MERRILL v. PERKINS

J. Y. Mugridge and S.C. Eastman, for the defendants, cited 1 Barb. 495; 1 Graham Waterman, New Trials, 549; Clerk v. Udall, 2 Salk. 649. Hewlett v. Cruchley, 5 Taunt. 281; Goodwin v. Gibbons, 4 Burr. 2108; Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208; Hamilton v. Bullock, 2 Hayw. (N.C.) 224; Com'rs v. Ross, 3 Binn. 520; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 Binn. 180; Woodruff v. Richardson, 20 Conn. 238; M. W. R. R. v. Winn, 26 Geo. 250; Russ v. Steamboat, 14 Iowa 363; Sexton v. Brock, 15 Ark. 345. Chase Streeter, for the plaintiff. In cases of tort, where it is claimed that the damages assessed by the jury are excessive, and that their verdict should he set aside for that reason, courts almost universally hold that they will not interfere unless the damages are so exorbitant, when compared with the circumstances of the case, as to satisfy them that the jury must have been influenced by passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption in making the assessment. Rand v. Redington, 13 N.H. 76; Belknap v. Rail road, 49 N.H. 358; Field Dam., c. 37, and numerous authorities cited in notes; Sedg. Dam. (5th ed.) 707, and authorities cited; Hilliard New Trials, c. 17; Bodwell v. Osgood, 3 Pick. 380; Treanor v. Donahoe, 9 Cush. 228; Worster v. Canal Bridge, 16 Pick. 541; Ayer v. Bartlett, 9 Pick. 156; Stoneham School Dist. v. Richardson, 23 Pick. 62; Tompson v. Mussey, 3 Me. 305; Jacobs v. Bangor, 16 Me. 187; Gilbert v. Woodbury, 22 Me. 246; Kimball v. Bath, 38 Me. 219; Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552; Gee v. Patterson, 63 Me. 49; Powers v. Cary, 64 Me. 9; Hobbs v. E. R. R., 66 Me. 573; Clark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 509; Woodruff v. Richardson, ib. 243; Nicholson v. Railroad, 22 Conn. 88; Waters v. Bristol, 26 Conn. 405; Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45; Worford v. Isbel, 1 Bibb (Ky.) 247; Solen v. Railroad, 13 Nev. 106; Ford v. Ward, 26 Ark. 360; Railroad v. Parks, 88 Ill. 373; Westerville v. Freeman, 66 Ind. 255; Railroad v. Casey, 52 Texas 112[ 52 Tex. 112]; Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205; Ash v. Ash, Comb. 357; Cowp. 230; 2 Wils. 405; 3 Wils. 61; 1 D. E. 277; 2 W. Bl. 1327; 1 Burr. 609; Butler v. Bangor, 67 Me. 385; Clark v. Whitaker, 19 Conn. 330; Hewlett v. Cruchley, 5 Taunt. 281; Duberley v. Gunning, 4 D. E. 651; Shaw v. Railroad, 8 Gray 45; Clerk v. Udall, 2 Salk. 649; Chambers v. Robinson, 1 Strange 691; Anon., 6 Mod. 22; Railroad v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250; Russ v. Steamboat, 14 Ia. 365. We think no case can be found where the court have set aside a second or subsequent verdict that was substantially like the first, on the ground that the damages assessed were excessive. "There ought to be an end of things," and a second verdict, substantially like the first, is reasonable proof that the first is right.