MAYERS v. CONSOLIDATED CHARCOAL COMPANY, INC

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

It is well settled that the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is generally a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, e.g., Stathoudakes v Kelmar Contr. Corp., 147 A.D.2d 690, 691; Associated Mut. Ins. Co. v Dyland Tavern, 105 A.D.2d 892, 893). Moreover, the drastic sanction of striking a pleading should not be invoked unless the resisting party's default is shown to be deliberate and contumacious (see, Read v Dickson, 150 A.D.2d 543; Stathoudakes v Kelmar Contr. Corp., supra; Scharlack v Richmond Mem. Hosp., 127 A.D.2d 580). Contrary to the defendants' contentions, our review of the record discloses that the Supreme Court's denial of the motion to strike the complaint constituted a proper exercise of discretion under the circumstances. Brown, J.P., Lawrence, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.