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Jaddo Kunwar v. Sheo Shankar Ram
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Chamier, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion concerns a suit for redemption of properties mortgaged to the appellant. The family of Bhuabal Bhagat (who, with his descendants, carried on an ancestral business and owned some zamindari property) had been managed by Hira Ram and Dhondhi Ram after several deaths in the family. On 4 July 1894 Hira Ram and Dhondhi Ram advanced family money by mortgaging some villages (already mortgaged to the appellant), and on 26 July 1894 they purchased another village with family funds that had previously been mortgaged to the appellant.
In 1895 the appellant sued on her mortgages and obtained two decrees (one for sale and one for foreclosure), both of which were made absolute; the appellant purchased property in execution of the decree for sale. Hira Ram and Dhondhi Ram were parties to those suits, but several other family members (the present plaintiffs) were not made parties.
In the present suit the plaintiffs sought a decree for redemption of all property mortgaged to the appellant on the ground that they had not been parties to the prior suits and therefore were not bound by the decrees. The court below granted them a decree for redemption as to property covered by the mortgage-deed of 4 July 1894 and the sale-deed of 26 July 1894. Jaddo Kunwar appealed, and the plaintiffs filed cross-objections on costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether members of a Hindu joint family who were not made formal parties to prior suits upon mortgages (some being minors or unborn when the prior suits were instituted) are entitled to redeem property that was sold or foreclosed upon in those prior suits.
- Whether the managers (Hira Ram and Dhondhi Ram), who acted for and defended the family in the prior suits and carried out mortgage or sale transactions with the consent or acquiescence of adult family members, effectively represented all family members so as to bind those who were not formally impleaded.
- What is the relevance and application of section 85 of the Transfer of Property Act (and the principle of necessary parties) to persons who were not known to the mortgagee when prior mortgage suits were instituted.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs contended that because they were not parties to the appellant's earlier suits they are not bound by the decrees and therefore are entitled to a decree for redemption of the property mortgaged to the appellant.
- Counsel for the plaintiffs relied upon the decision in Sundar Lal v. Chhitar Mal to support the proposition that sons in a Hindu family could maintain a suit for redemption of their shares even though a prior suit by their father had been dismissed.
- For certain plaintiffs (e.g., Dwarka Ram and Sheo Prasad Ram) the implicit argument was that, as non-parties, they retained rights to redeem despite earlier proceedings that affected family property.
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant (and her counsel) argued that the managers of the family (Hira Ram and Dhondhi Ram) effectively represented the family in the prior suits, that adult family members were aware of and acquiesced in the managers' conduct (expenses being entered in family accounts, managers recorded as mortgagees/proprietors), and hence the non-party plaintiffs are bound by those proceedings.
- The appellant relied upon a line of authority, including Ramakrishna Naraym v. Vinayak Narayan and other decisions, to support the proposition that where the managing members of a joint family sue or are sued and effectively represent the family, other members may be bound even if not formally impleaded.
- The appellant further argued (as reflected in the court's discussion) that section 85 of the Transfer of Property Act did not strictly apply because the appellant was unaware of the plaintiffs' existence when the suits were instituted, and that the doctrine of necessary parties and effective representation should be applied to deny the plaintiffs' redemption claim.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Balwant Singh v. Aman Singh | Authority based upon several decisions (including Debi Singh) concerning representation of family members and binding effect of prior suits upon joint family interests. | The court regarded Dwarka Ram and Sheo Prasad Ram's position as covered by this decision and treated their claim as weaker than the earlier case; concluded their suit should have been dismissed. |
| Debi Singh v. Jia Ram | Principle that sons in a joint family cannot recover family property merely because they were not parties to a suit that resulted in foreclosure or sale; the rule about representation can bind sons. | Used as a principal authority to dismiss claims of certain plaintiffs (Dwarka Ram and Sheo Prasad Ram) who sought redemption despite not being parties to prior mortgage proceedings. |
| Sundar Lal v. Chhitar Mal | Held that sons could maintain a suit for redemption of their shares despite a previous suit by their father being dismissed on his failure to pay; illustrates limits of the representation principle. | The plaintiffs relied on this decision; the court observed that the decision would likely have been different had the prior suit resulted in foreclosure or a sale, distinguishing it from the present facts. |
| Dhurm Das Pandey v. Mussumat Soondri Dibiah; Hari Saran Moitra v. Bhubaneswari Debi | Instances where an adopted son was held to be sufficiently represented by his adoptive mother in a suit upon a mortgage. | These authorities were cited to show that, in some circumstances, certain family members are treated as sufficiently represented; the court treated Sheo Shankar Ram and his son as effectively represented in the prior suits. |
| Narayan Gop Habbu v. Pandurang Ganu | Bombay High Court holding that nephews who assisted the karta in defending a suit were effectively represented by the karta and bound by the decree. | The court relied on this case as analogous authority for holding that family members who were effectively represented by the managers (karta-like figures) are bound by the proceedings. |
| Jogendro Deb Roy Kut v. Funindro Deb Roy Kut (Privy Council) | Passage describing that where the interest of a joint family is in issue and one member prosecutes or defends a suit, a decree may be binding upon all members if their interest is taken to have been sufficiently represented. | The court quoted and relied on this passage to support the proposition that effective representation in family matters can bind non-parties. |
| Bissessur Lull Sahoo v. Maharajah Luchmessur Singh | Examined execution proceedings and held that when decrees relate to joint family liabilities and are passed against a representative, joint family property can be taken in execution; courts should look to substance, not mere technicalities. | The court cited this case to justify not setting aside execution proceedings on technical grounds where substantial justice to the family-creditor relationship had been done; used to support dismissal of attempts to reopen foreclosure/sale. |
| Ramakrishna Naraym v. Vinayak Narayan | Bombay High Court decision that managing adult members may effectively represent an omitted family member in a suit upon family property or mortgage. | The appellant relied on this decision; the court treated its reasoning (that managing members represented the omitted members) as supportive of holding that Sheo Shankar Ram was bound by proceedings. |
| Gan Savant Bal Savant v. Narayan Dhond Savant | Discussed historical practice (circa 1853) where managers commonly sued and were sued on behalf of the family; context for how representation doctrines have developed. | Referred to as background showing older practice of managers representing families; the court noted modern limits but recognized circumstances where family may still be bound by manager's acts. |
| Padmakar Vinayah Joshi v. Mahadev Krishna Joshi; Kashinath Chimnaji v. Chimnaji Sadashiv | Authority recognizing that managers are not generally entitled to sue or be sued on behalf of the family, indicating limits on manager's capacity to bind family members. | The court cited these cases to acknowledge that manager's power to bind the family is not absolute, but observed that in certain circumstances the family may nonetheless be held bound by the manager's proceedings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded from factual findings of the lower court (not challenged on appeal): Hira Ram and Dhondhi Ram were managers of the family property; when the appellant sued on the mortgages she was unaware of the existence of the plaintiffs; the managers defended the suits with the authority of the adult family members; expenses were entered in family accounts; and some plaintiffs were minors or unborn at the time of the earlier suits.
The court analysed the plaintiffs' entitlement to redeem by separating groups of plaintiffs and applying settled principles and precedents:
- For Dwarka Ram and Sheo Prasad Ram the court applied the reasoning of Balwant Singh v. Aman Singh (based on Debi Singh v. Jia Ram and other cases) to conclude that they could not recover family property or their interests merely because they had not been formal parties to the prior suits which resulted in foreclosure or sale. The court held that their position was weaker than the authority relied upon and that their suit should have been dismissed.
- For Sheo Shankar Ram and his son Mathura Ram the court considered the applicability of section 85 of the Transfer of Property Act and the broader doctrine of necessary parties. The court noted that section 85 did not literally apply because the appellant did not know of the plaintiffs' existence when instituting the prior suits. However, the court emphasised that a person may nonetheless be a necessary party in substance, and that the strict rule of impleading all persons with an interest is not inflexible.
- The court examined evidence of actual representation: the mortgage-deed and sale-deed had been executed in favour of the managers alone; the managers alone were recorded as mortgagees and proprietors; the managers defended the suits; and adult family members had consented, expressly or impliedly, to the managers' acts and their abstention from redemption. Drawing on analogous authorities (including Narayan Gop Habbu and Privy Council passages in Jogendro Deb Roy Kut), the court concluded that Sheo Shankar Ram and Mathura Ram were effectively represented in the prior suits and therefore could not reopen the foreclosure or set aside the sale.
- The court rejected a broad application of section 85 to the present facts, treating representation by the managers and acquiescence of adult family members as decisive in binding the omitted members. The court also referenced Bissessur Lull Sahoo to support the proposition that execution proceedings should not be set aside on mere technicalities when substantial justice has been done and when the family has been effectively represented.
On this analysis the court found that all plaintiffs whose claims had been allowed by the lower court were nonetheless bound by the prior proceedings and that the lower court's decree in their favour was incorrect.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court entered the following dispositive order: the appeal is allowed, the cross-objections are dismissed with costs, and the suit stands dismissed with costs in both courts.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the plaintiffs' suit for redemption is dismissed; the appellant's decrees of foreclosure and sale stand, and the appellant retains the benefit of the execution-sale and foreclosure already obtained.
- The court applied and relied on existing authorities to hold that where managing members of a Hindu joint family have effectively represented the family (with the knowledge or acquiescence of adult members, and with substantive actions such as recording managers as mortgagees/proprietors and entering expenses in family accounts), omitted family members—even if minors or unborn at the time—may be bound by mortgage litigation and execution affecting family property.
- The opinion applies established precedents and principles of representation and necessary parties to the facts; it does not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond those authorities. The disposition is limited to the direct effect on the parties in this case.
Chamier, J.:— The following table will help to elucidate the statement of facts:—
Bhuabal Bhagat and his descendants, who were joint in every respect, carried on an ancestral business in saji, sugar and groceries under the style of Bhuabal Bhagat Bhoj Ram. They also did a little money lending and owned some zamindari property. After the death of Bhuabal Bhagat and four of his sons the management of the family business and property came into the hands of Hira Ram and Dhondhi Ram. On July 4th, 1894, the two last named advanced money belonging to the family upon a mortgage of some villages, already mortgaged to the appellant, and on July 26th, 1894, they purchased with family funds another village which also had been previously mortgaged to the appellant. In 1895, the appellant sued upon her mortgages and obtained two decrees, one for sale and the other for foreclosure. Both decrees were made absolute, and in execution of the decree for sale the appellant purchased the property covered by that decree. Hira Ram and Dhondhi Ram were parties to the suits brought by the appellant, but the plaintiffs were not made parties. In the present suit they claimed a decree for redemption of all the property mortgaged to the appellant, on the ground that they ought to have been made parties to the suits for sale and foreclosure and not having been made parties are not bound by the decrees which were passed. The court below has given them a decree for redemption of so much of the property as is covered by the mortgage-deed of July 4th, 1894, and the sale-deed of July 26th, 1894. Jaddo Kunwar has appealed on the ground that the entire suit should have been dismissed. The plaintiffs have filed cross-objections on the question of costs.
The court below has found, and the finding has not been challenged before us, that Hira Ram and Dhondhi Ram were the managers of the family property and business, that when the appellant brought her suits she was not aware of the existence of the plaintiffs; that Hira Ram and Dhondhi Ram defended the suits by authority of the adult members of the family, who were aware of what was being done in them, as all expenses incurred were entered in the family accounts, and that the plaintiff Bishnath Ram had not been born when the appellant brought her suits. To this finding it may be added that the plaintiffs, Mathura Ram, Dwarka Ram and Sheo Prasad Ram, were minors when those suits were brought.
As purchasers and mortgagees of the properties already mortgaged to the appellant, the family of the plaintiffs were obviously bound by the mortgages held by the appellant. Dhondhi Ram in his evidence says that they decided not to redeem the appellant's mortgages because they anticipated that a suit would be brought by the minor son of Radha Kishan, a member of the mortgagor's family, to challenge the sale and the mortgages. He says that he did not consult the plaintiff, Sheo Shankar Ram, but it is difficult to believe this. It is quite clear that the adult members of the family other than Hira Ram and Dhondhi Ram, acquiesced in, if they did not take part in, the decision of the managers not to redeem the appellant's mortgages. The sole ground upon which the plaintiffs claim to be entitled to redeem the property is that they were not parties to the suits brought by the appellant. The plaintiff, Bishnath Ram, may be disregarded as he was not in existence when the previous suits were brought. The case of the plaintiff's Dwarka Ram and Sheo Prasad seems to be covered by our decision in Balwant Singh v. Aman Singh, which is based upon several decisions of this Court, including that of the Full Bench in Debi Singh v. Jia Ram. Indeed the position of the plaintiffs Dwarka Ram and Sheo Prasad Ram is much weaker than that of the plaintiff in the case first mentioned, for in the present case there cannot at any time have been any doubt that the plaintiffs were bound to pay the sum due to the appellant if they wished to retain the properties sold and mortgaged to their family. Pandit Sundar Lal, on behalf of the plaintiff's respondents, relied upon the case of Sundar Lal v. Chhitar Mal, in which it was held that sons in a Hindu family could maintain a suit for redemption of their shares in the family property, although a previous suit by their father for redemption of the whole property had been dismissed on his failing to pay the amount found to be due on the mortgage. The decision in that case would probably have been the other way if the previous suit for redemption had resulted, as apparently it ought to have resulted, in a foreclosure or an order for a sale followed by a sale. For when property mortgaged by a father in a Hindu joint family has passed away from the family either by means of a foreclosure against the father or by means of a sale in execution of a decree against him upon a mortgage, it cannot signify whether the suit which resulted in the foreclosure or sale was instituted by the mortgagor or by the mortgagee. In neither case, consistently with the principle upon which the case of Debi Singh v. Jia Ram was decided, can the sons recover the family property or their interests in it merely because they were not parties to the suit brought by or against their father. So far then as the plaintiffs Dwarka Ram and Sheo Prasad Ram are concerned, I think it is clear that the suit should have been dismissed.
There remains the case of the plaintiffs Sheo Sbankar Ram and his son Mathura Ram. The principle upon which the case of Debi Singh v. Jia Ram rests does not apply to them; but I am nevertheless of opinion that their claim also should have been dismissed. It was contended on their behalf that the provisions of section 85 of the Transfer of Property Act were imperative and that they were in the position of ordinary puisne mortgagees who had not been made parties to a suit by a prior mortgagee and who therefore must be given an opportunity of redeeming the prior mortgage. Section 85 does not in terms apply to the case, for the appellant was not aware of the existence of the plaintiffs when she brought her suits. But a person may be a necessary party to a suit upon a mortgage, although the plaintiff is not aware of his existence, in the sense that if he is not impleaded he cannot be concluded or his rights affected by the decree passed in the suit. Primâ facie all persons interested in the right to redeem must be made parties to a suit by a mortgagee; but the rule is not inflexible, for example, it is settled law that in certain circumstances a son in a joint family is bound by a decree upon a mortgage obtained against his father, and it would no doubt be held that an adopted son was sufficiently represented by his adoptive mother in a suit upon a mortgage in circumstances similar to those found in the cases of Dhurm Das Pandey v. Mussumat Soondri Dibiah and Hari Saran Moitra v. Bhubaneswari Debi. In the present case there can be no doubt that Sheo Shankar Ram and his son Mathura Ram were, in fact represented by the managers of the family property in the suits brought by the appellants. With the consent, express or implied, of Sheo Shankar Ram and other adult members of the family the mortgage-deed of July 4th, 1894, and the sale-deed of July 26th, 1894, had been executed in favour of the managers alone and they alone were recorded as mortgagees and proprietors. With the same consent the managers had defended the suits and abstained from redeeming the appellant's mortgages. In somewhat similar circumstances the Bombay High Court held that all the members of a joint family were bound by a decree obtained against the karta of the family, see Narayan Gop Habbu v. Pandurang Ganu. In that case the defendant had obtained a decree for possession of land against one Anant, who was at the time the karta of a joint family consisting of his two nephews and himself. It was found that the uncle and nephews had been living together when the suit was brought and that the nephews had assisted their uncle to defend the suit. In the circumstances the High Court held that the nephews had been effectively represented in the suit by their uncle, and a suit by the nephews for recovery of their shares in the property was held not to be maintainable. Westropp, C.J, referred to and relied upon the following passage in the judgement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Jogendro Deb Roy Kut v. Funindro Deb Roy Kut:—“Their Lordships think that this case cannot be likened to those which sometimes occur in India wherein, the interest of a joint and undivided family being in issue, one member of that family has prosecuted a suit or has defended a suit, and a decree has been made in that suit which may afterwards be considered as binding upon all the members of the family, their interest being taken to have been sufficiently represented by the party in the original suit.”; In Bissessur Lull Sahoo v. Maharajah Luchmessur Singh the facts were as follows:—One Nath Das died in 1853, leaving a son, Ram Nath Das, who died in 1855. Ram Nath Das left two sons, Mosahib and Chooman Nath Das. Ram Nath Das had taken a lease of a village called Rudarpur. The landlord brought a suit for the rent against the widows of Nath Das and Ram Nath Das as guardians of Mosahib and Chooman. A second suit was brought against Mosahib for the rent of a village called Ramnagar, the lease of which stood in the name of Nath Das. A third suit was brought against the widow of Ram Nath Das as guardian of Mosahib. In execution of the decrees in the three suits a village called Maddanpur was put up for sale and bought by the plaintiff in those suits. Maddanpur had been acquired in the name of Ram Nath Das for the benefit of the family. A suit having been brought by the assignee of the rights of Mosahib and Chooman, their Lordships held on an examination of the proceedings that as all three decrees were in respect of a joint debt of the family and had been passed against a representative of the family property, they had properly been executed against the joint family property, and they concluded their judgement with a reference to two cases, the effect of which is that in dealing with execution proceedings the court should look at the substance of the transaction and should not set aside an execution upon mere technical grounds when the court found that it was substantially right. In the case before them they came to the conclusion that the circumstances warranted the assumption that the defendant or defendants in each of the previous suits had been sued as representing the family and, as the claim in each suit had been for money due from the family, joint property of the family had rightly been taken in execution. These cases show, I think, that where a joint family has been effectively represented in a suit and substantial justice has been done, the court is not always bound to set aside the execution proceedings merely because every member of the family was not formally made a party. A loose interpretation of this rule might easily lead to disastrous results and cause great confusion; but in the case before us, I think, we are justified in holding that the plaintiff, Sheo Shankar Ram, was effectively represented in the suits brought by the appellant and should not be permitted to reopen the foreclosure or have the sale set aside.
The learned counsel for the appellant referred us to the recent decision of the Bombay High Court in Ramakrishna Naraym v. Vinayak Narayan, in which it was held that the defendant appellant had been effectively represented by his undivided uncles, who were managers of the family property, in a suit brought upon a mortgage made by several members of the family. Chandavarkar, J., said:—“The present appellant was no doubt omitted from the suit, but the adult members of the family represented him. They were the managing members of the family; therefore, according to Hindu law, we must hold, in the absence of any other circumstance, that the present appellant had been substantially represented upon the record and was virtually a party to the suit.” As the remainder of the judgement shows, these remarks went beyond what was necessary for the decision of the appeal and there were other grounds upon which the same conclusion might have been arrived at. In former days, when the same strictness of procedure did not prevail as now, it was a common practice for the manager of joint family to sue and be sued on behalf of the family, see Gan Savant Bal Savant v. Narayan Dhond Savant, where West, J., discussed the state of the law as it was in 1853, but it is generally recognized now that the manager is not, as a rule, entitled to sue or liable to be sued on behalf of the family, see Padmakar Vinayah Joshi v. Mahadev Krishna Joshi and Kashinath Chimnaji v. Chimnaji Sadashiv. Nevertheless, it seems that in certain circumstances the whole family may beheld bound by the result of suits brought by or against the manager. In the particular circumstances of the present case, I think that we may properly hold that the plaintiff Sheo Shankar Ram, is bound by the proceedings taken against the managing member of the family by the appellant. If Sheo Shankar is bound, so also is his son Mathura Ram. I would allow the appeal, dismiss the cross-objections with costs, and dismiss the suit with costs in both courts.
Tudball, J.:— I concur.
By the Court.—The order of the Court is that the appeal is allowed, the cross-objections are dismissed with costs, and the suit stands dismissed with cots in both courts.
Appeal allowed.
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