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National Projects Co... v. M/S. Bundela Bandhu ...
Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges the order of the learned Single Judge dated 9.12.2004 which dismissed the Appellant's objections under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("A & C Act") on the ground that they were filed beyond the period prescribed by statute. The Single Judge also dismissed the Appellant's application for condonation of delay, holding that the Court had no power to condone such delay, and applied the Supreme Court's judgment in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.. The Single Judge directed that bank guarantees retained by the Respondent/Judgment Debtor be returned by 15.1.2005.
The arbitral award is said to have been signed on 20.1.1997. Execution proceedings were initiated by the Respondent on 7.1.2004 (after nearly seven years). The Appellant contends that it never received a copy of the award as required by section 31(5) of the A & C Act and only became aware of the award on 23.3.2004 when it received a notice in the execution proceedings (Ex. P.4/2004). The Appellant inspected the execution files, obtained a copy of the award from the Respondent, and filed objections under section 34 dated 31.7.2004 (supporting affidavit dated 30.7.2004), which were lodged in the Court registry on 7.8.2004. An application under section 34 read with section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay appears to have been filed on 4.10.2004.
The impugned award, as filed in execution proceedings, was produced by the Decree Holder and not received directly from the Arbitral Tribunal; the sole arbitrator died on 14.3.2002; and the arbitration files/records were not produced to the Court. There was no evidence on the record that the Arbitrator had dispatched a copy of the award to the Appellant.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Court has jurisdiction or power to condone delay in filing objections under section 34 of the A & C Act beyond the period stipulated by statute (i.e., beyond 3 months plus 30 days from delivery of the award).
- Whether the limitation period for filing objections under section 34 begins to run where a signed copy of the award has not been properly delivered to the party concerned as required by section 31(5) of the A & C Act (in particular, whether delivery must be to the officer/person in charge for government bodies or to specified officers for companies).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Appellant asserted that a copy of the arbitral award was never delivered to it as statutorily required by section 31(5) of the A & C Act; thus the limitation period under section 34(3) had not commenced.
- The Appellant states it became aware of the award only upon receipt of execution notice on 23.3.2004 and thereafter inspected records and obtained a copy of the award; objections under section 34 were dated 31.7.2004 and placed on record on 7.8.2004; an application for condonation under section 5 of the Limitation Act was subsequently filed on 4.10.2004.
- Counsel for the Appellant relied upon Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors to the extent it required delivery to the officer concerned and stressed that delivery must be “received” by the party/officer in order to trigger limitation periods; counsel also referred to other authorities (e.g., Transparent Packers and State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani) though the Court evaluated their relevance.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Respondent had initiated execution proceedings and relied on the view that objections were time-barred and that the Court did not possess power to condone the delay (the learned Single Judge applied Popular Construction to that effect).
- Learned counsel for the Respondent drew attention to the observations in Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. v. Raunaq and Company Pvt. Ltd. (in the context of the Arbitration Act, 1940) to support the contention that service of notice (as opposed to mode of service) is relevant; the Court noted, however, that the A & C Act's provisions must be read with the specific statutory obligations of section 31(5) and section 32(5).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union Of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470 | Paragraph 12: the phrase "but not thereafter" in proviso to s.34(3) is an express exclusion under Section 29(2) Limitation Act and bars application of Section 5 (i.e., court cannot condone delay beyond proviso period). | The Single Judge had applied this judgment to dismiss the objections as time-barred. The Division Bench accepted the legal proposition about non-availability of Section 5 where proviso applies but held Popular Construction inapplicable on the facts because the Appellant had not been shown to have received the award so that limitation had not begun to run. |
| Enkay Construction Co. v. Vice Chairman, DDA, 2000 (86) DLT 748 (= 2000(6) AD (Delhi) 530) | Under the repealed Arbitration Act, 1940, the uniform view was that objections filed beyond 30 days could not be entertained and Section 5 of Limitation Act could not be resorted to. | Referred to as authority for the principle that courts could not enlarge time under the old Act; used in historical context to show continuity of approach to limitation in arbitration matters. |
| Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1233 | Explains scheme under Chapter II of the old Act: application to set aside award must be made within 30 days of service of notice; objections after limitation cannot be treated as application to set aside. | Cited to support the proposition that objections falling within the grounds for setting aside must be filed within the stipulated period and cannot be entertained beyond limitation. |
| Hastimal Dalichand v. Hiralal Motichand, AIR 1954 Bom 243 | Observation that the Court can act suo motu where an award is patently illegal or directs performance of an act prohibited by law, in which case limitation under Art.158 would not arise. | The Court held that this case does not permit exercising suo motu power to set aside awards on S.30-type grounds where objections were filed beyond limitation; it is limited to patent illegality outside S.30 grounds. |
| Saha & Co. v. Isharsingh Kripalsingh, AIR 1956 Cal 321 (Full Bench) | Majority/minority split: the minority suggested non-existence/invalidity of arbitration agreement may be raised after limitation if not S.30 grounds; majority did not accept that position. | The Court declined to resolve the conflict but observed that Saha & Co. does not assist the Appellant where the objections raise S.30-type grounds; it is only where grounds fall outside S.30 that such objections might be entertained beyond limitation per the minority view. |
| Union Of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC 239 | Delivery under s.31(5) is substantive: the award must be delivered and “received” by the party; delivery to the officer directly concerned is the trigger for limitation; in appropriate cases delay was condoned where proper delivery did not occur. | The Court found Tecco Trichy important and helpful to the Appellant on the point that delivery must be to the officer concerned; Tecco influenced the Division Bench's conclusion that where delivery is deficient, limitation may not start, and restoration to be heard on merits may be appropriate. |
| State Of Goa v. Western Builders, (2006) 6 SCC 574 | Discussed s.43 (application of Limitation Act) and interaction of s.34 with Section 29(2) Limitation Act; held Section 5's applicability is limited by s.34 proviso; also noted absence of provision dealing with bona fide filing in wrong forum and relevance of rules analogous to Order VII Rules 10/10-A CPC. | Used to explain limits of condonation and to distinguish that Tecco Trichy was not considered in that case; the Court observed State of Goa did not sanction condonation beyond statutory limit and that Tecco's ratio (delivery to officer concerned) is of assistance but does not allow condonation beyond 120 days. |
| National Aluminum Co. Ltd. v. Pressteel and Fabrication (P) Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 540 | Discussed in State of Goa along with Popular Construction; reference point on arbitration and limitation interaction. | Noted by the Court as part of earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence considered in State of Goa; used in contextual analysis of limitation in arbitration law. |
| M/s Transparent Packers v. The Arbitrator-cum-Managing Director, JT 2000(7) SC 574 | Observation that a deponent to an affidavit need not invariably enter the witness box for the affidavit to have evidentiary value; reversal of dismissal where condonation was denied solely on that ground. | The Court observed this decision had limited relevance to the present matter and did not materially advance the Appellant's position on condonation under s.34(3). |
| State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 | Emphasized that the State cannot always be equated with individuals; delay of 109 days in filing an LPA before High Court was condoned. | The Court held this authority was of no assistance to the Appellant in respect of section 34 objections because s.34(3) proviso limits the power to condone beyond the statutory period. |
| Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. v. Raunaq and Company Pvt. Ltd., (1988) 4 SCC 31 | In the context of the Arbitration Act, 1940, observed that it is service of the notice (not the mode) that matters for limitation. | The Court noted these observations arise under materially different provisions of the earlier Act and that the statutory obligation of section 31(5)/32(5) of the A & C Act requires a higher standard of compliance in delivery/service. |
| Phonographic Performance Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry, [2004] EWHC 1795 (Ch) | Delay in commencing proceedings may be a factor in deciding whether proceedings are abusive; unjustified delay can be considered when assessing abuse of process. | The Court found the observations apposite in assessing the significance of the nearly seven-year gap between signing of the award and initiation of execution proceedings and treated delay as a relevant factor to examine on the record. |
| Union of India v. Surendra Kumar, 61(1996) DLT 42 (DB) | Under the old Act, lack of proper service/notice means time for filing objections did not commence; notice must contain particulars enabling identification of arbitration matter and be served on the officer in charge. | The Court relied on this decision to stress that service must be proper and that where particulars are absent or notice not served on the officer concerned, limitation does not start; used to justify deeming that delivery had not occurred in the present record. |
| R.P. Arora v. Union Of India & Ors, 1999(6) AD (Delhi) 679 | Service of notice held not correctly effected where it was not served on the official concerned; effective date for notice could be date of pronouncement of judgment. | Cited to support the proposition that service defects can delay commencement of limitation and that effective service may be deemed to occur only on pronouncement where service is defective. |
| Hi-Rise Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Alpha Woven Labels (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2000 Delhi 126 | Failure to mention suit number can render service irregular. | Cited as an example showing that lack of particulars in a notice may render service ineffective for limitation purposes. |
| Klg Systel Ltd. v. Fujitsu Icim Ltd., 84(2000) DLT 54 | Strict compliance under Order XXXVII Rule 3(2) required for service; process-server must attempt personal service; if not, condonation of delay in leave to defend is not available. | Used to illustrate the principle that where a statute or procedural rule prescribes a time-bound step, strict compliance is necessary before adverse orders or condonation can be considered. |
| Pleasant Securities & Finance Ltd. v. NRI Financial Services Limited, 2000(4) AD (Delhi) 768 | Similar approach to strictness in service and limitation under process rules. | Cited to support the general approach that time-bound statutory or procedural requirements must be strictly observed and that ineffective service precludes counting of limitation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis operated along two parallel axes: (A) legal availability of condonation under the A & C Act and related Limitation Act provisions; and (B) the factual question whether a signed copy of the award had been delivered to the Appellant so as to trigger the running of limitation.
(A) Legal position on condonation and limitation
- The Court accepted the legal proposition in Popular Construction that the words "but not thereafter" in the proviso to section 34(3) of the A & C Act constitute an express exclusion within section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, thereby barring the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act to extend time beyond the statutory proviso. Consequently, condonation beyond the 3 months + 30 days period is, as a general proposition, not available.
- The Court reviewed older jurisprudence under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Madan Lal, Enkay Construction, Indian Rayon, etc.) and observed continuity in the restrictive approach to enlarging time for objections — courts historically refused to enlarge the 30-day period. However, it recognized that some later authorities (notably Tecco Trichy) address the separate issue of whether limitation is triggered at all where delivery to the correct officer has not occurred.
- The Court distinguished authorities that allow suo motu action by courts (Hastimal, Saha & Co.) as not supporting condonation for S.30-type grounds raised in late objections; suo motu power is limited to patent illegality outside the statutory set of grounds.
(B) Factual and statutory requirements regarding delivery/service of award
- The Court emphasized that while it cannot condone delay beyond the statutory limit, the statutory scheme also imposes a strict obligation on the Arbitral Tribunal to deliver signed copies under section 31(5) and on service under section 32(5) of the A & C Act. The Court held that the mandatory time limits must be read alongside a requirement of substantial and authentic compliance with delivery/service obligations.
- Relying on Tecco Trichy and on local precedents (Union of India v. Surendra Kumar, R.P. Arora, Hi-Rise), the Court held that for government departments the delivery must be to the officer concerned; for companies, delivery should be to the Secretary, Director, Principal Officer or at the registered office in accordance with CPC rules (Order XXXIX/Order XXIX references). Where service/delivery is not shown to have occurred, time does not commence to run.
- Applying the facts, the Court noted: (i) the award was purportedly signed on 20.1.1997; (ii) execution was initiated only on 7.1.2004; (iii) the award filed in execution was produced by the Decree Holder not directly from the Arbitral Tribunal; (iv) the sole arbitrator had died on 14.3.2002; (v) the arbitration records were not produced; and (vi) there was no evidence the Arbitrator had dispatched a copy of the award to the Appellant. Given these deficiencies, the Court concluded that delivery/service had not been proved and therefore the limitation period under section 34 had not commenced to run.
- The Court also observed the significance of the seven-year hiatus between the date of the award and initiation of execution proceedings and recorded that such delay cannot be ignored without careful scrutiny of events; it considered the English authority Phonographic Performance on delay as relevant to abuse-of-process considerations.
Outcome of the analytical application: Because delivery/service as required by statute had not been established on the record, the Court concluded that the period for filing objections had not begun; therefore the question of condoning delay (i.e., applying Popular Construction to refuse condonation) did not arise on the facts. The Court therefore reversed the Single Judge's order which had dismissed the objections as time-barred.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court set aside the impugned order of the learned Single Judge dated 9-12-2004 on the ground that statutory provisions relating to service/delivery of the award (section 31(5) and related provisions) had not been complied with on the record, and therefore the time for filing objections had not commenced to run.
Core rulings emphasized:
- The learned Single Judge's order dated 9-12-2004 is set aside.
- Time for filing objections under section 34 had not commenced to run (on the available record) because there was no proof of delivery/service of the award to the Appellant in conformity with statutory requirements.
Direct consequences and directions:
- OMP 261/2004 (the objections under section 34) shall be decided on its merits in accordance with law.
- IA 8040/2004 shall stand disposed of as infructuous.
- EFA (OS) 9/2005 stands allowed.
- Ex. P.4/2004 (execution notice/matter) will be decided simultaneously with or along with OMP 261/2004.
- The parties shall bear their respective costs.
Wider implications noted by the Court: The decision reiterates that while courts generally cannot condone delay beyond the statutory window provided by section 34(3) (3 months + 30 days), that principle presupposes proper and substantial compliance with the delivery/service obligations under the A & C Act. Where delivery to the appropriate officer or entity cannot be established, limitation may not begin to run and objections may therefore be entertained on merits. The Court emphasized strict compliance with statutory time-bound schedules but also required authentic proof of delivery before invoking the statutory bar on condonation.
Vikramajit Sen, J.:— This Appeal assails the Order of the learned Single Judge passed on 9.12.2004 dismissing the Appellant's Objections under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘A & C Act’) on the grounds that they had been filed beyond the period stipulated by the statute. The Application for condoning the delay in filing these Objections has been dismissed holding that the Court did not possess any power to condone the delay. The learned Single Judge has applied the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Union Of India v. Popular Construction Co.., (2001) 8 SCC 470 = 2001(6) Scale 657, and in particular paragraph 12 thereof. Having dismissed the Objections the learned Single Judge had also directed that the Bank Guarantees retained by the Respondent/Judgment Debtor should also be returned on or before 15.1.2005
2. The assailed Award purports to have been signed on 20.1.1997 Execution Proceedings have inexplicably been initiated by the Respondent after the passage of seven years thereafter. The Appellant/Objector categorically contends that a copy of the Award was not delivered to it at any time, even though this was statutorily required to be done. section 31(5) of the a & c act states that - “After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party”. The further argument on behalf of the Appellant is that it learnt of the passing of this Award only on 23.3.2004 when it received notice in the Execution Proceedings (Ex. P. 4/2004). The Appellant thereafter states that “files of the Execution Case were subsequently inspected, a copy of the award obtained from the Respondent/Claimant and now the objections under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are being filed”. The Objections under section 34 of the a & c act challenging the Award are dated 31.7.2004 of which the supporting Affidavit is dated 30.7.2004 They came to be eventually filed in the Registry of this Court on 7.8.2004 An application under section 34 of the a & c act read with section 5 of the limitation act for condonation of delay, which ought to have accompanied the Objections, appears to have been filed on 4.10.2004 It is obvious, therefore, that even though the Award visited the Appellant with a liability running into several lacs of rupees which after interest would run into crores of rupees, the conduct of the Appellant manifests repeated and reckless carelessness. Even in such cases the request that is repeatedly made to the Court is that the delay and inept handling by Government organisations should at the most be looked upon askance, and the Court should bail out and rescue a slothful party from the legal grave that it has dug for itself. We should not overlook the fact that Parliament has made no distinction between Government and private persons so far as the law of limitation is concerned. Experience has shown that latitude given by the Courts has only come to be misused; delay of some days of yore, has been replaced by delay of months and years.
3. It is in these circumstances that we have to decide whether the application seeking condonation of delay in filing Objections to an Award is maintainable and could be granted by the Court. The learned Single Judge has applied paragraph 12 of Popular Construction, which reads as follows:
12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.
4. The regime of the repealed Arbitration Act, 1940, was that an Award had to metamorphose itself into being the ‘rule of Court’ before it attained executable efficacy. In the scheme of the A & C Act an Award can be enforced subject to the disposal of any Objections that may be filed. Civil Courts have a limited role to play. Even in the comparatively fluid format of the repealed statute. Courts had ruled that there was no scope for enlarging time or condoning delay in approaching the Court by way of Objections to an Award, which position would a fortiori continue in the prevailing statutory scheme. The conclusion reached in Enkay Construction Co v. Vice Chairman, Dda & Anr, DDA, 2000(86) DLT 748 = 2000(6) AD (Delhi) 530 was that the uniform view is that if Objections are filed beyond the period of 30 days as laid down in the Arbitration Act, 1940, they cannot be looked into since the Court does not possess power to entertain Applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The opinion of various High Courts had been considered. Reliance had been garnered from these paragraphs of Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1233:—
(7) This analysis of the relevant provisions of the Act contained in Chap. II which apply mutatis mutandis to arbitrations of the other two types shows that the Court has to pronounce judgment in accordance with the award if it sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration, or if it sees no cause to set aside the award. The Court has to wait for the time given to a party to make an application for setting aside the award and where such an application has been made the Court has to decide it first and if it rejects it the Court proceeds to pronounce judgment according to the award. It is clear, therefore, from S.17 that an application to set aside the award is contemplated therein and it is only when no such application has been made within the time allowed or if such an application has been filed and has been rejected that the Court proceeds to pronounce judgment in terms of the award. The Act, therefore, contemplates the making of an application to set aside an award and the grounds on which such an application can be made are to be found in S.30 The grounds on which an application can be made for setting aside the award are-(a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings, (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under S.35, or (c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. These are the only grounds on which an award can be set aside under S.30 and it will be seen that if a party wants an award to be set aside on any of these grounds it has to make an application. Thus any party wishing to have an award set aside on the ground that it was improperly procured or otherwise invalid has to make an application. We may also refer to S.32 which lays down that “notwithstanding any law for the time being in force, no suit shall lie on any ground whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award, nor shall any arbitration agreement or award be set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in this Act.
(8) It is clear, therefore, from the scheme of the Act that if a party wants an award to be set aside on any of the grounds mentioned in S.30 it must apply within 30 days of the date of service of notice of filing of the award as provided in Art.158 of the Limitation Act. If no such application is made the award cannot be set aside on any of the grounds specified in S.30 of the Act. It may be conceded that there is no special form prescribed for making such an application and in an appropriate case an objection of the type made in this case may be treated as such an application, if it is filed within the period of limitation. But if an objection like this has been filed after the period of limitation it cannot be treated as an application to set aside the award, for if it is so treated it will be barred by limitation.
(9) It is not in dispute in the present case that the objections raised by the appellant were covered by S.30 of the Act, and though the appellant did not pray for setting aside the award in his objection that was what he really wanted the Court to do after hearing his objection. As in the present case the objection was filed more than 30 days after the notice it could not be treated as an application for setting the award, for it would then be barred by limitation. The position thus is that in the present case there was no application to set aside the award on grounds mentioned in S.30 within the period of limitation and, therefore, the Court could not set aside the award on those grounds. There can be no doubt on the scheme of the Act that any objection even in the nature of a written-statement which falls under S.30 cannot be considered by the Court unless such an objection is made within the period of limitation (namely, 30 days), though if such an objection is made within limitation that objection may in appropriate cases be treated as an application for setting aside the award.
(10) Learned counsel for the appellant, however, urges that S.17 gives power to the Court to set aside the award and that such power can be exercised even where an objection in the form of a written- statement has been made more than 30 days after the service of the notice of the filing of the award as the Court can do so suo motu. He relies in this connection on Hastimal Dalichand v. Hiralal Motichand, AIR 1954 Bom 243 and Saha and Co. v. Isharsingh Kripalsingh, AIR 1956 Cal 321 (FB). Assuming that the Court has power to set aside the award suo motu, we are of opinion that that power cannot be exercised to set aside an award on grounds which fall under S.30 of the Act, if taken in an objection petition filed more than 30 days after service of notice of filing of the award, for if that were so the limitation provided under Art. 158 of the Limitation Act would be completely negatived. The two cases on which the appellant relies do not in our opinion support him. In Hastimal's case, AIR 1954 Bom 243, it was observed that “if the award directs a party to do an act which is prohibited by law or if it is otherwise patently illegal or void it would be open to the Court to consider this patent defect in the award suo motu, and when the Court acts suo motu no question of limitation prescribed by Art.158 can arise.” These observations only show that the Court can act suo motu in certain circumstances which do not fall within S.30 of the Act. Saha and Co.'s case, AIR 1956 Cal 321(FB), was a decision of five Judges by a majority of 3:2 and the majority judgment is against the appellant. The minority judgment certainly takes the view that the non-existence or invalidity of an arbitration agreement and an order of reference to arbitration may be raised after the period of limitation for the purpose of setting aside an award because they are not grounds for setting aside the award under S.30 It is not necessary in the present case to resolve the conflict between the majority and the minority Judges in Saha and Co.'s case, AIR 1956 Cal 321 (FB), for even the minority judgment shows that it is only where the grounds are not those falling within S.30, that the award may be set aside on an objection made beyond the period of limitation, even though no application has been made for setting aside the award within the period of limitation. Clearly, therefore, where an objection as in the present case raises grounds which fall squarely within S.30 of the Act that objection cannot be heard by the Court and cannot be treated as an application for setting aside the award unless it is made within the period of limitation. Saha and Co.'s case, AIR 1956 Cal 321 (FB), therefore, also does not help the appellant.
5. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Santosh Kumar, learned counsel for the Appellant, on Union Of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC 239 which has been decided without reference to Popular Construction. Their Lordships observed as follows:—
8. The delivery of an arbitral award under sub-section (5) of Section 31 is not a matter of mere formality. It is a matter of substance. It is only after the stage under Section 31 has passed that the stage of termination of arbitral proceedings within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act arises. The delivery of arbitral award to the party, to be effective, has to be “received” by the party. This delivery by the Arbitral Tribunal and receipt by the party of the award sets in motion several periods of limitation such as an application for correction and interpretation of an award within 30 days under Section 33(1), an application for making an additional award under Section 33(4) and an application for setting aside an award under Section 34(3) and so on. As this delivery of the copy of award has the effect of conferring certain rights on the party as also bringing to an end the right to exercise those rights on expiry of the prescribed period of limitation which would be calculated from that date, the delivery of the copy of award by the Tribunal and the receipt thereof by each party constitutes an important stage in the arbitral proceedings.
10. In the present case, the Chief Engineer had signed the agreement on behalf of the Union of India entered into with the respondent. In the arbitral proceedings the Chief Engineer represented the Union of India and the notices, during proceedings of the arbitration, were served on the Chief Engineer. Even the arbitral award clearly mentions that the Union of India is represented by the Deputy Chief Engineer/Gauge Conversion, Chennai. The Chief Engineer is directly concerned with the arbitration, as the subject-matter of arbitration relates to the department of the Chief Engineer and he has direct knowledge of the arbitral proceedings and the question involved before the arbitrator. The General Manager of the Railways has only referred the matter for arbitration as required under the contract. He cannot be said to be aware of the question involved in the arbitration nor the factual aspect in detail, on the basis of which the Arbitral Tribunal had decided the issue before it, unless they are all brought to his notice by the officer dealing with that arbitration and who is in charge of those proceedings. Therefore, in our opinion, service of the arbitral award on the General Manager by way of receipt in his inwards office cannot be taken to be sufficient notice so as to activate the department to take appropriate steps in respect of and in regard to the award passed by the arbitrators to constitute the starting point of limitation for the purposes of Section 34(3) of the Act. The service of notice on the Chief Engineer on 19-3-2001 would be the starting point of limitation to challenge the award in the Court.
11. We cannot be oblivious of the fact of impersonal approach in the government departments and organisations like Railways. In the very nature of the working of government departments a decision is not taken unless the papers have reached the person concerned and then an approval, if required, of the competent authority or official above has been obtained. All this could not have taken place unless the Chief Engineer had received the copy of the award when only the delivery of the award within the meaning of sub-section (5) of Section 31 shall be deemed to have taken place.
12. The learned Single Judge of the High Court as also the Division Bench have erred in holding the application under Section 34 filed on behalf of the appellant as having been filed beyond a period of 3 months and 30 days within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 34. There was a delay of 27 days only and not of 34 days as held by the High Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay in filing the application deserves to be condoned and the application under sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Act filed on behalf of the appellant deserves to be heard and decided on merits.
13. The appeal is allowed. The application under Section 34(1) filed on behalf of the appellant shall stand restored in the High Court, to be heard and decided in accordance with law by the learned Single Judge. No order as to costs.
6. A proper perusal of this Judgment will disclose that their Lordships were primarily influenced by the fact that a copy of the Award had not been served on the officer concerned with the dispute. The question of there being 24 days delay only was obviously made en passant since otherwise it may have become irreconcilable with the Popular Construction. The ratio of Tecco Trichy is that Award should be delivered to the officer concerned and to this extent it is of invaluable assistance to the Appellant.
7. Learned counsel for the Appellant has next drawn our attention to the decision of the Apex Court in State Of Goa v. Western Builders. (2006) (6) Scale 574, which has also been relied upon by learned counsel for the Respondent. Popular Construction was brought to their Lordships notice along with National Aluminum Co. Ltd. v. Pressteel and Fabrication (P) Ltd., [(2004) 1 SCC 540 = 2003(10) Scale 1062]. Tecco Trichy, however, was not cited and hence not considered. Their Lordships took note of the fact that section 43 of the a & c act envisaged the application of the Limitation Act, 1963 but in view of section 34 of the a & c act read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, “the applicability of Section 5 of Limitation will stand excluded and the application for condonation of delay upto a period of 30 days can be made to the Court and not beyond that”. Their Lordships thereafter took note of the fact that there was no provision in the A & C Act dealing with the bonafide filing of an action in a wrong forum. In our view, in this context it is certainly arguable that principles of prescription may have no role to play if Objections have been filed within the prescribed period regardless of the fact that the filing is in a Court not properly possessing jurisdiction. In such cases principles analogous to Rules 10 and 10-A of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure would require the return of the Objections with liberty granted to the Objector to file them in the proper forum within the period granted by the Court. In these circumstances either of the Courts would not actually have to condone the delay in filing the Objections. On the contrary, the return would facilitate and ensure that the Objections are dealt with and decided by the competent Court of jurisdiction. It was on that reasoning that their Lordships pronounced in Tecco Trichy that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the A & C Act, 1996. This Judgment, therefore, is not a precedent for the proposition that delay in filing Objections even beyond the period of 120 days from the date on which the Award had been delivered/served on the concerned party can be condoned.
8. Mr. Santosh Kumar, learned counsel for the Appellant, has sought to rely on M/s. Transparent Packers v. The Arbitrator-cum-Managing Director, JT 2000(7) SC 574, in our understanding which has scarce relevancy. All that was observed was that a deponent need not invariably enter the witness box for his affidavit to attract evidentiary value. The dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay only on this ground was reversed. Thereafter reference has been made to State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 placing special emphasis on the observations to the effect that the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. Their Lordships had condoned a delay of 109 days in filing of the LPA before the High Court. This decision is of no assistance to the Appellant since the proviso to section 34(3) of the a & c act vests power and discretion in the Court to entertain application for setting aside an Award filed after three months of the delivery of the arbitral Award on the concerned party, only for another thirty days but not thereafter. While condoning delay may be possible in Appeals, discretion so far as Objections to an Award is concerned, stands extinguished after thirty days post three months of delivery of the Award.
9. In this analysis we are of the opinion that there is no scope to submit that the Court possesses powers to condone delay beyond thirty days reckoned from the expiry of three months from the date on which a signed copy of the Award is delivered to the parties. Learned counsel for the Respondent has drawn attention to the observations found in Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd, v. Raunaq and Company Pvt. Ltd., (1988) 4 SCC 31, made in the context of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Court was called upon to rule on Section 14(2) of the erstwhile Arbitration Act, the provisions of which are materially different. Briefly, the observations to the effect that it is the service of the notice and not the mode or method of the service that is important would stand appreciably diluted in view of the statutory obligation contained in section 32(5) of the a & c act.
10. We have already mentioned that liability in terms of the Award runs into lakhs of rupees. The Appellant has consistently taken the stand that a copy of the Award has not been served on them. The hiatus of almost seven years between the signing of the Award on 20.1.1997 by the learned Arbitrator and initiation of Execution Proceedings on 7.1.2004 can be ignored only at the peril and expense of justice. The Court needs to be fully satisfied of events that transpired within this period. No explanation is forthcoming as to why Execution Proceedings were initiated after seven long years. The observations in Phonographic Performance Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry. [2004] EWHC 1795(Ch) 369 are apposite and read as follows:—
Whilst in the past, it would not be appropriate to look at delay of a party commencing proceedings other than by judicial review within the limitation period in deciding whether the proceedings are abusive, this is no longer the position. Whilst to commence proceedings within a limitation period is not in itself an abuse, delay in commencing proceedings is a factor which can be taken into account in deciding whether the proceeding are abusive. If proceedings of a type which would normally be brought by judicial review are instead brought by means of an ordinary claim, the court in deciding whether the commencement of the proceedings is an abuse of process, can taken into account whether there has been unjustified delay in initiating the proceedings.
11. The Award has been filed in Execution Proceedings bearing Ex. 4/2004 by the Decree Holder, along with EA 39/2004 dated 27.1.2004 It has not been received directly from the Arbitral Tribunal. The Registry has reported that the son of the deceased Arbitrator has stated that the arbitration files had been handed over to the concerned parties/Advocates. Material details are conspicuously missing. The Award, which has been purportedly signed by the Sole Arbitrator only on the last page, has not been engrossed on adequate/proper stamp paper. The Sole Arbitrator died on 14.3.2002 Learned counsel for the Appellant has submitted that several questions have been raised in the Objections, which have not received jural attention since the learned Single Judge has held that the subject Objections are time-barred and hence do not require adjudication.
12. While the Court does not possess power to condone delay or enlarge time beyond 120 days (3 months plus thirty days) from the date on which the arbitral Award was delivered to the party desirous of filing Objections to the Award, the stringency and rigidity of this provision makes it essential that the contemplated delivery/service must be meticulously and properly effected. In saying so we do not intend to impart a punctilious or fastidiously formal connotation to the word ‘delivered’ employed in section 31(5) of the a & c act but nevertheless there must be substantial and authentic compliance thereunder obviously at the instance of the Arbitral Tribunal itself. However, as has happened in the present case, it would be of no legal consequence if, while inspecting Court records, the advocate of the party learns of the existence of a 113 page Award. What if the Advocate thereafter slumbered over the matter. Would that foreclose the defence of the party concerned, in respect of whom there is a statutory obligation that a copy of the Award should directly be delivered upon it. The answer cannot but be in the negative. In Union of India v. Surendra Kumar, 61(1996) DLT 42(DB) in the context of Arbitration Act, 1940, the Division Bench of this Court observed as follows:
We have considered the submission of learned Counsel for the respondent but we are of the opinion that there was no proper service of the notice of the filing of the award on the appellant. The object of giving notice under Section 14(2) of the Act is to provide an opportunity to a party to submit objections to the award filed by an Arbitrator within a period of 30 days of the receipt of a notice in respect of filing of the award as per Article 119 of the Limitation Act. What is essential is that notice should post him with the knowledge of the award filed by the Arbitrator in a particular matter. Notice should therefore, specify such details as would enable a party to identify the arbitration case, otherwise the notice will not serve the purpose for which it was given and will not meet the requirements of law. In the instant case the notice does not specify the name of the work, the division or department to which the matter pertained or even the contract number. It is needless to point out that Ministry of Urban Development has a very large area of operation covering several departments of the Government including C.P.W.D, which itself has several divisions spread all over the country. Therefore, unless the notice of filing of the award gives the details of the arbitration matter in which award is given, it cannot be considered as a proper notice in accordance with law. Besides, it was not enough to direct notice of the filing of the award to the Secretary to the Govt. of India, Ministry of Urban Development particularly when the notice failed to disclose the material particulars of the matter. In the circumstances, the notice ought to have been sent to the Executive Engineer, who was Engineer-in-charge of the work, and was the person who had signed the contract on behalf of the Union of India and was dealing with the matter. Therefore, it was necessary that he should also have been arrayed as a party respondent in the matter. Merely arraying Union of India and sending the notice to the Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development would not be effective service as the Secretary to the Govt. of India was not aware of the case nor he was furnished with the particulars thereof. He would also be ignorant of the proceedings before the Arbitrator which culminated in the award.
Moreover in the present case as already noted it would be difficult for the Secretary to the Govt. of India to link up the notice of the filing of the award to the matter which was subject matter of the Arbitration proceedings as the notice does not give any details except that the award was rendered by Mr. S.S Juneja. Since no particulars of the case were given, the office of the Secretary, Govt. of India, Ministry of Urban Development made an endorsement on the notice itself to the effect that full particulars of the case were not given and the notice was received without enclosures. Even a letter was written to the Registrar by the office of the Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development, Govt. of India for seeking particulars of the matter. In these circumstances, therefore, failure to serve a notice of the filing of the award on the Executive Engineer amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. It is well settled that where the principles of natural justice have been violated in passing an order by the Court, the same can be set aside under the inherent powers. It is also well settled that no person can be prejudiced by the act of the Court. Therefore, when the notice of the filing of the award was not given to the Executive Engineer and no proper notice was given to the Secretary to the Government of India. Ministry of Urban Development, the time for filing the objections did not commence and could not have therefore, expired. In such an event the Court will have inherent jurisdiction to set aside the ex-parte decree.
13. In R.P Arora v. Union Of India & Ors, 1999(6) AD (Delhi) 679: 1999(82) (Delhi) 686 one of us had declined to accept that notice of the filing of the Award had been correctly effected since it had not been served on the concerned official, that is, the Executive Engineer, Construction Division-11, CPWD, New Delhi. In those circumstances the officer concerned was held to have notice of the filing of the Award effective from the date of the pronouncement of the Judgment. In Hi-Rise Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Alpha Woven Labels (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2000 Delhi 126 a Single Judge held that failure to mention the number of the Suit would result in the service being irregular. The same approach commends itself to us in the present case also, namely, that the Appellant must be deemed to have been delivered a copy of the Award today. If this is so, the Objections, being already on the record, cannot be held to be time-barred.
14. It is in the above analysis that we record the following conclusions: Firstly, that the Court does not possess any power to condone delay after the lapse of thirty days from the expiry of three months from date of the delivery of a copy of the Award on the parties. It would be absurd to contend that service of the Award on one party would be legally efficacious on the opposite contestant. Precedents exhorting a liberal approach especially where the State is concerned do not apply to the A & C Act which has not only taken care to generally restrict interference by a Civil Court, but after laying down a period of 30 days in the proviso to Section 34(3) has taken pains to state that thereafter no scope of enlargement is possible. Secondly, we hold that section 32(5) of the a & c act must be strictly complied with and the Award must actually be served on the officer concerned by the Arbitrator. In the case of companies, Order XXIX of the CPC would come into operation. The facts of the case in hand are indeed singular. The Award purports to have been signed on 20.1.1997 The Award has been filed in Court by the Claimant. The records of the Arbitral Proceedings have not seen the light of day. There is not even an iota of evidence that the Arbitrator had dispatched a copy of the Award to the Appellant.
15. Since the Appellant is incorporated under the Companies Act, it must be unequivocally and categorically clear from the record that a copy of the Award was either served on the Secretary or Director or Principal Officer or delivered at the Registered Office of the Appellant in consonance with Orders XXXIX Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No documents exist in this context.
16. It is our understanding that wherever a time-bound schedule is laid down by a statute its terms should be strictly complied with before adverse orders can be passed. Under Order XXXVII of the CPC ‘Leave to Defend’ is to be applied for within a specified time. Keeping this in mind in Klg Systel Ltd.Plaintiff; v. Fujitsu Icim Ltddefendant., 84(2000) DLT 54 this Court had declined to accept the contention of the Plaintiff that Summons had been properly served on the Defendant under Order XXXVII Rule 3(2) as the Process Server had not made any attempt to personally serve the party concerned. Hence, it was opined that the question of condonation of delay in filing the ‘Leave to Defend’ had not arisen at all. A similar approach was pursued in Pleasant Securities & Finance Ltd. v. NRI Financial Services Limited, 2000(4) AD (Delhi) 768.
17. For these reasons the Appeal succeeds. The Order of the learned Single Judge is set aside on the grounds that the provisions of a & c act pertaining to service of the Award on the party has not been complied with. The result is that time for filing of the Objections has not commenced to run. Therefore, the question of delay had not arisen, so as to warrant the application of Popular Construction. The effect will be that OMP 261/2004 shall now be decided on its merits in accordance with law. IA 8040/1004 shall stand disposed of as intructuous. EFA(OS) 9/2005 also stands allowed. Impugned Order dated 9-12-2004 is set aside. Ex. P.4/2004 would be decided simultaneously with or along with OMP 261/2004.
18. The parties shall bear their respective costs.
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