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Smt. Baijayanti Nanda v. Jagannath Mahaprabhu...
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner (plaintiff) filed T.S. No. 136 of 1992 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Puri seeking declaration of right, title and interest and confirmation of possession over certain suit land. Defendants appeared; defendant No. 4 filed a written statement and contested the suit while others did not (one written statement was not accepted). Issues were framed, evidence was led by both sides and documents were exhibited. Defendant No. 4 was examined as D.W.4 and did not, in her written statement or her evidence, mention the pendency of C.S. No. 80 of 2006.
After closure of evidence of defendant No. 4, D.W.5 (Upendra Samantaray) disclosed the pendency of C.S. No. 80 of 2006. Thereafter defendant No. 4 filed petitions (Annexure-1 series) seeking to admit a certified copy of the plaint in C.S. No. 80 of 2006 as evidence and to mark it as an exhibit. The plaintiff-petitioner objected (Annexure-2), arguing that the plaint was irrelevant and not a public document under section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act and therefore not admissible. The trial Court allowed the petitions and admitted the plaint as an exhibit by order dated 16.8.2007 (Annexure-3).
The petitioner challenged that order by filing the present writ petition before this Court seeking to set aside the trial Court's order admitting the plaint of C.S. No. 80 of 2006 as a public document under section 74 of the Evidence Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaint in C.S. No. 80 of 2006 is a "public document" within the meaning of section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act?
- If the plaint is not a public document, whether it could be admitted into evidence (and marked as an exhibit) in T.S. No. 136 of 1992 without formal proof of its contents?
- Whether the trial Court's order dated 16.8.2007 admitting the certified copy of the plaint as an exhibit was legally sustainable in the circumstances of this case?
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff-Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. B. Tripathy)
- The trial Court's order admitting the plaint as a public document was arbitrary and illegal.
- The plaintiff-petitioner is not a party to C.S. No. 80 of 2006, and the plaint of a suit filed by private plaintiffs cannot be treated as a public document under section 74 of the Evidence Act.
- The subject-matter and the suit land in C.S. No. 80 of 2006 are altogether different from the present suit; hence the plaint is irrelevant.
- The plaintiffs who filed C.S. No. 80 of 2006 (Sailabala Pattnaik and Bibhuti Bhusan Pattnaik) were not examined as witnesses; their plaint could not be exhibited or admitted as evidence without their proof.
- Defendant No. 4 neither pleaded the pendency of C.S. No. 80 of 2006 in her written statement nor deposed to it when examined as D.W.4; reliance on the plaint is therefore incompetent.
- Relied upon judgments including Gulab Chand v. Sheo Karan Lall Seth and Radhashyam Mohanty v. Narayan Chandra Nath to support these points.
Defendant-Opposite Party No. 4's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. P.K. Mishra)
- During the cross-examination of D.W.5, it emerged that C.S. No. 80 of 2006 was pending in the same Court; after that, defendant No. 4 filed the petition to mark the certified copy of that plaint as an exhibit.
- The trial Court relied on the Court's prior judgment in L.I.C. v. Narmada Agrawala (AIR 1963 Orissa 103) and allowed the petition to mark the plaint as an exhibit.
- Maintained that the plaint is a public document within the meaning of sections 7 and 74 of the Evidence Act (the opinion records the counsel's statement as asserting that view).
- Relied upon the judgment in Jagdishchandra Chandulal Shah v. State of Gujarat (1989 Cri LJ 1724) in support of admissibility of a certified copy of a plaint as part of the record.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gulab Chand v. Sheo Karan Lall Seth, AIR 1964 Pat 45 | Held that a plaint filed by a private person generally cannot be regarded as a "public document" under section 74; a plaint filed in Court does not become a public document merely by being admitted or registered. | The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that a plaint is not a public document and that a certified copy cannot, without more, prove the correctness of statements contained therein. |
| Radhashyam Mohanty v. Narayan Chandra Nath, 1987 64 CLT 102 | Principle that evidence must be confined to the pleadings; a party cannot lead evidence on a plea not before the Court. | The Court applied this ratio to conclude that defendant No. 4 could not rely on a plea not pleaded in her written statement nor in her evidence (D.W.4), and therefore could not later introduce the plaint as evidence. |
| Biseswar Dandpat v. Saraswatt Dei, W.P.(C) No. 16352 of 2006 (disposed 11.2.2014) | Analysed "what constitute a public document" under section 74 of the Evidence Act. | The Court cited this judgment as having analyzed what constitutes a public document and used that analysis as part of its reasoning that a plaint is not a public document for proving statements contained in it. |
| Manorama Srivastava v. Saroj Srivastava (Allahabad High Court) | Defined a public document as one whose contents are of public interest and made by authorized agents in the course of official duty; such documents are open to public challenge. | The Court cited this formulation to contrast the nature of public documents with plaints filed by private parties, reinforcing that plaints do not ordinarily meet this description. |
| J. Sturla v. Freccia (per Lord Blackburn; cited observation) | Observation that a "public document" is one made for public use and access, by a public officer in exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial duty; an entry in records of a manor or corporation may be "public" within that limited sense. | The Court reproduced Lord Blackburn's observations to explain the limited meaning of "public" in "public document" and to support the conclusion that plaints filed by private parties are not public documents in that sense. |
| Tarkeshwar Prasad Tewari v. Devendra Prasad Tewari (citation in text) | Held that a plaint is not a public document and a certified copy of plaint was rejected from evidence. | The Court relied on this holding to reinforce the view that certified copies of plaints are not admissible as public documents without proper proof. |
| Akshoy Ku. Bose v. Sukumar Dutta | Held that a written statement filed in a previous suit is not a public document and its certified copy is not admissible in evidence without calling for the original. | The Court cited this authority to analogize that pleadings like written statements or plaints are private documents requiring proof and are not provable merely by production of certified copies. |
| Usuf Hasan v. Raunaq Ali | Held that a plaint is a private document and must be proved by direct evidence; presumption from a certified copy was incorrect. | The Court used this decision to support the proposition that a certified copy of a plaint does not suffice to prove its contents without calling for the original or adducing proper proof. |
| Manbodh v. Hirasai (and Lakshan Chandra Mandal v. Takim Dhall, AIR 1924 Cal 558; Seethapathi v. Venkanna, AIR 1922 Mad 71) | Authorities supporting the refined but fundamental distinction between admissibility of a document as evidence of a transaction and admissibility of a document to prove statements contained in it; a plaint may prove that a suit was brought but not the correctness of statements in the plaint without direct or secondary evidence. | The Court relied on these decisions to explain that while a plaint may prove that a suit was instituted by a particular person on a particular allegation, it cannot be used to prove the correctness of statements contained therein unless properly proved. |
| Smt. Shamlata Wd/o Manohar Raut v. Vishweshwara Tukaram Giripunje, AIR 2008 Bom. 155 | Held that a certified copy of the plaint is not a public document and that the original plaint should be called for to prove it. | The Court cited this decision to support the conclusion that a certified copy of a plaint cannot be considered proved in the absence of calling for the original. |
| Jagdishchandra Chandulal Shah v. State of Gujarat, 1989 Cri LJ 1724 | Held (in paragraph 12) that a certified copy of a plaint may be a public document if it forms part of the record; signature may still require separate proof. | The Court considered this decision but described its ratio as potentially per incuriam because earlier decisions (e.g., Gulab Chand) were not considered; the Court did not follow this as a controlling authority for treating plaints generally as public documents. |
| Shazada Mohomed Shahaboodeen v. Daniel Wedgeberry (Mahomed Shababoodeen v. Wedgebarry) | Authority relied upon in support of plaint being a public document in one instance (certified copy of plaint admitted in that case), though not followed by other courts. | The Court noted this case was relied upon by other counsel but observed that the view has not been widely followed and does not outweigh the weight of authorities holding plaints not to be public documents. |
| New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Krishna Sharma (referenced in Manorama Srivastava) | Referenced as authority in the formulation of what constitutes a public document (as reproduced in Manorama Srivastava). | The Court cited the excerpt in Manorama Srivastava which referred to New India Assurance as part of the analysis of public document characteristics. |
| L.I.C. v. Narmada Agrawala, AIR 1963 Orissa 103 | Decision of this Court relied upon by the trial Court (and by defence counsel) in allowing the plaint to be marked as an exhibit. | The respondent relied on this Court's earlier decision as authority for admitting certified copy of a plaint; the present Court considered the reliance but ultimately concluded the plaint in the present facts was not a public document. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the central statutory provision at issue: section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act and reproduced the definition of "public documents" contained therein (documents forming acts or records of acts of sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, public officers, and public records kept in any state of private documents).
The Court reviewed prior decisions and authorities that interpret what constitutes a public document. It quoted and relied upon:
- Prior judgments (including Gulab Chand and others) holding that a plaint filed by a private person in Court is not a public document merely because it is admitted and registered by the Court; at most it becomes part of the case record but that does not render the plaint a public document for the purposes of proving the correctness of statements contained therein.
- Authoritative observations (including Lord Blackburn's quoted passage) emphasizing that "public document" denotes documents made for public use or reference by public officers in discharge of judicial or quasi-judicial duties and that the term "public" may have a limited sense.
- Decisions across various High Courts showing a consistent view: certified copies of plaints are not automatically admissible as public documents to prove substantive facts asserted in the plaint without appropriate proof (original or secondary evidence as permitted by the Evidence Act).
The Court then applied those principles to the facts. Key factual-legal points influencing the outcome were:
- Defendant No. 4 did not plead in her written statement nor depose as D.W.4 about the pendency of C.S. No. 80 of 2006; the information about that plaint emerged only through D.W.5 after D.W.4's evidence was closed.
- The plaintiffs of C.S. No. 80 of 2006 (Sailabala Pattnaik and Bibhuti Pattnaik) were not examined as witnesses; the plaintiff-petitioner in T.S. No. 136 of 1992 is not a party to C.S. No. 80 of 2006.
- Given the jurisprudence surveyed, a plaint of a private suit is at best admissible to prove that a suit was instituted by a particular person against someone on a particular allegation but is not admissible to prove the correctness of statements in the plaint unless proved by direct evidence or permissible secondary evidence.
- Allowing a certified copy of the plaint to be marked as an exhibit without demonstrating competence to rely upon it, without having the plaintiffs of the other suit produce evidence, and without calling for the original or otherwise complying with the provisions for secondary evidence, was not permissible.
- The Court also invoked the principle from Radhashyam Mohanty that evidence must be confined to the pleadings and that parties cannot be permitted to lead evidence on a plea not before the Court; this reinforced that defendant No. 4 could not employ the plaint as evidence when she had not pleaded its pendency or relied upon it in her pleadings or evidence earlier.
Weighing these legal authorities and the facts, the Court concluded that the plaint in C.S. No. 80 of 2006 did not qualify as a public document under section 74 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of proving the contents of the plaint in the present suit, and it could not be admitted into evidence and marked as an exhibit without proof of its contents.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court held that the plaint in C.S. No. 80 of 2006 is not a public document within the meaning of section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act and therefore cannot be admitted into evidence or marked as an exhibit without proof of its contents. Consequently, the order dated 16.8.2007 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Puri in T.S. No. 136 of 1992 admitting the plaint into evidence is set aside, and the writ petition is allowed. No cost.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The certified copy of the plaint in C.S. No. 80 of 2006 cannot be relied upon by defendant No. 4 in T.S. No. 136 of 1992 as a public document to prove the matters asserted in that plaint; such material must be proved by direct evidence or by permissible secondary evidence in accordance with the Evidence Act.
- Procedural implication: A party cannot introduce and rely on a plaint of another suit as a public document where the issue of such a plaint was not pleaded or proved in the trial as required; the trial Court's admission of such a plaint without appropriate proof was reversed.
- On precedent: The Court's decision follows existing authorities that a plaint is not ordinarily a public document for proving its substantive statements; the opinion did not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying and consolidating existing case law.
Order: Petition Allowed. The trial Court order dated 16.8.2007 (Annexure-3) is set aside; writ petition allowed; no costs.
B.R Sarangi, J.:— The plaintiff, being the petitioner, has filed this petition challenging the order dated 16.8.2007 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Puri in T.S No. 136 of 1992 under Annexure-3 allowing the petition filed by the defendant-opposite party No. 4 with regard to exhibiting the plaint of C.S No. 80 of 2006 as a public document under section 74 of the Evidence Act.
2. The short facts of the case, in hand, is that the petitioner being the plaintiff filed a suit bearing T.S No. 136 of 1992 before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Puri for declaration of her right, title and interest and confirmation of possession over the suit land. The defendants being summoned appeared in the suit. Besides defendant No. 4, Mina Samantaray and defendant No. 5, Santanu Mohapatra, none filed the written statement in the suit. The written statement filed by the defendant No. 5 was not accepted by the Court. However, defendant No. 4 contested the suit by filing her written statement. On the basis of the pleadings available, issues were framed and hearing of the suit commenced and witnesses from both the sides were examined and in course of such hearing documents were also exhibited. In the suit itself, defendant opposite party No. 4 herein, was examined as D.W 4. Neither in the written statement nor during her examination she has stated anything regarding filing or pendency of C.S No. 80 of 2006 and its relevancy to the present suit. But after closure of evidence of defendant No. 4, she examined one Upendra Samantaray as D.W 5 in the suit who disclosed regarding pendency of C.S No. 80 of 2006, in consequence thereof defendant No. 4, filed petitions vide Annexure-1 series for admitting the certified copy of the plaint in C.S No. 80 of 2006 as evidence facilitating D.W 4 for marking the same as exhibit, granting permission to file certified copy of the plaint in C.S No. 80 of 2006 and to call for the file of the said suit.
3. The plaintiff-petitioner objected uide Annexure-2 to the petitions filed in Arinexure-1 series stating, inter alia, that the plaint in C.S No. 80 of 2006 is quite irrelevant to the suit before the Court and the plaint being not a public document as per the provisions of section 74 of the Evidence Act, the same cannot be admitted into evidence and thus, prayed for dismissal/rejection of the petitions.
4. Learned Court below after hearing the parties allowed the petitions vide Annexure-1 series and admitted the plaint into evidence and marked the same as exhibit vide order dated 16.8.2007 under Annexure-3.
5. Mr. B. Tripathy learned-Counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner strenuously urged that the order impugned amounts to arbitrary and illegal exercise of power by the Court below as the plaintiff-petitioner is not a party in C.S No. 80 of 2006, and more so the plaint of a suit being not a public document cannot be admitted into evidence, and marked as exhibit in the suit without any formal proof as the subject-matter as well as the suit land are altogether different. He further submitted that the suit in C.S No. 80 of 2006 has been filed by one Sailabala Pattnaik and Bibhuti Bhiisan Pattnaik and they have not come to the-witness box and the plaint filed by them cannot be exhibited and admitted into evidence as the plaintiff-petitioner is not a party to the said suit. That apart defendant No. 4, opposite party No. 4 herein, has neither pleaded the said fact in her written statement nor deposed anything while she was examined as D:W. 4 in the suit. Therefore, she has no competency in any man-ner to rely on the plaint filed in the said suit. Therefore, the learned Court below on wrong interpretation of fact and law arrived at the conelusion that in order to ascertain a graphic picture of the dispute the Court has to take the aid of the other reference. In order to substantiate his contention he has relied upon the judgment in Gulab Chand v. Sheo Karan Lall Seth AIR 1964 Pat 45. and Radhashyam Mohanty v. Narayan Chandra Nath 1987 64 CLT 102..
6. Mr. P.K Mishra, learned Counsel for the defendant-opposite party No. 4 states that during cross-examination of D.W 5 by the plaintiff-petitioner it was elicited that another Civil Suit bearing C.S No. 80 of 2006 is now, pending in the same Court i.e, Civil Judge (Junior Division), Puri and after cross-examination of D.W 5 a petition has been filed by the defendant-opposite party No. 4 in the suit to markvthe certified copy, of the plaint in C.S No. 80 of 2006 as exhibit to which the plaintiff-petitioner has objected andt relying upon the judgment of this Court in L.I.C v. Narmada Agrawala AIR 1963 Orissa 103., the learned Court allowed the petition with regard to marking of the plaint, as exhibit and therefore, no illegality has been committed by the Court below by holding that the plaint is a public document within the, meaning of section 7, 4 of the Evidence Act. In support his contention he has relied upon the judgment in Jagdishchandra Chandulal Shah v. State of Gujurat 1989 Cri LJ 1724..
7. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances now it is to be considered whether plaint is a public document or not within the meaning of section 74 of the Evidence Act.
8. Public document has been defined under section 74 of the Evidence Act, which reads as follows:
“74. Public documents.— The following documents are public documents:
(1) Documents forming the acts or records of the acts;
(i) of the sovereign authority,
(ii) of official bodies and Tribunals, and
(iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India or of the Commonwealth, or of a foreign country;
(2) Public records kept in any State of private documents.”
9. This Court while considering section 74 of the Evidence Act passed a judgment in W.P(C) No. 16352 of 2006, Biseswar Dandpat v. Saraswatt Dei, disposed of on 11.2.2014 analyzing “what constitute a public document”.
10. The following documents are public documents:
(1) documents forming the acts or records of the acts;
(i) of the sovereign authority;
(ii) of official bodies and Tribunals and;
(iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of, or of the commonwealth other part of Her Majesty's dominions, or of a foreign country;
(2) public records kept in any state of private documents. (Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872), section 74].
11. What constitute public document has also been considered in Manorama Srivastava v. Saroj Srivastava, wherein the Allahabad High Court held as follows:
“A public document is such a document contents of which are of public interest and the statements are made by authorized and competent agents of the public in the course of their official duty. Public are interested in such a document and entitled to see it, so that if there is anything wrong in it they would be entitled to object. In that sense it becomes a statement that would be open to the public to challenge or dispute and therefore, it has a certain amount of authority. See New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Krishna Sharma.”
12. With reference to the question of admissibility of a public document in evidence, the following observations were made by Lord Blackburn:
“There “should be a Public inquiry, a Public Document, and made by a Public Officer. I do not think that, ‘Public’ there, is to be taken in the sense of meaning of the whole world. I think an entry in the books of a Manor is ‘public’ in the sense that it concerns all the people interested in the manor and an entry, probably, in a Corporation book concerning a matter or something in which all the corporation is concerned would be ‘public’ within that sense. But must be a ‘Public Document’, and it must be made by a Public Officer. I understand a ‘public document’, there, to mean, a document that is made for the purpose of the public making use of it and being able to refer to it. It is meant to be where there is a judicial, or quasi judicial, duty to enquire. It should be made for the purpose of being kept public so that the persons concerned in it may have access to it afterwards” (per Blackburn, J. Sturla v. Freccia)”
13. Taking into consideration the above meaning of “public document” and applying the same in the present context, the Patna High Court in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the decision in Gulab Chand (supra) held as follows:
“12. For the respondent (defendant No. 6) it was contended that Ext. 2, being a certified copy of a plaint, it would prove, without any further evidence, the contents of the original plaint including the signatures of the plaintiffs on that point. In other words, the argument was that the plaint filed in a Court was a public document, a certified copy of which could be granted under section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act, and when so granted, it will prove the contents of the original by the mere filing of it under section 77.
What are public documents are stated in section 74 of the Evidence Act: Documents forming the acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority, of official bodies and Tribunal, and of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India or of the Commonwealth or of a foreign country have been described as public documents. I cannot see how a plaint filed by a private person in Court to institute a case against some others can come within the descriptions of the documents given in that sub-section. Sub-section (2) of section 74 can in no way include a plaint. The plaint is neither an act nor the record of an act of any public officer. There can be ho strength in the contention that when the plaint is presented and the Court makes an order admitting or registering it, the plaint becomes an act or the record of an act of a public officer presiding over the Court. At the most, it will become a part of the record maintained by the Court in that case after the plaint is admitted and registered, but that itself will not make it a public document. If it were, then anything filed in a case in a Court of law either petitions or pleadings, private communications or documents which a party would file in a case would become public documents for the simple reason that they are on the record of a case in Court. The judgment and decree passed in a case are undoubtedly the acts of the Court, and they will be public documents on that account. Similarly, a petition of compromise which is made a part of the decree forms a part of the public document, but before its incorporation in the decree, it remains a private document, though filed in Court, forming a part of the case record.
13. Learned Counsel for the respondent relied upon some cases to support the view that a plaint or a written statement filed in a case are public documents. The case of Mahomed Shababoodeen v. Wedgebarry, was very much relied upon. No doubt, in that case a certified copy of the plaint was admitted on the ground that the plaint was a public document as it formed a part of the record but a certified copy of a written statement which was filed in the case was rejected. If a plaint could be a public document, there is no reason why the written statement should not come in that category; but the view taken in that case about the plaint being a public document and, as such, provable by the production of a certified copy did not find favour in any other Court. Authors on evidence like Field and Woodroffe doubted the correctness of that view also in their commentaries”.
14. The above finding of the learned Single Judge of Patna High Court is fortified in view of the judgment in Tarkeshwar Prasad Tewari… v. Devendra Prasad Tewari…. where plaint was held not to be a public document and certified copy thereof was rejected from the evidence.
15. In the case of Akshoy Ku. Bose v. Sukumar Dutta, the written statement filed in a previous suit was set down as not a public document and its certified copy was not admissible in evidence without calling for the original. Mere production of a certified copy in such a case was found to be not sufficient secondary evidence of its contents without any further evidence.
16. In case of Usuf Hasan v. Raunaq Ali it was similarly held that the plaint is a private document and it must be proved by direct evidence and no formal evidence was given about the plaint. The Lower Courts had drawn a presumption from the certified copy of the plaint about its genuineness but that was held to be an incorrect approach.
17. A similar view that a plaint is not a public document and that it should be proved like any other private document was taken in the case of Manbodh v. Hirasai. The learned Single Judge of Patna High Court made a reference to Lakshan Chandra Mandal v. Takim Dhall 9 Cal LJ 90; AIR 1924 Cal 558. where the learned Celebrated Judge Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee observed that the distinction between the admissibility of a document as evidence of a transaction and admissibility of a document in proof of a statement contained therein is of a refined but of a fundamental character though frequently overlooked and for that the learned Judge has referred to several cases including the case of Seethapathi v. Venkanna AIR 1922 Mad 71 FB. and held that a plaint may be admissible in proof of the fact that a particular suit was brought by a particular person against someone on a particular allegation; but it cannot be admissible to prove the correctness of a statement contained therein unless it is proved by direct evidence or by secondary evidence as provided in the Evidence Act.
18. In Smt. Shamlata Wd/o Manohar Raut v. Vishweshwara Tukaram Giripunje AIR 2008 Bom. 155., it is held as follows:
“The certified copy of the plaint is not a public document. Hence, it requires proof. For proving such document, original plaint suit have been called for in the Court. That that is not done hence the certified copy of the plaint could not be said to be proved at all.”
19. The reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner on the judgment of this Court in Radhashyam Mohanty (supra) this Court held that the only pleadings in the suit were that of plaintiffs and defendants and therefore, evidence is bound to be confined to the said pleadings. Therefore, evidence should be led to prove or disprove any of the facts comprised in the pleadings of the plaintiffs or defendants but the defendant cannot be permitted to lead evidence on a plea, which was not there before the Court.
20. In paragraph 12 of the judgment in Jagdishchandra Chandulal Shah (supra), the Gujarat High Court has held as follows:
“So far as the document at SI. No. 9 is concerned, it is the certified copy of the plaint filed against Mahobatsing Mansingh Jadeja by the complainant’ and it is a public document as it forms part of the record, as held by the High Court in the case of Shazada Mohomed Shahaboodeen v. Daniel Wedgeberry and therefore, that is also admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the contents thereof. However, when the question arises with regard to the signature thereon, it will be required to be proved in the same manner in which execution of the document is to be proved”.
21. Referring to the aforesaid judgment learned Counsel for the defendant-opposite party No. 4 argued that certified copy of a plaint filed in the Civil Court would be a public document and hence admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the contents thereof. In view of the analysis of the judgments cited before the Court in the forgoing paragraphs, the ratio decided in Jagdishchandra Chandulal Shah (supra), may constitute to be a per incurium judgment as the earlier judgment available has not been taken into consideration whereas in Gulab Chand (supra) various judgments in the subject has been taken into consideration and after analyzing section 74 of Evidence Act, cogent reason has been assigned that plaint may be admissible in proof of fact that a particular suit was brought by a particular person against someone on a particular allegation; but it cannot be admissible to prove the correctness of a statement contained therein unless it is proved by direct evidence or by secondary evidence as provided in the Evidence Act. In the present case, neither there is any whisper in the written statement filed by the defendant-opposite party No. 4 with regard to pendency of C.S No. 80 of 2006 nor in her evidence as D.W 4 has she stated anything about the same. The same has been spoken through evidence adduced by D.W 5, Upendra Samantary who incidentally disclosed regarding pendency of C.S No. 80 of 2006. The plaintiff-petitioner is not a party to the said suit and the said suit has been filed by Sailabala Pattnaik and Bibhuti Pattnaik and none of them examined as a witness in the present suit. Therefore, any application filed by them cannot be taken into consideration to exhibit the plaint as a public document so as to prove the case of defendant-opposite party No. 4. Applying the ratio of the judgment in Radhashyam Mohanty (supra), the pleadings in the suit were that of plaintiffs and defendants and the evidence therefore, is bound to be confined to the said pleadings. Hence, evidence should be led to prove or disprove any of the facts comprised in the pleadings of the plaintiffs or defendants but they cannot be permitted to lead evidence on a plea which was not there before the Court.
22. Considering the above facts and circumstances of the case and the law governing the field, this Court is of the definite conclusion that the plaint in C.S No. 80 of 2006 is not a public document within the meaning of section 74 of the Evidence Act and therefore, the same cannot be admitted into evidence and marked as exhibit without proving the contents thereof. In that view of the matter, the order dated 16.8.2007 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Puri in T.S No. 136 of 1992 is hereby set aside and the writ petition is allowed. No cost.
23. Petition Allowed.
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