IN THE MATTER OF NEVILLE G

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

We disagree with the appellant's contention that his placement should have been less restrictive. The Family Court has broad discretion in entering dispositional orders (see Matter of Naiquan T., 265 A.D.2d 331, 332; Matter of Tristan W., 258 A.D.2d 585, 586; Family Ct Act § 141). Great deference is given to its determination because "it had the opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, and observe their demeanor" (Matter of Severn J., 250 A.D.2d 682, 683). Moreover, it is well settled that "[t]he least restrictive alternative test does not require the court to actually try the lowest form of intervention, have it fail, and then try each succeeding level of intervention before ordering * * * placement" (Matter of Anthony M., 142 A.D.2d 731, 732; see Matter of Tristan W., supra, at 586; Matter of Jamil W., 184 A.D.2d 513, 514).

The Family Court's decision with respect to the disposition demonstrated that it carefully considered the less restrictive alternatives to the appellant's placement and properly balanced the needs of the juvenile and the need for the protection of the community (see Family Ct Act § 352.2). Accordingly, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion.

RITTER, J.P., O'BRIEN, CRANE and COZIER, JJ., concur.