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The State Of Bihar v. Dr. C.H Grant And Another
Summary of the Opinion (S.C. Prasad, J.) — Two Appeals from Santhal Pargana
Factual and Procedural Background
These two consolidated appeals arise from two judgments of the District Judge of Santhal Pargana concerning references made by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, dated 5-11-1952. The State of Bihar petitioned that compensation amounts payable in respect of lands formerly belonging to the Dumka Estate (proprietor Dr. G. H. Grant) had become payable to the State because the proprietary interest of Dr. Grant vested in the State on 22-5-1952 under the Bihar Land Reforms Act.
The Collector issued an award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act on 25-3-1952; the award was filed under Section 12. Possession of the acquired land was taken by the Collector under Section 16 on 21-8-1952. The money awarded was deposited and remained in deposit; Dr. Grant did not withdraw it until 25-5-1952, the date on which his proprietary interest is said to have vested in the State. The Deputy Commissioner made references to the District Judge on 5-11-1952. An Additional Collector later (10-3-1953) filed a petition alleging vesting in the State on 22-5-1952 and seeking declaration that compensation was payable to the State.
Mr. Grant contested the references. He relied on the Collector's award and on provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (Sections 11, 12 and 31) to assert that the award was final and that he was entitled to the compensation. The District Judge upheld Mr. Grant's objections and discharged the references. The State of Bihar appealed to this court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the proprietary interest of Dr. G. H. Grant (the ex-proprietor) having vested in the State under the Bihar Land Reforms Act on 22-5-1952, the right to receive the compensation awarded by the Collector (award dated 25-3-1952, filed under S.12) had already passed to the State, despite actual possession under Section 16 being taken only on 21-8-1952.
- Whether an award under Sections 11 and 12 (filed and declared final) precluded the Collector or the Government from referring, under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, a later-raised dispute about the apportionment of compensation or the persons entitled to receive it (including a person not shown as "person interested" in the original award).
- Whether the provisions of Sections 16, 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, read together, permit the Collector or the Government to refer disputes to the civil court and whether Section 31 prevents a reference under Section 30 where the award has already been filed and payment not tendered.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State of Bihar / Government Pleader)
- Title acquired under the Land Acquisition Act vests in the acquiring authority only when possession is actually taken under Section 16; therefore, the proprietor's title continued until the Collector took possession (21-8-1952).
- The Collector's award under Section 11 and its filing under Section 12 is an offer concerning area and compensation; it does not transfer title or vest the estate in the Government — vesting depends on possession.
- The Land Acquisition Act is a self-contained code for resolving disputes about persons interested and apportionment; Section 30 empowers the Collector to refer disputes to court, including disputes raised after an award by persons not named in the award, provided possession had not been taken before the new claimant acquired title.
- Section 31's obligation to tender payment does not preclude the Collector from making a reference under Section 30 in appropriate cases; the provisos to Section 31 do not bar such references.
- Reliance on Sections 16 and 48 to show that possession (and not merely the award) is the decisive act that divests title from the previous owner and vests it in the Government.
Respondent (Dr. G. H. Grant)
- The award dated 25-3-1952, filed under Section 12, was final and conclusive as between the Collector and persons interested, and therefore Mr. Grant became entitled to the compensation on that date.
- Because Mr. Grant had not objected to the award and had not been prevented from receiving payment, the Collector was legally bound under Section 31 to tender and make payment to him; the Government could not challenge the award or the validity of Mr. Grant's claim to compensation thereafter.
- The references made by the State under Section 30 after the award were legally untenable and constituted bad references.
- Authorities were cited to contend that Government could not be treated as a "person interested" for purposes of being made a party to such proceedings and that Government could not be permitted to institute references when it had not been a party to the original proceedings before the Collector.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Promotha Nath Mitra v. Rakhal Das Addy, 11 Cal LJ 420 | Shows that a purchaser at a revenue sale could be made a party to the land acquisition case. | The court cited it (with Jatindra Nath Roy) to support the proposition that persons who acquire an interest after an award may be entitled to be treated as persons interested and to have their claims determined under the Act. |
| Jatindra Nath Roy v. Narayan Das Khettry, ILR 52 Cal 862 : AIR 1926 Cal 97 | Also thrown in to illustrate circumstances where parties who acquired interests may be entitled to be made parties. | The court referenced it as additional support for permitting post-award claimants to be considered under the Act. |
| Imdad Ali Khan v. Collector of Farrukhabad, ILR 7 All 817 | Cited by respondent to argue that Government could not be a "person interested" and could not be made a party to a reference. | The court rejected the reliance on this case for the present facts, observing that subsequent authority (Makhan Lal) dissented from this view and that the Land Acquisition Act provides machinery to decide title questions even between private parties and Government. |
| Crown Brewery, Mussoorie v. Collector of Dehra Dun, ILR 19 All 339 | Also cited to contend Government could not be treated as a person interested or made a party. | The court did not accept this contention and treated these earlier Allahabad views as effectively superseded by later decisions. |
| Prabal Chandra v. Peary Mohun, 12 Cal WN 987 | Authority cited in the context of whether persons not party before the Collector could be added as parties in a reference. | The court noted that the Calcutta line of cases on that specific procedural question does not adversely affect the Collector's explicit referral in this case under S.30; the Calcutta cases were held to have limited bearing. |
| Sm. Indumati Debi v. Tulsi Thakurani, AIR 1942 Cal 53 | Held (in that line of Calcutta cases) that persons not party to the proceeding before the Collector could not be made parties to the apportionment case on a S.30 reference. | The court observed these Calcutta decisions concern a different point (adding parties after reference) and stated they do not have real bearing where the Collector has expressly referred disputes between the State and the respondent under S.30. |
| Makhan Lal v. Secy. of State, ILR 56 All 656 : AIR 1934 All 260 | Held that the Land Acquisition Act provides a complete scheme and the Court under the Act can decide title questions even between private parties and Government. | The court relied on this decision to reject the argument that Government could not be treated as a party or a person interested; it supported the proposition that the Act's machinery is competent to decide disputes involving Government. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds by examining the text and scheme of the Land Acquisition Act and the relationship among its key provisions (Sections 11, 12, 16, 18, 30, 31 and 48), and by assessing the arguments about vesting of title and the finality of awards.
- The court first analysed Section 12 and the statutory definition of "person interested." It explained that the award filed under Section 12 is "final and conclusive" only "except as hereinafter provided," and that the Act treats as "person interested" any person claiming interest in the compensation (even if the claim might be invalid). The Collector must treat claimants as interested persons and may include them in the award even if he ultimately awards them nothing.
- The court emphasised that the Collector is not competent to determine the ultimate validity of competing claims in every case; for that purpose Sections 18 and 30 provide for reference to the civil court when objections are raised concerning measurement, amount, persons to whom compensation is payable, or apportionment.
- The court construed Section 30 as authorising the Collector, when a dispute arises as to apportionment or persons entitled, to refer such dispute to the Court. The wording of Section 30 was read expansively: there is nothing in Section 30 that limits a reference to disputes only among persons already named in the Collector’s award. Thus a new claimant who appears after an award can be the subject of a reference by the Collector and the Court can determine the competing claims.
- The court addressed the contention that vesting of title depends only on possession under Section 16. It accepted the learned Government Pleader's position that taking possession is the decisive event for divesting title and vesting it in the Government — and that an award under Sections 11 and 12 alone does not effect transference of title. The court therefore treated vesting by statutory operation (under the Land Reforms Act) and the timing of actual possession under Section 16 as critical to who was entitled to receive compensation.
- The court reconciled Section 31 with Section 30: the obligation to tender payment under Section 31 and the provisos do not prevent the Collector from making a reference under Section 30 where a dispute concerning persons entitled or apportionment arises after an award, provided the Collector had not taken possession under Section 16 before the new claimant acquired title. In short, Section 31's operation does not defeat the remedial and referential jurisdiction furnished by Section 30.
- On precedent, the court reviewed authorities relied upon by the respondent (including some All-India/Allahabad and Calcutta decisions). It concluded that the Calcutta decisions dealing with the addition of parties post-reference have limited application here, and that the correct reading (supported by Makhan Lal) is that the Land Acquisition Act provides a complete scheme under which the Court can decide title disputes even between Government and private parties.
- Applying these principles to the facts, the court held that where the proprietary interest vested in the State in May 1952 and where the Collector had not yet taken possession, the entitlement to receive the compensation could be affected by that vesting; consequently the District Judge's view upholding Mr. Grant's claim to the compensation was incorrect.
Holding and Implications
APPEALS ALLOWED.
The court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of the District Judge below, and declared that the amounts of compensation in dispute shall be paid to the appellant (the State of Bihar). The appellant was awarded costs of the appeals and a single pleader's fee was assessed at Rs. 100/-. The two-judge bench (S.C. Prasad, J. and Rai, J.) concurred.
Implications: The direct effect is that the compensation amounts at issue are payable to the State rather than to Dr. G. H. Grant. The opinion rests on construction of the Land Acquisition Act's provisions (notably Sections 12, 16, 30 and 31) and on the timing of vesting and possession. The opinion does not purport to set out a new, freestanding precedent beyond applying existing statutory interpretation and the cited authorities to the facts; its operative effect is the reversal of the lower court judgments and the declaration that the State is entitled to the disputed compensation.
Prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what is contained in the opinion.
S.C Prasad, J.:— These two appeals have been heard together. They arise out of two judgments of the District Judge of Santhal Pargana delivered by him in two references made to him by the Deputy Commissioner of Santhal Parganas under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on 5-11-1952 on two petitions filed by the State of Bihar claiming that the amounts of compensation payable to the ex-proprietor of Dumka Estate, under which the lands in question had been situated and had subsequently been acquired by the Government of Bihar in village Phutabandh and Purna Dumka, had become payable to the State of Bihar, because the proprietary interest of Dr. G.H Grant, the ex-proprietor, had vested in the State of Bihar on 22-5-1952 under the Bihar Land Reforms Act.
2. In one of these cases there was a reference under S. 18 also on the objections raised by the Village Community, but that was not pressed at the time of the hearing and the references have been dealt with by the learned District Judge under S. 30 of the aforesaid Act, and we are concerned in these appeals with that matter only. It appears that the acquired land was taken possession of by the Collector under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act on 21-8-1952. The award had been given by him under S. 11 of the said Act on 25-3-1952. The amount was in deposit and had not been withdrawn by Dr. G.H Grant till 25-5-1952 when his interest as proprietor vested in the State Government, as already stated. The two references were made by the Deputy Commissioner on 5-11-1952 as mentioned above. It appears that on 15-10-1952 the Government Pleader of Dumka had submitted an opinion to the Deputy Commissioner of Santhal Parganas in which he said that as a dispute had arisen between the ex-landlord, Mr. Grant, and the State Government regarding the compensation, the dispute should be referred to the Civil Court for decision under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act.
3. It appears that on the basis of this opinion of the Government Pleader, the Deputy Commissioner made the aforesaid references. It further appears that on 10-3-1953 the Additional Collector of Santhal Parganas filed a petition before the District Judge of Santral Parganas alleging that the estate had vested in the State Government on 22-5-1952 under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, by which date the Collector had not taken possession of the land. Therefore, the amount of compensation had become payable to the State Government and not to Mr. Grant.
4. Mr. Grant contested both the references and alleged in both of them that the full amount of compensation for proprietary interest and trees had been awarded to him by the Collector by his award dated 25-3-1952 and the award had been duly filed in the office of the Collector under Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act. There having been no objection raised by him to receive the compensation, as awarded, the Collector had become legally bound under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act to tender and make the payment of the compensation to him, but this bad not been done.
5. It was further alleged that this award had become final and conclusive between the Collector representing the Government and Mr. Grant, and it was he, who was legally entitled to the full compensation for the proprietary interest, as awarded, and the State of Bihar had no right to the same, in spite of the fact that subsequently in May, 1952 the proprietary interest had vested in the State of Bihar. It was also contended that neither the Government nor the Collector could challenge the validity of the award and the claim of Mr. Grant to the compensation for the proprietary interest and that the references under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act made by the State Government at that stage were legally untenable and were bad references.
6. The learned District Judge upheld the objections raised by Mr. Grant and discharged the references holding that Mr. Grant was entitled to the compensation money according to the award and also interest. The State of Bihar has come up in appeal.
7. It has been contended by the learned Government Pleader on behalf of the State before us that the view taken by the District Judge was erroneous and he was not correct in holding, as he has done in his judgments under appeal, that as between Mr. Grant and the Government, the vesting of the interest of the former was not referred till it was taken possession of under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act and that this vesting had commenced as between them from the date of the award and its filing under Ss. 11 and 12 of the Act. His contention was that title to the land, acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, cannot vest until possession had been taken actually under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. He referred to this S. 16 and also to S. 48 of the Act in support of his contention.
8. Reference was made to the general scheme of the Act and its selfcontained nature and it was said that this Act provided for determination of all disputes in connection with all persons interested in the land in respect of the amount of compensation payable for acquisition of a particular land. He has also pointed out that in certain emergent cases (vide S. 17 of the Act) the Collector was empowered to take immediate possession of the land to be acquired urgently and to the provision of this section to the effect that as soon as the possession was taken, the title of the land would vest in the Government in spite of the fact that by that time the Collector might not have been able to give his award in respect of the amount of compensation and the person to whom the compensation was payable.
9. He, therefore, laid special stress on the provisions of the Act on the point of the vesting of the estate according to which provisions it depended exclusively and solely on the taking of possession of the land to be acquired, having no reference whatsoever to the determination of the compensation payable and the giving of the award by the Collector, which was merely an act of an offer on behalf of the acquiring authority, namely, the Government or the company, as the case may be, through the Collector, to the person interested in the land in question on the point of the area which was to be acquired and the amount of compensation which was proposed to be paid for acquisition.
10. That did not, according to him, constitute any transference of title from the person owning the land which remained with him until possession had been taken. He pointed out with reference to S. 48 of the Act, that at any time before possession had been taken the acquisitioning authority, namely, the Government, could withdraw from the acquisition, the result of which withdrawal would be that the amount of compensation shall not be payable to the person concerned, but that he shall be entitled to certain damages, and that no such withdrawal could be done once the Collector had taken possession of the land in which case the title would at once vest in the Government.
11. He urged, therefore, that it was clear that the taking of possession was the decisive factor in respect of the divesting of the title of the previous owner and its vesting in the Government and if, therefore, in the present cases the Deputy Commissioner had taken possession of the lands in question in August, 1952, it must be held that if there had been no divesting of the estate of Mr. Grant by reason of the Land Reforms Act in May, 1952, the title must have continued to remain with Mr. Grant till August, 1952 when the Deputy Commissioner had taken possession of these lands.
12. If before that date of the taking of the possession in August, 1952, Mr. Grant had withdrawn the compensation money deposited by the Deputy Commissioner, that would not have meant change in the title, because title could be lost by the owner only when the Collector took possession of the land. Even after the compensation had been withdrawn, if the land acquisition proceeding had been dropped and the Government had withdrawn from it, Mr. Grant the owner of the land would have had to refund the amount.
13. As regards the finality of the award under Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act he contended that only meant that if no dispute cropped up between the persons claiming the compensation amount and if no reference was made under S. 18 or S. 30 of the Act, the amount of the award shall be payable to the person mentioned thereunder. The finality did not, lie said, mean that there could be no dispute decided under this Act in respect of the rights of the person mentioned in the award, inter se, in respect of the payability of the compensation money. The learned Government pleader referred to S. 12 of the Act and urged that the section itself said that the finality shall be subject to other provisions of the Act.
14. Learned counsel on behalf of the respondent, Mr. Grant, has urged that the land acquisition proceeding was completed by the making of the award and, therefore, Mr. Grant became entitled to the compensation awarded on 25-2-1952. I think this argument is not correct. The position taken up by the learned Government pleader, which I have mentioned above, appears to me to be sound and well-founded.
15. Section 12 of the Act says that the award given by the Collector will be filed in his office and will, “except as hereinafter provided”, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the lands, and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. The definition of “person interested in the, land”, according to this Act is not exhaustive. What it really means is that it includes any person claiming interest in the amount of compensation whether it be a valid claim or not. The Collector is bound to treat every person who claims compensation as an interested person. He should include him in the award under S. 11, even though he may award him nothing.
16. The Collector is not competent to decide the validity of the claim. For that purpose if any person interested, who has not accepted the award, may apply to the Collector within the prescribed period under S. 18 of the Act praying that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, if his objection is to the measurement of the land or the amount of compensation or the person to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested, and the finality of the award under S. 12 of the Act is subject to the decision by that Court under S. 18 of the Act. Section 30 of the Act also deals with a reference made by the Collector to the Court and is as follows:
“When the amount of compensation has been settled under S. 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court”.
17. The finality under S. 12 of the Act must also be subject to the decision made by the Court on a reference under this section. This section gives discretion to the Collector to make reference of his own motion at any time, provided the dispute raised before him includes a person to whom a compensation or any part thereof is payable. It seems to me clear, therefore, that where the Collector has made an award under S. 11 of the Act and before payment has been made, if a new person, not previously appearing before him, appears, he can make a reference to the Court for the determination of that claim, and the Court, to which this reference is made, will be competent to decide the question between them. There is nothing in S. 30 to limit it to the disputes between the persons inter se to whom the compensation is payable and who are mentioned in the award of the Collector.
18. The clear object of this section appears to me to be to make some provision for decision of complicated matters where the Collector experiences difficulty in apportioning the compensation. Having regard to the whole scheme of the Act and especially to the definition of the person interested in the land as given in this Act, there does not seem to be any justification for the argument that no reference under S. 30 can be made by the Collector if a dispute is raised by any person other than those who have been mentioned as persons interested in the award of the Collector. If this view is taken, then those persons, who would be really entitled to compensation amount by reason of subsequent transfers either voluntary or involuntary after the award and before the title had vested in the State under S. 16 of the Act, would be deprived of their rights, to get the compensation, and will be driven to ordinary suits in common law Courts, of the Land Acquisition Act.
19. I do not think that this eventually is consistent with the scheme and object of the Act and its nature. In the case of Promotha Nath Mitra v. Rakhal Das Addy, 11 Cal LJ 420, a purchaser at a revenue sale was held to be entitled to be made a party to the land acquisition case (see also the case of Jatindra Nath Roy v. Narayan Das Khettry, ILR 52 Cal 862 : (AIR 1926 Cal 97), which throws some light on this point). If, therefore, the proprietary interest of Mr. Grant had vested in the Government in May, 1952 after the award and before the payment of the money to Mr. Grant, it must follow that the title to receive; the compensation as proprietor of the land had been lost by Mr. Grant.
20. Learned counsel for Mr. Grant next urged, citing the cases of Imdad Ali Khan v. Collector of Farrukhabad, ILR 7 All 817; Crown Brewery, Mussoorie v. Collector of Dehra Dun, ILR 19 All 339; Prabal Chandra v. Peary Mohun, 12 Cal WN 987 & ‘Sm. Indumati Debi v. Tulsi Thakurani, AIR 1942 Cal 53, that Govt., could not be held to be a person interested in the land, that it could not be made a party to any reference and that no reference could be made at the instance of the Government, especially when Government was not a party to the proceeding when it had been initially started and when the award had been given. I do not find any substance in these contentions. The two earlier Allahabad cases appear to have been dissented from by the same High Court in the case of Makhan Lal v. Secy. of State, ILR 56 All 656 : (AIR 1934 All 260).
21. In this case, the objector claimed interest in the land itself as being the owner thereof or at any rate permanent lessee and the Government, on the other hand, asserted that the land was Government property and that the claimant was a mere tenant at will. It was observed that the Land Acquisition Act provided a complete scheme and machinery for the determination of all questions of title and of the amount of compensation that was to arise in the proceeding and, therefore, it was competent to the Court acting under this Act to decide any question of title even though such a question might arise between a private party on the one hand and the Government on the other. If I may say so with respect, this view is correct.
22. The two Calcutta cases are really on different points, namely, whether a person can be added a party to a proceeding after the reference has been made to the Court. It was held in AIR 1942 Cal 53 following the earlier case reported in 12 Cal WN 987, that persons claiming a share in the compensation money who were not parties to the proceeding before the Collector, could not be made parties to the apportionment case, because on a reference under S. 30 of the Act the jurisdiction of the Court was confined expressly to the dispute referred to it by the Collector. I do not think, this case goes against the appellant here because in the reference in question the Collector had expressly referred the disputes between the appellant and the respondent to the District Judge of Santhal Perganas for decision. Here there is no question of adding the State as a party to the proceeding by the District Judge. These two Calcutta cases have, therefore, no real bearing on the matter to be decided in the case.
23. The last argument of learned counsel for Mr. Grant was on the basis of Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act that this section provided that the Collector shall tender and make payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested, entitled thereto according to the award, and shall also pay, the amount of them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section, one of the contingencies being that if there was any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in Court to which a reference under S. 18 would be submitted. There are three provisos to this sub-section, one of them being that no person, who has received the amount otherwise than under protest, shall be entitled to make any application under S. 18, the second one being that nothing contained in this section shall affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or part of compensation awarded under the Act to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. We are concerned with the third proviso.
24. It is clear to me that this section cannot at all stand in the way of reference, which the Collector might like to make to the Court for determination of disputes under S. 30 of the Act, even if such disputes are raised, after the award by him, by a person, who was not shown in that award as one of the persons interested in the land, provided the Collector had not taken possession of that land under S. 16 of the Act before the date on which the new claimant contends to have acquired title to the land sought to be acquisitioned.
25. I find that the contentions of the learned Government Pleader for the appellant are well-founded and the learned District Judge's judgments cannot be upheld. The appeals are allowed and the judgments passed by the Court below are set aside. It is declared that the amounts of compensation, which are in dispute, shall be paid to the appellant. The appellant shall get costs of these appeals. There shall be one set of pleader's fee which is assessed at Rs. 100/-.
26. Rai, J.:— I agree.
V.S.B
27. Appeals allowed.
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