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R. Sukumar & Others v. The State of Tamil N...
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The matter concerns a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging an administrative order (G.O.Ms.No.81, Tamil Nadu Development and Religious Endowment and Information Department, dated 15.03.2010) by the first respondent which confirmed the appointment of an Executive Officer in respect of Thirusoolanathasamy Temple, Thirusoolam, Chennai. The appointment had earlier been made by the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Chennai (the second respondent) in Na.Ka.No.12204/2006/L.5 dated 07.06.2008 pursuant to proceedings initiated under Section 45(1) of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act.
The petitioners are trustees who claim to manage the temple under a scheme (dated 12.05.1982) framed under Section 45(1) and identify themselves as representatives of the community in O.A.No.41 of 1979 before the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Chennai. After objections were heard, an Executive Officer was appointed; the petitioners filed a revision under Section 114 of the Act which was dismissed by the first respondent, prompting this writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appointment of an Executive Officer under Section 45(1) of the H.R. & C.E. Act was legally sustainable in the facts of this case.
- Whether the temple is a "denomination" temple such that it attracts protection under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, and if so, whether that protection prevents appointment of an Executive Officer under Section 45(1).
- Whether obtaining a management scheme under Section 64(1) (and having a scheme framed under Section 45(1)) amounts to a declaration that a temple is a denomination temple.
- Whether the first respondent properly considered the objections and grounds raised in the revision/appeal before confirming the appointment.
- Whether the objector (the 5th respondent) had locus standi and whether additional allegations raised for the first time in the writ petition can be considered by the first respondent on remand.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. W.C. Thiruvengadam, Senior Counsel)
- The temple is not only a community temple but also a denomination temple; therefore it is entitled to protection under Article 26 of the Constitution of India.
- Because it is a denominational institution, Section 107 (as invoked by counsel) and the protections of Article 26 should operate to prevent appointment of an Executive Officer without considering those protections.
- Even if irregularities exist, alternative remedies (such as removing trustees or other proceedings) should be adopted instead of appointing an Executive Officer, in order to respect Article 26 protections.
- Reliance on authorities: (1999) 7 SCC 666 (SRI KANYAKA PARAMESWARI ANNA SATRAM COMMITTEE v. COMMISSIONER, H.R. & C.E. DEPTT.) and 1995-2-L.W.213 (K. EKAMBARAM AND ANOTHER v. COMMISSIONER, HR&CE) to support the contention that Article 26 protections apply.
- The 5th respondent (objector) lacks locus to object and the impugned orders based on such objections cannot be sustained.
5th Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. M. Sundar)
- Obtaining a scheme under Section 64(1) (or framing a scheme under Section 45(1)) does not automatically declare the temple to be a denomination temple.
- To declare a temple as a denomination temple, the three-fold test from S.P. Mittal (1983 (1) ACC 51) must be satisfied: (1) common faith/beliefs; (2) a common organisation; and (3) designation by a distinctive name. The respondents found those tests were not complied with.
- Section 45(1) confers wide powers on the 2nd respondent to act for mismanagement irrespective of whether the temple is a denomination temple or a community temple.
- The petitioners admitted material allegations; sale deeds executed purportedly in the name of the temple without authority and without permission under Section 34 indicate management not in accordance with law, justifying the appointment of an Executive Officer.
Respondents 1–4 / State (as advanced by Mr. T. Chandrasekaran, Special Government Pleader)
- The scheme framed under Section 45(1) is expressly subject to the provisions of the H.R. & C.E. Act; obtaining a scheme under Section 64 does not amount to a judicial declaration of denominational status.
- Only a competent civil court can declare that a temple is a denomination temple; administrative steps to frame or obtain schemes do not have that declaratory effect. Therefore the writ petition should be dismissed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| (1983) 1 ACC 51 — S.P. MITTAL & OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS | The three-fold test to determine whether an institution qualifies as a "religious denomination": (1) collection of individuals with a common system of beliefs or doctrines (common faith); (2) a common organisation; and (3) designation by a distinctive name. | The court applied this test to hold that merely having a management scheme does not establish denominational status; until a competent civil court grants a decree declaring denomination, Article 26 protection does not apply. |
| (1999) 7 SCC 666 — SRI KANYAKA PARAMESWARI ANNA SATRAM COMMITTEE v. COMMISSIONER, H.R. & C.E. DEPTT. | Authority cited by petitioners to argue for application of Article 26 protections when an institution is denominational; in that case the Apex Court remanded matters relating to an institution declared denominational. | The court held this precedent inapplicable because that case involved an institution already declared denominational and remitted to the institution; the present case does not involve such a prior declaratory finding. |
| 1995-2-L.W.213 — K. EKAMBARAM AND ANOTHER v. COMMISSIONER, HR&CE OF ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT ETC | Authority relied upon by petitioners; addressed the applicability of Article 26 to community temples (left the issue open by the Division Bench). | The court found this authority not directly applicable because the Division Bench had left the issue open; it did not establish that Article 26 blocked administrative action under Section 45(1) in a community temple situation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, applying statute and precedent to the facts stated in the record:
- Characterisation of the Scheme and its Effect: The court noted the scheme dated 12.05.1982 was for management of the temple and expressly subject to the provisions of the H.R. & C.E. Act. It rejected the proposition that having a scheme under Section 64(1) or a scheme framed under Section 45(1) automatically converts the temple into a denomination temple with constitutional protections under Article 26.
-
Requirement of a Declaratory Finding: Relying on the S.P. Mittal formulation, the court emphasized that the denomination question requires satisfaction of the three tests. The court held that a declaration that a temple is a denomination temple must be obtained from a competent civil court; the court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot, in the absence of such a civil decree, declare denominational status.
The three tests (quoted by the court) were reproduced as:
"The term religious denomination must satisfy the following three conditions:- (1) it must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conclusive to their spiritual well being, i.e. a common faith; (2) a common organisation; and (3) designation by a distinctive name."
- Applicability of Authorities Relied On by Petitioners: The court analyzed the precedents relied upon and found them inapplicable. The Apex Court decision cited by petitioners (SRI KANYAKA PARAMESWARI) concerned an institution already declared denominational and was remanded; the Ekambaram decision left open the question of Article 26's applicability to a community temple. Therefore neither authority supported the immediate grant of Article 26 protections here.
- Scope of Section 45(1): The court accepted respondents' contention that Section 45(1) confers wide power to address mismanagement or irregularities by trustees, and that such power can be exercised irrespective of whether a temple is a community or denominational temple. The court nevertheless recognized that where a temple is denominational, authorities must consider Article 26 protections in the specific context—though that factual situation was not established here.
- Procedural Deficiency in the First Respondent's Order: The court found a material procedural defect: the first respondent's order merely referred to "some objections from the general public" without examining the nature or truth of those objections or addressing the grounds of appeal raised by the petitioners. Further, serious allegations relied upon by the 5th respondent were raised for the first time in the writ petition and had not been considered by the authorities below; the petitioners had not been put on notice regarding these allegations.
- Remedy Directed: Because of the failure to adjudicate the factual and procedural aspects properly, the court set aside the first respondent's order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration on the merits. The court authorized the 5th respondent to raise additional allegations before the first respondent, but required those allegations and supporting documents to be served on the petitioners so that the petitioners may meet them.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court set aside the impugned order passed by the first respondent and remanded the matter for fresh consideration on merits. The first respondent was directed to decide the appeal and the objections after permitting the 5th respondent to raise additional objections and to supply copies of those objections and documents to the petitioners.
Specific directions and immediate consequences:
- The 5th respondent is permitted to raise additional objections before the first respondent within three weeks from receipt of a copy of the court's order, and must furnish copies of those objections and documents to the petitioners.
- The first respondent is directed to decide the appeal and objections (including the petitioners' grounds and the additional allegations) within two months from receipt of a copy of this order.
- The petitioners retain the procedural option to approach a competent civil court to obtain a declaratory decree that the temple is a denomination temple; until such a decree is obtained, Article 26 protections will not be treated as applicable by this court.
- The writ petition is disposed of accordingly; no costs were awarded and connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
Implications for precedent and broader law: The court expressly did not treat the matter as establishing a new rule that converts administrative schemes into declarations of denominational status. It emphasized that denominational status requires a civil court's declaratory determination under the tests in S.P. Mittal. The decision therefore remands for fact‑specific administrative reconsideration rather than creating a novel legal doctrine.
(PRAYER: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issuance of writ of certiorari, calling for the records relating to the impugned order passed by the first respondent herein issued in G.O.Ms.No.81, Tamil Nadu Development and Religious Endowment and Information Department, dated 15.03.2010 confirming the order of appointment of Executive Officer in the aforesaid temple by the learned Commissioner, H.R.&C.E. Chennai issued in Na.Ka.No.12204/2006/L.5 dated 07.06.2008 and to quash the same as illegal.) 1. Even though, the interim petitions are listed before me, by consent, this writ petition is taken up for final hearing. 2. The writ petition has been filed challenging the order passed by the first respondent who has confirmed the order of the 2nd respondent in appointing an Executive Officer at Thirusoolanathasamy Temple, Thirusoolam, Chennai. The writ petitioners claim to be the trustees represented by the Community in O.A.No.41 of 1979 by the Deputy Commissioner, H.R.&C.E. Chennai – 600 034. In pursuant to the said scheme, the petitioners are managing the temple. 3. It is the case of the petitioners that the temple is not only a community temple but also a denomination temple. In pursuant to the complaints made proceedings have been initiated under Section 45(1) of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (hereinafter referred as 'Act') by the 2nd respondent seeking to appoint an Executive Officer. After hearing the objections an Executive Officer was appointed and challenging the same, a revision was filed under Section 114 of the Act before the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent has dismissed the revision filed by the petitioners and hence the present writ petition has been filed. 4. Mr.W.C.Thiruvengadam, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the temple in question is not only a community temple but also a denomination temple. The learned senior counsel further submitted that in as much as the temple is a denomination temple, in accordance with Section 107 of the Act the protection under Article 26 of the Constitution of India will have to be given and therefore without considering the same, the impugned orders having been passed are liable to be set aside. The learned senior counsel also submitted that even assuming that there are any irregularities, the respondents can adopt other methods such as removing the trustees or by inducting other proceedings instead of appointing an executive officer which will be contrary to the protection given under Article 26 of the Constitution of the India. 5. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1999) 7 SCC 666 [SRI KANYAKA PARAMESWARI ANNA SATRAM COMMITTEE v, COMMISSIONER, HINDU RELIGIOUS & CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS DEPTT.] and the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court reported in 1995-2-L.W.213 [K.EKAMBARAM AND ANOTHER v. COMMISSIONER, HR&CE OF ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT ETC] and submitted that in view of the protection available under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, the orders impugned will have to be set aside. The learned senior counsel also submitted that the objector namely 5th respondent has no locus-standi to give the objections and therefore the impugned orders passed by the respondents 1 and 2 based upon the said objections for a community temple cannot be sustained. 6. Per contra, Mr.M.Sundar, learned counsel appearing for the 5th respondent submitted that merely obtaining a scheme under Section 64(1) of the Act would not automatically amount to getting a declaration that the temple is a denomination temple. The learned counsel submitted that in order to declare a temple as denomination temple, the three tests as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in 1983 (1) ACC 51 [S.P.MITTAL & OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS] will have to be followed. The learned counsel further submitted that a factual finding has been given by the respondents 1 and 2 that the said tests have not been complied with and therefore the temple in question is not a denomination temple. The learned counsel further submitted that Section 45(1) of the Act gives a wider power to the 2nd respondent to take action irrespective of the fact whether a temple is a denomination temple or otherwise. 7. According to the learned counsel appearing for the 5th respondent, the allegations have been admitted by the petitioners. Therefore the orders impugned are perfectly justified. The learned counsel also placed reliance upon certain sale deeds said to have been executed by the petitions in the name of the temple. The learned counsel submitted that the said sale deeds having been executed without authority of law and without getting the permission under Section 34 of the H.R.&C.E. Act would indicate that the management of the temple has not been done in the manner known to law. Hence, the learned counsel submitted that the orders impugned will have to be sustained. 8. Mr.T.Chandrasekaran, learned Special Government Pleader based upon the counter affidavit submitted that even a perusal of the scheme framed under Section 45(1) of the Act would clearly show that it is subject to the provisions of the Act. The learned Special Government Pleader further submitted that in any case obtaining a scheme by the exercise of power under Section 64 would not amount to a declaration that the temple is a denomination temple which can only be done be a competent civil court. Hence he prayed that the writ petition will have to be dismissed. 9. Heard Mr.W.C.Thiruvengadam, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.T.Chandrasekaran, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents 1 to 4 as well as Mr. Mr.M.Sundar, learned counsel appearing for the 5th respondent. 10. Admittedly the scheme framed under Section 45(1) of the Act dated 12.05.1982 is for the management of the temple. A perusal of the said scheme would also indicate that it is subject to the provisions of the H.R.&C.E. Act. Merely by getting a scheme framed under Section 64(1) of the Act, it cannot be contended that the temple is a denomination temple. In order to declare that a temple is a denomination temple the test laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in 1983 (1) ACC 51 [S.P.MITTAL & OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS] will have to be set aside. In the said judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the following tests, which are extracted hereunder: "The term religious denomination must satisfy the following three conditions:- (1) it must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conclusive to their spiritual well being, i.e. a common faith; (2) a common organisation; and (3) designation by a distinctive name." 11. Therefore until and unless the petitioners approaches the competent Civil Court and get the decree declaring that the temple is the denomination temple, this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot give a declaration that the temple is a denomination temple. Hence it is open to the petitioners to approach the Civil Court and get a declaration that the temple is a denomination temple. Till the petitioners approaches the Civil Court and get a declaration it cannot be said that the protection under Article 26 of the Constitution of India would be applicable to the petitioners. 12. The judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners in (1999) 7 SCC 666 [SRI KANYAKA PARAMESWARI ANNA SATRAM COMMITTEE v, COMMISSIONER, HINDU RELIGIOUS & CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS DEPTT.] and the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court reported in 1995-2-L.W.213 [K.EKAMBARAM AND ANOTHER v. COMMISSIONER, HR&CE OF ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT ETC] are not applicable to the present case on hand. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the above referred judgment has remanded the matter to the institution which has been declared as a denominational one which is not the case before us. Similarly in 1995-2-L.W.213 [K.EKAMBARAM AND ANOTHER v. COMMISSIONER, HR&CE OF ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT ETC] the Division Bench has left the issue open regarding the applicability of Article 26 of the Constitution of India to a community temple. 13. As contended by Mr.M.Sundar, learned counsel for the 5th respondent the power under Section 45(1) of the Act is wider enough to cover any mismanagement or irregularities committed by the trustees in-charge. Therefore it cannot be contended that in view of the protection of Article 26 of the Constitution of India in any given situation an executive officer cannot be appointed. It is no doubt true that in a denominational institution the authorities will have to consider the protection available under Section 26 of the Constitution of India Act vis-a-vis the provisions contained under Section 45(1) of the Act. Since the said situation has not arisen in the present case, this Court is of the opinion that the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that the temple being a denomination institution the protection under Article 26 of the Constitution of India will have to be considered. 14. There is a difference between a community temple and a denomination temple. As observed earlier for a community temple to become a denomination temple the tests laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court will have to be satisfied. Therefore the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that the temple in question being a community temple it should be considered as denomination temple, therefore the protection under Article 26 of the Constitution of the India will have to be given cannot be countenanced. Further the power under Section 45(1) of the Act can be exercised irrespective of the fact that a temple is a denomination or community temple. 15. However, a perusal of the orders impugned passed by the first respondent would show that the objections and the grounds raised in the appeal have not been considered properly. The 1st respondent has merely stated that there were some objections from the general public. The said order has been passed without considering the nature of objections and whether they are true or not. Apart from that the allegations raised in the writ petitions for the first time by the learned counsel for the 5th respondent Mr.M.Sundar even though they have not been raised before the authorities below are quite serious in nature. However this Court can go into the said allegations since they have not raised before the authorities and the petitioners have not been put on notice regarding the same. 16. Hence taking into consideration of the above said facts, this Court is of the opinion that the orders passed by the 1st respondent will have to be set aside and the 1st respondent will have to be directed to go into the merits of the case including the grounds of appeal raised by the petitioners in so far as the factual aspects are concerned as well as the allegations made for the first time in the writ petition by the 5th respondent. While considering the said issue, the permission is given to the 5th respondent to raise the said allegations before the 1st respondent and the 1st respondent will have to furnish the allegations raised as well as the documents relied upon by the 5th respondent to the writ petitioners before proceeding to decide the same. 17. The 1st respondent is directed to decide the appeal as well as the objections to be raised by the 5th respondent, within a period of two months, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and the 5th respondent is permitted to raise all the additional objections before the 1st respondent, within a period of three weeks, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and the copies of the said objections and the documents will have to be furnished before deciding the appeal on merits. The question of the petitioners right to manage the temple as one belong to the community can also be agitated before the first respondent. 18. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
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