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S.S. Bhagat v. N.S. Ahluwalia

Delhi High Court
Apr 4, 1977
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Avadh Behari Rohatgi, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Six plaintiffs, each claiming to be trustees of six trusts, instituted a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure against a sole defendant, N.S. Ahluwalia, alleging serious breaches of trust. The reliefs sought included removal of the defendant as trustee, a direction to render accounts, delivery of the trust property, and a declaration that the property was endowed.

The plaintiffs relied upon written consent dated January 11, 1974, embodied in an order of Mr. Naveen Chawla, Additional District Magistrate (South) Delhi, who had been empowered by the Lt. Governor under Section 93 to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General for the purposes of Section 92. The appointment/order under Section 93 dated November 28, 1973, was produced and its signatures proved on the record.

A preliminary issue was framed on January 31, 1975: whether a valid permission as envisaged within the ambit of Section 92 had been obtained by the plaintiffs. That preliminary issue is the focus of the opinion.

The record shows an extended history of prior attempts to obtain consent (beginning with applications filed in 1961 and subsequent orders in 1962 and 1964), including a prior suit (Suit No. 410 of 1966) that was dismissed on December 15, 1971 because the substituted consent order of May 21, 1964 was held to have been passed without the previous sanction of the State Government (following the Privy Council decision in Prem Narain v. Ram Charan). Subsequent applications for consent were made in 1972 and 1973, and the present consent (January 11, 1974) followed substitution of applicants and proof of empowerment of the Additional District Magistrate under Section 93.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a valid permission/consent as envisaged within the ambit of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been obtained by the plaintiffs.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

  • No valid consent under Section 92 had been obtained.
  • No notice was given to the defendant by the Additional District Magistrate before giving consent.
  • Delhi courts lack jurisdiction to hear the suit.
  • The suit is bad for misjoinder of causes of action and is multifarious (one suit cannot be instituted for six trusts).
  • The suit is outside the scope of Section 92.
  • The plaintiffs have no interest in the trust.
  • A specific contention was raised that only Shri Vinoo Bhagat (plaintiff No.5) appeared before the Additional District Magistrate when consent was considered and that he did not hold a power of attorney on behalf of the other plaintiffs, rendering the consent invalid.

Plaintiffs' Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The plaintiffs asserted that consent had been obtained by order dated January 11, 1974 from the Additional District Magistrate (South), acting under powers of the Advocate-General delegated by the Lt. Governor under Section 93.
  • The plaintiffs produced documentary proof of the Lt. Governor's empowerment (order dated November 28, 1973) and the consent order, and witnesses proved signatures on those documents.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Prem Narain v. Ram Charan and others, AIR 1932 PC 51 The Privy Council held that under Section 93 the "previous sanction" of the Local Government is necessary for the exercise of powers by a Collector or other officer; appointment plus previous sanction are both necessary for the provisions of Section 93 to be utilized. The court relied on this authority to explain that previous sanction must be strictly proved and that the absence of such sanction renders consent vulnerable; it distinguished the prior invalid consent in the earlier suit on this very ground, and it applied Prem Narain to confirm the legal requirement satisfied in the current record (i.e., the court examined whether the present consent suffered that defect).
Shavax v. Masood Hosain (Shavax v. Syed Masood Hossain), AIR 1965 AP 143 Authority for the proposition that the Advocate-General's order under Section 92 is not quasi-judicial; the Advocate-General need not hold an enquiry or hear parties and acts in an administrative capacity in granting or refusing consent. The court cited this case to support the conclusion that the Advocate-General (and his delegate) need not hear the defendant or conduct a quasi-judicial inquiry before granting consent; it applied the principle to reject the contention that notice to the defendant or presence of all applicants was required.
Sadhu Singh Sunder Singh v. Mangalgir Mohatmin Dera, AIR 1956 Pepsu 65 A solitary decision taking a contrary view (impliedly treating the order as having a different character). The court noted this decision as an exception and treated it as a solitary contrary authority; it did not follow it, explaining that the weight of authority is against its correctness.
Amrita Nand v. Advocate-General, AIR 1974 Punjab and Haryana 334 Authority among a preponderance of High Court decisions holding that the Advocate-General's order under Section 92 is administrative and not quasi-judicial. Used to support the general proposition that the Advocate-General's grant of consent requires only satisfaction of a prima facie case and does not decide rights—court relied on this collective authority to treat the consent as administrative.
A.K. Bhaskar v. Advocate-General, AIR 1962 Ker. 90 (FB) One of the High Court decisions supporting the administrative character of the Advocate-General's act under Section 92. Cited as part of the preponderant view that the Advocate-General's order is not quasi-judicial; court relied on these authorities to explain the limits of judicial review of consent.
Raju v. Advocate-General, AIR 1962 Mad. 320 Another authority supporting the administrative character of consent under Section 92. Referred to as part of consistent jurisprudence that the Advocate-General does not adjudicate rights when granting consent; court treated it as supporting the settled view.
K.M. Abdul Kasim v. P.M.N. Mohamed Dawood, AIR 1961 Mad. 244 Authority on the administrative nature of the Advocate-General's functions under Section 92. Used to buttress the court's conclusion that the Advocate-General need not conduct a hearing or inquiry before granting consent.
Swami Shantanand Saraswati v. Advocate-General, AIR 1955 All. 372 Authority to the same effect (Advocate-General's function non-judicial). Counted among the High Court authorities establishing the preponderant view relied upon by the court.
Shrimali Lal Kasliwal v. Advocate-General, AIR 1955 Raj. 166 Authority supporting the administrative view of the Advocate-General's act under Section 92. Included in the array of authorities the court relied on to treat the consent as administrative and not quasi-judicial.
Desraj v. Deputy Commissioner, Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1962 J & K 86 Another High Court decision endorsing the administrative character of consent under Section 92. Referred to as part of the prevailing judicial consensus the court applied to its analysis.
Satyananda v. Phani Lal, AIR 1955 Cal. 155 Cited for the proposition that where previous sanction is necessary, the obtaining of such sanction must be strictly proved and courts will not draw presumptions under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that formalities have been complied with. The court cited Satyananda to emphasize that proof of prior sanction under Section 93 must be strict and that no presumption can be drawn that due formalities were followed; it applied this to examine the present record for a valid appointment and sanction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequential analysis grounded in the text of Sections 92 and 93 and the authorities cited in the record:

  1. Statutory framework: The court identified that Section 92 permits suits to be instituted either by the Advocate-General or by two or more persons who have an interest in the trust and who have obtained the written consent of the Advocate-General. Where the Advocate-General is absent, Section 93 permits the appointment of an officer to exercise those powers with prior sanction of the Local Government.
  2. Nature of the Advocate-General's function: The court reviewed precedent and concluded that the Advocate-General's act in granting consent under Section 92 is administrative (not judicial or quasi-judicial). The consequence is that the Advocate-General need only be satisfied that there is a prima facie case and that it is in the public interest for the suit to be tried; he is not required to decide contested issues of fact or law, nor to hold an enquiry or hear the proposed defendant before granting consent. The court cited multiple High Court decisions and rejected the solitary conflicting view from the Pepsu High Court.
  3. Scope of judicial review: Given this administrative character, the court explained the limited scope of a court's inquiry when the validity of consent is challenged. The court may inquire into whether the consent was given by a competent authority and whether requisite formalities under Sections 92 and 93 have been complied with (notably the necessity for prior sanction under Section 93). However, the court should not re-decide the substantive merits on the question of whether the suit should be allowed to proceed; those merits are for the trial court upon evidence.
  4. Application to the present facts: The court examined the documentary proof produced in support of the consent—specifically, the order under Section 93 dated November 28, 1973 appointing the Additional District Magistrate (South) to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General in respect of the present application, and the consent order dated January 11, 1974 issued by Mr. Naveen Chawla. Signatures on both documents were proved by witnesses called for that purpose. On that basis the court found that the appointment and delegation required by Section 93 had been validly proven.
  5. Distinguishing prior invalid consent: The court contrasted the present record with the earlier situation that had led to dismissal of the prior suit (where substitution order of May 21, 1964 lacked previous sanction). Relying on Prem Narain and related authorities, the court emphasized that where previous sanction is a statutory requirement it must be strictly proved; having considered the present proofs, the court found no comparable defect in the present consent.
  6. Specific contentions addressed: The court rejected the defendant's argument that lack of personal appearance by five applicants (only plaintiff No.5 being present) invalidated the consent: the application itself was signed by all six applicants and the law did not require presence or that a power of attorney be produced; notice to the defendant or applicants was not obligatory before granting sanction. The court referred to Shavax (Supra) to support this position.
  7. Conclusion on the preliminary issue: On the cumulative basis of competency of the authority, documentary proof of appointment and delegation under Section 93, and the settled view of the administrative character of the consent, the court decided the preliminary issue in favour of the plaintiffs and held that a valid sanction for instituting the present suit had been obtained.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court decided the preliminary issue in favour of the plaintiffs and held that there is a valid sanction for the institution of the present suit by the plaintiffs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The immediate effect is that the preliminary objection to the jurisdiction/validity of consent under Section 92 is overruled and the suit may proceed on its merits before the court.
  • Broader legal point addressed in the opinion: The court stated that the law is settled, on the preponderant view of numerous High Court authorities, that the Advocate-General's order under Section 92 is an administrative act and not quasi-judicial; thus, absence of an opportunity of hearing or an inquiry by the Advocate-General generally does not invalidate the consent. The court rejected the earlier contrary Pepsu decision as not reflecting the prevailing view.
  • No new precedent claimed: The court applied existing authorities and principles to the facts before it; the decision resolves the preliminary issue on the evidence and record produced rather than purporting to create a novel rule of law.

Order: The court ordered the preliminary issue answered in favour of the plaintiffs and recorded that there was a valid sanction for instituting the suit.

Show all summary ...

Avadh Behari Rohatgi, J.:— Six plaintiffs claiming themselves to be trustees of six trusts have brought this suit under s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) against N.S Ahluwalia, the sole defendant. It is alleged in the plaint that the defendant has committed serious breaches of trust.

2. The reliefs asked for in the plaint are as follows: that the defendant be removed from the office of the trustee; that he be directed to render accounts; that he be ordered to deliver the trust property and a declaration that the property was an endowed property should be made.
3. In the plaint the plaintiffs say that by an order dated January 11, 1974 they have obtained the consent of the Additional District Magistrate (South) Delhi exercising the powers of the Advocate-General under s. 92 of the Code as conferred upon him by the Lt. Governor Delhi for the institution of the present suit.
4. The defendant has raised numerous defences to the suit. As regards consent the defence is that no valid consent has been obtained under s. 92 of the Code. On this plea the following preliminary issue was framed on January 31, 1975:
Whether a valid permission as envisaged within the ambit of s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been obtained by the plaintiffs ?
It is this issue which calls for decision.
5. Section 92 provides for a suit being instituted by the Advocate-General or by two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate-General.
6. The present suit has been brought not by the Advocate-General (there is no Advocate-General in Delhi who could act under s. 92, Code of Civil Procedure) but by six trustees after obtaining the consent of the authority duly empowered to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General.
7. The consent on the basis of which the present suit has been instituted is dated January 11, 1974. It is embodied in an order of Mr. Naveen Chawla, Additional District Magistrate (South) Delhi (Ex. PW 1/1). It appears from that order that the said Additional District Magistrate was empowered by the Lt. Governor to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General under s. 92.
8. The order under s. 93 of the Code where by the Lt. Governor appointed the Additional District Magistrate (South) Delhi to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General under s. 92 in respect of the application moved by the present six trustees has been proved on the record. The order is dated November 28, 1973 (PW 3/1). It is signed by Mrs. S. Duggal, Deputy Secretary (Litigation) Delhi Administration. Her signatures were proved by a witness of the department (G.S Nangia, PW 3).
9. The signatures of Shri Naveen Chawla on the order dated January 11, 1974 made in exercise of the powers of the Advocate-General conferred upon him under s. 93 have been proved by Additional District Magistrate (North) Shri S.L Arora, PW 2.
10. This case has a history behind it. Much time was lost in obtaining consent. Each time consent was obtained death intervened; suit could not be brought. Once when suit was brought it was dismissed. The court held that the Collector did not have the previous sanction of the State Government for the exercise of his powers.
On December 15, 1961 Sarvshri Gurbachan Singh and S.S Bhagat made an application praying that consent be given to them under s. 92 to institute a suit against the present defendant. The Collector, Delhi Mr. S.G Bose Mullick gave consent by his order dated October 19, 1962 (PW 2/1). As it happened Shri Gurbachan Singh died before the suit could be instituted. An application was then made by one Gurdit Singh for substitution of his name in place of Shri Gurbachan Singh, deceased, for bringing the suit along with Shri S.S Bhagat, the surviving petitioner. Shri S.G Bose Mullick permitted Gurdit Singh's name to be substituted in place of Gurbachan Singh by his order dated May 21, 1964 (PW 2/2).
11. Gurdit Singh and S.S Bhagat brought a suit (Suit No. 410 of 1966) under s. 92 in this court against the defendant. That suit failed on the ground that the subsequent order of the Collector granting permission of substitution was passed without obtaining the sanction of the State Government. Following the authority of the Privy Council in Prem Narain v. Ram Charan and others, AIR 1932 PC 51 (1) Prithvi Raj J. dismissed the suit on December 15, 1971 holding that for the order dated May 21, 1964 there was no previous sanction of the State Government for the powers exercised by the Collector under s. 92.
12. On April 11, 1972, a fresh application was made to obtain consent. By order dated April 10, 1973 Shri Ashok Nath, Additional District Magistrate (South) gave consent, he having been empowered by the order of the Lt. Governor to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General under s. 92 by letter dated May 25, 1972. On this consent suit could not be brought as K.S Malik, one of the applicants in the application dated April 11, 1972, had died on June 19, 1973, before the suit could be filed.
13. Yet another application had to be moved for fresh consent. This was done on July 23, 1973 wherein Commander G. Nandy Singh became the applicant in place of the deceased K.S Malik. On this application Mr. Naveen Chawla granted the permission on January 11, 1974, as I have said.
14. The defendant contends that there is no valid consent obtained for the suit. The grounds of challenge set out in the written statement can be summarised as follows:
(a) that no notice was given to the defendant by the Additional District Magistrate before giving consent.
(b) Delhi courts have no jurisdiction to hear the suit.
(c) The suit is bad for misjoinder of causes of action and multiferiousness. One suit for six trusts cannot be instituted.
(d) The suit is outside the scope of s. 92.
(e) Plaintiffs have no interest in the trust.
15. As regards all these objections it is enough to say that it is not the function of the Advocate-General under s. 92 to give a decision on the issues that might arise in the course of the suit under s. 92 and a court of law is competent to come to its own conclusions of fact and law. All that the Advocate-General has to satisfy himself before granting the sanction is that there is a prima facie case and that it is worthwhile that the suit should be tried by a court in the interests of a public charity. Take an example. Whether the plaintiffs in this case have an interest in the trust which would bring them within the scope of s. 92 is one of the issues which will be framed and tried in the suit itself. It is for the court to determine this issue in the light of the evidence adduced before it.
16. Nor does the law require the Advocate-General to hear the defendant before granting the permission. The reason is that the Advocate-General in exercising the powers vested in him under s. 92 does not perform a judicial function. It is not even quasi-judicial. It is an administrative function which he discharges. He is not compelled by any statutory obligation to hear witnesses, to admit documentary evidence, or to hold an enquiry before granting or refusing consent when he is moved under s. 92: See Shavax v. Masod Hosain, AIR 1965 AP 143 (2).
17. With the exception of a solitary decision of Mehr Singh J. of the Pepsu High Court in Sadhu Singh Sunder Singh v. Mangalgir Mohatmin Dera, AIR 1956 Pepsu 65 (3) the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Madras, Allahabad, Rajasthan, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Haryana and the former Chief Court of Punjab have all uniformly held that the order of the Advocate-General under s. 92 is merely an administrative or an executive act and cannot be called a quasi-judicial order. The preponderant view is that neither s. 92 nor any other provision of the Code requires the Advocate-General to hold an enquiry or to give an opportunity of hearing to the party which might be affected by the giving of his consent. The Advocate-General has merely to see whether there is or there is not a prima facie case that should be allowed to go to a court of law. He does not decide the rights of the person against whom the suit is intended to be filed as such a person will have full opportunity to present his case before the court in which the suit is filed. The Advocate-General does not decide anybody's rights. Nor does he take away the right of the defendant to the proposed suit to defend the same on all possible grounds available to him in law. He does not give any decision on the merits of the controversy one way or the other. There is no lis before him: See Amrita Nand v. Advocate-General, AIR 1974 Punjab and Haryana 334 (4), Shavax v. Syed Masood Hossain, AIR 1965 Andhra Pradesh 143, A.K Bhaskar v. Advocate-General, AIR 1962 Ker. 90 (5) (FB), Raju v. Advocate-General, AIR 1962 Mad. 320 (6), K.M Abdul Kasim v. P.M.N Mohamed Dawood, AIR 1961 Mad. 244 (7), Swami Shantanand Saraswati v. Advocate-General, AIR 1955 All. 372 (8), Shrimali Lal Kasliwal v. Advocate-General, AIR 1955 Raj. 166 (9) and Desraj v. Dy. Commissioner, Jamtnu and Kashmir, AIR 1962 J & K 86 (10).
18. Judges after judges have doubted the correctness of the view of the Pepsu High Court. The numerous authorities on the subject are conclusive against its correctness. The law may therefore be taken to be settled that the order of the Advocate-General is not quasi-judicial.
19. It being firmly established that in exercising the powers vested in him under s. 92 the Advocate-General does not perform a judicial function, the question at once arises: what is it that a court has to see to determine the validity of sanction ? Now where there is a consent all that the court is concerned to see whether there is a valid sanction by a competent authority. It cannot go beyond the sanction. It cannot enquire whether the sanctioning authority has heard the parties though it can enquire into the competency of the Authority to act under Ss. 92 and 93, Code of Civil Procedure.
20. In this case there is a valid appointment of the Additional District, Magistrate (South) by the Lt. Governor to exercise the powers of the Advocate-General under s. 92. That appointment has been duly proved. S. 93 requires and the Privy Council has so held in Prem Narain's case that previous sanction for the exercise of the power must be obtained by the Collector or other officer appointed for each particular case. General sanction by the State Government is not enough. The obtaining of such sanction must be strictly proved because in the absence of such sanction the suit will be without jurisdiction. In such a case the court will not draw a presumption under ss. 114, Evidence Act that all due formalities of law must have been complied with: Satyananda v. Phani Lal, AIR 1955 Cal. 155 (11).
21. On the true construction of s. 93 the previous sanction of the Government is necessary in every suit before the Collector or the officer appointed could exercise powers conferred upon the Advocate-General by Ss. 91 and 92 of the Code. The Privy Council in Prem Narain's case (supra) said:
“In their Lordships' opinion S. 93 provides for two distinct matters; the appointment of an officer to exercise the powers conferred by Ss. 91 and 92 on the Advocate-General, and the “previous sanction” of the Local Government to the exercise of such powers: in each case both the appointment and the previous sanction of the Local Government to the exercise of the powers are necessary before the provisions of S. 93 can be utilized.”
22. Consent in the previous suit was held to be invalid on this ground by Prithvi Raj, J. Consent in the present suit does not suffer from any such defect. I, therefore, hold that there is a valid sanction.
23. Counsel argued that Shri Vinoo Bhagat, plaintiff No. 5, alone was present before the Additional District Magistrate (South) when the application for consent was considered. He said that the remaining five applicants were not present in the consent proceedings, though the application purported to be on behalf of all of them. It was contended that Shri Vinoo Bhagat did not hold any power-of-attorney on behalf of the remaining plaintiffs and therefore consent given is invalid. This argument is without merit. The reason is plain. The application was signed by all the six applicants as is clear from the evidence of R.L Gupta PW 4. One of the applicants could appear before the Additional District Magistrate (South) to pursue the application. Even his presence was not required in law. Without issuing notice to the applicants the Collector could have decided the application. A notice to the institution or the trustees is not obligatory before granting sanction: See Shavax v. Masood Hosain (supra).
24. For these reasons I would decide the preliminary issue in favour of the plaintiffs and hold that there is a valid sanction for the institution of the present suit by the plaintiffs.
Ordered Accordingly.