Joint Family Firm Of Jamnalal Ramlal Kimtee v. Kishendas And State Of Hyderabad

Mohd. Ahmed Ansari, J.:— On the application of the Firm of Jamnalal Ramlal Kimtee under Article 228 of the Constitution this Court has sent for the record of the execution proceedings arising out of a compromise decree before the City Civil Court, Hyderabad for determining certain issues relating to the: validity of the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act, No. 12 of 1952, under which the records of the case have been summoned from the Civil Court by the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board.

2. The decree holder is the joint Hindu family firm styled Jamnalal Ramlal Kimtee. It had filed a suit in the District Judge's Court, Secunderabad, to recover Rs. 31,350 from Kishendas, who claims to be a Jagirdar. On 13-12-1943, a decree was passed in terms of a compromise whereby Kishendas promised to pay Rs. 17,500 on or before 15-2-1944. It provided that in default of payment the amount shall carry annual interest at 6 per cent until realisation.

3. The judgment-debtor having failed to pay, the execution proceedings were transferred to the City Civil Court, Hyderabad, where they are still pending. The judgment-debtor appears to have set up the plea that he had pledged some jewels with the decree-holder; that subsequent to the decree the jewels were agreed to be sold and the proceeds to be appropriated towards the decretal amount; and that consequently the decree-holder was not entitled to apply for execution. The; execution Court found on evidence that the alleged agreement was not proved and the finding was upheld in appeal by this Court on 23-10-1952.

4. On the proceedings being recommenced in the City Civil Court, the judgment-debtor raised a further plea about the Court not having jurisdiction to proceed with the execution in view of the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act, which had come into operation on 18-3-1952. The decree-holder denied that the judgment-debtor was a Jagirdar and challenged the aforesaid Act on the strength of Articles 14, 19 and 254 of the Constitution.

5. The petition of the decree-holder now before us is directed against the judgment-debtor and the Hyderabad State and invokes our powers under Article 228. It prays that either the execution case be withdrawn and disposed of by this Court, or the constitutional questions relating to the validity of the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act be settled and the case returned to the lower Court for disposal in conformity with the decision of this Court.

6. According fo the petitioner the Act is void because:

(1) It discriminates against the creditors of Jagirdars by directing their debts to be drastically reduced and scaled down under Sections 28 and 35, by depriving them of the rights of realising their decretal amounts in the several modes under the Code of Civil Procedure, and by favouring certain class of creditors under Section 3 who are excluded from the operation of the Act.

(2) It establishes Boards with exclusive jurisdiction and arbitrary powers and curtails the right of parties to have legal assistance before the Board, and

(3) It contains provisions repugnant to those of the Code of Civil Procedure which had been applied to Part ‘B’ States earlier in April 1951.

7. On the petition being admitted, the opposite parties were directed to file their statements and the records of the case were summoned from the court executing the decree. During the course of the argument before us the learned Advocate of the decree-holder added a further ground in support of his plea relating to the invalidity of the Act. He argued that because Sections 28, 35 and 37 of the impugned Act authorise the reduction and scaling down of the decretal amounts, without providing for compensation, the law constitutes deprivation of property and is repugnant to Article 31 also.

8. The constitutionality of the Act is thus challenged, on four grounds and we propose to deal first with the argument founded on Article 19. Although the petition does not specifically mention which of the rights guaranteed by Article 19 have been infringed by the impugned Act, it is obvious from the several grounds of the petition that the petitioner's claim rests on Article 19(1)(f). In order therefore to succeed it must be shown that the alleged infringement does not amount to reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public; for such restriction on freedom to hold property has been permitted by clause (5) of Article 19.

9. The principles governing this question are explained in the — ‘State Of Madras v. V.G Row .’, AIR 1952 S.C 196 (A), thus:

“……….both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the impugned restrictive law should be examined, from the point of view of reasonableness; that is to say, the court should consider not only factors such as the duration and the extent of the restriction, but also the circumstances under which and the manner in which their imposition has been authorised. It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied, to each individual statute impugned and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases.

The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent and the urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, that is, proportion of the imposition, the prevailing condition at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict

In valuing such illusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of Judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have in authorising the imposition of the restrictions considered them to be reasonable.”

10. The aforesaid observations should be read along with an earlier pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of — ‘Chintaman Rao v. State Of Madhya Pradesh .’, AIR 1951 SC 118 (B), where the phrase “reasonable restriction” in Article 19(6) was construed to imply intelligent care and deliberation in the choice of a course by the legislature. There it was held that legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right, cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and therefore the restriction must have a reasonable relation to the object which the legislature seeks to achieve and which is necessitated by public interest.

11. We need not cite other authorities and burden this part of the judgment, since the earlier pronouncement of the Supreme Court referred to above has been consistently followed. The observations of the learned ex-Chief Justice of India in the later case are safe guide in adjudicating on complaints of any particular statute being violative of Article 19.

12. Under Section 267(2) of the Hyderabad CPC an execution application regarding any jagir or inam land or any right pertaining to such tenures had to be decided by the Inam Department according to the Rules framed by the Government. According to the decision of the High Court the incomes of the jagirs could not be attached without permission of the Inam Department, and if such attachment was desired the Court could get such attachment made by forwarding the prayer to the aforesaid Department.

13. It is also well established that neither a jagir nor the income from such tenures could be sold like ordinary properties. Therefore the right of a decree-holder against such properties was always limited so long as the income was not realised or invested. The Abolition of Jagir Regulation was passed by the Military Governor in exercise of the authority conferred by a firman of H.E.H the Nizam.

14. Section 2(f) of the Regulation defined the expression ‘Jagudar’ as the person who immediately before the day appointed under S. 5 was the holder of a jagir. Section 2(c) gave the meaning of Guzarayab as one who under a lawful order passed before the commencement of the Regulation was entitled to maintenance from the income of a Jagirdar or Hissedar, and S. 2(e) defined Hissedar as one who was entitled to a share in the income of a jagir according to existing law. Section 4 provided that no person after the commencement of the Regulation was to be appointed as a Jagirdar whether in succession or otherwise.

15. Sections 17 and 18 excluded Jagirdar's home, farms and personal properties from the operation of the Regulation, and S. 5 directed a date to be notified for the transfer of the administration of the jagirs to the Government. On the dates so appointed the Jagirdars were to make over the managements of their jagirs to the Jagir Administrator and on failure to comply with these provisions the officer appointed under the Regulation could forcibly take possession. Such dates had been notified and possessions taken over.

16. Section 6 laid down that the jagirs should be included in the Diwani and unless and until included in a District, should be administered by the Jagir Administrator. The powers, rights and liabilities in relation to such jagirs should thereafter cease to be exercisable by the Jagirdars and be exercisable by the Administrator. Sub-Section (4) of S. 6 provided that no Jagirdar should recover or receive any customary or other dues from any tenant or resident of the jagir, and under Sub-S. (7) of S. 6 the shares in the net income of the jagirs were made inalienable save with the previous sanction of the Government, and only liable to attachment to the extent of half in execution of the decree.

17. The Regulation after providing for deductions of certain percentage of gross revenue for the expenses of the administration laid down as to how the incomes were to be distributed among the persons entitled to them. Then S. 14 declared the amounts to be interim maintenance allowances until such time as the terms of the commutation of the jagirs were determined.

18. On 25-1-1950 another Regulation called the Hyderabad Jagirs Commutation Regulation 1359, F. was passed. Section 3 of this Regulation laying down the method of calculating the commutation provided that the commutation sum for every jagir should be the sum resulting from the multiplication of the basic annual revenue of the Jagir, calculated in accordance with S. 4, by the figure specified in the appropriate entry in the second column of the table annexed to the Section. The Table contained seven entries beginning from Rs. 2,000 or less and ending with Rs. 2,00,000 or more.

19. Then against each entry the figures by which it was to be multiplied were given which vary from 30 to 10. Section 4 provided for ascertaining the basic annual revenue by first ascertaining the gross basic sum, which should be the average annual gross revenue for the ten years opening with the Fasli Year 1347 and ending with the fasli year 1356, and then deducting 20 or 60 per cent, for expenses.

20. Section 6 said that the commutation should be distributable in like proportion as the net income was distributable under S. 11, Abolition of the Jagir Regulation. Section 9 made the amount inalienable save with the previous sanction of the Government and not more than half liable to attachment in execution of decrees.

21. The effect of these two Regulations was that the Jagirdars were barred from realising the past arrears of their jagir revenues and they lost all benefits arising therefrom except the commutation amounts which were assessed on the basic annual revenues after being multiplied by progressively decreasing figures. It can be hardly denied that the financial positions of persons with large jagir revenues were badly affected by the two Regulations.

22. It is true that the other properties of Jagirdars were at all times liable to attachment but it cannot be denied that the monetary benefits accruing to the former Jagirdars from their tenures had enabled them to meet their liabilities without their other properties being sold. At any rate honest Jagirdars in expectation of such gains being continued may have incurred liabilities, with the intention of meeting them from jagir incomes, which they found suddenly lost.

23. It was argued by the learned Advocate of the respondents that in examining the reasonableness of the several provisions of the impugned Act the contents of the two earlier Regulations must not be lost sight of, and we think that his argument has force, for they and their effects on the financial positions of the persons whose tenures had been merged, indicate the conditions prevailing at the time of passing of the impugned enactment. We will now proceed to examine the several provisions of the impugned Act.

24. Section 2(f) includes in the definition of Jagirdar a Guzarayab and Hissedar and says that their meanings are the same as given in cls. (c) and (e) of S. 2 of the Abolition of Jagir Regulation. The word ‘debt’ has also been defined by S. 2(e) to mean any liability in cash or kind, secured or unsecured, inclusive of decretal amount due from a Jagirdar. Under S. 3 five classes of debts have been excluded from the operation of the Act and the authority under the Act when assessing the value of the property of a debtor is required by Section 33(3) to deduct the amounts of such detbs from the assessment.

25. For purposes of ascertaining these amounts S. 30 enjoins that notice of an application for settlement should be served on the Jagir Administrator, Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Local Authorities, Scheduled Banks, and persons entitled to maintenances under decrees, who are to furnish information. Failure to furnish information, except in the case of a debt due to the Government, results in the debt being extinguished.

26. Another class of debts excluded from the operation of the Act is contained in S. 18, which, authorises a Jagirdar with total debts of not less than Rs. 5,000 to apply for settlement. It will be seen that the benefits of the Act are confined only to those who were Jagirdars, Hissedars or Guzarayabs, when the Abolition of Jagir Regulation became law and do not extend to their heirs or successors. In other words the Act gives relief only to those whose financial positions were impaired by passing of certain reform measures.

27. It will also be observed that the debts owed to the smaller creditors of such persons and the public demands are not adversely affected by the Act.

28. Broadly speaking the settlement under the Act is to be in the form of an award by a Board before whom proceedings are to start on an application of a Jagirdar-debtor or his creditor. The award is to be made after taking accounts of the debts in the manner provided by S. 28, and ascertaining the capacity of the debtor by valuation of his properties under S. 36. After the liability has been so ascertained the remaining debt is extinguished under S. 38.

29. The Board is to consist of a Chairman and two other Members, who are to be nominated by the Government. The Government has further authority under Ss. 4 and 5 to determine the extent of a Board's jurisdiction, to dissolve it or to remove its Members. Section 6 empowers the Board to decide all questions of title and priority, which may arise in any case within its cognizance, or which it may deem expedient or necessary for purposes of doing justice or making complete settlement of debts. The Board is further vested with powers under S. 7 to summon and compel production of evidence.

30. All proceedings are subject to the control of the High Court under S. 9 and by S. 47 appeals are provided to High Court within 60 days against certain decisions specified in the Section. Then the grounds on which appeals can he are enumerated in S. 48.

31. Once the earlier history of these tenures is kept in view and it is remembered that the incomes were attachable only through Revenue Department, or distributable under S. 11, of the Abolition Regulation between the Jagirdars and his Hissedars, or the advance payments likewise authorised against future incomes, we think that the machinery best suited for satisfactory settlement of the debts must reasonably be some authority in the Revenue Department with wide powers. Otherwise the archives of the Revenue Department or jagir Administrator was found to disclose something that would upset the settlement.

32. We now come to the procedure by which the award can be given. Section 11 permits any Jagirdar ordinarily residing in any part of the State of Hyderabad, or any creditor of his, to apply to the Board of competent jurisdiction, which application is required to be in writing in the prescribed form and is to contain all the debts due by the debtor.

33. Section 12 provides that every creditor on being required to do so by notice in writing by his debtor shall within one month from the date of the receipt of the notice, file before the Board a true and correct statement of all his claims against such debtor and so also every debtor on being required to do so by notice in writing by any of his creditors shall within one month from the date of the receipt of such notice file before the Board a true and correct statement of all the debts owed by such debtor and of his income in the year preceding the date of such notice.

34. Section 23 then casts duties on the debtors and creditors to produce all books and accounts, to submit to examination and to supply all information in respect of the debts due and the securities held by creditors. It further casts a duty on the debtors to furnish inventories of their properties.

35. The Board is then required by S. 24 to decide two preliminary issues:

(i) whether the person whose debts are to be settled, is a debtor as defined by the Act, and

(ii) total amount of such debts on the date of the application exceed Rs. 5,000.

36. If the findings on the aforesaid issues are in the affirmative, the Board has to proceed to take accounts according to S. 28 which provides that notwithstanding any earlier settled accounts, separate accounts of the principal and interest shall be taken. It lays down further that as regards the principal only such amounts be debited as may from time to time have been actually received by the debtor, or on his account from the creditor.

37. Any decretal amounts against such a debtor for the principal and interest can also be debited and in case the decree or order does not specify the principal and interest separately, nor contain any material for determining the same, two-thirds and one-third of the amount should be deemed as awarded on account of principal and interest respectively.

38. Taking accounts of interests has been classified into three groups:

(1) The interests on transactions which had commenced before January 1, 1934 should be debited as simple interest on the balance of the principal at the agreed rate, or at the decretal rate or at a rate not exceeding 12 per cent, whichever is the lowest. Then the principals and interests found due are to be reduced to the extent not exceeding 40 per cent.

(2) The interests on transactions commencing on or after January 1, 1934 upto January 1, 1943 should be debited as simple interest on the balance of principal for the time at the rate agreed to, or at a rate allowed under the decree, or at a rate not exceeding 9 per cent; whichever is the lowest. These amounts should also be reduced to the extent not exceeding 30 per cent.

(3) The interest on transactions which begin on or after January 1, 1943 should be debited as simple interest at the agreed rate or at the rate allowed under a decree or at a rate not exceeding 6 per cent, per annum whichever is the lowest.

39. The Section further goes on to provide that all money paid by or on the account of the debtor to the creditor, all profits, services or other advantages received by the creditor should be credited first towards the interest, the residue towards the principal; and after striking the balance if anything be due from the debtor on the date of the application, the sum so found is to be deemed to be the amount due under S. 31. The Board is next to determine the value of the debtor's property and his paying capacity and in order to ascertain such value S. 33 directs exclusion of all assets exempted from attachment by the Code of Civil Procedure and also assets necessary to meet the debts exempted from the operation or the Act by S. 3.

40. After value of the debtor's property is determined, S. 34 lays down that the paying capacity of the debtor shall be deemed to be 60 per cent, of that value. Under S. 35 the unsecured debts are to be scaled down pro rata to the paying capacity of the debtor, i.e, if all the debts found due to the debtor are more than 60 per cent, of the value of the property belonging to the debtor, the debts shall be further scaled down pro rata of the paying capacity of the debtor.

41. Section 36 says that after such scaling down the Board is to make an award, which among other things should provide for payment in annual instalments not exceeding twenty. If at any stage of the proceedings the Board finds that income and movable properties of the debtor are not sufficient to allow his debts being liquidated by annual instalments not exceeding twenty, it shall make an order under S. 52 adjudicating the debtor as insolvent. Section 40(2) requires the award to be registered and it can be executed, if default of payment be made, by an application to the Board which if satisfied about the default shall transfer the award for execution to the Collector. Thereupon the Collector has to recover the amounts of the instalments from the debtor as arrears of land revenue.

42. The Government is, however, authorised by S. 43 to postpone payment of any instalment by a period not exceeding one year on the ground of serious hardship. Finally S. 48 forbids alienation of any property belonging to a debtor before all his debts are discharged except with the previous sanction of the Government.

43. According to the petition the following features of the Act are discriminatory and unreasonable:

(a) It re-opens settled accounts,

(b) It operates to reduce interest in respect of debts where interest is not granted by decree,

(c) It directs reduction of principal and interest by 30 per cent and 40 per cent in the case of certain transactions,

(d) It scales down debts to 60 per cent, of the value of the Jagirdar's property,

(e) It provides for payment of debts in instalments, and

(f) It authorises declaration of the debtor as insolvent if property be not sufficient to allow the debt being liquidated by annual instalments not exceeding twenty in number.

44. The learned Advocate relying on the aforesaid features urged that the Act is utterly unreasonable; and that under it the last holder of jagir however large his income from the jagir, any Hissedar, however small his share in the jagir may be and even a maintenance holder for a small sum though he might possess vast properties can avoid payment of a substantial portion of his debts.

45. It is well to remember in this connection that a few hard cases do not make the provisions of a legislation which is otherwise reasonable and in public interest void on the ground of the guarantee contained in Article 19(1)(F) having been infringed thereby.

46. To justify the complaint, the limitations under the impugned enactment must be arbitrary, excessive and without any reasonable relation to the object it seeks to attain. If the limitations be found to have reasonable relations to the purpose in view, they are saved by Article 19(5). We have, therefore, to determine whether, the limitations complained against bear such relation to the object for which the impugned Act was passed.

47. We have already said that before the passing of the Abolition of Jagir Regulation on 15-8-1949, the Jagirdars, or their co-sharers enjoyed considerable benefits from the revenues of these tenures, and that the consequences of the aforesaid Regulation have not been financially advantageous to the former holders. They often found that their resources were inadequate to meet their earlier monetary liabilities. Their creditors may have found that the dwindled resources of the debtors reduced their prospect of recovering their loans fully.

48. Again the compensation amounts under the Jagir Commutation Regulation have not been without complaints of heavy deductions on account of expenses. In these circumstances adjusting the earlier liabilities to suit the changed positions of such debtors does not appear to us to be an unreasonable choice of course. It will be remembered that at one time the Jagirs were not attachable at all. Under the two Regulations half allowances and compensations were made attachable.

49. Fairness demands that if debts be reduced, both exempted and not exempted — properties be pooled together and made available to the creditors. The course adopted saves the debts from starvation and collapse and the creditors' interests are not ignored.

50. The legislature considered apparently that 60 per cent, of all the properties should be made liable for the payment of the debts, and we think that the reduction of past debts and making the entire property of debtors liable for their discharge is a reasonable way out and is in consonance with the object underlying the Act, namely, to afford relief to those, whose paying capacities were impaired by the abolition of the old system of land tenures and by the passing of the various public reform measures in the interest of the State.

51. There are provisions in the impugned Act for correcting by this Court error of law or of fact in the decisions of the Boards if failure of justice is caused. We also find provision for realisation of the arrears of instalments by the efficacious mode of recovery as revenue demands. Again making decretal amounts payable by instalments through leasing of immovable properties is not novel; for we find in para 7 of the Third Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure a scheme of liquidation of money decrees where execution proceedings are transferred to the Collector under S. 48 of the Code.

52. Section 58 of the impugned Act also prohibits alienation of the properties of the debtors. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the impugned Act violates guarantee of freedom of properties on the ground that the limitations complained of have no reasonable relation to the object of the Act.

53. Of course however reasonably related the provisions may be to the object, it is obvious that it alone would not save them from being void unless the object be also in the “interest of general public”. These words have been interpreted in the Full Bench case of — ‘Iswari Prosad Goenka v. N.R. Sen, AIR 1952 Cal 273 (FB)(C), by Harries, C.J who says at p. 278:

“……………The phrase “in the interest of she general public” means, I think, nothing more than in the public interest and it may well be that legislation affecting a limited class of persons or a limited area might well be legislation in the public interest, though the public of other part of India might not be directly affected by such legislation. The matter may be in the interest of the general public though the public generally may not be directly affected by legislation.

If they are indirectly affected, that would be quite sufficient to make legislation in the public interest. Legislation affecting a particular class or a particular area would only directly affect the members of the class, or the inhabitants of that particular area, but the removal of some serious abuse or grievance or discontent is a matter indirectly affecting the public generally. It is not in the interest of the general public or in the public interest to allow any class of persons to labour under some grievance or to be genuinely discontented.

It is in the interest of the general public or in the public interest that all classes of the citizens of India are content and that their grievances should be removed.”

54. The aforesaid observations were approved in — ‘Bhaskar Narayan v. Mohd. Alimulla Khan’, AIR 1953 Nag 40 (D), where it has been held that the Berar Land Revenue Code Amendment Act was in the interest of the general public even though its object was to ameliorate the conditions of only a class of persons. The learned Judges have observed at p. 50 as follows:

“We are also of the opinion that this law is in the interest of general public even though its object is to ameliorate the conditions of only a class of persons.”

55. The view is further supported by a Full Bench of the same High Court in — ‘Bhaurao Atmaram v. S.D.O Chandur-Morsi’, AIR 1955 Nag 1 (FB) (E), where Section 3 of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act has been held to be constitutional.

56. Again in — ‘Santhankrishna Odayar v. Vaithilingam’, AIR 1954 Mad 51 (F), it has been held that a public purpose does not cease to be such because it ultimately benefits the individual. We need not multiply authorities on this point; for it is clear to us that though the object of affording relief to the class of former Jagirdars or their cosharers may not directly benefit the public, yet it indirectly serves a public purpose by ‘attending’ as remarked by Harries, C.J in the Calcutta Case ‘to a festering sore which may eventually affect the whole body’.

57. It was argued before us on behalf of the respondents that the three enactments viz., the Jagir Abolition Regulation, the Jagir Commutation Regulation and the impugned Act should be taken together and in considering the public interest the enactment should not be divorced from the earlier legislations. We think there is considerable force in the argument for the chronic incapacity to pay the debt which the impugned Act sets out to relieve is in a large number of cases due to the passing of the two earlier Regulations, which cannot but be held to have been in the interest of the general public. The inability having so arisen, all the three Acts should be considered as inter-related. Their central object was land reform and the prevention of injurious consequences and hardships to which the reform may give rise. It is difficult there fore to hold that the constitutional guarantee available to a citizen under Article 19 is thereby infringed.

58. We now propose to deal with his argument that the Act is discriminatory and infringes the doctrine of the equal protection of law. It is now well settled that mere differentiation does not make a legislation obnoxious to Article 14. The Legislature can make classification, in other words it can determine who should be governed by a particular piece of legislation. Such a classification must, however, be based on some real and substantial distinction, bearing a just and reasonable relation to the objects sought to be attained and it should not be arbitrary and without any substantial basis. We need cite only the case of — ‘Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P’, AIR 1954 S.C 728 (G), where the present Chief Justice of India at p. 740 observed:

“………….it is well settled that mere differentiation does not make a legislation obnoxious to the equal protection clause. The Legislature has always the power to make classification and all that is necessary is that the classification should not be arbitrary but must bear a reasonable relation to the object which the legislation has in view.”

59. Therefore the three things that have to be determined in this connection are:

(i) whether a substantial distinction exists between the persons covered by the impugned Act and those that are excluded,

(ii) what is the object which the Act seeks to attain, and

(iii) whether a just and reasonable relation exists between the provisions and the object of the impugned Act.

60. The second and the third have already been dealt with and only the first point remains to be examined.

61. The differentiation between the Jagirdars, and their creditors and those of the rest of the public is a substantial one in so far as under the two earlier Regulations the estates conferring benefits on Jagirdars etc., alone have been merged in the State lands, and consequently their financial stability alone has been impaired by such merger. The objects of the Act being to afford some relief to the impoverished Jagirdars in lieu of their inability to meet existing liabilities, the reduction of the debts as well as scaling them down to the present paying capacity of such persons have a just relation to the object of the enactment.

62. Exclusion of certain class of debts under Section 3 of the impugned Act also is not without substantial justification, for public demands do not stand in the same position as ordinary demands. We, therefore, hold that Article 14 has also not been infringed, and this part of the argument of the petitioners must fail.

63. Coming to the last contention that the decree-holder is deprived of the fruits of his decree which is his property without any compensation, it is well to remember that every curtailment of right does not amount to its deprivation. Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 deal with different subjects. The former read with clause (5) postulates the existence of property; otherwise the reasonable restrictions contemplated by cl. (5) could not be brought into play, whereas if there be substantially total deprivation of property, Article 31 becomes applicable.

64. The aforesaid proposition is now settled by the case of — ‘State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji’, (S) AIR 1955 S.C 41 (H). When every enjoyment and interest in property is taken away leaving a mere husk of title, Article 19(1)(f) is not attracted. In therefore follows that because the property of the decree-holders has not been entirely taken away, no question of the exercise of the right of eminent domain arises in the case.

65. It may be that the availability of the light has been made subject to the taking of an account or to being scaled down according to the paying capacity of the debtor. But whether the right will then become a mere husk and as a consequence amount to the deprivation of the property cannot be now held as certain, and the contention, based on Article 31 of the Constitution is not relevant. We will finally take up the question whether the Act is contrary to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and is therefore rendered void by Article 254. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of — ‘Saverbhai Amaidas v. State Of Bombay .’, AIR 1954 S.C 752 (I) concludes this point. In that case dealing with. Article 254(2) Venkatarama, J. says at p. 757.

“………The important thing to consider with reference to this provision is whether the legislation is “in respect of the same matter”. If the later legislation deals not with the matters which, formed the subject of the earlier legislation, but with other and distinct matters though of a cognate and allied character then, Article 254(2) will have no application. The principle embodied in section 107(2) and Article 254(2) is that when there is legislation covering the same ground both by the Centre and by the Provinces…… the; law of the Centre should prevail over that of the State.”

66. It is obvious that the Code of Civil Procedure does not cover the same field as the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act, and accordingly the provisions complained against cannot become void on the ground of repugnancy. We overrule the argument.

67. We accordingly decide the constitutional question raised before us against the petitioner, and hold the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement. Act is not a void piece of legislation.

68. We dismiss the petition and direct that the record be returned to the Hyderabad City Civil Court for proceeding with the objection according to law. In the circumstances of the case: there will be no order as to costs.

D.H.Z

69. Petition dismissed.