Karumuri Venkata Nageswara Rao, v. Directorate of Enforcement, Hyderabad Zonal Office,

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alleging large-scale irregularities in the award and execution of liquor transportation contracts by APSBCL. It is alleged that the tender process was manipulated to favour certain entities, resulting in generation of proceeds of crime, which were subsequently layered and laundered through various companies and sub-contractors. The prosecution alleges that the petitioner, a former Minister for Civil Supplies, abused his political influence by facilitating the induction of M/s. Sree Sudarsana Constructions as a sub-contractor, participated in the diversion and utilization of proceeds of crime, and derived benefits through his family members and associated entities.

3. Heard Sri G.Ashok Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri D. Narender Naik, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Directorate of Enforcement.

4. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner has been falsely implicated due to his political background and relationship with his son, without there being any direct material connecting him with the alleged offence. He contended that the petitioner had no role in the award of the APSBCL transportation contracts or in the generation of the alleged proceeds of crime, and that no proceeds of crime have

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been traced to his account. It is further submitted that the allegations are primarily based on statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, which are unreliable and arise out of commercial disputes, and are not supported by independent evidence. He further submitted that the petitioner has cooperated with the investigation, custodial interrogation is unnecessary as the case is founded mainly on documentary evidence, and that the petitioner is aged, suffering from health ailments, has deep roots in society, is not a flight risk, and satisfies the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA. Therefore, he prayed for grant of pre-arrest bail.

5. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for the Directorate of Enforcement opposed the petition contending that the investigation has revealed the petitioner's active involvement in the money laundering conspiracy by abusing his political influence, facilitating the induction of dummy sub-contractors, arranging illegal profit-sharing, and knowingly assisted in the acquisition, concealment, use and utilization of the proceeds of crime. He submitted that the allegations are supported not only by statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA but also by bank records, financial transactions, documentary evidence,

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material collected during investigation and the money trail linking the petitioner and his family members with the proceeds of crime. He further submitted that the investigation is at a crucial stage, custodial interrogation of the petitioner is necessary to trace the complete money trail, identify other beneficiaries and confront him with the incriminating material collected during investigation. He also contended that the petitioner has failed to satisfy the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA and, therefore, the relief of anticipatory bail cannot be granted and prayed the Court to dismiss the Criminal Petition.

6. Having regard to the submissions made, the first contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that neither the Vigilance Report nor the remand report contains any specific allegation against the petitioner implicating him in the commission of the offence. It is contended that all the allegations are directed only against the petitioner's son and that no amount was transferred to the petitioner's account. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel submits that the Vigilance Report clearly indicates that the petitioner was instrumental in facilitating the transactions

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between M/s. Sigma Supply Chain Solutions Private Limited (SSCSPL) and M/s. Sree Sudarsana Constructions, the latter being a concern belonging to the petitioner's son. It is further contended that although no amount was directly credited to the petitioner's account, he managed the affairs relating to the contract, and therefore, the mere absence of direct financial transfers to his account does not entitle him to anticipatory bail.

7. Having considered the above submissions, it is evident that the alleged amounts were transferred to the accounts of the petitioner's son, daughter-in-law, and wife, and not to the petitioner himself. However, the Vigilance Report specifically states that the petitioner facilitated the entrustment of the sub- contract to SSCSPL and retained only 15% of the project while the remaining amount was released through bills. The remand report also alleges that the petitioner was the person behind in awarding of contract. Therefore, merely because no amount was directly transferred to the petitioner's account, it cannot be concluded, at this stage, that he is entitled to anticipatory bail.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the contract in question was merely a transportation contract and that the decision to award the contract had been taken in the year 2020 after enhancing the transportation

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charges from Rs.19/- in view of the demand made by the hamalis for increased labour charges. It is also submitted that the petitioner's name does not find mention in the Vigilance Report and that he was not the Minister in charge of the concerned department or any other department at the relevant point of time, but was only an MLA. Therefore, according to the petitioner, none of the allegations can be attributed to him and he has been falsely implicated. In support of his contentions he relied on the order of this Court in Criminal Petition No.11123 of 2025 and the judgment in Prem Prakash V Union of India¹

wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :

"11. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1] , this Court categorically held that while Section 45 PMLA restricts the right of the accused to grant of bail, it could not be said that the conditions provided under Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail. Para 302 is extracted hereinbelow :

(SCC p. 259)

"302. It is important to note that the twin conditions provided under Section 45 of the 2002 Act, though restrict the right of the accused to grant of bail, but it cannot be said that the conditions provided under Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail. The discretion vests in the court, which is not arbitrary or irrational but judicial, guided by the principles of law as provided under Section 45 of the 2002 Act."

These observations are significant and if read in the context of the recent pronouncement of this Court dated

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9-8-2024 in Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate [Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 12 SCC 660 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1920] , it will be amply clear that even under PMLA the governing principle is that "Bail is the Rule and Jail is the Exception". In para 52 of Manish Sisodia [Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 12 SCC 660 :

2024 SCC OnLine SC 1920] , this Court observed as under:

"52. … From our experience, we can say that it appears that the trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail. The principle that bail is a rule and refusal is an exception is, at times, followed in breach. On account of non-grant of bail even in straightforward open-and-shut cases, this Court is flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding to the huge pendency. It is high time that the trial courts and the High Courts should recognise the principle that "bail is rule and jail is exception."

16. Coming back to the scope of inquiry under Section 45, Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1], while reiterating and agreeing with the holding in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of

Maharashtra [Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1057] , held that the court while dealing with the application for grant of bail in PMLA need not delve deep into the merits of the case and only a view of the court based on the available material available on record is required. It held that the court is only required to place its view based on probability on the basis of reasonable material collected during investigation. The words used in Section 45 are "reasonable grounds for believing"

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which means that the court has to see only if there is a genuine case against the accused and the prosecution is not required to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

17. We deem it fit to extract the relevant portion (paras 302-303) from Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1]:

(SCC pp. 259-60)

"302. It is important to note that the twin conditions provided under Section 45 of the 2002 Act, though restrict the right of the accused to grant of bail, but it cannot be said that the conditions provided under Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of bail. The discretion vests in the court which is not arbitrary or irrational but judicial, guided by the principles of law as provided under Section 45 of the 2002 Act. While dealing with a similar provision prescribing twin conditions in MCOCA, this court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma [Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1057] , held as under : (SCC pp. 318-19, paras 44-46)

'44. The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion, does not lead to the conclusion that the court must arrive at a positive finding that the applicant for bail has not committed an offence under the Act. If such a construction is placed, the court intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding that the applicant has not committed such an offence. In such an event, it will be impossible for the prosecution to obtain a judgment of conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be the intention of the legislature. Section 21(4) of the MCOCA, therefore, must be construed reasonably. It must be so construed that the court is able to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before

commencement of trial. Similarly, the court will be required to record a finding as to the possibility of his committing a crime after

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grant of bail. However, such an offence in futuro must be an offence under the Act and not any other offence. Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of an accused, the court must necessarily consider this aspect of the matter having regard to the antecedents of the accused, his propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence.

45. It is, furthermore, trite that for the purpose of considering an application for grant of bail, although detailed reasons are not necessary to be assigned, the order granting bail must demonstrate application of mind at least in serious cases as to why the applicant has been granted or denied the privilege of bail.

46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. However, while dealing with a special statute like MCOCA having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the court may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials collected against the accused during the investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction. The findings recorded by the court while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced thereby."

303. We are in agreement with the observation made by the Court inRanjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma [Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1057] . The Court while dealing with the application for grant of bail need not delve deep into the merits of the case and only a view of the court based on available material on record is required. The court will not weigh the evidence to find the guilt of the accused which is, of course, the work of trial court. The

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court is only required to place its view based on probability on the basis of reasonable material collected during investigation and the said view will not be taken into consideration by the trial court in recording its finding of the guilt or acquittal during trial which is based on the evidence adduced during the trial. As explained by this Court inNimmagadda Prasad [Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 466 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 575] , the words used in Section 45 of the 2002 Act are

"reasonable grounds for believing" which means the court has to see only if there is a genuine case against the accused and the prosecution is not required to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt."

(emphasis supplied)

9. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel submits that there were several irregularities in the tender process and that, although the petitioner was not the Minister concerned, the sub-contract was awarded to his son's concern, thereby indicating his involvement. It is further contended that no transportation work was actually carried out by the petitioner's son's concern and that the amounts received constitute proceeds of crime generated through fake invoices without execution of any work. Since the investigation is still at a preliminary stage, a detailed probe is required. In support of his contentions, he relied on the order of this Court in Crl.P.No.13817 of 2024, and judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court

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in Serious Fraud Investigation Office V Aditya Sarda², wherein it was held as under :

18. Now, so far as anticipatory bail is concerned, this court has consistently emphasized that anticipatory bail should not be granted as a matter of routine, particularly in serious economic offences, involving large scale fraud, public money or complex financial crimes. In P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement [(2019) 9 SCC 24; (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 509; 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143.] , it was observed as under [ See page 57 of (2019) 9

SCC.] :

"Grant of anticipatory bail in exceptional cases

69. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but several other purposes. Power under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an extraordinary power and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of the pre-arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; possibility of the applicant fleeing justice and other factors to decide whether it is a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail…

71. Article 21 of the Constitution of India states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure prescribed by law. However, the power conferred by article 21 of the Constitution of India is not unfettered and is qualified by the later part of the article, i.e., '… except according to a procedure prescribed by law'. In State of M.P. v. Ram Kishna Balothia [(1995) 3 SCC 221; 1995 SCC (Cri) 439.] , the

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Supreme Court held that the right of anticipatory bail is not a part of article 21 of the Constitution of India and held as under : (SCC page 226, paragraph 7) '7.… We find it difficult to accept the

contention that section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an integral part of article

21. In the first place, there was no provision similar to section 438 in the old Criminal Procedure Code. The Law Commission in its 41st report recommended introduction of a provision for grant of anticipatory bail. It observed:

"We agree that this would be a useful advantage. Though we must add that it is in very exceptional cases that such power should be exercised."'

In the light of this recommendation, section 438 was incorporated, for the first time, in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Looking to the cautious recommendation of the Law Commission, the power to grant anticipatory bail is conferred only on a court of session or the High Court. Also, anticipatory bail cannot be granted as a matter of right. It is essentially a statutory right conferred long after the coming into force of the Constitution. It cannot be considered as an essential ingredient of article 21 of the Constitution. And its non-application to a certain special category of offences cannot be considered as violative of article 21.

(emphasis supplied)

72. We are conscious of the fact that the legislative intent behind the introduction of section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to safeguard the individual's personal liberty and to protect him from the possibility of being humiliated and from being subjected to unnecessary police custody. However, the court must also keep in view

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that a criminal offence is not just an offence against an individual, rather the larger societal interest is at stake. Therefore, a delicate balance is required to be established between the two rights—safeguarding the personal liberty of an individual and the societal interest. It cannot be said that refusal to grant anticipatory bail would amount to denial of the rights conferred upon the appellant under article 21 of the Constitution of India…

77. After referring to Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra [(2011) 1 SCC 694; (2011)

1 SCC (Cri) 514; 2010 SCC OnLine SC 1375.] and other judgments and observing that anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances, in Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar [(2012) 4 SCC 379; (2012)

2 SCC (Cri) 468; 2012 SCC OnLine SC 259.] , the Supreme Court held as under : (SCC page 386, paragraph 19) '19. Parameters for grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence are required to be satisfied and further while granting such relief, the court must record the reasons therefor. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has falsely been enroped in the crime and would not misuse his liberty. (See D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T. Manokaran [(2007) 4 SCC 434; (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 345; 2007 SCC OnLine SC 274.] , State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S. Husain [(2008) 1 SCC 213; (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 176; 2007 SCC OnLine SC 1235.] and Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal [(2008) 13 SCC 305; (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 1; 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1500.] .' Economic offences

78. Power under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being an extraordinary remedy, has to be exercised sparingly; more so, in cases of economic offences. Economic offences stand as a different class as they affect the economic fabric of the society. In Directorate Of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain . [(1998) 2 SCC 105; 1998 SCC (Cri) 510; 1998 SCC

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OnLine SC 30.] , it was held that in economic offences, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail."

19. In Y.S Jagan Mohan Reddy v. Central Bureau Of Investigation . of Investigation [(2013) 7 SCC 439; (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 552; 2013 SCC OnLine SC 452.] , it was observed as under [ See page 449 of (2013) 7 SCC.] :

"34. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offences having deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country.

35. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations."

20. In Nimmagadda Prasad v. Central Bureau Of Investigation . of Investigation [(2013) 7 SCC 466; (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 575; 2013 SCC OnLine SC 454.] , it was observed as under [ See page 474 of (2013) 7 SCC.] :

"23. Unfortunately, in the last few years, the country has been seeing an alarming rise in white-collar crimes, which has affected the fibre of the country's economic structure. Incontrovertibly, economic offences have serious repercussions on the development of the country as a whole. In State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal [(1987) 2 SCC 364; 1987 SCC (Cri) 364; 1987 SCC OnLine SC 170.] this court, while considering a request of the prosecution for adducing additional evidence, inter alia, observed as under : (SCC page 371, paragraph 5)

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'5.… The entire community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book. Amurder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community. A disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to administer justice in an even-handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white-collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the national economy and national interest.'"

21. Recently in Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar [2024 SCC OnLine SC 282.] , a very pertinent observations have been made with regard to the powers of the court to grant anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has been observed that:

"9. It is thus obvious from the catena of decisions dealing with bail that even while clarifying that arrest should be the last option and it should be restricted to cases where arrest is imperative in the facts and circumstances of a case, the consistent view is that the grant of anticipatory bail shall be restricted to exceptional circumstances. In other words, the position is that the power to grant anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an exceptional power and should be exercised only in exceptional cases and not as a matter of course. Its object is to ensure that a person should not be harassed or humiliated in order to satisfy the grudge or personal vendetta of the complainant. (See the decision of this court in HDFC Bank Ltd. v. J.J. Mannan alias J.M. John Paul [(2010) 1 SCC 679; (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 879; 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1922.] .

10. When a court grants anticipatory bail what it actually does is only to make an order that

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in the event of arrest, the arrestee shall be released on bail, subject to the terms and conditions. Taking note of the fact the said power is to be exercised in exceptional circumstances and that it may cause some hindrance to the normal flow of investigation method when called upon to exercise the power under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, courts must keep reminded of the position that law aides only the abiding and certainly not its resistant. By saying so, we mean that a person, having subjected to investigation on a serious offence and upon making out a case, is included in a charge sheet or even after filing of a refer report, later, in accordance with law, the court issues a summons to a person, he is bound to submit himself to the authority of law. It only means that though he will still be at liberty, rather, in his right, to take recourse to the legal remedies available only in accordance with law, but not in its defiance. We will dilate this discussion with reference to the factual matrix of this case. However, we think that before dealing with the same, a small deviation to have a glance at the scope and application of the provisions under section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not be inappropriate…

25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion by the court depending on the facts and

circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the court concerned has to be very cautious as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the court shall not pass an interim protection pending consideration of such application as the section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest and we say that such orders shall be passed in

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eminently fit cases. At any rate, when warrant of arrest or proclamation is issued, the applicant is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary power. Certainly, this will not deprive the power of the court to grant pre- arrest bail in extreme, exceptional cases in the interest of justice. But then, person(s) continuously, defying orders and keep absconding is not entitled to such grant."

10. Learned Standing counsel also relied on the judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in P.Chidambaram Vs Directorate of Enforcement³and Amanatullah Khan V Directorate of Enforcement⁴, wherein it was held as under :

27. In cases under PMLA, which are economic offences in nature, the following crucial observations of Hon'ble Apex Court in P. Chidambaram (supra) in respect of grant or refusal of anticipatory bails are relevant to be considered:

"78. Power under Section 438 Cr. P.C. being an extraordinary remedy, has to be exercised sparingly; more so, in cases of economic offences. Economic offences stand as a different class as they affect the economic fabric of the society. In Directorate Of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain ., (1998) 2 SCC 105, it was held that in economic offences, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail. ***

83. Grant of anticipatory bail at the stage of investigation may frustrate the investigating agency in interrogating the accused and in collecting the useful information and also the materials which might have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the accused knows that he is protected by the order of the court. Grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in economic offences would definitely hamper the effective investigation. Having regard to the materials

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said to have been collected by the respondent- Enforcement Directorate and considering the stage of the investigation, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail.

84. In a case of money-laundering where it involves many stages of "placement", "layering i.e. funds moved to other institutions to conceal origin" and "interrogation i.e. funds used to acquire various assets", it requires systematic and analysed investigation which would be of great advantage. As held in Anil Sharma, success in such interrogation would elude if the accused knows that he is protected by a pre-arrest bail order. Section 438 Cr. P.C. is to be invoked only in exceptional cases where the case alleged is frivolous or groundless…"

30. In the case of Rohit Tandon v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2018) 11 SCC 46, three-judge bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that such statements are admissible in nature and can make out a formidable case about involvement of accused in the offence of money laundering. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court are as under:

"31. …The prosecution is relying on statements of 26 witnesses/accused already recorded, out of which 7 were considered by the Delhi High Court. These statements are admissible in evidence, in view of Section 50 of the Act of 2002. The same makes out a formidable case about the involvement of the appellant in commission of a serious offence of money laundering. It is, therefore, not possible for us to record satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the appellant is not guilty of such offence…"

(Emphasis supplied)

31. Furthermore, the challenge to Section 50 of PMLA was rejected by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), wherein it was held that the statements recorded under Section 50 of PMLA cannot be compared to statements under Section 67 of NDPS Act, and that such statements were not in violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.

74. This Court cannot allow a new jurisprudence or different sets of rules to prevail regarding investigation qua 'classes' & 'masses' by each time permitting an excuse or request that being a public figure, being an

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MLA, Chairman of the Waqf Board and being busy with some activities of his constituency, he could not appear before the investigating agency."

11. Further, there is no dispute on the question of maintainability of the present application, if petitioner is entitled for the same, whereas this Court is required to examine whether the petitioner has made out a case for grant of anticipatory bail. The allegation against the petitioner is that he was instrumental in facilitating and orchestrating the award of the sub-contract by SSCSPL to the company belonging to his son. At this stage, the Court is not expected to undertake a detailed examination of the evidence or record findings on the truthfulness of the allegations. The learned counsel has also contended that the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA are required to be satisfied even while considering an application for anticipatory bail and that there is no absolute bar against granting anticipatory bail in cases arising under the said Act. Likewise, the satisfaction of the twin conditions stipulated under Section 45 of the PMLA cannot be arrived at in favour of the petitioner at this stage of investigation. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has not made out a case for grant of anticipatory bail.

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12. Further, the allegations against the petitioner are that, despite not being the Minister of the concerned department, he played a key role in securing the sub-contract for his son's concern through SSCSPL without any actual execution of work. These allegations require thorough investigation. At this stage, it cannot be said that the petitioner has been implicated without any material. The other contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is suffering from serious cardiac problem and was admitted to the hospital on 29.06.2026, where he is presently undergoing treatment as such, he is entitled to anticipatory bail on medical grounds. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel has opposed the said contention, contending that there is no medical emergency warranting the grant of anticipatory bail. It is pointed out that the medical records disclose that the Troponin test was normal and do not indicate any condition necessitating such relief.

13. Having considered the rival submissions on this aspect, this Court finds that although the petitioner was admitted to the hospital on 29.06.2026, the only medical record placed before the Court is the report dated 29.06.2026. No subsequent medical records have been produced to demonstrate the petitioner's present condition, whether he continues to remain

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hospitalized, whether he has been discharged, or whether any surgical intervention or other urgent medical procedure has been advised. In the absence of any material establishing a medical emergency or serious health condition requiring immediate protection from arrest, this Court is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner on medical grounds also, as such, the same is liable to be dismissed.

14. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.

_______________

K. SUJANA, J

Date : 03.07.2026 Rds

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THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA CRIMINAL PETITION No.9676 OF 2026

DATE :03.07.2026

Rds