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Doyle and Ors v An Coimisiun Pleanala and Ors [No. 4] (Approved)

High Court of Ireland
May 29, 2026
Smart Summary (Beta)

Anonymised Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicants sought judicial review of a planning permission granted to a data-centre development promoted by Company A (the notice party). The challenge raised climate-related objections under s.15 of the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015 and statutory planning grounds under the Planning and Development Act 2000. The High Court heard the case in two substantive modules. In Module I the Court dismissed the Applicants' challenge (including a claim about a bat roost) and found any alleged inspector error harmless. In Module II the Applicants' case was also dismissed. The Applicants then applied for leave to appeal. The leave application was heard, the draft judgment was circulated to parties under the court's practice direction, and this reserved judgment refuses leave to appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a data-centre project that is conditioned to require Corporate Power Purchase Agreements (CPPAs) that offset on-site energy consumption can be regarded as a project "powered from renewable energy" for the purposes of s.15 Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015.
  2. Whether recitation that a decision-maker "had regard to" the 2015 Act (and to the Climate Action Plan 2023) can satisfy the Commission's duty under s.15, and what evidential or demonstrative duty the Commission bears to show compliance.
  3. Whether and how carbon budgets and sectoral emissions ceilings (as referenced in the Climate Action Plan 2023) must be addressed in a s.15(1) consistency analysis at the project level.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

  • Permission was inconsistent with s.15 because the project was not truly "powered from renewable energy" and CPPAs (as conditioned or as structured) did not adequately mitigate or render the project consistent with national climate instruments.
  • The Commission's recital that it "had regard to" the 2015 Act / CAP 2023 did not demonstrate the required consistency and the decision-maker failed to meet the statutory duty.
  • Macro-level instruments such as carbon budgets and sectoral emissions ceilings were not properly addressed at project level.

Respondent (the Commission)'s Arguments

  • The Applicants misread isolated phrases in the judgment out of context; the judgment as a whole and the Inspector's report show substantive engagement and that CPPAs were conditioned and considered.
  • Coolglass (Supreme Court) governs the evaluative spectrum available to decision-takers under s.15 and precludes automatic appellate intervention where settled law is applied to particular facts.
  • The Applicants failed to plead or argue many of the new points now advanced (additionality, time-matching, proximity) and cannot raise them first in a leave application.

Company A (Notice Party)'s Arguments

  • The project was conditioned so that CPPAs (as set out in the developer's submission) form part of the mitigation regime; the High Court correctly treated CPPAs as an offsetting measure.
  • The Applicants' recharacterisation of the case in the leave application is opportunistic; the pleaded case was that no CPPA was conditioned and that point was rejected on the facts.
  • The proposed appeal raises factual or mixed questions unsuited to leave and would cause further unjustified delay and prejudice to Company A.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Coolglass Wind Farm Ltd v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2026] IESC 5 That appellate intervention is limited; decision-takers have a margin of appreciation and an evaluative spectrum in applying s.15 climate duties. The Court held Coolglass to be dispositive: the Commission was entitled to consider CPPAs within the evaluative spectrum and this limited the Applicants' grounds for appeal.
Doyle v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2025] IEHC 158 Previous High Court Module I judgment dismissing certain grounds (including bat roost issue) as harmless error. Referred to as part of the procedural history confirming Module I dismissal.
Doyle v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 205 Costs argument at Module I (applicants sought reservation of costs). Noted as part of judgment history; the earlier request on costs was rejected.
Doyle v. An Coimisiún Pleanála (No. 3) [2026] IEHC 156 Module II dismissal of Applicants' substantive case. Recorded as part of the procedural history leading to the leave application.
O'Sullivan v. Health Service Executive [2023] IESC 11 Limits on draft-judgment engagement and not transforming draft circulation into a new phase of litigation. Quoted in relation to the court's draft-judgment procedure and the proper scope of parties' responses.
O'Sullivan v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75 On caution against treating draft procedures as full re-argument and on fairness standards. Used to justify restricting draft-judgment responses to specific, non-substantive corrections.
Attorney General v. Crosland (No. 2) [2021] UKSC 58 Why restriction on publication of draft judgments is in the interests of administration of justice. Referenced to support confidentiality directions regarding the draft judgment circulation.
Baigent v. Random House Group Ltd [2006] EWHC 1131 Authority illustrating concerns about draft-material confidentiality and usage. Referenced alongside other authorities on draft judgment confidentiality.
R. (Counsel General for Wales) v. Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2022] EWCA Civ 181 Authorities on draft judgments and related procedural safeguards. Referenced in the practice-direction discussion on draft judgment confidentiality.
Public Institution for Social Security v. Banque Pictet & Cie SA and others [2022] EWCA Civ 368 Authorities on confidentiality and circulation of drafts. Referenced for the same procedural point on drafts.
Itkin v. Wood [2023] JRC 101 Authority on draft judgments and procedure (Jersey). Referenced in support of draft-judgment confidentiality principles.
Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2024] IESC 28 Point must fall within pleadings for appeal; scope of pleading. Used to state that points not falling within pleadings generally are unsuitable for appeal.
Leech v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 106 Issues of pleading/misinterpretation are usually case-specific and not questions of public importance. Used to underline that misinterpretation or pleading issues typically do not justify leave to appeal.
Minister for Justice and Equality v. Andrzejczak (No. 2) [2018] IEHC 11 Question must actually arise on the facts and not be abstract. Quoted for the principle that leave questions must arise concretely on the facts.
GOCE Limited v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 43 New issues formulated for appeal are unsuitable where not argued below. Adopted to support the proposition that questions must have been argued at trial.
S.A. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 2) [2016] IEHC 646 Point should be determinative and make a difference to outcome; timeliness of leave applications. Used to show leave is inappropriate where the point would not change the result and must be timely.
Morehart v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 701 Similar principle that a point should make a difference to the outcome to justify appeal. Referenced to emphasise that mere interesting points are insufficient for leave.
Rooney v. Minister for Agriculture and Food [2016] IESC 1 Warning against focusing on isolated debatable rulings rather than the overall case. Quoted to caution against appellate tactics that ignore the broader case weaknesses.
Monkstown Road Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 9 Questions must accurately reflect the judgment and not be distortions for appeal. Used to reject exaggerated or distorted formulations of appeal questions.
Stapleton v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 178 Point must not invite appellate court into discursive or essayistic exercise; official status of appellant not dispositive. Used to reinforce that novel or official-appellant status does not automatically make a point suitable.
Cooper v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 96 Applicant's misunderstanding of legal position does not amount to public importance. Used to show that mere disagreement with conclusion is insufficient for leave.
B.S. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134 Application of law to facts is often a mixed question unsuitable for appeal. Referenced to support that application-of-law questions are generally inappropriate for certification.
Halpin v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 218 Mixed questions of law and fact are unsuitable for appeal. Used as authority that application of principles to facts is not a pure question of law.
Rushe v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 429 Similar point on mixed questions and finality. Referenced in relation to finality and suitability for appeal.
Stanley v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 671 Application-of-law-to-facts unsuitable for appellate leave. Used to reinforce the general rule about mixed questions.
Eco Advocacy CLG v. An Bord Pleanála, Keegan Land Holdings Limited, An Taisce - The National Trust for Ireland and Client Earth AISBL [2024] IESCDET 62 On the limits of appellate review and when appeals may be necessary to resolve doubt. Referenced in discussing when appeals are appropriate to resolve legal doubt.
Patrick McCaffrey & Sons Limited v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESCDET 145 Analogy on fact-specific points not raising wider public importance. Used to illustrate that fact-specific points will not usually warrant leave.
Nagle View Turbine Aware Group v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 3 Where law is not uncertain, public interest suggests no appeal is warranted. Adopted to argue that absence of legal uncertainty makes certification inappropriate.
Callaghan v. An Bord Pleanála [2015] IEHC 493 Novelty alone does not make a point suitable for appeal. Referenced to reject novelty as sufficient for leave.
Maguire T/A Frank Pratt & Sons (No. 2) [2023] IEHC 209 Disagreement with judgment does not equate to uncertainty in law. Used to support that mere disagreement is insufficient for certification.
Carrownagowan Concern Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 8 and [2025] IESCDET 9 Reference that CJEU reference requests do not rescue otherwise unsuitable appeal points. Used to show that asking for CJEU reference does not convert an unsuitable point into a suitable one.
R.A. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 830 Examples where solid cases for leave were granted; general guidance on when leave is granted. Quoted to note that strong leave applications are granted but superfluous certifications are discouraged.
B.W. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 833 Same contextual examples as above. Referred to illustrate when leave may be granted.
K.R.A. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 2) [2016] IEHC 421 Procedural examples of leave being granted in other contexts. Referenced among illustrative authorities on leave.
S.T.E. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2016] IEHC 544 Same as above. Used as example in the survey of authorities.
R.A. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal (No. 3) [2016] IEHC 671 Examples of leave practice. Included in the list of illustrative authorities.
B.S. (India) & Anor. v. Minister for Justice and Equality & Ors. (No. 3) [2020] IEHC 485 Examples of leave practice in immigration contexts. Included as part of illustrative authorities.
Dublin City Council v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2021] IEHC 34 Example of leave practice in planning cases. Listed among illustrative authorities.
Waltham Abbey Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 597 Example of leave practice. Listed among illustrative authorities.
Sweetman v. An Bord Pleanála (Sweetman XVII) (No. 2) [2021] IEHC 662 Example of leave practice. Listed among illustrative authorities.
Save Roscam Peninsula CLG v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2022] IEHC 328 Example of leave practice. Listed among illustrative authorities.
Joyce-Kemper v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 5) [2022] IEHC 349 Example of leave practice. Listed amongst illustrative authorities.
Kerins v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 5) [2023] IEHC 280 Example of leave practice. Referenced in the survey of authorities.
Coolglass Wind Farm Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 1 High Court decision earlier referenced concerning s.15 and climate evaluation. Listed as prior authority in the High Court jurisprudence and contextual background.
Heavey v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 311 (as cited) Illustrative planning leave jurisprudence. Included in the list of authorities relevant to leave practice.
Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank U.C. v. Murray & Anor [2026] IESC 30 Failure to raise points at the appropriate time is unhelpful; procedural obligation to flag errors in draft judgments. Applied to criticize Applicants for not raising alleged draft-judgment ambiguities in the draft-circulation process.
Ryanair v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 194 Illustration of opportunistic appellate tactics and their futility. Quoted by analogy to show how a trivial textual point would change nothing practically.
Fahy Beg Referenced in relation to treatment of CPPAs and offsets in prior jurisprudence. Used by the Court to show relevant prior line of authority considered in the judgment (as relied on in reasoning).
Friends of Killymooney Lough (No.2) On prejudice from further delay in planning litigation. Used by analogy to show prejudice to notice party from further delay.
Shamsa Doyle v. An Coimisiún Pleanála (No.2) [2026] IEHC 207 On prejudice and costs in planning judicial review context. Referenced as analogous authority on prejudice from delay.
Condon (No.2) [2026] IEHC 136 Refusal of leave where misunderstanding spreads confusion; public interest limb. Adopted to show that appeals based on misunderstanding are not in the public interest.
Hellfire Massy Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 38 Warning against spreading maximum confusion in appellate formulations. Quoted to criticise Applicants' tactic of decontextualising phrases to generate confusion.
The People (D.P.P.) v. Rattigan [2013] IECCA 13 Principle of delayed eloquence (raising better points after getting judgment). Used to caution against launching new points for the first time on appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the leave application against statutory and established criteria for certification: the point must properly arise, be a point of law, be of exceptional public importance, and an appeal must be in the public interest. The Court found that:

  • The Applicants repeatedly relied on isolated, preambular phrasing (e.g. "powered from renewables") read out of context. A holistic reading of the judgment, including the operative paragraphs and the Inspector's report, showed that CPPAs were treated as offsetting measures and were expressly considered.
  • The Applicants' pleaded case was fundamentally that no CPPA condition existed; that central point was rejected at trial and the Applicants did not challenge that factual conclusion in the correct form. Many arguments now advanced (additionality, time-matching, proximity, or that CPPAs could never satisfy s.15) were not pleaded or argued below and were raised for the first time in the certificate submissions.
  • Even if the preambular phrase were read literally, correcting that reading would not change the legal or factual outcome because Coolglass permits decision-takers to assess consistency on a net-emissions basis and to consider offsets such as CPPAs within an evaluative spectrum. Thus the alleged textual infelicity would not be determinative.
  • The Court emphasised procedural obligations: parties must use the draft-judgment process to flag material errors; the Applicants failed to do so and cannot rely on that omission to manufacture grounds for appeal.
  • On public-interest considerations the Court noted finality in planning law, the comprehensive scrutiny the project had already undergone, prejudice and irrecoverable delay to Company A, and that the Supreme Court's Coolglass judgment had recently settled the relevant legal framework, limiting the public interest in further appellate intervention.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application for leave to appeal is DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • The High Court's substantive orders dismissing the proceedings stand, including the operative recitals that conditions collectively require CPPAs as set out in the developer's response document.
  • The Court reaffirmed that Coolglass constrains appellate intervention: questions about application of settled planning/climate law to particular facts are primarily for trial courts and generally unsuitable for certification.
  • No order as to costs of the leave application, save that if a leapfrog to the Supreme Court is granted the costs of the leave application will be costs in that appeal; otherwise no order as to costs.
  • The decision emphasises procedural obligations in draft-judgment engagement and discourages raising unpleaded or post-judgment reconfigurations of the case on leave applications.