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State Of Haryana And Another v. Ankur Gupta .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent’s father, a Government employee in Haryana, died in harness on 21-12-1996. At that time, a new compassionate appointment policy dated 22-08-1996 had come into force following a Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment. The revised policy barred compassionate appointments where one parent of the deceased employee was still in Government service and also fixed an income ceiling of ₹2,500 per month.
Despite these restrictions, the respondent was appointed as a clerk on 12-09-1997 under the Die-in-Harness Scheme. Government correspondence in May 1997 acknowledged that the respondent’s mother was a serving Government employee earning ₹5,880 per month, but nonetheless sought “relaxation” of the policy. A show-cause notice was later issued on 18-05-2001, and the appointment was cancelled by order dated 24-09-2001.
The respondent challenged the cancellation before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which set aside the State’s order, reasoning that the respondent had worked for roughly four years and had obtained employment without fraud or misrepresentation. The State of Haryana appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondent’s appointment, made in violation of the revised compassionate appointment policy dated 22-08-1996, could be sustained merely because he had worked for about four years without fraud or misrepresentation.
- Whether the High Court was justified in granting relief despite the explicit policy bar and absence of any provision permitting relaxation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant State’s Arguments
- The appointment was made per incuriam and in clear violation of the policy effective from 22-08-1996; a mistaken appointment cannot confer a legal right.
- No provision existed for relaxing the policy requirements, particularly the bar where one parent remains in Government service.
Respondent’s Arguments
- The respondent practised no fraud or misrepresentation; he had rendered over four years of service.
- Relying on Union of India v. K.P. Tiwari, the Supreme Court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution to disturb the High Court’s equitable relief.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. K.P. Tiwari (2003) 9 SCC 129 | Supreme Court’s self-imposed restraint in exercising Article 136 jurisdiction. | Invoked by the respondent to argue against interference; the Court nevertheless proceeded to examine the merits. |
| State of Haryana v. Rani Devi (1996) 5 SCC 308 | Compassionate appointment is an exception, justified only to tide over sudden financial crisis; not a right under Articles 14 or 16. | Cited to emphasise that compassionate appointments must strictly conform to policy and constitutional requirements. |
| LIC of India v. Asha Ramchhandra Ambekar (1994) 2 SCC 718 | Courts cannot direct compassionate appointments beyond the scope of governing regulations. | Used to underscore that sympathy cannot override the binding policy framework. |
| Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana (1994) 4 SCC 138 | Regular recruitment must be through open competition; compassionate appointment is a narrow exception. | Reinforced the need to restrict compassionate appointments to cases expressly covered by policy. |
| Director of Education (Secondary) v. Pushpendra Kumar (1998) 5 SCC 192 | Dependants cannot insist on a particular post; the exception must not eclipse general recruitment rights of others. | Bolstered the Court’s view that policy exceptions must be narrowly tailored. |
| State of Manipur v. Md. Rajaodin (2003) 7 SCC 511 | Re-affirmation of limitations on compassionate appointments. | Relied upon to uphold the validity and “logic” of the 22-08-1996 policy. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court noted that the revised policy dated 22-08-1996 expressly disqualified dependants if one parent remained in Government service and exceeded the income ceiling. The respondent’s mother was a serving employee earning well above the permissible limit. Government correspondence from May 1997 recognised these facts, yet proceeded contrary to policy without any statutory provision permitting relaxation.
Sympathetic considerations, the Court stressed, cannot override clear policy mandates, citing a consistent line of decisions (Rani Devi, Asha Ramchhandra Ambekar, Umesh Kumar Nagpal, Pushpendra Kumar, Md. Rajaodin). The High Court’s reliance on absence of fraud and the respondent’s four-year service was therefore misplaced: a mistaken appointment does not create a vested right.
The Court also rejected the respondent’s plea under Union of India v. K.P. Tiwari, holding that the present case involved a manifest breach of policy warranting intervention under Article 136.
Holding and Implications
Held: The appeal is allowed; the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s judgment is set aside and the cancellation order dated 24-09-2001 stands restored.
Implications: The respondent’s four-year service does not legitimise an appointment made in violation of the governing policy. Nonetheless, the Court granted limited equitable relief: if the respondent applies for regular Government employment within two years and is otherwise selected, over-age disqualification will be waived and past service will be considered. No new legal precedent is created; the decision reinforces strict adherence to compassionate appointment policies.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.
2. The compassion shown by the functionaries of the appellant State by giving appointment to the respondent on compassionate ground (under Die-in-Harness Scheme) was nullified by a subsequent order. The respondent questioned the legality thereof before the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh. By the impugned judgment, the High Court held that though the appointment may not have been in accordance with the policy of compassionate appointment, yet the fact that the respondent (writ petitioner) had worked for about four years and was not guilty of any fraud or misrepresentation in seeking appointment under the Scheme, the impugned order dated 24-9-2001 was not justified.
3. Factual position is almost undisputed and brief reference thereto would suffice:
The father of the respondent while in service died on 21-12-1996. Prior to that i.e on 22-8-1996 the policy relating to compassionate appointment as was inoperative earlier was modified. The modification was done in view of a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Prior to the modification there was no embargo on a person getting appointment under the compassionate appointment scheme, even though one of his parents was in service at the time when the other expired. The High Court held that the very purpose of compassionate appointment was lost by this method of appointment. It was, therefore, held that the dependant of a deceased government employee shall not be entitled to employment on compassionate grounds in case one of his parents is alive and is in government employment. In view of the change, no person was entitled to be considered for compassionate appointment where one of his parents is alive and is in government employment. As the respondent's mother was in government employment, the authorities felt that his appointment was not permissible, in view of clear stipulation in the policy decision dated 22-8-1996. The appointment was sought to be nullified by order dated 18-5-2001. The respondent was appointed as a clerk on 12-9-1997 on compassionate grounds under the Die-in-Harness Scheme. Show-cause notice was issued on 18-5-2001. The respondent submitted his reply, and by an order dated 24-9-2001 the appointment letter issued on 12-9-1997 was cancelled. As noted above, the High Court nullified the action.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant State submitted that the approach of the High Court is erroneous. When the appointment was made in violation of the policy, and by mistake the respondent had been appointed, that does not confer any legal right upon him. In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that as rightly observed by the High Court, there was no misrepresentation or fraud practised by the respondent in gaining employment. The respondent has worked for more than 4 years and in view of what has been stated by this Court in Union of India v. K.P Tiwari (2003) 9 SCC 129, (2002) 1 LLJ 672, jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short “the Constitution”) should not be exercised.
5. We find that the appointment, admittedly, was not permissible in view of the policy which came into force from 22-8-1996. The earlier policy was changed in view of a decision of the High Court. The correctness of the policy decision was not under challenge.
6. As was observed in State of Haryana v. Rani Devi (1996) 5 SCC 308, JT (1996) 6 SC 646 it need not be pointed out that the claim of the person concerned for appointment on compassionate ground is based on the premise that he was dependent on the deceased employee. Strictly, this claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. However, such claim is considered as reasonable and permissible on the basis of sudden crisis occurring in the family of such employee who has served the State and dies while in service. That is why it is necessary for the authorities to frame rules, regulations or to issue such administrative orders which can stand the test of Articles 14 and 16. Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Die-in-Harness Scheme cannot be made applicable to all types of posts irrespective of the nature of service rendered by the deceased employee. In Rani Devi case (1996) 5 SCC 308, JT (1996) 6 SC 646 it was held that the scheme regarding appointment on compassionate ground if extended to all types of casual or ad hoc employees including those who worked as apprentices cannot be justified on constitutional grounds. In LIC of India v. Asha Ramchhandra Ambekar (1994) 2 SCC 718, (1994) 27 ATC 174 it was pointed out that the High Courts and Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic considerations to make appointments on compassionate grounds when the regulations framed in respect thereof do not cover and contemplate such appointments. It was noted in Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana (1994) 4 SCC 138, (1994) 27 ATC 537 that as a rule, in public service appointments should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. The appointment on compassionate ground is not another source of recruitment but merely an exception to the aforesaid requirement taking into consideration the fact of the death of the employee while in service leaving his family without any means of livelihood. In such cases the object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crisis. But such appointments on compassionate ground have to be made in accordance with the rules, regulations or administrative instructions taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased.
7. In Director of Education (Secondary) v. Pushpendra Kumar (1998) 5 SCC 192 it was observed that in the matter of compassionate appointment there cannot be insistence for a particular post. Out of purely humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided the family would not be able to make both ends meet, provisions are made for giving appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for appointment. Care has, however, to be taken that provision for grant of compassionate employment which is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions does not unduly interfere with the right of those other persons who are eligible for appointment to seek appointment against the post which would have been available, but for the provision enabling appointment being made on compassionate grounds of the dependant of the deceased employee. As it is in the nature of exception to the general provisions, it cannot substitute the provision to which it is an exception and thereby nullify the main provision by taking away completely the right conferred by the main provision.
8. These aspects have been highlighted by this Court in a recent decision in State of Manipur v. Md. Rajaodin (2003) 7 SCC 511.
9. Above being the legal position, the logic of the policy cannot be undermined. Coming to the question whether there was any fraud or misrepresentation, we find that right from the beginning, the officers concerned were acting in a manner contrary to the policy. When the Director of Industrial Training and Vocational Education, Haryana wrote to the Commissioner and Secretary, Industrial Training and Vocational Education Department, Haryana Government, on 22-5-1997, it was clearly indicated that the mother of the respondent was already in government service. It was also noted that according to the government instructions only those dependants of the deceased employee/officer whose family income is up to Rs 2500 per month can be appointed. In the letter itself it is mentioned that the monthly salary of the respondent's mother was Rs 5880 and, therefore, there was no scope for appointing the respondent. Having said so, it was indicated that relaxation may be given in his case. The High Court proceeded on the basis as if there was relaxation of the stipulations. No provision could be shown to us whereby relaxation is permissible, particularly when the policy in this respect was modified on the basis of and in implementation of the decision of the High Court. Though the learned counsel for the respondent referred to the 1970 guidelines where there was scope for relaxation, the same does not assist the respondent because that was operative at a point of time when the policy dated 22-8-1996 notified to be in line with the High Court's judgment was not in operation.
10. Looked at from any angle, the view of the High Court is indefensible. The judgment of the High Court is, therefore, set aside. But while allowing the State's appeal, it cannot be lost sight of that the respondent was in government service for more than about four years. It is stated by the learned counsel for the respondent that he has already become overaged for government employment. In the peculiar circumstances, in case the respondent applies for a job in the Government within a period of two years and is selected dehors the compassionate appointment scheme, the question of his having crossed the age bar, would not stand in his way and the service rendered by him shall be duly considered. The appeal is allowed subject to the aforesaid observations. Costs made easy.
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