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State Of H.P. v. Pradeep Singh
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The accused, Pradeep Singh alias Bittu, was tried for offences alleged to have been committed on 28 September 2003. The trial was conducted in Sessions Trial No. 1-S/7 of 2004 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Solan, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh. By judgment dated 6 October 2004 the trial court acquitted the accused of the charged offences.
Prosecution's case was that on the night intervening 27/28 September 2003 a police patrol at a place called Dhirja on Rajgarh road (a naaka) apprehended a man who was later identified as the accused. The police alleged they recovered from a polythene bag carried by the accused approximately 1 kilogram 200 grams of a contraband substance looking like charas, and also a country-made pistol and live cartridges hidden in his pants. Two 25-gram samples were taken, the bulk parcel and samples were sealed on the spot, an N.C.R.B form and rukka were prepared, and FIR No. 257/03 dated 28.9.2003 was registered under Section 20 NDPS Act and Section 25 Arms Act.
At trial the prosecution examined 14 witnesses; the accused's statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded. The trial court acquitted the accused on multiple grounds and the State appealed the acquittal. The High Court heard counsel for both sides, examined the record and dismissed the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court was correct in concluding that police had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act.
- Whether the absence of independent witnesses during search and seizure operations fatally undermined the prosecution case.
- Whether material contradictions in the statements of police officials render the prosecution's version of recovery from the accused unreliable.
- Whether the prosecution established the required link evidence and proper chain of custody / resealing of samples.
- Whether the opinion of a ballistic expert was necessary to prove that the seized pistol was in working condition, or whether the armourer's testimony sufficed.
- Whether the trial court's acquittal should be reversed on appeal, i.e., whether the acquittal resulted in a travesty of justice.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State Of H.P v. Pawan Kumar, (2005) 4 SCC 350 | Interpretation of the word "person" in Section 50 NDPS Act; holdings that articles like bags are not to be treated as part of the body for purposes of Section 50. | The High Court relied on this precedent to reverse the trial court's finding that Section 50 NDPS Act had been violated, because the contraband was recovered from a polythene packet carried by the accused and not from his naked body. |
| Sukhpal v. State Of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 10 | Principle that an armourer (having special training) test-firing a firearm and opining it is in firing condition can be sufficient to satisfy the prosecution's burden regarding the weapon's working condition. | The court relied on this authority to hold that the armourer's test-firing and testimony (PW-3) were adequate; thus the trial court's criticism for not obtaining a formal ballistic expert opinion was reversed on this point. |
| Brij Pal v. State (Delhi Administration), (1996) 2 SCC 676 | Similar principle as in Sukhpal concerning sufficiency of an armourer's evidence about a firearm's firing condition. | Used alongside Sukhpal to support the view that the armourer's evidence (and his stated training) was sufficient to prove that the pistol was in working order. |
| Mohammed Ankoos v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, (2010) 1 SCC 94 | Standard for appellate interference with an acquittal: appellate court should not interfere unless the acquittal is shown to be a result of manifest misappreciation or travesty of justice. | The court invoked this precedent to conclude that the trial court had not incorrectly appreciated the evidence and that the acquittal did not amount to a travesty of justice; therefore, the High Court dismissed the State's appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The High Court conducted a multi-step analysis focused on the admissibility and reliability of the prosecution case, and on whether the trial court's reasons for acquittal were legally sustainable.
- Section 50 NDPS Act: The court examined whether the mandatory provisions of Section 50 were breached. Relying on State Of H.P v. Pawan Kumar, it concluded that Section 50 did not apply to articles such as a polythene bag carried by the accused and that the trial court's finding of a Section 50 violation should be reversed because the contraband was recovered from a packet carried in the accused's hand and not from the body.
- Ballistic evidence: The court examined the trial court's criticism that a ballistic expert's opinion was not obtained. Citing Sukhpal and Brij Pal, it held that an armourer with appropriate training and experience test-firing the weapon is sufficient evidence of the firearm's working condition. The armourer (PW-3) testified to his training and that the weapon was test-fired and cartridges were live; this warranted reversal of the trial court's finding on that point.
- Credibility of police witnesses and need for independent witnesses: The court accepted that, as a general principle, police testimony does not always require independent corroboration if otherwise credible; however, it emphasized that each case must be examined on its facts. On the facts, the court found material and significant contradictions among the police witnesses (PW-11, PW-5, PW-6, PW-7) concerning key aspects: whether a naaka had been set up, the precise location and distance measurements from a bifurcation, timing of events, duration of proceedings on the spot, and how the police reached the spot (use of private vehicle).
- Circumstantial and procedural infirmities: The court identified additional reasons that weakened prosecution credibility: - There was no documentary proof of police movement from the station (no records explaining why a private vehicle was used or who sent them). - The recovery allegedly occurred in pitch darkness by vehicle light for several hours; the court questioned why the accused could not be taken to the police station, which was relatively close, or why independent witnesses from nearby habitations/shops were not associated. - The police allegedly weighed the contraband on the spot using scales they were carrying, which the court found improbable if the patrol was routine. - The principal witness (PW-11) displayed poor familiarity with local topography and could not reconcile documentary entries (N.C.R.B form columns filled on the spot) with the sequence of events described.
- Chain of custody and resealing issues: The court agreed with the trial court's detailed findings that resealing and delivery of parcels had not been properly corroborated. It noted contradictory testimony about who deposited and resealed the parcels (references made to Ext. PW 14.A, testimony of S.I. Kanwar Singh Guleria, Sh. Virender Chauhan (PW-14), and M.H.C. Madan Lal (PW-4)), resulting in doubt about the manner of depositing and resealing of the parcels and thereby undermining the reliability of the samples and link evidence.
- Overall assessment: Considering all material contradictions, documentary gaps, the questionable chain of custody, and the prosecution's failure to associate independent witnesses at the scene where needed, the court concluded that the prosecution had not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the contraband, pistol and cartridges were recovered from the conscious possession of the accused.
- Standard for appellate interference: Applying the ratio in Mohammed Ankoos, the court found no basis to hold that the trial court had incorrectly appreciated evidence or that the acquittal offended justice; thus, reversal was unwarranted.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The High Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore the appeal against the acquittal failed. The court DISMISSED the State's appeal and upheld the acquittal.
Direct consequences for the parties: - The accused's acquittal by the trial court is maintained. - Any bail bonds furnished by the accused are discharged.
Broader implications: - The opinion did not purport to lay down a new legal precedent; the court applied and relied upon existing Supreme Court authorities (cited above) to resolve specific issues (interpretation of Section 50 NDPS Act; sufficiency of an armourer's evidence). - The decision emphasizes that where police evidence contains material inconsistencies, absence of independent witnesses and deficiencies in chain of custody and resealing can be decisive in negating prosecution's case under NDPS/Arms charges.
This summary is confined to and based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion. No information not present in the opinion has been added.
Justice Sanjay Karol, J.
For an offence, which is alleged to have been committed on 28.9.2003 accused was put to trial. In terms of judgment dated 6.10.2004, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Solan, District Solan, H.P in Sessions Trial No. 1-S/7 of 2004, titled as State of H.P v. Pradeep Singh alias Bittu, accused stands acquitted of the charged offences.
2. It is the case of prosecution that during the night intervening 27th/28 September, 2003, SI/Addl. SHO, P.S Solan, Sh. Kanwar Singh Guleria (PW-11) along with ASI-Ashok Kumar (PW-5), ASI-Anant Ram (PW-6), HC-Ranjit Singh (PW-7) and other police officials were on patrol duty at a place called Dhirja on Rajgarh road. There they had also set up a naaka. At about 12.15 a.m, they saw a man coming from Maryog side. He was asked to stop. However seeing the police party he tried to flee away. Police officials chased him and after covering some distance apprehended him. He disclosed his identity to be Pradeep Singh, the instant accused. Police noticed that he was carrying a polythene bag in his left hand. Suspecting that he may be carrying contraband substance, PW-11 issued memo (Ext. PA) seeking his consent for carrying out search. Accused offered himself to be searched by the police officials present on the spot. Accordingly search was carried out and it was found that accused was carrying 1 kilogram and 200 grams of contraband substance which looked like charas in the polythene bag which he was carrying in his hand. Search further revealed that he was also carrying a country made pistol which he had hidden in his pant. Police officials weighted the charas and took two samples of 25 grams each. Samples and the bulk parcel were sealed on the spot. N.C.R.B form was filled up on the spot by PW-11 himself. Also ruka (Ext. PG) was prepared and sent through HC-Ranjit Singh (PW-7) to police station Solan where F.I.R No. 257/03 dated 28.9.2003 (Ext. PH) was registered under Sections 20 of the NDPS Act and Section 25 of the Arms Act. The same was registered by SIVirender Chauhan (PW-14) was carried back by PW-7 to the spot. With the completion of search and seizure operations, accused was arrested on the spot and police party returned to the police station where sealed parcels of the contraband substance along with the pistol and live cartridges which were also sealed separately, were deposited with MHC-Madan Lal (PW-4). In the police station they were resealed again. Const. Gulab Singh (PW-10) took sample of charas to the C.T.L Kandaghat from where report (Ext. PK) obtained. The seized pistol was test fired by Armourer Sh. Bhakhtwar Singh (PW-3) in the presence of Tehsildar Sh. Vikas Sood (PW-2) and certificate (Ext. PW 3.A) obtained which revealed that cartridges were live. Special report (Ext. PL) was sent by the police team to the superior officer i.e Addl. Superintendent of Police, Solan which was received by HC-Yoginder Singh (PW-12) in his office. With the completion of investigation challan was presented in the Court for trial.
3. The accused was charged for having committed offences punishable under Sections 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘NDPS Act’) as also Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Arms Act’), to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial.
4. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses and statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C was also recorded.
5. Appreciating the material on record, Court below acquitted the accused of the charged offences on the grounds that (i) Police had failed to comply with mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act; (ii) No independent witness was associated by the police party during the search and seizure operations; (iii) There were inherent and material contradictions in the statements of the police officials which render the prosecution version of recovery of charas and gun & live cartridges from the conscious possession of the accused to be extremely doubtful; (iv) Even the link evidence did not establish the prosecution case and (v) Opinion of the ballistic expert was not obtained by the police to certify that the seized pistol was in a working order and could be used for shooting. Hence the present appeal.
6. We have heard Sh. R.K Sharma, learned Senior Addl. Advocate General duly assisted by Sh. J.S Guleria, Assistant Advocate General on behalf of the appellant-State as also Sh. N.K Tomar, learned counsel on behalf of the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence placed on record by the prosecution. Having minutely examined the record, we are of the considered view that no case for reversal of acquittal is made out at all.
7. Insofar as the findings of the learned Trial Court with regard to the non compliance of mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is concerned, in view of the change in position of law we are of the considered view that such finding needs to be reversed. Undisputedly alleged recovery of contraband substance was affected not from the body of the accused but from the polythene packet which he was carrying in his hand.
8. A three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in State Of H.P v. Pawan Kumar., (2005) 4 SCC 350 has held as under:-
“The word “person” has not been defined in the Act. In view of the basis principles of interpretation of statutes, it becomes necessary to look to dictionaries to ascertain the correct meaning of the word “person”. Having regard to the scheme of the Act and the context in which it has been used in the section it naturally means a human being or a living individual unit and not an artificial person. The word has to be understood in a broad common-sense manner and, therefore, not a naked or nude body of a human being but the manner in which a normal human being will move about in a civilized society. Therefore, the word “person” would mean a human being with appropriate coverings and clothings and also footwear.”
“11. A bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc. can, under no circumstances, be treated as body of a human being. They are given a separate name and are identifiable as such. They cannot even remotely be treated to be part of the body of a human being. Depending upon the physical capacity of a person, he may carry any number of items like a bag, a briefcase, a suitcase, a tin box, a thaila, a jhola, a gathri, a holdall, a carton, etc. of varying size, dimension or weight. However, while carrying or moving along with them, some extra effort or energy would be required. They would have to be carried either by the hand or hung on the shoulder or back or placed on the head. In common parlance it would be said that a person is carrying a particular article, specifying the manner in which it was carried like hand, shoulder, back or head, etc. Therefore, it is not possible to include these articles within the ambit of the word “person” occurring in Section 50 of the Act.”
Hence it cannot be said that there was violation of mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act.
9. Insofar as the findings with regard to the non-obtaining of the opinion of the ballistic expert is concerned, again we are of the view that same needs to be reversed. The Apex Court in Sukhpal v. State Of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 10 and Brij Pal v. State (Delhi Administration)), (1996) 2 SCC 676 has held that Armourer having special training in the subject opining that the fire arm was in firing condition would be sufficient enough to prove the burden laid down upon the prosecution. In the instant case Bhakhtwar Singh (PW-3) has categorically deposed that not only he has experience of testing fire arms but has also undergone one year course in fire arm at the I.M.E Centre Secunderabad in the year 1987-88. This witness along with Sh. Vikas Sood (PW-2) have testified that the seized pistol was fired and cartridges recovered were found to be live and the pistol to be in a working condition.
10. It is a settled position of law that if version of police officials otherwise inspires confidence, then unless circumstances otherwise warrant, corroboration of their testimonies by independent witnesses would not be necessary. But then each case has to be considered on the given facts.
11. Undisputedly in the instant case police party did not associate any independent witness. Out of 14 prosecution witnesses, testimonies of only four witnesses i.e ASI-Ashok Kumar (PW-5), ASI-Anant Ram (PW-6), HC-Ranjit Singh (PW-7) and SI-Kanwar Singh Guleria (PW-11) who were present at the spot at the time of search, seizure and arrest operations is relevant. Having minutely examined their depositions we find that there are material contradictions rendering their version to be untrustworthy, unreliable, unbelievable and thus not worthy of credence.
12. In fact prosecution version with regard to the setting up of naaka at the spot where the search and seizure operation was carried out, itself does not inspire confidence. It knocks down foundation of the prosecution story.
13. PW-11 who allegedly headed the patrolling party has deposed that in the night intervening 27/28 September, 2003 he was on patrolling duty at Dhirja on Rajgarh road. Now significantly he does not state that naaka had been set up by the police party unlike the version given by PW-5, PW-6 and PW-7. It is not the case of these witnesses that any unlawful or illegal activity was going on in the area which necessitated setting up of naaka or prompted the police to patrol the area and that too in the deep hours of night. All these witnesses admit that they had no prior information about any illicit trafficking of drugs in the area. They also had no information about the accused indulging in such activity. Significantly there is no documentary evidence on record to show that police party left the police station either for the purposes of setting up a naaka or for patrolling the area at Dhirja. Absence of this material piece of evidence is conspicuous rendering the case to be doubtful. Further all these witnesses admit that they travelled from police station, Solan to Dhirja by a private vehicle. Now what was the need for the police to have travelled in a private vehicle has not been explained. Why and who sent them has also not been explained. No document to show the purpose, object and time of their movement from the police station has been placed on record by prosecution. According to some of these witnesses they travelled in the vehicle belonging to Sh. Ashok Kumar (PW-5) and Sh. Parshottam. Sh. Parshottam has not been examined in Court and testimony of PW-5 does not inspire confidence. There is nothing to show he owned a vehicle.
14. In Court PW-11 states that at Dhirja there is a bifurcation from which place one road leads to Rajgarh and the other goes to Jaunaji. According to this witness naaka was set up on the Rajgarh road at a distance of ¾ to 1 km from this bifurcation. Here he improves his statement. Be that as it may be, this version of his stands materially contradicted by PW-5 and PW-7 according to whom naaka was set up at a distance of only 50 meters from bifurcation. PW-6 has yet another version to give. He states that naaka was set at a place which was 1½ km away from the said bifurcation. This contradiction being material shatters the prosecution case. In the absence of any material to show movement of the police officials from the police station prosecution story of setting up naaka is totally unbelievable.
15. It has come on record, through the version of PW-11 that there was no light on the spot. It was pitch dark and recovery proceedings were conducted in the light of the vehicle. Such proceedings continued for over 3 - 4 hours. Now this version is absolutely unbelievable. What was the need to conduct search and seizure operation on the spot has not been explained. Had the police party suspected the accused of carrying some contraband substance they could have conveniently brought him to the police station which was just at a driving distance of 45 minutes from the spot. That apart, PW-11 admits that Village Maryog is just at a distance of 2½ kms from the aforesaid bifurcation. It has come on record through the testimonies of spot witnesses that at Maryog there are several houses. Police could have easily conducted such proceedings in the presence of independent witnesses in the village.
16. PW-11 weighed the contraband substance i.e charas on the spot from the scales which he was allegedly carrying with himself. Now if police did not have any prior information and had gone on a general patrol duty and that too after taking lift in a private vehicle then why would they carry a kit along with themselves? This also renders the prosecution version to be extremely doubtful.
17. Further PW-11 is not even familiar with the topography and geography of the area where accused was apprehended and arrested. He is not aware as to whether there is any school situated on the main road at Dhirja. He also does not know whether there is any Village by the name of Ambar near the place where naaka had been set up. He does not know names of other villages of the area. He does not remember the number of the vehicle in which he returned to the police station. He does not remember the number of the vehicle in which HC-Ranjit Singh came to the police station. His testimony to our mind does not inspire confidence at all, more so, for the reason that he admits that columns 1 to 8 of the N.C.R.B form were filled up by him on the spot. Now it is undisputed case of the prosecution that HC-Ranjit Singh (PW-7), after getting the F.I.R registered at the police station did not meet the police party on the spot but in stead met them near Giri Pul when they were on their way back to the police station. Now if this were true, then how is it that number of the F.I.R finds mention in column No. 1 of the N.C.B form which allegedly was filled up on the spot? Perusal of the same shows that all the columns (No. 1 to 8) were filled up in one go, by the same person, in the same flow of hand and with the same ink.
18. No doubt PW-5, PW-6 and PW-7 have corroborated the version of PW-11 with regard to search and seizure operations but we find that even these witnesses were not present on the spot. PW-7 states that he had not seen the school building at Dhirja. He does not remember having seen the service station which is just at a short distance from the place where allegedly naaka was put. He could not narrate the names of the villages which fell between Dhirja and Maryog. Version of PW-5 is also to this effect. PW-5 does not remember the time when PW-7 left the spot with a rukka. He does not remember the number of the police officials who remained at the spot. He does not remember the time when accused was arrested.
19. Significantly it has come in the version of PW-5 that at Dhirja bifurcation itself there were 3 - 4 houses and in Village Maryog there were 20 - 25 houses. It has also come in the version of PW-6 and PW-7 that at Dhirja itself there are 4 - 5 shops. Then why is it that police party did not make any endeavour to associate any person from the said shops. It is not the prosecution case that none was residing within the shops, which is the normal practice in the hilly areas of the State.
20. We also find that there is another material contradiction in the statements of these witnesses. According to PW-6, after accused saw the police party, he ran away and after chasing him, police party nabbed him after 10 - 15 minutes. According to him it took about 1½ - 2 hours for the police party to complete the proceedings on the spot and thereafter they returned to the police station at 5.00 a.m Now this version of his contradicts the version narrated by PW-11 according to whom when police party asked the accused to stop he “tried to run away” but was nabbed and the police party, after completing the proceedings left the spot only at about 4.00 - 4.30 a.m and case property was handed over at the police station only at about 7.00 a.m Whereas according to SIVirender Chauhan (PW-14), police party returned to the police station at 5.45 a.m when PW-11 handed over the case property to him.
21. Hence we find that there are material contradictions in the version of the police officials and as such their testimonies do not inspire confidence. In the given facts and circumstances corroboration of their testimony by independent witness was absolutely necessary, more so, for the defence taken by the accused, that he was arrested by the police at some other place and that too on certain false grounds.
22. We also find that with regard to link evidence trial Court has returned following findings, with which we are in agreement:-
“23. The resealing of the sample is also not substantiated to have been done in this case in the manner as envisaged under Section 55, ND & PS Act. Ext. PW 14.A is a certificate of resealing signed by Sh. Virender Chauhan, Addl. S.H.O Sh. Virender Chauhan, Addl. S.H.O testified that the case property i.e one sealed parcel containing 1 kg. 150 gm. charas and two sealed parcels of 25 gm. each sealed with six seals bearing impression ‘H’ were delivered to him by Sh. Kanwar Singh Guleria, S.I alongwith other property and he resealed the said 3 charas parcels and samples each with three seals bearing impression ‘Z’ and then handed over the parcels to the M.H.C Sh. Kanwar Singh Guleria has testified that the case property was handed over to him by S.H.O However, such version does not find corroboration from the testimony of Sh. Mandan Lal, PW-4, as per him the parcels which were sealed with seal ‘Z’ were deposited with him by Sh. Kanwar Singh Guleria, S.I This makes it evident that he was silent about depositing of sample parcels by Sh. Virender Chauhan with him and as such, doubt has crept about the manner in which the parcels were deposited and resealed. Therefore, it cannot be held that the parcels were of charas and as such, the testimony of Sh. Madan Lal, M.H.C and that of Sh. Gulab Singh, constable that sample was sent for analysis and report of chemical examiner Ext. PM that the sample was of charas cannot be availed by the prosecution to prove that it was charas and as such, the production of Ext. P5 parcel and Ext. P6 sample parcel is immaterial. The entire evidence adduced as such, does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was found in possession of charas. This point as such, is answered in negative.”
23. Thus in our considered view, prosecution has failed to establish that the contraband substance, pistol and live cartridges were recovered from the conscious possession of the accused from the spot.
24. Having perused the testimony of the prosecution witnesses on record, it cannot be said that prosecution has been able to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable material on record.
25. The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, (2010) 1 SCC 94, it cannot be said that the Court below incorrectly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice. No ground for interference is called for. Present appeal is thus dismissed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged.
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