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Majera, R (on the application of v Secretary of State for the Home Department
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant, a Rwandan national who came to the United Kingdom as a child and obtained indefinite leave to remain, was convicted of serious offences in 2006 and became subject to a deportation order in November 2012. After serving his custodial term he was transferred to open conditions and, on 30 March 2015, the Parole Board directed his release on licence. Immediately upon release, however, the Secretary of State detained him under the Immigration Act 1971.
On 30 July 2015 the First-tier Tribunal granted the Appellant immigration bail. The bail order required him to report to his offender manager and expressly permitted unpaid voluntary work. Contrary to that order, an immigration officer issued a separate notice imposing (i) a prohibition on all work, paid or unpaid, and (ii) an 8 pm-7 am curfew.
The Appellant’s solicitors asserted that the Secretary of State had no power to modify bail conditions unilaterally and requested withdrawal of the added restrictions; the requests were refused on 3 December 2015 and 4 January 2016. The Appellant sought judicial review of those refusals. The Upper Tribunal quashed the Secretary of State’s decisions, holding that the bail order, although defective, remained binding until varied or set aside.
The Secretary of State appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, declaring the bail order a nullity because it failed to comply with statutory wording, and concluded that the Secretary of State’s restrictions were therefore lawful. The present appeal to the Supreme Court followed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a governmental authority (or any person) may lawfully act inconsistently with a court or tribunal order it considers defective without first having that order varied or set aside.
- Whether a defect in a First-tier Tribunal bail order rendered the order void ab initio, thereby freeing the Secretary of State to impose independent immigration restrictions.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- A court order—defective or not—must be obeyed unless and until it is varied or set aside; acting inconsistently is unlawful.
- The Secretary of State should have applied either to the First-tier Tribunal to vary the bail conditions or to the Upper Tribunal for judicial review, rather than impose fresh restrictions unilaterally.
Secretary of State's Arguments
- The bail order was void because it did not oblige the Appellant to appear before an immigration officer as required by paragraph 22(1A) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971.
- Being void, the bail order had no legal effect, allowing reliance on paragraph 2(5) of Schedule 3 to impose residence, employment and reporting restrictions.
- (Conceded) There was no statutory power to impose a curfew, following R (Gedi).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chuck v Cremer (1846) | Court orders must be obeyed until set aside, even if apparently null. | Formed the cornerstone of the Supreme Court’s ruling that the Secretary of State had to comply with the bail order. |
| Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P 285 | Unqualified obligation to obey court orders unless discharged. | Cited to reinforce the above principle. |
| Isaacs v Robertson [1985] AC 97 | Same principle applied by the Privy Council. | Used as additional authority on the binding force of court orders. |
| M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377 | Executive must comply with court orders; contempt possible. | Illustrated consequences for non-compliance by government. |
| Director of Public Prosecutions v T [2007] 1 WLR 209 | Distinction between challenging administrative measures and court orders. | Supported rejection of Secretary of State’s collateral challenge. |
| R v Lunn [2006] 1 WLR 2870 | Validity and certainty of court orders even where jurisdiction in doubt. | Quoted on need for certainty and finality. |
| Rochdale MBC v KW (No 2) [2016] 1 WLR 198 | Orders of any court are binding until set aside. | Affirmed the same rule. |
| R v Kirby [2019] 4 WLR 131 | Obligation to obey binding orders; respect for rule of law. | Used to underscore the constitutional imperative. |
| R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] AC 1787 | Court decisions bind the executive unless overruled or legislated away. | Cited as modern affirmation of rule-of-law rationale. |
| Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 | “No degrees of nullity” dictum. | Relied on by Court of Appeal, but distinguished by Supreme Court. |
| Hoffmann-La Roche v Secretary of State [1975] AC 295 | Effect of subordinate legislation before and after being declared ultra vires. | Supreme Court explained its limits and inapplicability to court orders. |
| Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143 | Collateral challenge to unlawful byelaws in criminal proceedings. | Distinguished because a bail order (court order) is different from subordinate legislation. |
| Smith v East Elloe RDC [1956] AC 736 | Unlawful administrative acts may produce legal effects until quashed. | Used to illustrate complexity of “voidness.” |
| Calvin v Carr [1980] AC 574 | Decisions treated as facts with legal consequences until set aside. | Supported nuanced view of invalid acts. |
| Percy v Hall [1997] QB 924 | Police acting under byelaws later declared invalid. | Cited for common-law techniques limiting retroactive invalidity. |
| Salvesen v Riddell [2013] UKSC 22 | Use of statutory powers to manage effects of invalid measures. | Referential; shows flexible remedies. |
| Mossell (Jamaica) Ltd v OUR [2010] UKPC 1 | Recognition that invalid acts can have interim legal consequences. | Quoted to reject absolute “voidness.” |
| New London College Ltd v Secretary of State [2013] UKSC 51 | “Voidness” is relative, not absolute. | Relied on for flexible approach. |
| London & Clydeside Estates v Aberdeen DC [1980] 1 WLR 182 | Caution against rigid “void/voidable” categories in administrative law. | Used to criticise Court of Appeal’s binary analysis. |
| Durayappah v Fernando [1967] 2 AC 337 | Standing may bar relief even if act unlawful. | Illustrated discretionary outcomes. |
| R v Soneji [2006] 1 AC 340 | Statutory context may override automatic nullity. | Example of purposive approach. |
| Johnson v Walton [1990] 1 FLR 350 | Binding effect of orders from courts of limited jurisdiction. | Supported application to First-tier Tribunal orders. |
| In re B (Court’s Jurisdiction) [2004] EWCA Civ 681 | Same principle as above. | Reinforced competence of limited-jurisdiction courts. |
| R v Central London County Court, Ex p London [1999] QB 1260 | Validity of detention based on court orders later alleged void. | Illustrated practical consequences of obedience rule. |
| R (H) v Ashworth Special Hospital Authority [2003] 1 WLR 127 | Professionals cannot override tribunal discharge orders until quashed. | Paralleled present facts. |
| R (Lunn) v Governor of Moorland Prison [2006] 1 WLR 2870 | Need for finality and certainty in court orders. | Cited by analogy. |
| Serious Organised Crime Agency v O Docherty [2013] CP Rep 35 | Orders binding despite jurisdictional doubts. | Referenced for completeness. |
| Quietlynn Ltd v Plymouth CC [1988] QB 114 | Collateral challenges not always permitted. | Contrasted with Boddington. |
| R v Wicks [1998] AC 92 | Limits on collateral challenges where other remedies exist. | Supports requirement to pursue proper procedural route. |
| Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91 | Historic authority for defending criminal prosecution by disputing byelaw validity. | Background to Boddington discussion. |
| R v Hull University Visitor, Ex p Page [1993] AC 682 | Ultra vires doctrine in judicial review. | Referenced in analysis of voidness. |
| Demer v Cook (1903) 88 LT 629 | Execution of warrants issued in excess of jurisdiction still binding on officers. | Quoted historically on execution of orders. |
| R (Gedi) v Secretary of State [2016] EWCA Civ 409 | No power to impose curfew under paragraph 2(5) Schedule 3. | Concession by Secretary of State. |
| Secretary of State v SM (Rwanda) [2019] Imm AR 714 | Court of Appeal decision treating bail order as void. | Decision reversed by Supreme Court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Judge Reed, delivering judgment for a unanimous Supreme Court panel, held that the Court of Appeal applied an incorrect analytical framework. While the Court of Appeal focused on administrative-law concepts of “nullity,” the Supreme Court emphasised that a bail order is a judicial order. Constitutional principles dictate that such orders are binding and must be obeyed unless and until varied or set aside by a competent court or altered by legislation.
The Court traced the historical line from Chuck v Cremer through Hadkinson, M v Home Office and modern authorities, confirming a “plain and unqualified obligation” to comply with court orders. Assertions that the order was defective—whether for non-compliance with paragraph 22(1A) or any other reason—did not give the executive licence to disregard it.
By contrasting authorities on subordinate legislation (Hoffmann-La Roche, Boddington) with those on judicial orders, the Court clarified that notions of “voidness” and collateral challenge do not override the constitutional hierarchy of courts. Even if the bail order were “null,” it carried legal force until formally set aside; the Secretary of State therefore acted ultra vires by imposing new conditions.
Procedurally, the Supreme Court criticised the Court of Appeal for entertaining a collateral attack on the bail order within the Secretary of State’s defence rather than requiring a separate, timely judicial-review claim subject to permission, timeliness and discretionary bars.
Holding and Implications
Appeal ALLOWED. The Secretary of State’s decisions of 3 December 2015 and 4 January 2016 remain quashed; the Appellant continues on the bail granted 30 July 2015.
Implications: The ruling re-affirms the constitutional principle that court and tribunal orders bind all parties—including the executive—until varied or set aside. It clarifies that administrative-law “voidness” doctrines do not justify unilateral executive non-compliance with judicial orders and underscores proper procedural routes for challenging allegedly defective orders. No new statutory interpretation was created, but the decision strengthens rule-of-law safeguards governing interactions between the judiciary and the executive.
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