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State Of U.P v. Mata Bhikh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
On 11 April 1968, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) of Gyanpur initiated proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning Plot No. 338 in Village Balapur Rohi. The SDM restrained Ram Lakhan and his associates from interfering with the possession of Smt Ram Piari, who was represented by her agent, Doodnath. Despite the subsisting order, the respondents allegedly disturbed Ram Piari’s possession.
Acting on Doodnath’s petition dated 10 March 1972, the then SDM filed a written complaint under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondents. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gyanpur registered Criminal Case No. 94 of 1973, convicted all respondents and sentenced each to three months’ rigorous imprisonment. The Additional Sessions Judge, Gyanpur upheld the conviction in Appeal No. 21 of 1976.
The respondents sought revision before the Allahabad High Court (Criminal Revision No. 614 of 1977). The High Court set aside the conviction, reasoning that the complaint had not been filed by “the public servant concerned” within the meaning of Section 195(1)(a) CrPC because it emanated from a successor SDM rather than the SDM who had issued the original Section 145 order. The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the expression “the public servant concerned” in Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure includes a successor in office of the public servant who originally promulgated the order alleged to have been disobeyed.
- Consequently, whether a complaint filed by such a successor SDM is valid for the purpose of prosecuting an offence under Section 188 IPC.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab, 1962 Supp 2 SCR 812 | Complaint by “public servant concerned” is a mandatory pre-condition; trials without such complaint are void. | Court reiterated the mandatory nature of Section 195 but addressed who qualifies as the “public servant concerned.” |
| P.D. Patel v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Rang 292 | “Public servant concerned” includes a successor in office. | Used as persuasive authority supporting an inclusive interpretation. |
| Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1422 | A successor Magistrate may file a complaint under Section 476; statutory duties can be performed by successors. | Main Supreme Court authority underpinning the decision that successors fall within Section 195(1)(a). |
| Subramanian Chettiar, Re, AIR 1957 Mad 442 | Successor public servants may lodge complaints under analogous provisions. | Cited affirmatively to bolster the inclusive approach. |
| Public Prosecutor v. Mohammed Ali, AIR 1969 AP 41 | Same principle that successors have authority to complain. | Referenced as supportive precedent. |
| Government Advocate, Bihar v. Kumar Singh, AIR 1938 Pat 83 | Lodging a complaint is a public duty; successors can fulfill it. | Relied upon to demonstrate historical consistency of the view adopted. |
| Manik Lal Bhagat v. State, 1982 Cri LJ 1473 (Cal) | Explicitly holds that “public servant concerned” includes the office holder for the time being and his successor. | Cited as contemporary High Court support for the inclusive reading. |
| Mata Bhikh v. State, 1980 Cri LJ 575 (All) | Restrictive view that only the original public servant or his superior may complain. | Supreme Court rejected this reasoning as unsustainable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by reaffirming that Section 195(1)(a) CrPC is intended to prevent vexatious private prosecutions for certain offences, and that a written complaint by the proper public servant is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Examining the statutory language, the Court observed that the provision also permits a complaint by “some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate,” illustrating a legislative intent to ensure continuity of enforcement rather than conferring a personal privilege on the original officer.
Addressing the interpretive split among High Courts, the Court endorsed the line of authority (Rangoon, Patna, Madras, Andhra Pradesh and Calcutta) which recognises successors in office as falling within the phrase “public servant concerned.” Heavy reliance was placed on its own earlier decision in Ajaib Singh, where a successor Magistrate was deemed competent to act under Section 476 CrPC. The Court reasoned that any alternative construction would create practical difficulties: orders under Sections 133, 145 or 146 would become unenforceable if the issuing officer were transferred, retired or otherwise left office before a complaint could be filed.
Accordingly, the Court held that a successor SDM acquires the same legal standing as his predecessor for the purpose of lodging a complaint under Section 195(1)(a). The Allahabad High Court’s restrictive interpretation was therefore incorrect and unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; High Court judgment set aside. The Supreme Court restored the conviction but, given the protracted nature of the proceedings (commenced in 1968) and the lapse of time, issued only an admonition to the respondents under Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act rather than enforcing the original custodial sentence.
Implications: The decision authoritatively clarifies that the phrase “the public servant concerned” in Section 195(1)(a) CrPC encompasses successors in office. This prevents offenders from evading prosecution merely because the original authority has vacated the post and ensures continuity in the enforcement of public orders without necessarily involving higher-level administrative superiors. No new precedent was set on sentence; the ruling primarily resolves the interpretive conflict on who is competent to lodge complaints under Section 195(1)(a).
S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.— The short point involved for determination in this appeal is with regard to the interpretation of the expression ‘the public servant concerned’ appearing in Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’). The brief facts of the case which led to this controversy are as follows:
2. It is the admitted case that on April 11, 1968 a proceeding was initiated before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Gyanpur under Section 145 of the Code in respect of a dispute over Plot No. 338 situated in Village Balapur Rohi and it ended in favour of Smt Ram Piari on whose behalf one Doodnath represented the matter as her agent. By an order dated April 11, 1968 one Ram Lakhan and his party, who were the respondents in the proceeding were restrained from interfering with the possession of Smt Ram Piari. Ram Lakhan died without leaving any issue. There were six respondents besides Ram Lakhan of whom two were his brothers and the remaining his nephews. It appears that there was a civil litigation between the parties, but we are not concerned in the present appeal about that civil dispute. It is stated that the respondents with the full knowledge that an order under Section 145 had been promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered disobeyed that direction and disturbed the possession of Smt Ram Piari. Doodnath, who represented Smt Ram Piari in the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code before the S.D.M, filed a petition on March 10, 1972 complaining that the respondents had violated his order, thereupon the Sub-Divisional Magistrate preferred the petition under Section 188 IPC before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate (1st Class), Gyanpur (Varanasi) against the respondents which was registered as Criminal Case No. 94 of 1973. The trial court, both on the basis of the documentary and oral evidence, produced before it, found the respondents guilty of the offence punishable under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code and convicted them thereunder and sentenced each of them to undergo three months' rigorous imprisonment which conviction was confirmed on appeal by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Gyanpur in Criminal Appeal No. 21 of 1976 on its file.
3. The respondents on being dissatisfied by the judgment of the appellate court preferred Criminal Revision No. 614 of 1977 before the High Court of Allahabad which, for the reasons, assigned in the impugned judgment, allowed the revision and set aside the conviction and sentence passed on the respondents mainly on the ground that the complaint in this case had been filed not by ‘the public servant concerned’, namely, the Magistrate who passed that order under Section 145 of the Code, but by a successor Magistrate and that any successor Magistrate cannot exercise jurisdiction under Section 195(1)(a) and that the complaint, therefore, is not maintainable in law.
4. Being aggrieved by the order of the High Court the State of U.P has filed this criminal appeal challenging the correctness of the impugned judgment in interpreting the expression “the public servant concerned”.
5. The relevant provisions of Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Code reads thus:
“No Court shall take cognizance —
(a)(i) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or
(iii) ….
except on the complaint in writing of ‘the public servant concerned’ or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.”
6. The object of this section is to protect persons from being vexatiously prosecuted upon inadequate materials or insufficient grounds by person actuated by malice or ill-will or frivolity of disposition at the instance of private individuals for the offences specified therein. The provisions of this section, no doubt, are mandatory and the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned therein unless there is a complaint in writing of ‘the public servant concerned’ as required by the section without which the trial under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code becomes void ab initio. See Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab 1962 Supp 2 SCR 812, AIR 1962 SC 1206, 1962 Cri LJ 286. To say in other words a written complaint by a public servant concerned is sine qua non to initiate a criminal proceeding under Section 188 of the IPC against those who, with the knowledge that an order has been promulgated by a public servant directing either ‘to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order, with certain property in his possession or under his management’ disobey that order. Nonetheless, when the court in its discretion is disinclined to prosecute the wrongdoers, no private complainant can be allowed to initiate any criminal proceeding in his individual capacity as it would be clear from the reading of the section itself which is to the effect that no court can take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 of the IPC except on the written complaint of ‘the public servant concerned’ or of some other public servant to whom he (the public servant who promulgated that order) is administratively subordinate.
7. A cursory reading of Section 195(1)(a) makes out that in case a public servant concerned who has promulgated an order which has not been obeyed or which has been disobeyed, does not prefer to give a complaint or refuses to give a complaint then it is open to the superior public servant to whom the officer who initially passed the order is administratively subordinate to prefer a complaint in respect of the disobedience of the order promulgated by his subordinate. The word ‘subordinate’ means administratively subordinate i.e some other public servant who is his official superior and under whose administrative control he works.
8. There is a cleavage of opinion among the High Courts as to the proper construction of the words ‘public servant concerned’ appearing in Section 195(1)(a) of the Code as to whether that expression incudes the successor in office of the said public servant.
9. A Division Bench of the High Court of Rangoon in P.D Patel v. Emperor AIR 1933 Rang 292 has held that the ‘public servant concerned’ in Section 195(1) includes the successor in office also and that he is competent to make a complaint.
10. This Court in Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh AIR 1968 SC 1422, 1969 Cri LJ 4, 70 Pun LR 1131 while interpreting the provisions of Section 195(1)(b) of the old Code after making reference to the provisions of Section 559(1) of the old Code corresponding to Section 35(1) of the new Code which reads, “Subject to the other provisions of this Code, the powers and duties of a Judge or Magistrate may be exercised or performed by his successor in office” held that “A successor in office of a Magistrate can file a complaint under Section 476 of the Code in respect of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code.”
11. Reference may also be made in Subramanian Chettiar, Re AIR 1957 Mad 442, 1957 Cri LJ 765 and Public Prosecutor v. Mohammed Ali AIR 1969 AP 41, 1969 Cri LJ 145.
12. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Government Advocate, Bihar v. Kumar Singh AIR 1938 Pat 83 has held that making the complaint prescribed in Section 195(1)(a) of the Code is a public duty and responsibility and must not be mistaken for a personal privilege and there is nothing against any successor in office of the public servant to whom information was given making the complaint under Section 182 IPC.
13. The Calcutta High Court in Manik Lal Bhagat v. State 1982 Cri LJ 1473, (1982) 1 Cal HN 149 drawing strength on the dictum laid down in Ajaib Singh AIR 1968 SC 1422, 1969 Cri LJ 4, 70 Pun LR 1131 and after making reference to the Kumar Singh AIR 1938 Pat 83 observed thus:
“… the expression ‘public servant concerned’ in Section 195(1)(a) of the Code includes the person holding the office of the public servant for the time being, the holder of which made the order for violation or disobedience whereof a complaint under Section 195(1)(a) is made, and also the successor in office of that public servant.”
14. Contrary to the view in the above decisions, a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court held in Mata Bhikh v. State 1980 Cri LJ 575, 1979 All Cri R 454, 1980 All Cri C 72 that the power to file a complaint must be exercised by the public servant concerned personally and in the event of his non-availability, his senior public servant to whom the public servant concerned may be subordinate has to exercise jurisdiction under Section 195(1)(a) and on the above observation, he concluded that a complaint filed by a successor Magistrate was not maintainable in law.
15. On a scrutiny of Section 195(1)(a), we are of the view that a successor in office of a public servant concerned will also fall within the ambit of the expression ‘public servant concerned’. Any other view contrary to it will only create difficulties in certain situations. For example, in a case where a public servant concerned promulgates a preliminary order under Section 133, 145 or 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is transferred or retires or ceases to be in office on any account before a final order is passed, would it mean that the successor who is under the law to continue the same proceeding has no right to file a complaint if the preliminary order is disobeyed. The answer would be that the successor in office can file a complaint. In every such situation, one cannot expect the superior officer to whom the public servant is administratively subordinate to file a complaint against the wrongdoers disobeying either the preliminary order or the final order promulgated by the public servant concerned.
16. Therefore, in the light of the dictum laid down in Ajaib Singh AIR 1968 SC 1422, 1969 Cri LJ 4, 70 Pun LR 1131 we are of the view that the successor in office of the public servant gets into the same position of the public servant concerned and he is in law eligible to file a complaint against wrongdoers. To say in other words, the successor in office falls within the ambit of the expression ‘public servant concerned’. The view taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
17. However, coming to the question of sentence, after taking into consideration the fact that the proceedings commenced in the year 1968 and the judgment in revision by the High Court was rendered in August 1979, we admonish the respondents under Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act instead of directing them to undergo the sentence passed by the trial court and as confirmed by the lower appellate court.
18. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
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