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Orimolusi v The Provost, Fellows and Scholars Of The University Of Dublin and Ors (Approved)

High Court of Ireland

Jun 17, 2026

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Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant commenced judicial review proceedings challenging a series of internal decisions made by The University (School of Pharmacy) and related appellate bodies, arising from findings about his fitness to practise. The Applicant had progressed through a five-year integrated Pharmacy programme (leading to a B.Sc (Pharm) and an M. Pharm) subject to an eight-year statutory completion limit. During the M. Pharm year the Applicant was found to have committed multiple breaches, including repeated instances of plagiarism and other conduct concerns. The School Fitness to Practise (School FTP) committee recommended withdrawal from the M. Pharm programme; the Dean of Graduate Studies approved that recommendation. The Applicant appealed to the College Fitness to Practise (College FTP) committee, which largely affirmed the School decision (with one dissent). The Applicant then appealed to the College Visitors (heard by the Pro‑Chancellor and the Judicial Visitor), who upheld the College FTP. The Applicant obtained leave to apply for judicial review, limited procedural anonymisation was granted, and the High Court considered preliminary issues including amenability to judicial review, time and alternative remedies, and whether the court should review only the Visitors' decision.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the decisions of The University and its internal fitness to practise bodies were amenable to judicial review.
Whether earlier decisions (prior to the Visitors) could be challenged given time limits and the existence of internal appellate remedies (i.e. issues of alternative remedies, estoppel, and collateral attack).
Whether the Visitors' decision was lawful: procedural fairness, jurisdictional competence, proper application of University statutes and policies, and proportionality of the outcome.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

The decisions (School FTP, College FTP, Visitors) were disproportionate, unreasonable, irrational, ultra vires, unfair and in breach of fair procedures.
The University failed to follow its statutes, regulations and policies (including consultation with the Junior Dean) and improperly treated matters of plagiarism and undergraduate conduct within the fitness to practise process.
The Applicant faced double jeopardy / res judicata, estoppel, abuse of process, undue delay and reversal of burden of proof at committee hearings.
The College FTP and Visitors failed to give adequate reasons and/or wrongly treated disciplinary matters as fitness to practise matters; the Applicant also sought access to Turnitin match data and raised jurisdictional objections late in the Visitors' process.

Respondents' Arguments

The matters were internal university decisions and, in principle, not amenable to judicial review (private law/contractual relationship).
Challenges to earlier stages were out of time and/or precluded because the Applicant pursued internal appeals (alternative remedies/discretionary bar).
The internal fitness to practise structures and appeal routes provided adequate remedies; the court should therefore limit review (if any) to the Visitors' decision, and defer to specialist decision‑makers on factual and professional judgments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Flanagan v. UCD [1988] I.R. 724	Authority on reviewability of university decisions.	Listed among authorities on amenability; considered in general survey of case law.
Rajah v. Royal College of Surgeons [1994] 1 I.R. 384	Distinction between private/academic judgment and reviewable functions (discipline may be reviewable).	Relied on in assessing whether university decisions were public in character or private; informed comparison with other cases.
Zhang v. Athlone Institute of Technology [2013] IEHC 390	Amenability to review where statutory source or disciplinary function exists.	Used to illustrate prior findings where disciplinary functions gave rise to reviewability.
Fassi v. Dublin City University [2015] IEHC 38	University decisions not reviewable where private/academic; exceptions where public element exists.	Cited as part of the line of authority on amenability and exceptions.
Galbraith v. Dublin City University [2022] IEHC 520	Decision that academic/degree progression matters were not amenable to judicial review.	Identified as a closely analogous case supporting non‑amenability; court compared facts and found differences but noted resemblance.
Shatter v. Guerin [2021] 2 I.R. 415	Consideration of source of power relevant to amenability.	Not relied on by parties but noted by the court as relevant to the inquiry into source of powers.
O'Donnell v. Tipperary South Riding County Council [2005] 2 I.R. 483	Public/private distinction; Denham J.'s observations on burden to show a private contract‑derived duty.	Quoted to explain the approach to whether a function is manifestly private.
Beirne (per Finlay C.J.) (cited within O'Donnell)	Principle that duties manifestly private and deriving solely from contract are outside judicial review.	Adopted to frame the legal test on source and nature of the power.
Quinn v. King's Inns [2004] 4 I.R. 344	Examination/academic decision deriving from institute rules may be private/contractual.	Applied to distinguish disciplinary or statutory functions from private academic decisions.
Re Malone's Application [1998] N.I. 67	Consideration of nature of power as well as its source.	Referenced to support analysis that nature of power matters for amenability.
Geoghegan v. Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland [1995] 3 I.R. 86	Disciplinary functions may be subject to review.	Distinguished from purely academic/examination functions in the court's analysis.
Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] 2 I.R. 752	Requirement for reasoned decisions in administrative law.	Applied in assessing sufficiency and timeliness of the Visitors' written reasons.
Crayden v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] 3 I.R. 785	Example of a classic multistage decision process.	Used to contrast the present case's structure (stages were largely self‑standing).
Arthropharm (Europe) Limited v. the Health Products Regulatory Authority [2022] IECA 109	Principles on alternative remedies, time limits, collateral attack and when internal remedies bar judicial review.	Invoked to explain the discretionary bar where adequate alternative remedies exist and to frame the court's approach to earlier stages.
Finnerty v. Western Health Board [1998] IEHC 143	Time begins to run when the final decision is made; reiteration that reiterations are not new decisions.	Quoted (via Arthropharm) on the point that a reiteration is not a new decision for time running purposes.
Independent Newspapers plc v. IA [2020] IECA 19	Rule against collateral attack in multi‑stage decision making.	Applied to support limitation of challenges to later decisions where earlier decisions could have been challenged in time.
Sweetman v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] 2 IR 250	Principle preventing collateral challenges to earlier decisions after time has expired.	Reinforced the court's view on collateral attack and finality of earlier stages.
Amariei v. The Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22	Comprehensive restatement: applicants must exhaust alternative remedies; only exceptional fundamental denials of justice permit judicial review despite alternatives.	Applied as binding authority on alternative remedies; led the court to limit review to the Visitors' decision.
AB v. Chief International Protection Officer [2026] IESC 23	Complementary authority on adequacy of alternative remedies and when judicial review is exceptional.	Referenced in explaining the standard for when review may be permitted despite alternative remedies.
Glencore Energy UK Limited v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2017] 4 WLR 213	Illustration of refusal of judicial review where statutory alternative remedies exist unless exceptional abuse of power.	Used to exemplify appellate versus judicial review relationship when alternatives exist.
In re Preston [1985] AC 835	Authority relied on in the Glencore discussion regarding exceptional circumstances.	Referred to in the court's consideration of when judicial review may supplant statutory routes.
Stefan v. Minister for Justice (dicta cited)	Earlier dicta about fairness of initial hearing and appeal; discussed and limited by later authorities.	Noted as potentially misleading if relied upon without the qualification provided by Amariei.
The State (Stanbridge) v. Mahon	Context for limits on using judicial review to cure defective appealable processes.	Referred to in the discussion of the scope of judicial review versus appeal.
Corrigan v. Irish Land Commission [1977] I.R. 317	Applicant cannot raise matters in judicial review that were not raised at first instance.	Applied to confine the court to issues that were presented to the Visitors.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a structured analysis:

Amenability: The court reviewed authorities on whether university/internal decisions are subject to judicial review and concluded—carefully and narrowly—that the decisions in this case were amenable to review. The finding was narrow and fact‑specific, grounded on four persuasive features: (a) the School's code was modelled on the statutory regulator's code; (b) concerns related to fitness to practise in a regulated profession; (c) a realistic connection between the internal fitness to practise process and the statutory certification required under the Pharmacy Act rules; and (d) the disciplinary element (plagiarism) in the background. The court emphasised this was not a general holding that university processes are ordinarily amenable.
Scope of review / alternative remedies: Applying Arthropharm and the Supreme Court's restatement in Amariei and related authorities, the court held that internal appeal remedies operated as an adequate alternative and that the Applicant, having chosen the internal appellate route, could not now collaterally challenge earlier stages where time for direct judicial review had expired. The court characterised most stages (School FTP, College FTP) as self‑contained de novo appeals; once those were pursued the earlier decisions became moot in practical effect. The court therefore limited its review to the Visitors' decision, and only to issues raised before the Visitors (Corrigan principle).
Substantive review of the Visitors' decision: The court assessed procedural fairness and legality of the Visitors' decision. It reviewed whether written reasons were timely and sufficient (Connelly), whether jurisdictional/"fork in the road" arguments were sustainable, whether plagiarism should have been exclusively disciplined rather than considered under fitness to practise, whether the Visitors impermissibly deferred to committees, and whether mitigation and evidential access (Turnitin) were improperly handled. The court found: (a) written reasons were provided in a timely and sufficiently reasoned form; (b) the jurisdictional/fork‑in‑the‑road argument was misconceived given the multiplicity of concerns and the statutory/policy framework allowing fitness to practise consideration of patterns of conduct; (c) treating repeated plagiarism as part of a fitness to practise inquiry was permissible; (d) the Visitors properly showed respect to specialist committees without undue deference; (e) mitigation evidence was considered; and (f) late requests for Turnitin data were not outcome‑determinative.
Standard of intervention: The court stressed its supervisory (legality) role rather than a merits review, and noted the wide discretion afforded to the Visitors by the University statutes and the consequent deference to their process and conclusions.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION DISMISSED

Holding: The court refused the Applicant's claims and dismissed the judicial review challenge to the Visitors' decision (the decision upholding withdrawal from the M. Pharm programme and the finding that the Applicant was not fit to practise).

Implications: The direct effect is that the Visitors' decision stands and the earlier internal decisions are not set aside by this court. The court made a narrow finding that, on these facts, the University's decision‑making was amenable to judicial review, but it expressly declined to establish a general rule that University processes are ordinarily reviewable. The court indicated that The University is prima facie entitled to costs and listed a costs hearing. No broader precedent altering the settled relationship between internal appellate remedies and judicial review was announced beyond the court's narrow, fact‑specific conclusions.

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