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Musunuru Venkayya And Others v. Potlapalli Venkatarama Rao And Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Sep 15, 1955
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These proceedings (S.C.C.M. Ps. Nos. 4205 to 4221 of 1954) are applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against a judgment of the Madras High Court dated 18-12-1953 (reported at AIR 1954 Mad 788 (FB)). The underlying litigation arose from 17 suits originally filed in the District Munsif's Court, Bezwada by the respondents (proprietors of the village Bommaluru, Krishna District) against certain tenants (the petitioners). The respondents sought possession of holdings, an injunction restraining removal of paddy heaps standing on the suit land, division of paddy heaps, and in ten suits, recovery of cesses.

The tenants contended that the village was an "estate" within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act and that they had occupancy rights. The plaintiffs (proprietors) relied on a decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 that the village was not an estate and contended that that decision was res judicata. The tenants pointed to a later decision in O. S. No. 318 of 1943 and related suits, which had held that the RDO's finding in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 was not res judicata.

A common set of issues was framed (including whether the suit land is an estate; whether prior decisions operate as res judicata; questions of jurisdiction; whether suits were premature as to cesses; and relief). The District Munsif found the village to be an estate and held the civil court lacked jurisdiction. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge/District Judge held the village was an estate and that the defendants had occupancy rights, and found the RDO decision did not operate as res judicata between the parties. The Madras High Court disagreed with the courts below on the estate question: it held the RDO finding was not res judicata but further held that the village was not an estate under sections 3(2)(d) or 3(2)(e) of the Madras Estates Land Act, and remanded the suits for further trial on the remaining issues.

After remand, the trial court would have to deal with a small number of remaining issues (including cesses, and, in connected suits, whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a charge and to interest). Counsel for the petitioners made concessions before this Court that, if the High Court's primary findings were correct, the remaining issues would amount to formal matters and a decree in favour of the plaintiffs would follow.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the judgment and remand order of the Madras High Court constitutes a "final order" within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India, thereby entitling the petitioners to leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
  2. Whether leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1) should be granted in the present cases (given the High Court's findings and the value of the subject-matter).
  3. Ancillary procedural questions arising from applications: whether to consolidate appeals for valuation, security and printing; whether to stay trial of certain suits pending the admitted appeal; and whether to stay other suits connected to the same subject-matter.

Arguments of the Parties

Argument advanced by Mr. Venkatarama Sastry

  • It was contended that because the Madras High Court remanded the matters for disposal on remaining issues, the High Court's order was not a "final order" within the meaning of Article 133; in other words, the remand kept the suit alive and the rights of the parties were yet to be finally determined.

Argument advanced by Mr. Somasundaram (for the petitioners)

  • He argued that the High Court had decided all the material issues (notably that the village was not an estate and that prior decisions did not operate as res judicata), and that after remand nothing remained except the formal passing of decree by the trial court; therefore the High Court's order should be treated as a "final order" within Article 133.
  • He conceded that, given the High Court's findings, the plaintiffs would be entitled to a decree for cesses, and that ancillary issues in connected suits (whether plaintiff is entitled to a charge and to interest) should be decided in favour of the plaintiffs as a matter of course.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Firm Ramchand Manjimal v. Firm Goverdhandas Vishandas Ratanchand, AIR 1920 PC 86 An order is final if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties; an order that leaves rights to be determined by the courts is not final. The Court cited this authority for the basic test of finality: whether the order finally disposes of the parties' rights. It applied the test to the present High Court judgment.
Abdul Rahman v. D.K. Cassim and Sons, AIR 1933 PC 58 The finality must be a finality in relation to the suit; if after the order the suit remains live with rights still to be determined, then the order is not final. Quoted and relied upon to reinforce the test that an order is final only if the suit is no longer "live" with rights outstanding; used to assess the High Court's remand order.
Mohammad Amin Bros. Ltd. v. Dominion of India, AIR 1950 FC 77 The Federal Court accepted and followed the definition of "final order" as requiring final disposition of rights. The Court noted that the Federal Court adopted the same definition, and relied on that acceptance to support applying the same test here.
Ragavacharyulu v. Venkata Ramanujacharyulu, AIR 1954 Mad 406 A Division Bench of the Madras High Court stated that an order is final only if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties in the suit or proceeding. The Court cited this Madras decision as adopting the same well-settled test of finality and applied that understanding in concluding whether the High Court's order was final.
Mangaraju v. Varahalamma, AIR 1956 Andhra 47 After reviewing the case law, the court noted that an appeal under Art. 133 lies if the order complained of finally disposes of the rights of the parties; it should not be interlocutory. The Court referred to this decision (of this Court) as consistent authority on the meaning of finality and used it to support the application of the finality test to the present facts.
Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar v. Shiv Ratan Deo Singh, AIR 1955 SC 576 The Supreme Court held that where the High Court had decided all material issues and only the formal passing of decree remained, the High Court's order was a "final order" under Art. 133. The Court relied on this Supreme Court decision as a directly analogous authority: because the High Court in the present case had decided all material issues leaving only formal decrees, the Madras High Court order was likewise final.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The central legal inquiry was whether the Madras High Court's judgment and remand order constitute a "final order" under Article 133(1) of the Constitution, permitting an appeal to the Supreme Court with the High Court's certificate.

The Court summarized and applied settled authorities (Privy Council, Federal Court, High Courts and the Supreme Court) which define "final order" as one that finally disposes of the rights of the parties in the suit; if the suit remains "live" with rights outstanding to be determined, the order is not final. The Court repeatedly emphasized the substance-over-form approach: what matters is whether, in substance, any rights remained outstanding after the High Court's judgment.

Applying those principles to the facts, the Court observed that the Madras High Court had:

  • held that the decision in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 (RDO's finding that the village was not an estate) did not operate as res judicata between the parties; and
  • held that the village was not an estate under the relevant provisions (S.3(2)(d) or S.3(2)(e)) of the Madras Estates Land Act.

The Court further noted counsel's admissions (for the petitioners) that, given those findings, the remaining issues (such as cesses, entitlement to a charge and interest in connected suits) would be resolved in the plaintiffs' favour and what remained following remand was essentially the formal act of passing decrees. Because the High Court had decided all material issues between the parties and nothing substantive remained to be adjudicated on remand, the Court concluded that the Madras High Court's order was, in substance, a final adjudication of the parties' rights.

The Court therefore held that the Madras High Court's judgment was a "final order" within Article 133(1). The Court also noted that the subject-matter value exceeded Rs. 20,000, satisfying the monetary threshold for leave under Article 133(1).

On ancillary applications, the Court ordered consolidation of appeals for valuation, security and printing. It admitted the appeal and granted a stay of trial of O.S. No. 110 of 1946 pending the appeal, but directed that security bonds given in that suit and connected suits be cancelled given that plaintiffs had received their half share; there would be no stay as regards any decree for costs. Two other stay applications (C.M. Ps. Nos. 4578 and 4579 of 1955) relating to suits O.S. No. 234 of 1953 and O.S. No. 250/51 were refused and dismissed with costs.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Court held that the Madras High Court's judgment and remand order is a final order within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India.

As a direct consequence of that holding:

  • LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED: The petitioners were granted leave to prefer appeals to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1).
  • The Court ordered consolidation of the appeals for purposes of valuation, security and printing (C.M.P. No. 422 of 1954).
  • The trial of O.S. No. 110 of 1946 was stayed pending the admitted appeal to the Supreme Court; security bonds given in that suit and connected suits were to be cancelled because the plaintiffs had received their half share; there was no stay as regards a decree for costs (C. M. P. No. 4580 of 1955).
  • Applications for stay of the trials of O.S. No. 234 of 1953 and O.S. No. 250/51 were dismissed with costs (C. M. Ps. Nos. 4578 and 4579 of 1955).

Implications: The decision's practical effect is to permit the petitioners to proceed to the Supreme Court with leave, and to impose the procedural orders set out above (consolidation, partial stays). The opinion applies settled authorities on the meaning of "final order" and does not purport to establish a new doctrinal rule beyond applying those established tests to the facts; the opinion's discussion and disposition are directed to the question of finality and the attendant procedural relief.

Order accordingly.

Show all summary ...

Judgement

SUBBA RAO, C.J. :- S. C. C. M. Ps. Nos. 4205 to 4221 of 1954 :

These are applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India against the judgment pf the Madras High Court delivered on 18-12-1953 in C. R. Ps. Nos. 1927 to 1943 of 1949 reported in AIR 1954 Mad 788 (FB). The said revisions arise out of 17 suits filed in the District Munsifs Court, Bezwada by the respondents, who are proprietors of the village called Bommaluru in the Krishna District against tenants, the petitioners, for possession of holdings in the village, for an injunction restraining them from removing the paddy heaps standing in the suit land and for effecting division of the paddy heaps.

In ten of the suits, they also asked for recovery of cesses from the tenants. The 1st defendant was a co-sharer with the plaintiffs and the other defendants are tenants. The tenants pleaded, inter alia, that the village was an estate within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act and that they had occupancy rights therein.

This contention was countered by the plaintiffs stating that the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 holding i that the village was not an estate was res judicata between the parties and, therefore, the plea that the village was an estate was not open to the tenants.

To defeat this plea, the tenants pleaded that In O. S. No. 318 of 1943 and other suits, it was held that the finding in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 to the effect that the village was not an estate was not res judicata and that this would, in its turn. operate as res judicata between the parties with the result that the petitioners would be entitled to prove in the present suits that the village was not an estate.

2. On the above pleadings, the following issues were framed in one batch of suits.

1. Whether the suit land is an estate and, if so, whether this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit ?

2. Whether the decision in O. S. No. 318 of 1943 and other suits of that batch operates as res Judicata on the above issue ?

3. Whether the decision in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 on the file of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nuzvid operates as res judicata with regard to issue 1 ?

4. Whether the suit is premature as far as cesses are concerned ?

5. To what relief are the plaintiffs entitled ?

3. The said issues are common to O. S. Nos. 110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120 and 122 of 1946. The following issues were settled in O. S. Nos. 452B, 454, 458, 460, 462, 464, 468 and 470 of 1946 :

1. Whether the defendants have occupancy-rights ?

2. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction ?

3. Whether the plaintiff, is entitled to a. " charge ?

4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest ?

5. Whether the suit is barred by res judicata ? Additional Issue framed on 11-4-194" :-

Whether the decision in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 ort the file of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nuzvid, operates as res judicata with regard to issue-1 ?

4. The learned District Munsif held that, the village was an estate and therefore the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. In that, view, he held that the other issues did not arise for consideration. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge placed before himself the following points :

1. Whether the decision in M. P. No. 2 of 193S of the Revenue Divisional Officer of Nuzvid-operates as res judicata as between the parties on. the question, whether the suit land is an estate ?

2. Whether the suit land is an estate and the-contesting defendants have occupancy rights-therein ?

3. whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to-try the suit ?

5. The learned District Judge held, agreeing with the first court, that the suit land was an. estate and that the defendants have occupancy rights. On the first point, he found that the-decision in M. P. No. 3 of 1938 did not operate as res judicata between the parties. He also allowed the appeal filed by the tenants against the order of the first Court disallowing costs. In the-result, he dismissed the appeals filed by the plaintiffs and allowed the appeals filed by the defendants.

The High Court held that the finding of the Revenue Court was not res judicata but disagreed with the Courts below and held that the village was neither an estate under S. 3(2) (d) nor under S. 3(2) (e) of the Madras Estates Land Act. The suits were remanded for further trial on, the other issues not disposed of.

The High Court, therefore, decided issues 1 and 3 in the batch of suits O. S. Nos. 110 of 1946 etc., and issues 1, 2 and the additional issue in the batch of suits O. S. Nos. 452 of 1946 etc. After remand, issues 2, 4 and 5 in the former batch and issues 3, 4 and1 5 in the latter batch remain to be decided.

In view of the conclusion arrived at by the Madras High Court that the decision in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 viz., that the village was not an estate was not res judicata and that the village was not an estate, issue 2 becomes unnecessary for that issue was raised only as a counter-blast to issue 3. Issue, 2 raised the question whether the finding in. O. S. No. 318 of 1943, namely, that the finding in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 was not res judicata would operate as res judicata between the parties. As it was held that the finding in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 would not operate as res judicata between the parties, issue 2 became unnecessary.

6. As regards the question of cesses Mr. Somasundaram, learned Counsel for the petitioner concedes that the plaintiffs would be entitled to a decree for cesses. Among the issues framed in the connected batch of O. S. Nos. 452 of 1946, etc., the only issues, which remain to be decided are (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a charge ?

(2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest ?

7. Mr. Somasundaram, learned counsel for the petitioners, concedes that the two issues should automatically be decided in favour of the plaintiffs, if the finding of the High Court on the other question was right. The result is that, after the remand; by the High Court, nothing remains to be done except to make formal decree in favour of the plaintiffs.

8. The law on the subject has been well settled. Article 133 of the Constitution of India says :

Article 133(1)

An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in civil proceedings of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies :

9. Mr. Venkatarama Sastry contends that, as the High Court remanded the matter for disposal on the remaining issues, the order of remand was not a "final order within the meaning of that Article. Mr. Somasundaram for the petitioners argues that the High Court decided all the material issues and that after remand nothing remains except for the trial court to make a formal decree, and therefore, the order of remand was a "final order" within the meaning of the Article.

The connotation of the word final in Art. 133 and similar words in the previous statutes have been the subject of judicial scrutiny by the Privy Council, Supreme Court and by the High Courts. In Firm Ramchand Manjimal v. Firm Goverdhandas Vishandas Ratanchand, AIR 1920 PC 86 (A) the Judicial Committee, in construing similar words in 8. 109, C.P.C. observed at page 87 as follows :

"The effect of those and other judgments is that an order is final if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties. The orders now under appeal do not finally dispose of those rights but leave them to be determined by the courts in the ordinary way"
.

10. The Judicial Committee again in Abdul Rahman v. D.K. Cassim and Sons, AIR 1933 PC 58 at p. 60 (B) reiterated the same view and laid down the following test namely

"The finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. If, after the order, the suit is still a live suit in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined, no appeal lies against it under S. 109(a)"
.

11. The Federal Court in Mohammad Amin Bros. Ltd. v. Dominion of India AIR 1950 FC 77 (C), accepted and followed the definition of a final order as laid down by the Judicial Committee. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J. and Venkatarama Ayyar, J. in Ragavacharyulu v. Venkata Ramanujacharyulu, AIR 1954 Mad 406 (D) also adopted the same test when they said :

"It is therefore well settled that an order can be held to be a final order only if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties in the suit or proceeding"
.

12. So too a Division Bench of this Court of which one of us (The Chief Justice) was a member, in Mangaraju v. Varahalamma. AIR 1956 Andhra 47 at p. 49 (E), after reviewing the case law on the subject, observed :

"From the aforesaid discussion of the case law on the subject, it is clear an appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Art. 133 if the order complained of finally disposes of the rights of the parties. To put it differently, it should not be a interlocutory order but a final order deciding the rights of the parties. The word judgment in the Article in the contest means final judgment in the sense that it finally decides the rights of the parties."

13. The question, therefore, is whether the judgment of the Madras High Court in the present case has finally decided the rights of the parties, or whether the suit after remand was still a live suit in which the rights of the parties should be determined. What matters is not the form but the substance. If, in substance, no rights of the parties are outstanding to be decided in the suit, it cannot be said that a mere pendency of a suit on the file of a Court deprives the otherwise final adjudication of the rights of the parties by the High Court of its finality.

This view gets support from the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar v. Shiv Ratan Deo Singh, (S) AIR 1955 SC 576 (F). There, the High Court had decided all the material issues and what remained to be done was only the passing of the decree by the first court in terms of the High Courts decree. On that basis, the Supreme Court held that the order of the High Court was final order within the meaning of Art. 133.

14. If the aforesaid principles are applied, can it be said in the present case that the order in question is not a final order within the meaning of Art. 133. All the material issues between the parties were finally decided. It was finally held that the village was not an estate and that the previous judgments did not operate as res judicata.

In view of the clear concessions made before us, there is nothing more to be done after remand by the trial Court except to pass a decree. In the circumstances, we hold that the order of the Madras High Court is a final order within the meaning of Art. 133.

15. It is not disputed that the value of the subject-matter in dispute is more than Rs. 20,000/-. We, therefore, grant leave to the petitioners to prefer appeals to the Supreme Court under Art. 133(1) of the Constitution of India, C. M. P. No. 422 of 1954

16. This is an application for consolidating the appeals for purpose of valuation, security and printing. It is ordered.

C. M. P. No. 4580 of 1955.

17. This is an application for staying the trial of O. S. No. 110 of 1946 pending appeal to the Supreme Court. As we have admitted the appeal, we think it is just and proper that the trial of the suit should be staved. But it is represented to us that the plaintiffs received their half share giving security bonds to the Court. It is agreed that the said security bonds given in O. S. No. 110 of 1946 and the other connected suits should be cancelled. There will be no stay as regards the decree for costs.

C. M. Ps. Nos. 4578 and 4579 of 1955

18. These are two applications for stay of trial of two suits O. S. No. 234 of 1953 and 6. S. No. 250/51 filed by the respondents for declaration that the petitioners and others in the village have no occupancy rights and that the plaintiffs are entitled to half the produce on the suit lands. We do not see any reason for staying these suits pending the disposal of the appeal to the Supreme Court.

19. These applications are, therefore, dismissed with costs.

Order accordingly.