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Director Of Public Instructions Of W.B & Ors. v. Dr. Ashish Pal & Ors.
Judgment Summary — Appeal against judgment dated 21 March 1997 in C.O No. 526(W)/96
Factual and Procedural Background
The writ petitioner (first respondent) was appointed as a part-time lecturer in Plant Protection at Netaji Mahavidyalaya, Hooghly, and allegedly worked since 1987 at a monthly remuneration of Rs. 1,000/-. Initially the University Grants Commission (UGC) sanctioned his pay; after four years the UGC stopped undertaking the financial liability in terms of its scheme.
The petitioner filed an earlier writ (C.O No. 13196(W) of 1995) seeking sanction of a post (on the ground that workload justified it) and absorption. By judgment dated 11.8.95 a learned single Judge directed the Director of Public Instructions and the Secretary, Department of Higher Education, Government of West Bengal to consider according sanction for a second post, to send any proposal to the Finance Department and thereafter to consider the question of the petitioner's absorption.
The Government created a second post by order dated 29.11.95. Because the petitioner's name had not been recommended by the College Service Commission, the petitioner's case for absorption was not considered; the Commission allegedly did not send a recommendation despite requests. The petitioner then filed the writ now in dispute (C.O No. 526(W)/96), inter alia praying for absorption in the Plant Protection department with retrospective effect. The learned single Judge allowed that writ application. The present appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 21 March 1997 passed in C.O No. 526(W)/96.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner's service can be regularised (i.e., whether the court may direct regularisation/absorption of the petitioner into service despite the absence of recommendation by the College Service Commission and non-compliance with statutory recruitment provisions).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (State / College/Authority) Arguments (as presented through Mr. Maitra)
- The learned trial Judge erred in directing absorption because the petitioner was not selected by any valid selection committee in terms of extant rules; the petitioner was not validly appointed.
- Recommendation of the College Service Commission is a sine qua non for appointment; hence relaxation of recruitment rules could not have been directed by the trial court.
- Reliance placed on authorities including Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar v. State of Maharashtra, E. Ramakrishnan v. State of Kerala and Smt. Debi Rani Bhattacharyya v. District Inspector of Schools (S.E.) Burdwan to support the contention that regularisation/recruitment cannot bypass prescribed selection processes.
- Another writ application concerning inaction of the College Service Commission (C.O No. 1221(W)/95) was pending.
College Service Commission's Arguments (as presented through Mr. Mondal)
- Plant Protection is appertaining to Botany but the petitioner is a candidate in Zoology; hence his case could not be considered for a Botany post.
- The petitioner was on a Zoology panel at Sl. No. 17A, but the life of that panel had expired.
Writ Petitioner / Respondent's Arguments (as presented through Mr. Pratap Kumar Roy)
- The appellant did not file any affidavit-in-opposition; on that basis the appeal is not maintainable.
- By the earlier direction in C.O No. 13196(W)/95 the petitioner’s case should have been considered on its merits and therefore respondents were bound to consider absorption.
- Plant Protection was a new subject introduced by UGC; two posts were created — one to be filled from Botany and another from Zoology — and the petitioner should have been considered for the Zoology slot.
- The petitioner was part of the organiser staff and UGC had assumed financial liability for five years; having taken a full teaching load, he ought to have been absorbed and the appointment was not a back-door one.
- Reliance placed on Jaipal v. State of Haryana and Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana (both concerning "equal pay for equal work") and contention that the earlier judgment of a learned single Judge attracts constructive res judicata and/or estoppel.
- It was also contended that the appellant relied on two-judge bench decisions while the respondent relied on three-judge bench decisions that are binding.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1995 SC 962 | Authority that when appointment is illegal, regularisation cannot be ordered. | Relied on as precedent supporting the proposition that regularisation cannot follow an illegal appointment; used to support setting aside the trial judge's order. |
| E. Ramakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 1996 (10) SCC 565 | Similar principle regarding invalid appointments and limits on regularisation. | Used by the Court among other Apex decisions to support the conclusion that regularisation cannot be a substitute for recruitment under law. |
| Smt. Debi Rani Bhattacharyya v. District Inspector of Schools (S.E.), Burdwan, 1996 (II) CHN 415 | Cited by appellant to support restriction on regularisation/appointment without proper selection. | Noted as relied upon by appellant; consistent with Court’s view that statutory recruitment procedures must be followed. |
| Jaipal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 1504 | Decision concerning "equal pay for equal work" doctrine and limits on absorption/regularisation in certain factual matrices. | Cited by respondent; Court observed these decisions were about equal-pay issues and did not support the respondent's broader contention for regularisation here. |
| Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 2049 | Dealt with equal pay for equal work; held that repeated short-term appointments did not merit absorption. | Relied on by respondent; Court noted this decision runs counter to respondent's contention and does not support regularisation in the present case. |
| B.N. Nagrajan v. State of Karnataka, (AIR 1979 SC 1676 / 1979 (3) SCR 937) | Canonical authority that regularisation cannot be a mode of recruitment; defines limits of regularisation. | Treated as a foundational principle; repeatedly followed and applied to hold that regularisation is not permissible to create substantive appointment here. |
| R.N. Nanjudappa v. T. Thimmiah, 1972 (2) SCR 799 | Earlier authority on meaning of "regular" and "regularisation". | Followed as one of the authoritative pronouncements defining regularisation; used to support the Court's conclusion. |
| V. Srinivas Reddy v. Government of A.P., J.T. 1994 (6) SC 476 / AIR 1995 SC 586 | Approved earlier decisions that regularisation cannot be mode of recruitment. | Noted as an approving decision of earlier precedents and applied as part of the chain of authority against regularisation here. |
| Krishna Chandra Singha v. State of West Bengal, 1996 Lab IC 28 | Followed the principle that regularisation is not a mode of recruitment. | Referenced as a decision of this Court consistent with the principle that regularisation cannot create substantive appointment. |
| Sk. Jamaluddin v. State of West Bengal, 1995 Lab IC 1853 | Illustrates the rule that regularisation is not a means of recruitment and may violate Article 309. | Applied as supporting authority holding that appointment by regularisation is improper where statutory safeguards absent. |
| Sanjoy Chakraborty v. Union of India, 1996 Lab IC 1326 | Held that regularisation does not equate to permanence and that appointment by regularisation may violate Article 309. | Used to reinforce the proposition that regularisation cannot create permanent substantive posts absent statutory authority. |
| Lalan Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 1995 (2) PLJR 309 | Held regularisation may be effected only by virtue of a legislative Act or a state policy adopted in exercise of executive power under Article 162. | Cited to show limited circumstances in which regularisation may be valid; Court noted regularisation must conform to statutory or executive scheme and cannot be ordered contrary to statute. |
| Ashwini Kumar Sinha v. State of Bihar, JT 1995 (8) SC 563 | Upholds limits on judicially directed regularisation where statute prescribes recruitment methods. | Referenced as upholding the view that High Court lacks jurisdiction to direct regularisation contrary to statutory provisions. |
| Birbhum Zilla Parishad v. Nitya Hari Chatterjee, 100 CWN 748 | Considered by this Court in relation to regularisation issues. | Referred to as one of several decisions addressing regularisation principles; applied as supporting precedent. |
| West Bengal Board of Primary Education v. State of West Bengal, 1997 (1) CLJ 165 | Division bench held teachers not appointed under any law satisfying Articles 14 & 16 cannot be regularised. | Quoted and applied to hold that regularisation is not available where appointment was not under statutory rules; supports setting aside trial judge. |
| State of Orissa v. Dr. Piari Mohan Misra, AIR 1995 SC 974 | “Mere prolonged or continuous service does not ripen into regular service to claim permanent or substantive status.” | Relied upon to reject the contention that length of service alone justifies regularisation. |
| Miss Juliate Zimik v. The State of Manipur, 1997 Lab IC 2384 | High Court decision consistent with the proposition that continuous service does not automatically confer regular status. | Noted as supporting authority from Gauhati High Court consistent with the broader line of decisions. |
| N. Sreedharan v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, 1997 Lab IC 2557 | Similar view that prolonged service does not necessarily create regular service. | Cited to show consistency of high court practice with Supreme Court rulings. |
| J&K Public Service Commission v. Dr. Narinder Mohan, (1994) 2 SCC 630 | When appointment is illegal the question of regularising the appointee does not arise. | Applied to reinforce that illegal appointment cannot be validated by subsequent regularisation. |
| State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar, (1997) 4 SCC 88 | Daily-wage appointments relating to contingent establishment cannot be regularised by High Court direction; there must exist a post and appropriate statutory or administrative rules. | Referred to as authority limiting judicial regularisation of ad hoc/daily-wage appointments; used to criticise directions that bypass recruitment processes. |
| Sri Pintu Acharyya v. State of West Bengal, 1997 (2) CLJ 428 | Division bench consideration relating to regularisation issues. | Referred as part of local judicial authority that considered similar matters. |
| State of Himachal Pradesh v. Suresh Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 138 / JT (1996) 2 SC 455 | Appointment in violation of recruitment rules is illegal. | Referenced to support the proposition that appointments contrary to prescribed recruitment rules cannot be regularised. |
| State of West Bengal v. Nani Gopal Jana, 1998 (I) CHN 5 | Illustration that appointment in violation of recruitment rules is illegal. | Cited in support of the Court's view that non-compliance with recruitment statutes precludes valid regularisation. |
| P. Ravindran v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, (1997) 1 SCC 350 | Court must not bypass commission-based recruitment; regularisation except in extraordinary cases is deprecated. | Applied to underscore that courts should not direct regularisation in place of constitutionally or statutorily prescribed recruitment processes. |
| Mohd. Nazimuddin v. State of Bihar, (1990) 2 BLJR 843 | Full Bench: decision on a pure question of law touching jurisdiction does not operate as res judicata. | Applied to reject the respondent's res judicata argument where the issue was essentially jurisdictional/legal. |
| Chittoori Subhanna v. Kudappa, AIR 1965 SC 1325 | Authority on res judicata and jurisdictional questions. | Referred to in support of the principle that pure questions of law touching jurisdiction do not create res judicata effects. |
| Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai Subbanna, AIR 1971 SC 2355 | Authority on res judicata and jurisdictional points. | Used to support the same proposition regarding res judicata and jurisdictional issues. |
| Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v. L.V.S. Dikshitu, AIR 1979 SC 193 | A decision rendered by an authority lacking jurisdiction cannot be sustained by doctrine of res judicata or estoppel. | Applied to hold that an order which is a nullity for lack of jurisdiction cannot be mounted as res judicata. |
| Isabella Johnson (Smt) v. M.A. Susai (Dead) By Lrs., AIR 1990 SC 993 | Pure questions of law on jurisdiction cannot be the subject of estoppel; jurisdictional questions not amenable to res judicata by estoppel. | Applied to reject estoppel argument where the dispute involved a jurisdictional legal question. |
| Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation, (1990) 1 SCC 361 | Case considered in comparative discussion of regularisation jurisprudence. | Referenced as one of several decisions distinguished on facts and legal context in local judicial consideration of regularisation issues. |
| Dharwad Dist. P.W.D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Association v. State of Karnataka, (1990) 2 SCC 396 | One of the authorities concerning regularisation and daily-wage/different factual scenarios. | Noted and distinguished on the facts; Court recorded that some decisions did not consider earlier binding precedents addressing meaning of regularisation. |
| Jacob M. Puthuparmbil v. Kerala Water Authority, (1991) 1 SCC 28 | Another decision dealing with service/regularisation in particular factual matrix. | Distinguished by reference to more authoritative precedents defining 'regularisation'. |
| State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa, (1967) 1 SCR 128 | One of the authoritative pronouncements defining "regular" and "regularisation". | Referred to as an essential precedent forming part of the core ratio that regularisation cannot be used to create substantive appointment outside statutory scheme. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in structured steps grounded in statute and precedent:
- Statutory framework: The Court examined relevant statutory provisions governing college teacher recruitment and security of service in West Bengal: the West Bengal College Service Commission Act, 1978 (notably Section 7 setting out the Commission's duty to select persons and Section 9 clarifying that recommendation of the Commission is not necessary for part-time appointments), the West Bengal College Teachers (Security of Service) Act, 1975 (notably Section 3 requiring appointment on recommendation of University and College Service Commission except in limited contingencies; Section 4 on appointment letters; Section 5 on probation), and the Calcutta University First Statutes, 1979 (Clause 101A prescribing appointments in accordance with the 1978 Act).
- Character of the appointment: The petitioner had been appointed only as a part-time lecturer under a UGC scheme and had not been appointed in terms of the statutory provisions (the 1978 Act, the 1975 Act and Calcutta University Statute). The Court accepted that the appointment was not made in conformity with the statutory recruitment procedures for permanent posts.
- Precedent establishing limits on regularisation: The Court reviewed a substantial line of authority (including B.N. Nagrajan, R.N. Nanjudappa, V. Srinivas Reddy and subsequent High Court and Supreme Court decisions) demonstrating the settled principle that "regularisation cannot be a mode of recruitment" and that regularisation cannot be used to validate appointments made contrary to statutory recruitment procedures. The Court emphasised that regularisation cannot be used to create substantive permanent status where appointments were not made in accordance with law.
- Prohibition on validating illegal appointments: The Court relied on authorities (e.g., J&K Public Service Commission v. Dr. Narinder Mohan, Arundhati Pargaonkar) holding that when an appointment is illegal, the question of regularising the appointee does not arise.
- Fact-specific application: Applying these principles, the Court held that because the petitioner was appointed without following the statutory provisions governing recruitment to permanent college posts, the petitioner could not be regularised. The Court noted that while the initial appointment may not have been a "backdoor" appointment in the colloquial sense, a temporary appointment under the UGC scheme cannot be treated as dehors (outside) the statute when filling permanent posts; permanent posts must be filled according to statute and recruitment rules.
- Res judicata and estoppel: The Court rejected the respondent's contention that the earlier single-judge judgment produced constructive res judicata or estoppel. The Court explained (relying on Patna Full Bench decisions and Supreme Court authorities) that a decision on a pure question of law touching jurisdiction does not operate as res judicata, and that an order which is a nullity for want of jurisdiction cannot be sustained by res judicata or estoppel.
- On precedential weight and distinctions: The Court addressed the parties' reliance on different benches and decisions, observing that many of the respondent's cited Supreme Court decisions arose in different factual situations and did not displace the binding precedents (three-judge bench decisions) that define and limit the doctrine of regularisation.
- Constitutional considerations: The Court emphasised that a direction for regularisation, if made in this case, would be violative of statutory provisions and of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India (equal protection and equality of opportunity in public employment), because it would bypass the recruitment safeguards established by statute.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The impugned judgment of the learned single Judge allowing the writ (C.O No. 526(W)/96) was set aside and the appeal was allowed. The Court concluded that the petitioner could not be regularised in service.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the trial court's direction to absorb/regularise the petitioner is quashed and the petitioner is not regularised by this order.
- The Court held that regularisation cannot be used to validate an appointment made contrary to the statutory recruitment provisions (West Bengal College Service Commission Act, 1978; West Bengal College Teachers (Security of Service) Act, 1975; Calcutta University Statutes), and that such a direction would offend Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
- The Court rejected the invocation of res judicata and estoppel in relation to the earlier single-judge judgment because the matter involved pure questions of law touching jurisdiction; such questions do not operate as res judicata or estoppel as a matter of law.
- The Court observed that although the Supreme Court in some cases has, in extraordinary circumstances, used Article 142 to direct regularisation, this High Court does not possess comparable power to effect such regularisation outside statutory schemes.
- No order as to costs was made.
Disposition: Appeal allowed; impugned judgment set aside; no order as to costs.
Satyabrata Sinha, J.:—This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 21st March, 1997 passed by a learned single Judge of this court in C.O No. 526(W)/96.
2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass.
3. The writ-petitioner-first respondent was appointed as a part-time lecturer in the subject of plant protection in Netaji Mahavidyalaya, Hooghly. He was allegedly working since 1987 at a monthly remuneration of Rs. 1,000/-. Intially, University Grants Commission used to sanction his pay but after four years the University Grants Commission did not continue to undertake the financial liability as per their norms. The writ petitioner filed a writ application before this Court being C.O No. 13196(W) of 1995 claiming that a post should be sanctioned as work load justified the same. He also prayed for his absorption in the said institution. By a judgment dated 11.8.95 a learned single Judge of this court directed the Director of Public Instructions, Government of West Bengal and the Secretary to the Department of Higher Education, Government of West Bengal to consider the question of according sanction for second post and to send the proposal to the Finance Department and thereafter to consider the question of absorption of the petitioner.
4. A second post had been created by the Government by an order dated 29.11.95 However, as the name of the petitioner had not been recommended by the College Service Commission, the petitioner's case for absorption could not be considered. The Commission allegedly despite requests did not also sent recommedation. In that situation, the petitioner filed another writ application which was marked as C.O 526(W)/96, inter alia, praying for his absorption in the plant protection department with retrospective effect. By reason of the impugned judgment the learned trial Judge allowed the writ application.
5. Mr. Maitra, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, submitted that the learned trial Judge committed an illegality in giving the impugned direction as the writ petitoner was not selected as a part-time lecturer by any valid selection committee in terms of the extant rules. It was further submitted that the petitioner was not validly appointed and in any event, as regard the inaction on the part of the College Service Commission is concerned, another writ application being C.O No 1221(W)/95 is pending. It is submitted that recommendation of the College Service Commission is sine qua non for appointment and in that view of the matter relaxation of the recruitment rule could not have been directed. Reliance in this connection placed on Dr. Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1995 SC 962, E. Ramakrishnan v. State of Kerala reported in 1996 (10) SCC 565 and Smt. Debi Rani Bhattacharyya v. District Inspector of Schools (S.E) Burdwan reported in 1996 (II) CHN 415.
6. Mr. Mondal, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the College Service Commission, inter alia, submitted that the plant protection is the subject appertaining to Botany but the petitioner is a candidate of Zoology and as such his case cannot be considered. It is further submitted that a panel has been made for Zoology, wherein the petitioner's position was at Sl. No. 17A but the life of the said panel has expired.
7. Mr. Pratap Kumar Roy, the learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner-respondent, on the other hand, submitted that as the appellant did not file any affidavit-in-opposition, this appeal is not maintainable. It has further been submitted that keeping in view the direction made by a learned single Judge of this Court in C.O No. 13196(W)/95 that the case of the petitioner should have been considered on its own merits, the respondents were bound to do so. It has been submitted that plant protection is a new subject which was introduced by the University Grants Commission, for which two posts had been created, one of which was to be filled up from Botany and another from Zoology. Mr. Roy would contend that as the petitioner was an organiser staff, he should have been absorbed keeping in view the fact that UGC had taken up the financial liability for a period of five years. It has further been submitted that the petitioner having taken up full load work he ought to have been absorbed. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Jaipal v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1504 and Bhagwan Dass v. State of Harayana reported in AIR 1987 SC 2049. The learned Counsel submitted that the appointment of the petitioner was not a back-door one. It was further submitted that the appellant has relied on the decision of division bench of the Supreme Court comprising of 2 Judges whereas these decisions relied upon by him have been rendered by division benches comprising of 3 Judges which are binding on this court. It had further been submitted that the Judgment of learned single Judge of this Court in earlier writ application would attract the principles of constructive res judicata and/or estoppel.
8. The principal question which arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the petitioner's service can be regularised.
9. It had not been denied or disputed that the case of the petitioner has not been recommended by the College Service Commission. The State of West Bengal enacted West Bengal College Service Commission Act, 1978. The said Act was enacted to provide for the constitution of a College Service Commission in West Bengal and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 7 of the said Act begins with non-obstante clause and reads thus:—
“Functions of the Commission. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, custom or usage to the contrary, it shall be the duty of the Commission to select persons for appointment to the posts of Teachers of a College:
Provided that—
(i) for selection of persons for appointment to the posts of Teachers other than Principal, the Commission shall be aided by two persons having special knowledge on the subject for which such selection is to be made, of whom one shall be a nominee of the University to which such college is affiliated and the other shall be a nominee of the Chancellor of such University.
(ii) for selection of person for appointment to the post of Principal, the Commission shall be aided by the Vice-Chancellor of the University to which such college is affiliated or his nominee and a nominee of the Chancellor of such University.
(2) It shall also be the duty of the Commission to advise the Chancellor or the State Government on such matter as may be referred to it by either of them.”
10. The said provision, therefore, is of wide amplitude.
11. Section 8 provides for the manner of selection. Section 9 provides for the effect of recommendation of the Commission. It clearly states that recommendation of the Commission would not be necessary if the appointment was on a part-time basis.
12. The State of West Bengal also enacted the West Bengal College Teachers (Security of Service) Act, 1975. Section 3 of the said Act reads as follows:—
“Appointment to the post of a teacher shall be made by the Governing Body on the recommendation of the University and College Service Commission to be consitituted by the State Government in the manner prescribed:
Provided that pending formation of such Commision such appointment shall be made on the recommendation of a Selection Committee to be constituted for the purpose in the manner prescribed:
Provided further that no recommendation of the University and College Service Commission or the Selection Committee will be necessary with respect to filling up for a period not exceeding six months of any permanent or temporary vacancy in the post of a teacher:
Provided also that in cases of perment vacancies or temporary vacanies for a period exceeding six months, if no recommendation of the University and College Service Commission or Selection Committee, as the case may be is forthcoming, it shall be lawful for the Governing Body of the College to extend, with the prior approval of the University to which such college is affiliated, the period of a teacher from time to time, so, however, that the total period of such temporary appointment shall not exceed two years.”
13. Section 4 of the said Act provides that every teacher of a College on his appointment be provided with a letter of appointment containing such terms and conditions of appointment as may be prescribed.
14. Section 5 provides for a period of probation to be undergone by such teacher and only on satisfactory completion of period of probation the Governing Body may confirm such teacher.
15. The Calcutta University First Statutes, 1979 also provides for appointment of teachers of Colleges. Clause 101A of the said Ordinance reads thus:—
“Appointment of teachers, whole-time or part-time, including Principals, of affiliated colleges other than Government Colleges shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the West Bengal College Service Commission Act, 1978 (West Bengal LXII of 1978) and the rules made thereunder.”
16. As noticed hereinbefore, the petitioner was appointed only as a part-time lecturer. It may be true that he was appointed on the basis of a scheme framed by University Grants Commission but the fact that he had not been appointed in terms of the aforementioned Acts has not been and cannot be disputed.
17. It is now well settled by reason of various decisions of the Supreme Court of India as also of this Court that regularisation cannot be a mode of recruitment. Reference in this connection may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in B.N Nagrajan v. State of Karnataka reported in 1979 (3) SCR 937 and R.N Nanjudappa v. T. Thimmiah reported in 1972 (2) SCR 799. The aforementioned decisions have been referred to with an approval of the Apex Court in V. Srinivas Reddy v. Govt. of A.P reported in J.T 1994 (6) SC 476. The aforementioned decisions have been followed by this Court in various judgments. Reference in this connection may be made to Krishna Chandra Singha v. State of West Bengal reported in 1996 Lab IC 28 and Sk. Jamaluddin v. State of West Bengal reported in 1995 Lab IC 1853. This aspect of the matter has also been considered in Sanjoy Chakraborty v. Union of India reported in 1996 Lab IC 1326, wherein it has, inter alia, been held that regularisation does not mean permanance. It has also been held that appointment by way of regularisation would be violative of Article 309 of the Constitution of India.
18. In Lalan Kumar Singh v. The State of Bihar reported in 1995 (2) PLJR 309, a division bench of Patna High Court (of which I was a member) upon taking into consideration a large number of decisions, held that regularisation can be done by virtue of or under the provision of legislative Act or a policy decision adopted by the State in exercise of its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. In several decisions which had been noticed in that judgment, it has been held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue an order directing regularisation of the services of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the colleges of the Universities contrary to the mandatory provisions contained in the Bihar State Universities Act. The said view has been upheld by the Apex Court in Ashwini Kumar Sinha v. State of Bihar reported in JT 1995 (8) SC 563. I have also considered this aspect of the matter in Birbhum Zilla Parishad v. Nitya Hari Chatterjee reported in 100 CWN 748.
19. This aspect of the matter has again been considered in West Bengal Board of Primary Education v. State of West Bengal reported in 1997 (1) CLJ 165 by a division bench of this court holding:—
“The second principal question framed by the learned trial Judge must also be answered in negative in view of the fact that the teachers when so appointed having not been appointed under any provision of law or upon following any rule conforming to the provision of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and their services being not protected under any statute, question of their regularisation does not arise. This bench in several cases including in Registrar of North Bengal University v. Biplab Roy in FMA No. 159/93 disposed of on 24.1.96, inter alia, obseved:—
The Supreme Court of India in a number of decisions categorically held that regularisation cannot be a mode of apointment. Reference in this connection may be made to B.N Nagrajam v. State of Karnataka reported in 1979 (3) SCR page 937 and R.N Nenjundeppa v. J. Thimmaiah reported in 1972 (2) SCR page 749 : 1972 Lab IC 618, which have recently been followed by the Supreme Court in V. Shrinibas Reddy v. Govt. of A.P reported in AIR 1995 SC 586; Sk. Jamaluddin v. State of West Bengal reported in 1995 Lab IC 1853. Similar view has been taken in Asoke Kumar Pal v. State of West Bengal C.O No. 4244(W) of 1995 disposed of on 25.4.1995 and reported in 1995 Lab IC (NOC) 319; Narendra Nath Palui v. State of West Bengal reported in 99 CWN 440, 1995 (2) SLR 670, 1995 Lab IC 37 (Ker); 70 FLR 294 (All) and 1994 (2) SCC 630; 1993 (2) SCC 213, AIR 1995 SC 962, 1995 (2) CLJ 255; Bishnudeo Chowclhury v. State of Bihar reported in 1995 (1) PLJR 123 (Pat) (F.B). This aspect of the matter has also been considered by various Division Benches of the Patna High Court on amongst others 1994 (1) PLJR 68, 1995 (2) PLJR 309 and 1995 (2) PLJR 573.
20. Reference in this connection may be made to Birbhum Zilla Parished v. Nitya Hari Chatterjee reported in 100 CWN 748.
21. It is not necessary to multiply decisions on this point.
22. In State of Orissa v. Dr. Piari Mohan Misra reported in AIR 1995 SC 974, the Apex Court held:—
“Mere prolonged or continues service does not ripen into a regular service to claim permanent or substantive status.”
23. The same view has been taken recently by Gowhati High Court in Miss Juliate Zimik v. The State of Manipur reported in 1997 Lab IC 2384 and Kerala High Court in N. Sreedharan v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation reported in 1997 Lab IC 2557.
24. The Apex Court has also considered in J&K Public Service Commission v. Dr. Narinder Mohan reported in (1994) 2 SCC 630 that when the appointment is illegal, the question of regularising the appointee in service does not arise.
25. The Apex Court has also considered the same view in Dr. Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1995 SC 962 and E. Ramakrishnan v. State of Kerala reported in 1996 (10) SCC 565. Yet recently in State of U.P v. Ajay Kumar reported in (1997) 4 SCC 88, it has been held:
“The admitted position is that the respondent came to be appointed on daily-wage basis on 14.2.1985 as Class IV employee, Nursing Orderly, in the Medical College by the Medical Superintendent. When the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court for his regularisation, the learned Single Judge pointed out that the respondent has not brought to the notice of the Court, any statutory rule under which the respondent could be regularised, on the basis of the service rendered by him as a daily-wage earner. Even the method of recruitment adopted by the Superintendent was not proper inasmuch as he did not call for applications. The Division Bench reversed the decision of the learned Single Judge and had given directions. It is now settled legal position that there should exist a post and either administrative instructions or statutory rules must be in operation to appoint a person to the post. Daily-wage appointment will obviously be in relation to contingent establishment in which there cannot exist any post and it continues so long as the work exists. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench was clearly in error in directing the appellant to regularise the service of the respondent to the post as and when the vacancy arises and to continue him until then. The direction in the backdrop of the above facts is, obviously illegal.”
26. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by a division bench of this court in Sri Pintu Acharyya v. State of West Bengal reported in 1997 (2) CLJ 428.
27. It is also well-settled that an appointment made in violation of the recruitment rules would be illegal. Reference in this connection may be made in (1995) 1 SCC 138, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Suresh Kumar Verma reported in JT (1996) 2 SC 455 and State of West Bengal v. Nani Gopal Jana reported in 1998 (I) CHN 5.
28. There cannot be any doubt or dispute that the petitioner was appointed without going through the processes as required under the Calcutta University First Statute, 1979, the West Bengal College Teachers (Security of Service) Act, 1975, as also the West Bengal College Service Commission Act, 1978.
29. The petitioner, therefore, could not have been regularised in his services nor any such direction could be given. In our opinion, the learned trial Judge committed an error in not considering this aspect of the matter.
30. It may be true that the initial appointment of the petitioner was not a backdoor one but it must be borne in mind that such an appointment cannot be said to be dehors the statute as for the purpose of a temporary employee, the College Service Commission was not required to be considered. The University Grants Commission merely made a scheme. If the said scheme had not been continued the question of the continuation of the petitioner in service does not arise. Whenever a permanent post has to be filled up, the provisions of the aforementioned statute must be followed in the matter of recruitment. A direction for regularisation if made by this court, the same shall be violative of statutory provisions as also Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
31. The contention of Mr. Roy to the effect that the judgment of a learned single Judge of this court in the earlier writ application constitutes a res judicata is also not correct. A pure question of law of jurisdiction never operates as res judicata.
32. For the same reasons, the question of invoking the doctrine of estoppel also does not arise in this case.
33. In Mohd. Nazimuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (1990) 2 BLJR 843, a full bench of Patna High Court (of which I was a member) held:—
“It is now well known that a decision on a pure question of law touching the jurisdiction of the court does not operate as res judicata. Reference in this connection may be made to Chittoori Subhanna v. Kudappa, reported in AIR 1965 SC 1325 and in Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai Subbanna, reported in AIR 1971 SC 2355.”
34. Spencer-Bower and Turner in ‘The Doctrine of Res judicata’, stated the law in Article 114 thereof thus:
“A Tribunal may exceed its jurisdiction either by embarking upon an enquiry outside its province, or, while confining its inquiry within the proper limits, by making an order in excess of its powers. In either case the result will be to nullify the decision as a res judicata in the former case, by the effect of the events, we have mentioned upon the declaratory part of the decision, and, in the second, by their effect upon its jussive or prohibitory provisions.”
35. Refusal to exercise jurisdiction on an erroneous view of the law is also a question of law touching the jurisdiction of the Court.
36. Further, if the order passed was a nullity being wholly without jurisdiction, the same will also not operate as res judicata. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v. L.V.S Dikshitu, reported in AIR 1979 SC 193, wherein the law was laid down in the following terms:—
“If the argument holds good, it will make the decision of the Tribunal as having been given by an authority suffering from inherent lack of jurisdiction, such a decision cannot be sustained merely by the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel, as urged in this case.”
37. In Isabella Johnson (Smt) v. M.A Susai (Dead) By Lrs.. reported in AIR 1990 SC 993, it has been held:—
“A Court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. Further, it is well settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law and the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law.”
38. So far as the submission of Mr. Roy to the effect that the judgments referred to were rendered by division benches consisting of 3 Judges of the Supreme Court whereas the decisions cited by Mr. Maitra are judgements rendered by 2 Judges is wholly misplaced. The judgments of the Apex Court relied on by Mr. Roy were rendered in different fact situation. The Apex Court in the said decisions did not consider the judgments of 3 Judges in B.N Nagrajan (supra) and other decisions which judgements were binding upon the later Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision relied upon by Mr. Roy apart from having different fact situation, are not binding on this court keeping in view the earlier Supreme Court decisions as also later ones.
39. In Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1987 SC 2049, the Apex Court was concerned with the doctrine ‘equal pay for equal work’. It was held that the petitioners who were appointed each time for six months after giving a break or two, their prayer for absorption could not be granted. The said decision, therefore, runs counter to the contention of Mr. Roy.
40. In Jaipal v. State of Harayana, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1504, the Apex Court was again concerned with the doctrine ‘equal pay for ‘equal work’. Both the aforementioned decisions were relied upon by Mr. Roy had been rendered by a two Judges' Bench.
41. This aspect of the matter has been considered by various decisions of this court as also by the Patna High Court in M.B Gupta v. Instrumentation Ltd. reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 137 wherein the decisions in Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation . reported in (1990) 1 SCC 361, Dharwad Dist. P.W.D Literate Daily Wage Employees Association v. State of Karnataka reported in (1990) 2 SCC 396 and Jacob M. Puthuparmbil v. Kerala Water Authority reported in (1991) 1 SCC 28 were distinguished. It was noticed:
“Unfortunately, however in none of the aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court considered its earlier binding precedents on the question of manner of regularisation, that its, State Of Mysore v. S.V Narayanappa, (1967) 1 SCR 128 and R.N Nanjudappa v. T. Thimmiah reported in (1972) 2 SCR 799. The aforementioned judgments of the Supreme Court was followed by a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in B.N Nagrajan v. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1676.”
42. The Patna High Court, thereafter, referred extensively from R.N Nanjudappa v. T. Thimmiah (1972) 2 SCR 799 and B.N Nagrajan v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1979 SC 1676). It was held:—
“In none of the cases referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court which have defined the term ‘regular’ and ‘regularisation’ were taken into consideration. The decisions of the Supreme Court referred to on behalf of the petitioner, therefore, will have to be considered from that angle.
43. The Patna High Court, this Court and the Supreme Court in various decisions have also taken into consideration the fact that if appointment is made by a back-door or where the initial appointment is made contrary to the provision of law, the same would be violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
44. The aforementioned view finds support from later decisions.
45. In P. Ravindran v. Union Territory of Pondicherry reported in (1997) 1 SCC 350, the Apex Court relied upon Dr. Narinder Mohan (supra) and held:—
“Shri K.M.K Nair, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the petitioners are postgraduates, M. Phil and Ph. D., and they are highly qualified and have acquired experience from 1987 as lecturers. When they were appointed number of vacancies were available. Since they have been working since 1987, they require to be regularised by suitable directions. We find no force in the contention. The petitioners also have that right. At one time, they staked their claims but were not selected. Therefore, the process of recruitment through the Commission, as envisaged under the Constitution, cannot be by passed by issuing direction for regularisation of the services of the ad hoc persons who had come to the service through back-door entry. This Court in a catena of decisions has deprecated this practice of regularisation except in extraordinary cases by directing the Government to frame a scheme and regularise Classes III and IV services in accordance with the scheme. Even in subsequent decision, that leverage is not being insisted upon. This Court in J & K Public Commission v. Dr. Narinder Mohan had held that the Court cannot adopt hybrid process of direction to regularise the services by passing the process of selection envisaged under the Constitution. This Court has deprecated the Government for exercising the power under Article 320 of the Constitution taking out the posts from the purview of the Commission and to regularise services dehors the Commission. Under those circumstances, we are of the view that the Tribunal has rightly rejected the claim to grant the relief sought for.
46. As in our view the petitioner is not entitled to regularisation as the same would attract the wrath of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, the question of upholding the judgment on the ground of estoppel, res judicata or the judicial finality as has been submitted by Mr. Roy does not arise. It may be true that in some cases regularisation had been directed by the Supreme Court has under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which power this Court does not have.
47. For the reasons aforementioned the impugned judgment cannot be upheld which is accordingly set aside. Accordingly the appeal is allowd but there will be no order as to costs.
48. Ronojit Kumar Mitra, J. I agree.
Appeal allowed.
K.G
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