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S.M. Nistarini Dasi v. Makhanlal Dutt

Calcutta High Court
Apr 3, 1872
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (a Hindu widow) sued seeking a declaration of her rights over the estate of her late husband for maintenance and for repayment or charge in respect of expenses incurred for her daughters' marriages. The defendants included Chandra Mohan Sur (a mortgagee) and Makhanlal Dutt.

In the trial court Markby, J. heard preliminary objections raised by the defendant Chandra Mohan, including (1) that a Hindu widow had no such rights as claimed, and (2) that the plaint only sought a declaration of right and did not ask for any specific relief. Markby, J. expressed views on notice to an alienee for the creation of a lien and on the sufficiency of the plaint, and dismissed the suit as against both defendants with costs (scale No. 2) for being only a general declaration without asking for ascertainment of a specific amount or particular relief.

An application for security for costs of an intended appeal under s. 342 of Act VIII of 1859 was made on behalf of defendant Chandra Mohan and supported by citation of Bamasundari Dasi v. Ramnarayan Mitter; Phear, J. refused that application. The plaintiff appealed to the higher Court. On appeal, the higher Court (Couch, C.J., with Phear, J. and others participating in the proceedings) heard argument and ultimately remanded the case for retrial, directing that fresh issues be framed and that the parties bear their own costs of the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaint, which principally prayed for a declaration of the plaintiff's right to maintenance and for payment/charge in respect of marriage expenses, was fatally defective because it did not ask for ascertainment of a specific sum or identify the particular fund or portion of the property to be charged.
  2. Whether, to establish a lien against property in the hands of an alienee (e.g., a mortgagee), it is necessary that the alienee had notice not merely of the widow's existence but of her having actually asserted a claim for maintenance against the heir.
  3. Whether the trial Court, in the exercise of its discretion and equitable powers, ought to have framed issues and afforded specific relief under the general prayer instead of dismissing the suit for want of a specific relief in the plaint.
  4. Whether security for costs of the appeal should be ordered under s. 342 of Act VIII of 1859 in the circumstances presented (poverty alleged as ground for security application).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments — as presented by Mr. Lowe

  • The plaint did more than seek a mere declaration of right: it asked that the right of maintenance be declared and that the amount be ascertained, with an account to be taken.
  • Cited s. 15 of Act VIII of 1859 and case law (Kenaram Chuckerbutty v. Dinonath Panda) to support the proposition that a suit should not be dismissed merely because it asks for a declaratory decree.
  • Maintained that the widow has a right to maintenance while residing in the family dwelling-house and relied on authorities (including references to Vyavashta Darpana and cases cited) to support the availability of maintenance and the charge on the estate.
  • Argued that an injunction (if granted) would be more than a mere declaratory decree and that the plaint's prayers (including for an account) were sufficiently specific to obtain a decree and subsequent ascertainment of amount.
  • Contended that in the lower Court she was not permitted to go into the merits, and that dismissal on preliminary points prevented her from establishing entitlement.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments — as presented by Mr. Marindin and Mr. Branson

  • The suit was vague and oppressive: it asked for an indefinite burden to be declared over the defendant's property without fixing the amount, without stating what would be a proper sum, and without specifying what part of the estate would be charged.
  • The claim for daughter's marriage expenses was the daughters' right and therefore the daughters ought to have sued, not the mother on their behalf.
  • The plaintiff had been given an opportunity in the Court below to amend the pleadings and to frame issues but either did not or declined to take that opportunity.
  • On the security application, Mr. Branson argued the plaintiff should give security for the costs of the appeal under s. 342, relying on Bamasundari Dasi v. Ramnarayan Mitter; the respondents also contended there had been delay and that the appeal might be vexatious.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Srimati Bhagabati Dasi v. Kanailal Mitter Whether a widow has a lien on the property in the hands of alienees — Phear, J.'s ruling was that an alienee must have notice not only of the widow's existence but of her having asserted a claim for maintenance against the heir for a lien to be established. Markby, J. followed this ruling and applied it to hold that the allegations in the plaint (that the mortgagee knew of the widow's existence) were insufficient to show the necessary notice that she had actually asserted a claim against the heir; this supported dismissal on that part of the case.
Eshan Chunder Singh v. Sham Churn Bhutto Cited for the rule, as understood from Judicial Committee of the Privy Council authorities, that a Court of Equity may afford relief under a general prayer even if the special relief claimed is inaccurately framed. Couch, C.J. relied on this line of authority to hold that the trial court might have, despite the plaint's form, framed issues and afforded specific relief under the general prayer rather than dismissing the suit; supported remanding the case for retrial.
Mohammed Zahoor Mi Khan v. Mussamat Thakooranee Rutta Koer Judicial Committee of the Privy Council authority cited alongside Eshan Chunder Singh for the equitable practice that courts can grant relief under a general prayer. Used by Couch, C.J. to justify the proposition that the Court could, upon the existing plaint, frame issues and grant specific relief without dismissing the suit for a mere mistake in the particular prayer.
Bamasundari Dasi v. Ramnarayan Mitter Cited by respondent in support of an application for security for costs under s. 342 of Act VIII of 1859. Referred to by Mr. Branson in support of ordering security for costs. Phear, J. declined to order security on the basis of the material before him (poverty alone was not enough in the circumstances) and dismissed that application.
Kenaram Chuckerbutty v. Dinonath Panda Cited for the proposition that a suit should not be dismissed merely because it seeks a declaratory decree (supporting allowance of declaratory relief). Relied on by Mr. Lowe in argument; the Court accepted the general proposition that declaratory remedies may be available and that a mistake in the special prayer should not necessarily bar relief — informing Couch, C.J.'s approach to remand rather than dismissal.
Mangala Debt v. Dinanath Boss Cited for the proposition that a widow could not be ejected from the family dwelling-house. Advanced by Mr. Lowe to support the need to protect the widow's maintenance/occupation rights; cited in argument but the Court's principal disposition focused on procedure and framing of issues rather than deciding the substantive point at that stage.
Ram Chandra Dikshit v. Savitribai Cited for the proposition that the maintenance of a Hindu widow is a charge on the whole estate and on every part of it. Relied on by Mr. Lowe in argument to show the substantive scope of a widow's maintenance claim; the Court's disposition addressed the pleading/form issue and remanded for determination of substantive matters on framed issues.
Gobindmani Dasi v. Shamlal Bysak (cited) Cited as an example where an injunction was granted (an example used to show relief beyond a mere declaration). Referenced by Mr. Lowe to show that injunctive relief (more than a declaration) might be appropriate; the appellate Court's decision nevertheless concentrated on allowing the matter to be tried with proper issues rather than deciding injunctive relief at the appeal stage.
Government v. Rajah Raj Kishen Singh Cited by respondents in argument concerning the claim for the daughter's marriage expenses (the point being those expenses are the daughters' rights). Used in respondent's argument to suggest the daughters, not the mother, ought to sue in respect of marriage expenses; the Court did not finally determine that point on appeal but remanded for trial on proper issues.
Arbuthnot v. Betts Cited regarding the raising of issues on appeal (as to when issues may be raised). Referred to by Mr. Lowe in argument; Couch, C.J. observed that the authority must be understood as applying to special appeals rather than regular appeals — addressing the limits of raising issues on appeal in the particular procedural posture.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Markby, J. (trial judge):

  • Initially considered the plaint and the issues and expressed the view that the plaint did not show ground for the relief claimed in the general form pleaded.
  • On the question whether a Hindu widow had the rights claimed, Markby, J. stated he would follow Phear, J.'s ruling in Srimati Bhagabati Dasi v. Kanailal Mitter (as reported) and reserved the right to reconsider in the Court of Appeal. He summarized that ruling as requiring that, to establish a lien against property in the hands of an alienee, the widow must show the alienee had notice that she had actually set up a claim for maintenance against the heir.
  • Markby applied that test to the plaint and found no allegation of the necessary notice of assertion of claim; only that the mortgagee knew of the widow's existence. He therefore found the pleaded facts insufficient to establish a lien in the hands of the mortgagee.
  • He also considered (without deciding authoritatively) that the claim for expenses of a daughter's marriage stood in the same position as maintenance and so required similar notice to an alienee.
  • Separately, Markby regarded the plaint as fatally defective in form because it sought only a general declaration of right without asking that the proper sum for maintenance be ascertained or specifying the portion of property to be charged or asking for substantive operative relief (e.g., a specific charge or ascertainment). He noted the practice of the Court is for such a widow to ask that an inquiry be made to fix a fit and proper sum and the mode/portion of security.
  • Because no amendment was proposed and the plaint and issues were in the court's view indefinite and insufficient to enable a specific decree to be made, he dismissed the suit as against both defendants with costs (scale No. 2).

Phear, J. (on application for security for costs):

  • Considered Markby, J.'s reasoning and the dismissal ground relied on the plaint being a vague general declaration lacking specification of amount/fund to be charged.
  • He observed that if the plaint could only be construed as a general declaration that is incapable of practical use, the litigation might be vexatious and could justify security for costs; but he expressed doubt whether the plaint must be construed so narrowly and allowed the plaintiff some latitude to argue the plaint could be read as asking for ascertainment of a specific sum and charge.
  • Because the respondent who sought security (Mr. Branson) had relied only on the plaintiff's poverty and had given no other ground, Phear, J. dismissed the security application, leaving the costs of that application to be costs in the appeal proceedings.

Couch, C.J. (on appeal):

  • Accepted that it is a proper practice for a suit by a widow for maintenance to pray for an inquiry as to a fit and proper sum and the mode/portion of property to be charged.
  • However, he applied the equitable principle (as found in Courts of Equity and supported by the Judicial Committee decisions in Eshan Chunder Singh v. Shama Churn Bhutto and Mohammed Zahoor Mi Khan v. Mussamat Thakooranee Rutta Koer) that, when the plaintiff mistakes the specific relief in the special prayer, the Court may yet grant the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled under the general prayer, provided the relief is agreeable to the case made by the bill/plaint.
  • On that basis Couch, C.J. held that Markby, J. might have framed issues to determine what should be allowed for maintenance and expenses, rather than dismissing the suit. He reasoned that dismissal without leave to bring a fresh suit had the effect of barring the plaintiff's right and was too severe a penalty for a mistake in the form of the suit.
  • Concluded that the proper course was to remand the case for retrial with fresh issues framed in accordance with the opinion, and ordered that the parties bear their own costs of the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for re-trial with fresh issues to be framed in accordance with the judgment; the parties were ordered to bear their own costs of the appeal. (Rendered in the opinion as: Case remanded.)

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the trial Court's dismissal was set aside and the matter is to be retried with properly framed issues so that, if the plaintiff is entitled, the appropriate sums for maintenance and any proper charge for marriage expenses may be ascertained and decreed. The plaintiff is not barred by the earlier dismissal from pursuing those claims on the remand.
  • The appellate Court endorsed the equitable principle that courts may, in appropriate cases, grant relief under a general prayer even if the special prayer is inaccurately or insufficiently framed — and that a mere mistake in the form of relief should not be punished by barring substantive rights where the case otherwise permits framing of issues and proper inquiry. The Court therefore directed that issues be framed and the matter retried instead of dismissal.
  • On security for costs: the application for security under s. 342 (as pursued in the proceedings) was refused by Phear, J. on the material before him (the poverty ground alone was insufficient for the present order), and the costs of that application were to be costs in the appeal proceedings.
  • The decision does not purport to finally determine the substantive questions of whether and to what extent the mortgagee's property is chargeable or whether the daughters' marriage expenses are recoverable by the mother; those matters were left to be determined on the retrial under properly framed issues.
Show all summary ...

Markby, J. (who after shortly stating the plaint and issues continued) — I did not consider that there was any ground shown in the plaint for such relief, and, further, it appeared to me that, if the property were declared subject to the plaintiff's claim for maintenance and marriage expenses, she would obtain thereby all the security she would require.

The defendant Chandra Mohan, before proposing any issues and raising his other objections, objected generally to the form of the suit, first, on the ground that a Hindu widow had no such rights as were claimed in this suit; secondly, on the ground that the plaint only asked for a declaration of right, and not for any relief; and upon these two points after hearing Counsel on both sides, I was asked to express my opinion.

With regard to the first point, I considered that, without expressing any final opinion of my own, and reserving to myself the power of reconsidering the matter in the Court of Appeal.

I ought, for the purpose of this suit, to follow the ruling of Phear, J., in the case of Srimati Bhagabati Dasi v. Kanailal Mitter decided on the 8th instant. The learned Judge (according to a report of his judgment in the Englishman newspaper, which has on this argument been treated as correct) said that he was not prepared to say that the mere fact of the existence of the widow was sufficient notice to give her a lien against the estate in the hands of alienees; that against an heir who has taken the property the widow has a right to have her maintenance treated as a charge an the property; that she may doubtless follow the property in the hands of any one who takes it with notice of her having set up a claim for maintenance against the heir, but that in Bengal, she has not a lion on the property in respect of her maintenance against all the world, irrespective of her notice. I took the ruling of the learned Judge there to be that, in order to establish a lien against property in the hands of an aliene, the widow must show, not only that the alienee had notice of her existence, and therefore notice of the existence of a person who might claim maintenance, but notice that she had actually set up that claim against the heir. I do not understand that any such notice as that was alleged to have taken place in this case, but all that was alleged here as regards the maintenance, was that the mortgagee was aware of the widow's existence, and it was sought to be inferred from that that he was aware of her claim to maintenance, and the third issue was apparently framed with the intention of proving and relying on these facts; and I thought that, according to the ruling of the learned Judge upon which I base my decision, was not sufficient.

I also thought that, without going into the question now (upon which no authority had been cited before me, and upon which I express no opinion) as to whether or not the claim for the expenses of a daughter's marriage is precisely the same in character and extent as the claim for maintenance, it was quite clear that that part of the claim which relates to those expenses stands in the same position: because if it is necessary that notice that a claim has been set up as against the heir should be given in the case of maintenance, it seems to me by parity of reasoning that it must also be given in the case of expenses for the daughter's marriage.

The case was then adjourned until the following morning, in order that the parties might consider the effect of this ruling on the case as it stood. On the case being again called on, permission was asked on the part of the plaintiff to alter the frame of her 3rd issue by substituting an issue in this form:— Whether the defendant Chandra Mohan Sur took the property with notice that the plaintiff had asserted her right to maintenance out of the mortgaged property against the heir? And she also wished to make a similar alteration in the 4th issue. It was stated that the plaintiff was prepared to prove that the defendant Chandra Mohan had had express notice of the plaintiff's assertion of her right to maintenance and marriage expense. This alteration in the issues was opposed by the defendant Chandra Mohan as not being in accordance with the allegation in the plaint, and his Counsel relied on the case of Eshan Chunder Singh v. Sham Churn Bhutto. But I thought that case had really nothing whatever to do with the question, and decided to alter the issues.

It remained, however, to decide the other objection, namely that the suit was only for a declaration of right, and did not ask for any relief; and, upon consideration, I think that that objection is fatal to the suit in its present form. I am inclined to think that the rule which excludes suits for a mere declaration of right is not quite so strict here as in England, and that by the practice of the Courts, at any rate in the Mofussil, suits are admitted in certain exceptional cases for a declaration of right, although no actual relief has been asked for, or could be granted; probably, because in these particular cases, there is manifest convenience in having the right ascertained, and there is no other way of raising the question: but I think there is nothing in the practice of this Court which would justify this suit in its present form. On the contrary, I think, it is the practice here, whenever a widow sues to have her right of ! maintenance declared, for her to ask, not that her right should be declared, generally, but that it should be enquired what is a fing and proper sum for her maintenance, and upon what portion of her deceased husband's property and in what mode it should be secured. Whether or no, such a suit must be preceded by a demand by a mother, and refusal by the son to maintain his mother, I need not now say: but I may observe that there is no allegation in this case that the son is not maintaining his mother, or even that any funds applicable to that purpose have been directed by him to any other purpose. It is not said that she has been turned out of the family dwelling-house, or that there is any prospect of her being ejected. She asks for general lien to be declared over the whole property for her maintenance, without fixing the amount, and that the money expended on her daughter's marriages should be declared a charge on the property, without any inquiry whether those sums were properly expended; and the issues raised are in accordance with this indefinite prayer. In this form I think the suit cannot be maintained; and as no proposal is made for amending the form of the suit or the issues in this respect, the suit must be dismissed as against both defendants with costs on scale No. 2.

Pending the appeal, Mr. Branson, on behalf of the defendant Chandra Mohan, applied that the plaintiff should be ordered to give security for the costs of the appeal under s. 342 of Act VIII of 1859; he referred to the case of Bamasundari Dasi v. Ramnarayan Mitter.

Mr. Lowe, contra.— If the application is granted, the effect will be to prevent the proper rights of the plaintiff from being asserted. In the lower Court no issue as to her rights was allowed to be raised. The case was dismissed on preliminary points: the plaintiff has had no opportunity of going into her case and showing she is entitled to the relief asked for. [Phear, J. — You do not in your plaint ask for any specific sum for maintenance, or that it should be paid out of any particular fund; that is the reason Markby, J., gives for dismissing it. It may be your appeal is merely a vexatious proceeding. Mr. Branson.— Opportunity was given to the plaintiff in the Court below to amend her pleadings, but she elected to stand by them as they were.] She asked in her prayer that an account might be taken for the purpose of ascertaining the proper amount of maintenance. The prayer is specific enough to enable us to obtain a decree, and then the amount can be ascertained. In applications of this kind, diligence should be used; there has here been great delay on the part of the defendants.

Mr. Branson in reply. — Opportunity was given to the plaintiff in the Court below to amend her case, but she refused to do so. It is said the plaint prayed for a specific declaration, but the second ground of appeal is that the learned Judge “erred in holding that the plaintiff's suit would not lie unless the plaint asked for a specific sum to be ascertained as necessary for the maintenance of the plaintiff, and further sought to charge such sum upon a specific portion of the property mentioned in the plaint.”

[Mr. Lowe objected to reference to the grounds of appeal, but the objection was overruled.]

Cur. adv. vult.

Phear, J.:— On consideration of Markby, J's judgment, I find that he dismissed the suit mainly on the ground that the plaint only asked for a vague general declaration of right to maintenance, without further asking that the proper sum for maintenance should be ascertained, and made specific in amount. The last words of his judgment are “she” (the plaintiff) asks for a general lien to be declared over the whole property for her maintenance, without fixing the amount, and that the money expended on her daughter's marriages should be declared a charge on the property, without any enquiry whether those sums were properly expended; and the issues raised are in accordance with this indefinite prayer. In this form I think the suit cannot be maintained; and as no proposal is made for amending the form of the suit or the issues in this respect, the suit must be dismissed with costs.” Markby, J., therefore, was of opinion, not only that the claim of the plaintiff was at the outest to have a general right of this kind declared, bat also that the parties themselves declined to enable him to make a decree, which should be specific in its character, and on this ground he refused to give the plaintiff the relief which she asked. Now whether Markby, J., was right or wrong, as a matter of strict law or procedure, in refusing to make the general declaration of right to maintenance, for which he considered the plaintiff asked, still if I thought the plaint could not be construed otherwise than in the way in which Markby, J., construed it, namely, that it asked for nothing more than a general declaration, I should consider the litigation set on foot by the plaintiff as in a sense vexatious; because it seems to me that, even if she got the general declaration, she could make no use of it, without suing the defendants again de novo. Then, attributing this character to the suit, and coupling it with the apparent want of means of the plaintiff, I should think it was a case in which I ought to direct security for the costs of further litigation to be given. But I am not sure that the plaint must necessarily be construed quite so narrowly as Markby, J., did construe it. I express no opinion upon this point; but if the plaintiff has any ground to ask the Appeal Court, on the footing of her plaint, to make a decree for a specific amount of maintenance, and to charge it on the poverty, which is the subject of the suit, I think that her proverty alone ought not to lead me to grant the present application. It does seem to me on the-whole that the plaintiff may be fairly justified in asking the Appeal Court to put the latter construction on the plaint. Consequently, as Mr. Branson has not given me any other ground than that of poverty in support of his application for security for the costs of the appeal, I think I most dismiss it. The-costs of the application will be costs in the appeal proceedings.

On the appeal comming on to be heard, Mr. Lowe and Mr. Bonnerjee appeared for the appellants.

Mr. Marindin and Mr. Branson appeared for the respondents.

Mr. Lowe. — More is asked for in this case than a mere declaration of right: the plaint asks that a right of maintenance may be declared, and that the amount may be ascertained: that is in accordance with the usual practice in cases of this kind, which is first to get a declaration of the right, and then to make an enquiry as to the value of the property and position of the parties, with a view to ascertain the amount. The plaint asks that an account may be taken. (MAcpherson, J. — The plaint asks for an account “for the purposes aforsaid” i.e, for the purpose of the declaration of the right, not of ascertaining the amount.] A suit is not to be dismissed, merely because it only asks for a declaratory decree; see s. 15, Act VIII of 1859 — Kenaram Chuckerbutty v. Dinonath Panda. The widow has a right to maintenance as long as she continues to live in the family dwelling-house. The maintenance of unmarried daughters was a charge on the estate in the hands of the heir, Makhanlal, Shama Charan's Vyavashta Darpana, 368–370. That the property id small, is all the greater reason for assigning the widow some maintenance, and Mangala Debt v. Dinanath Boss decides that she cannot be ejected from the family dwelling-house as the defendant threatens to do. The case of Ram Chandra Dikshit v. Savitribai decides that the maintenance of a Hindu widow is a charge on the whole estate and on every part of it [Couch C.J — The question there was as to whether one brother could be sued alone, and it was held that he could.] We ask for an injunction, which is more than a mere declaration of right: if we are entitled to an injunction against Makhanlal, that is, more than a declaration of right — Gobindmani Dasi…Plaintiff; v. Shamlal Bysak…Defendant.* Bysak.

The Court called on the respondents.

Mr. Marindin.— It is in the discretion of the Court to give a declaratory decree or not. It would be vexatious and harassing if a plaintiff could come in and ask for an indefinite sum to be charged on the property. There is no prayer that the amount of maintenance should be ascertained, nor is it stated what would be a proper amount, nor on what part of the estate it is to be charged. [Couch, C.J — Ought this suit to be dismissed because the issue was not raised, whether the property in the hands of the mortgagee is chargeable with maintenance, and what is a proper sum f I think we have, if necessary, power to raise the issue now.] If the plaintiff asks for it, I do not think I can oppose it being raised, but the costs of the appeal ought in that case to be paid by the plaintiff — The Government v. Rajah Raj Kishen Singh. As to the claim for the daughter's marriage expenses, that is the right of the daughters, and they ought to have sued.

Mr. Branson on the same side. — Opportunity was given in the Court below to raise the issue, but advantage was not taken of it by the plaintiffs.

Mr. Lowe in reply — As to raising issues, see Arbuthnot v. Betts. [Couch, C.J — That must be understood as applying to special appeals, not to regular appeals.] As to marriage expenses being a charge, see Vyavashta Darpana, 342 & 358.

Couch, C.J:— This is an “appeal from a decree of Markby, J., dismissing the suit with costs. The ground of the dismissal is stated by the learned Judge to be that the suit was only for a declaration of right, and did not ask for any relief, and that it is the practice of the Court, whenever a widow sues to have her right of maintenance declared for her to ask, not that her right should be declared generally, but that it should be inquired what is a fit and proper sum for her maintenance. We agree that this is a proper practice, and that it would be unjust that a burden of an indefinite amount should be imposed upon the property which the defendant Chandra Mohan Sur holds as mortgagee by a general declaration of the plaintiffs right to maintenance, rendering it necessary for him to institute a snit to hare the amonnt determined. The plaint prayed “that the plaintiff's rights over the estate of her late husband by way of maintenance, and for the expenses attended upon the marriages of her said daughters, as well those already incurred as those which may hereafter be incurred in respect of the marriage of her still unmarried daughter, may be ascertained and declared; and that it may be declared that the defendant Chandra Mohan Sur took his said mortgage subject to the plaintiff's right to maintenance, and right to be recouped the expenses necessarily and properly incurred by her in and about the marriage of her said two daughters, as also the right to be provided with the expenses necessary for the due and fitting performance of her said unmarried daughter's marriage, when incurred, or to some one or other of such rights, and that for the purposes aforesaid, all proper accounts may be taken and directions given.” The plaint also prayed “that the defendant Makhanlal Dutt may be restrained by and under the order and injunction of this Honorable Court from alienation, dealing with, or disposing of the said one-third share of and in the said family dwelling-house, No. 2, Beadon Street, until the further order of this Honorable Court, and that the plaintiff may have such further or other relief as the nature of this case may require.”

Now the rule in Courts of Equity is that, if the plaintiff should mistake the relief to which he is entitled in his special prayer, the Court may yet afford him the relief to which he has a right under the prayer for generel relief, provided it is such relief as is agreeable to the case made by the bill. This rule should be acted upon in this Court, and is in accordance with the judgments of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Eshan Chunder Sing v. Shama Churn Bhutto and Mohammed Zahoor Mi Khan v. Mussamat Thakooranee Rutta Koer. Although, as the learned Judge says, no proposal was made for amending the form of the suit, we think he might, upon the plaint as it then was, have framed issues for the purpose of ditermining what should be allowed for the maintenance and expenses, if the plaintiff should be found to be entitled to them, and that this should have been done instead of the suit being dismissed. No leave being reserved to bring a fresh suit, the effect of the dismissal is to bar the right of the plaintiff, which is too great a penalty for a mistake in the form of the suit. We think the suit should be remanded for re-trial, fresh issues being framed in accordance with this judgment; and that the parties should bear their own costs of this appeal.

Case remanded.
Attorney for the plaintiff: Mr. Hart.
Attorneys for the defendant, Chandra Mohan Sur: Messrs. Ghose and Bose.