rule (5) of R. 32 covers only mandatory injunctions and not prohibitory injunctions. The ruling in — ‘Sachi Prasad v. Amar Nath Roy (A)’ (cit. sup.) is itself no authority for the proposition which the learned Judge has enunciated. In that case, of the two learned Judges Richardson J. took the view which has appealed to the learned Judge of the Court below, while the other learned Judge, Beachcroft J. expressed no opinion.
17. The decision in — ‘Sachi Prasad v. Amar Nath Roy, (A)’ (cit. sup.) was expressly dissented from in that very Court in — ‘Hemchandra Naskar v. Narendra Nath’, AIR 1934 Cal 402 (C), and also in — ‘Angad v. Madho Ram’, AIR 1938 All 416 (D) and — ‘Chinnabha Chetty v. Chengalroya’, AIR 1950 Mad 237 (E). A contrary reasoning is also to be found in — ‘Toon Lal v. Sonoo Lall’, AIR 1938 Pat 522 (F). With all due respect, the much dissented dictum of Richardson J. does not appeal to us. The words of sub-r. (5) of R. 32 clearly indicate that they are apposite only to mandatory injunctions & not to prohibitory injunctions. The earlier sub-rules may contemplate both kinds of injunctions, but the wording in those sub-rules is not the same as in sub-rule (5). This matter has been elaborated in the rulings to which we have referred and we need not therefore go more elaborately into this matter. We accordingly hold that the earlier decree did not afford the relief of possession by way of execution which Ajabrao seeks in the present case.
18. After Ajabrao's suit for possession was decreed and execution of that decree was had and Ajabrao obtained possession, that decree was exhausted and was incapable of execution a second time. All that remained was only a prohibitory injunction against Sadasheorao and that injunction could only be enforced against Sadasheorao by the penalty of commitment to detention. That remedy was inappropriate to a case in which possession had been lost. Once Ajabrao had lost possession of these fields at the instance of Sadasheorao, he could only obtain possession by bringing a fresh suit. In our opinion, the learned Judge of the Court below was in error in holding that the present suit was barred under Section 47 of the CPC.
19. Once we reverse that decision, the entire decision is in favour of Ajabrao and a decree for possession must therefore follow. It was pointed out that Ajabrao has again asked for a perpetual injunction against the defendants in the case. There was no perpetual injunction against the first three defendants because that injunction was against Sadasheorao personally. Similarly, there was no perpetual injunction against the other defendants in the earlier suit because they were not parties thereto. The relief of perpetual injunction was therefore correct in the present case. We accordingly reverse the decision of the lower Court and decree the entire claim of Ajabrao for possession as well as perpetual injunction against the defendants in the case. This, of course, is subject to our decision on the question of abatement.
20. As regards abatement, it is unfortunate — and we say it respectfully — that no notice of the application for substitution etc., was sent to Satyabnamabai before her name was brought on the record of the case. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that since the name of satyar bnamabai is on the record of the case it must be held that substitution has already been effected and no question of abatement can now arise. The learned counsel for the respondents contend the opposite. It is clear that the learned Chief Justice intended substituting the name of Satyabhamabai subject to any objection at the time of hearing. The order which has been passed cannot be interpreted differently. Of course, the appropriate course was to make the order about substitution prior to bringing the legal representative on the record and not leave it to be considered at the hearing. Perhaps the learned Chief Justice did not wish to join her but merely brought her on record to afford her an opportunity to state what she wished. Satyabhamabai was sent a notice of this appeal but has not cared to put in an appearance. She was personally served with the notice and her son was represented before us.
21. We also examined this matter from the point, of view of the application itself. We are of opinion, that the affidavit which has been filed by the appellant explaining the delay in making the application for substitution should be accepted. A long time has now elapsed and the learned counsel, for the respondents have not attempted to controvert that affidavit. Even at the hearing no effort was made to controvert it or to challenge the affidavit of Ajabrao in any way. In view of this, even if the matter were open to us, we allow the applications for substitution, for setting aside the abatement and for extending the time for making the application for setting aside the abatement. Since Satyabhamabai has had an opportunity of contending the contrary, we see no reason to issue a fresh notice to her. It may also be pointed out that the fourth and fifth defendants, are father and son, and the son is already on the record of the case representing such interest as Satyabhamabai may have obtained under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. However, we need not go into that question because we think the application for substitution should be allowed and the abatement set aside. In view of this, we see no reason to order the abatement of the appeal. The judgment and decree of the Court below are reversed and in place thereof the claim of the plaintiff for possession and injunction is decreed. The respondents, shall bear the entire costs of this appeal as also of the Court below.
B/D.R.R
22. Appeal allowed.
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