Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Chaitan Patjosi Mohapatra v. Kunja Behary Patnaik

Calcutta High Court
Jun 29, 1911
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Deputy Collector originally passed a decree for over Rs. 100 for rent due in respect of a tanki-tenure. On remand from the Court, the Deputy Collector found that tanki-tenures were not transferable. The decree-holder applied for execution and then applied that another property of the judgment-debtor—a kharida mafi-tenure—might be sold; that kharida mafi land was auctioned. Upon learning of the sale, the judgment-debtor (the petitioner) deposited the decretal amount with costs and the 5% payable to the auction-purchaser, sought cancellation of the sale and alleged fraud, irregularity and loss.

The Deputy Collector held that section 310A of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) did not apply to sales under Act X of 1859 and that there was no other law under which he could set aside the sale. The Collector upheld the Deputy Collector's decision on appeal. The High Court issued a rule, sought findings on the nature of the tenures involved, and proceeded to hear a preliminary objection regarding the High Court's jurisdiction to interfere with orders under Act X of 1859.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under section 15 of the Charter Act to supervise or interfere with orders of Revenue Courts (Deputy Collector / Collector) made under Act X of 1859.
  2. Whether the sale of the kharida (lakhiraj) land was ultra vires because the decree concerned a non-transferable tanki-tenure and the procedure under section 109 of Act X of 1859 was not followed (i.e., whether execution against other property was permissible in the circumstances).
  3. Whether section 310A of the Civil Procedure Code applies to sales made under Act X of 1859 (in particular, whether a sale to a third-party auction-purchaser attracts the post-sale remedies under section 310A).
  4. Whether the proper procedural remedy in this matter was by appeal (to the District Judge) or by revision/control by the High Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Opposite Party's Arguments (learned Vakil for the Opposite Party)

  • A preliminary objection was advanced that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with orders of the Deputy Collector and Collector passed under Act X of 1859; reliance was placed on Huro Mohun Mukerjee v. Kedar Nath Das.
  • It was contended that because the original suit was valued at above Rs. 100, an appeal lay to the District Judge (and not to the Collector) and therefore the High Court could not entertain revision in the matter.
  • Implicitly, the Opposite Party supported the view that section 310A CPC did not apply to sales under Act X of 1859 (this position appears through argument and reliance on precedent).

Petitioner's Arguments (learned Vakil for the Petitioner / judgment-debtor)

  • The Deputy Collector had no jurisdiction to sell the other lakhiraj property of the petitioner in the manner done; the sale and subsequent proceedings were therefore ultra vires and void.
  • The Deputy Collector was competent to entertain an application under section 310A CPC; in refusing to do so the Deputy Collector refused to exercise lawful jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Huro Mohun Mukerjee v. Kedar Nath Das The power of control and superintendence given by section 15 of the Charter Act refers to the general appellate jurisdiction of the Court and not to particular cases extraordinarily exercised; not to superintendence vested in the Commissioner and Board of Revenue by express provisions of the Act (as held by L. S. Jackson and Ghosh, JJ.). The Court noted this authority supports the Opposite Party's objection to High Court interference, but observed that the view was subsequently departed from and virtually overruled in later decisions; therefore it did not bar the Court's jurisdiction in the present matter.
Bhyrab Chandra v. Shama Soondari Collector's Court was treated as a Court over which the Sudder Court possessed appellate jurisdiction; section 15 of the Charter Act gives superintendence to compel revenue courts to do acts which by law they should do and to restrain them when they have no jurisdiction (as stated by Norman, J.). The Court relied on this decision as supporting its jurisdiction to supervise Revenue Courts under section 15 of the Charter Act.
Golinda Coomer v. Kristo Coomar High Court compelled Deputy Collector to entertain an application for restitution of an excess realised in execution of a decree subsequently modified; illustrates that relief not provided in Act X of 1859 may be granted under the general Civil Procedure Code. The Court used this case to show that the High Court can require Revenue authorities to act under general CPC provisions where Act X does not provide, supporting supervisory jurisdiction and application of CPC where appropriate.
Deanutoollah v. Nawab Nazim Act X of 1859 confers upon Revenue Courts a limited jurisdiction; the High Court under its power of control can prevent them from exceeding that jurisdiction. The Court cited this case to justify setting aside a Collector's attachment and sale of properties other than the tenure in arrear where the Collector had not shown satisfaction that execution could not be obtained against the person or movables; it was applied directly to hold the sale ultra vires.
Gudadhar v. Nund Lall An order of the Collector ordering execution against a person (where the decree had been passed) can be set aside by the High Court. Referred to as an example of the High Court setting aside Revenue Court orders that exceeded jurisdiction.
Rooknee Ray v. Amirt Lal An appellate decree of the Collector was set aside as passed without jurisdiction. Referred to support the proposition that the High Court may set aside Collector's orders passed without jurisdiction.
Naisir Jan v. Akbur The Collector was compelled to entertain an intervention which he had disallowed. Used as an example that High Court can compel Revenue authorities to exercise jurisdiction they improperly refused to exercise.
Nilmony Singh v. Taranath Mukerjee The Privy Council held that Revenue Courts deciding suits under Act X of 1859 are Civil Courts and that, except where Act X expressly provides otherwise, procedure of the Civil Procedure Code applies; section 284 of Act VIII of 1859 was relied upon to show that execution procedure under the Civil Code applies. The Court treated this decision as pivotal: it supports the proposition that provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (including post-sale remedies) apply to proceedings under Act X of 1859 unless otherwise provided; the Court relied on it to hold section 310A CPC applicable to the present case.
Mohant Gobind Ramanuja v. Lakhan Parida The text notes this case may seem to go further but is consistent with older decisions when read in light of Nilmony Singh. Cited to show consistency of subsequent authorities with the Privy Council's ruling and not to obstruct the Court's asserted jurisdiction.
Harish Chandra v. Ananta Charan Reported statement that the Code of Civil Procedure applies up to the sale and does not apply after; and that section 310A comes in after provisions relating to sale (no detailed discussion provided in the report). The Court acknowledged this authority as supporting the contrary view but noted that it did not discuss Nilmony Singh, and therefore did not prevent the Court from following Nilmony Singh's reasoning to apply section 310A.
Adhirani v. Raghu The Allahabad Court followed Nilmony Singh reasoning and held that section 43 CPC was applicable to rent suits under Act XII of 1881 (the local Rent Act). Referred to as supporting authority that CPC provisions can apply to rent suits under local rent legislation, reinforcing the Court's view that CPC can apply to Act X proceedings.
Radha Madhub v. Lakhi Narain Held that section 373 CPC did not apply to suits before Revenue authorities; the Court there treated Act X of 1859 as a "complete Code" for matters specially provided for in the Act. Noted as a decision that took a contrary view to Nilmony Singh; the present Court criticized its reliance on a notion of completeness that ignored Nilmony Singh and related authorities.
Nogendra Nath v. Mathura Mahun Related to the application of section 14 of the Limitation Act to rent suits in Revenue Courts (cited in Radha Madhub). Cited only as a precedent relied upon in Radha Madhub; the present Court did not treat it as dispositive against Nilmony Singh.
Makunda Bullabh v. Bhogban Chandra A Bench held that section 373 CPC did not apply (same view as Radha Madhub) and distinguished Nilmony Singh as not specifically dealing with section 373. The Court disagreed with the distinction and used Nilmony Singh to justify that CPC provisions (including post-sale remedies) must be followed in the absence of express contrary provisions in Act X.
Hare Krishna v. Bhusan Chandra Expressed serious doubt whether, in view of Nilmony Singh, Act X of 1859 can still be said to be a "complete Code" in the sense of excluding the CPC's application. Referred to as supportive of the proposition that Nilmony Singh limits the "complete code" notion and that the CPC may apply to proceedings under Act X.
Ram Lochan v. Beni Prosad A Bench relied on Nilmony Singh and an Allahabad Full Bench (Madho Prokash v. Murli Monohar) to hold that section 492 CPC (injunctions) applied to rent-decrees under the local Rent Act transferred for execution to a Civil Court. Used to reinforce the Court's conclusion that provisions of the CPC apply where Act X does not expressly provide otherwise; cited in support of applying CPC remedies to transferred/executed rent-decrees.
Madho Prokash v. Murli Monohar Full Bench of Allahabad relied on Nilmony Singh for the proposition that CPC provisions (e.g., section 492) can apply to rent-decrees transferred for execution to a Civil Court. Cited (through Ram Lochan) as part of the chain of authority supporting the application of CPC provisions to rent-decrees where Act X is silent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two main strands of analysis: (1) jurisdiction to interfere with orders under Act X of 1859; and (2) the substantive legality of the sale and applicability of section 310A CPC.

1. Jurisdiction under section 15 of the Charter Act.

The Court considered the preliminary objection that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with orders made under Act X of 1859. It reviewed earlier authorities: the decision in Huro Mohun Mukerjee v. Kedar Nath Das (restrictive view), then later decisions (including Bhyrab Chandra, Golinda/Gobinda Coomer, Deanutoollah, and the Privy Council in Nilmony Singh) which moved away from that restrictive approach. The Court concluded—on the authority of Nilmony Singh and subsequent cases—that it had jurisdiction under section 15 of the Charter Act to supervise and, where appropriate, prevent Revenue Courts from exceeding their limited statutory jurisdiction under Act X of 1859.

2. Appeal vs. revision and the proper remedial route.

The Opposite Party argued that because the original suit exceeded Rs. 100 an appeal lay to the District Judge, precluding revisional interference. The Court rejected this: it held that the sale was impeached as ultra vires (illegal), and that the case also involved section 310A CPC (the auction-purchaser being a third party); in either event the Deputy Collector's proceedings were amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court rather than only to an appeal.

3. Merits — was the sale ultra vires?

The Deputy Collector had found that the tanki-tenure for which arrears were decreed was not saleable. That made the matter one under section 109 of Act X of 1859: other property of the judgment-debtor could only be sold if satisfaction could not be obtained by execution against the person or moveable property of the judgment-debtor. The record contained nothing to show that any attempt had been made to execute against the person or movables. The Deputy Collector's authorization for sale consisted only of an affidavit by the decree-holder requesting sale of the mafi-kharida land; no statutory procedure under section 109 was followed. Consequently, the sale of the lakhiraj (kharida) land was ultra vires and void. The Court expressly relied upon Deanutoollah v. Nawab Nazim as authority for that proposition.

4. Applicability of section 310A CPC.

The Court analysed whether section 310A CPC applied to sales under Act X of 1859. It reasoned that if the sale had complied with sections 109 and 110 (i.e., been a proper sale under Act X), then the sale would be governed by “the provisions of the law, for the time being in force, applicable to the sale of such under-tenures for demands other than those of arrears of rent,” which the Court interpreted as bringing in the Civil Procedure Code for matters from attachment to delivery of possession. The Court dealt with contrary pronouncements (e.g., Harish Chandra v. Ananta Charan and other decisions holding Act X to be a complete Code) and found that the Privy Council decision in Nilmony Singh established that, except where Act X expressly provides otherwise, procedure of the Civil Procedure Code must apply. The Court therefore concluded that section 310A CPC was applicable to the present case and that the Deputy Collector had failed to exercise lawful jurisdiction by refusing to entertain the petitioner's application under section 310A.

5. Outcome of the analysis.

On this combined analysis — (a) the sale was ultra vires because the statutory procedure for selling other property under section 109 was not followed; and (b) section 310A CPC applied and the Deputy Collector wrongly refused to entertain the remedy — the Court set aside the orders of the Deputy Collector and the Collector and declared the sale void.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The orders of the Deputy Collector and the Collector are set aside; the sale is held to be ultra vires and void.

Direct consequences for the parties (as directed by the Court):

  • The parties are to be restored to the position they occupied before the sale.
  • The auction-purchaser will be refunded the amount paid by him.
  • The decree-holder will realize his decretal amount first from the deposit made by the petitioner under section 310A CPC and any balance in due course of law.
  • Each party will pay its own costs in connection with these proceedings in all Courts.
  • The rule issued by the Court was made absolute.

Broader legal implication stated in the opinion: the Court held that the Civil Procedure Code (including section 310A) applies to sales under Act X of 1859 where the Act does not expressly provide otherwise; this view relies substantially on the Privy Council decision in Nilmony Singh v. Taranath Mukerjee and on subsequent domestic authorities.

Rule made absolute.
Show all summary ...

The Deputy Collector passed a decree for over Rs. 100 for the rent of a tanki-tenure. The learned Deputy Collector has upon a remand by this Court found that these tanki-tenures are not transferable. The decree-holder put in an application for execution and soon after an application that some other property of the judgment-debtor might be sold; this other property a kharida mafi-tenure of the judgment-debtor was accordingly sold. Having come to know of the sale he deposited the decretal amount with costs and the 5 per cent, payable to the auction-purchaser and asked for the cancelment of the sale; he also alleged fraud, irregularity and loss. The Deputy Collector held that sec. 310A, C.P.C, did not apply to sales under Act X of 1859 and there was no other law under which he could set aside the sale. On an appeal the Collector upheld the decision of the Deputy Collector and on motion to us we at first issued the above rule and being desirous to know whether the property had been rightly sold in accordance with law we asked for findings as to the nature of the tenure in respect of which arrears had been decreed and also the one sold. The findings have been sent and at the further hearing of the rule a preliminary objection has been taken that we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of the Deputy Collector and Collector passed under Act X of 1859 and reliance is placed on the case of Huro Mohun Mukerjee v. Kedar Nath Das. In this case L.S Jackson and Ghosh, JJ., held that the power of control and superintendence given by sec. 15 of the Charter Act was in reference to the general appellate jurisdiction of the Court and not to particular cases in which that jurisdiction is extraordinarily exercised or to a superintendence vested in the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue by the express provisions of the Act. This view certainly supports the objection but it has been subsequently departed from in a series of cases and virtually overruled. Very soon after the above case was decided the case of Bhyrab Chandra v. Shama Soondari in which Norman, J., said, “it is clear that the Collector's Court is a Court over which at the time of the passing of the Charter Act the Sudder Court possessed appellate jurisdiction and therefore it is clear that the 15th section of the Charter Act gives us a superintendence over such Courts for the purpose to which I have already alluded:” the purpose is set cut in the earlier part of the judgment and is “to compel them to do any act which by law they should do, to command them to execute all powers with which they are vested and to ??? them from meddling when they have no jurisdiction.” L.S Jackson, J., agreed. This was a case in which the Collector had entertained an appeal which lay to the District Judge. The same question came before the Full Bench in the next year in the case of Golinda Coomer v. Kristo Coomar. In this case the Deputy Collector refused to entertain an application for restitution of, an excess realised in execution of a decree subsequently modified. The Judge did not entertain an appeal as he thought an appeal was incompetent as the matter was subsequent to decree. The High Court compelled the Deputy Collector to entertain the application. It may be noted that there is no provision for such restitution in Act X of 1859 and the order must have been made in accordance with the general Civil Procedure Code.

Then in the case of Deanutoollah v. Nawab Nazim, Sir Barnes Peacock, C.J, and D.N Mitter, J., held that Act X of 1859 confers upon the Revenue Courts merely a limited jurisdiction and the High Court under its general power of control has the right to prevent them from exceeding that jurisdiction. In this case the attachment and sale order passed by a Collector in respect of properties of the judgment-debtor other than the tenure in arrear was set aside by the High Court as it was not shown that the Collector was satisfied that execution could not be obtained against the person and moveable property of the judgment-debtor.

In the case of Gudadhar v. Nund Lall, the order of the Collector ordering execution against a person against whom the decree passed had been cancelled, was set aside by the High Court. In the case of Rooknee Ray v. Amirt Lal, an appellate decree of the Collector was set aside as passed without jurisdiction. In the case of Naisir Jan v. Akbur, the Collector was compelled to entertain an intervention which he bad disallowed. The matter went up to the Privy Council in the case of Nilmony Singh v. Taranath Mukerjee. In that case an order of the Collector transferring a decree for execution to another district was s?t aside by the High Court as passed without jurisdiction on the authority of Gobinda Coomer v. Kristo Coomar and their Lordships of the Judicial Committee agreed with the High Court as to its jurisdiction under sec. 15 of the Charter Act.

The case of Mohant Gobind Ramanuja v. Lakhan Parida may seem at first blush to go a step further but we think it quite in keeping with the older decisions read by the light of the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Nilmony Singh v. Taranath.

We have therefore no doubt that we have jurisdiction to interfere under sec. 15 of the Charter Act. It was further con tended by the learned Vakil for the Opposite Tarty that as the original suit was valued at above Rs. 100 an appeal lay to the District Judge and not to the Collector and we cannot therefore interfere in revision. We cannot uphold this objection. In the first place the sale in this case is impeached as ultra vires and illegal and in the second place the case was one under sec. 310A, C.P.C, the auction-purchaser being a third party and in either case the proceedings of the Deputy Collector are amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court and not to an appeal.

On the merits of the case it is contended by the learned Vakil for the Petitioner, firstly, that the learned Deputy Collector had no jurisdiction to hold the sale of other lakhiraj property of the Petitioner in the manner in which he did it and that on that ground the sale and all subsequent proceedings are ultra vires and void; and, secondly, that the learned Deputy Collector was quite competent to entertain the application under sec. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code and in re-fusing to do so refused to exercise lawful jurisdiction.

On the first point the learned Deputy Collector has found that the tanki-tenure in respect of which arrears had been decreed was not saleable. The case, therefore, was clearly one under sec. 109 of Act X of 1859 and the other property of the Petitioner could be sold only if satisfaction of the judgment could not be obtained by execution against his person or moveable property. In this case that procedure was not followed. There is nothing to show that any attempt was made to execute the decree against the person or the moveable property of the Petitioner. All that the learned Deputy Collector says is “on the 26th February 1909, the decree-holder made an affidavit that the tanki-tenure for which he had obtained a decree for arrears having been allotted for the sheba of Jaggannath temple, other properties of the judgment-debtor may be sold for realisation of the decretal amount and according to his prayer the mafi-kharida land 162 acres were sold.” As the jurisdiction of the Deputy Collector ??? limited one and the procedure under sec. 109 was not followed, the sale of the lakhiraj land of the judgment-debtor was ultra vires and must be set aside, see Deanutoollah v. Nawab Nazim.

The second question raised by the Petitioner is whether sec. 310A was applicable to the case. If the sale had been held in due compliance with the provisions of secs. 109 and 110, the sale would be “under the provisions of the law, for the time being in force, applicable to the sale of such under-tenures for demands other than, those of arrears of rent due in respect thereof,” i.e, under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. This would naturally attract all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code with regard to sales, from attachment to delivery of possession at least, and there is no special provision in Act X of 1859 dealing with these matters. It is contended however that only those sections of the Code are applicable which provide for proceedings up to and inclusive of the sale and none else: reliance is placed for this contention on the case of Harish Chandra v. Ananta Charan. The learned Judges are reported to have said “the Code of Civil Procedure applies up to the sale and does not apply after. Sec. 310A comes in after the provisions relating to sale:“although there is no discussion of the reasons pro and con and no reference is made to what the law is after sale in such cases, we should have felt ourselves somewhat embarrassed by this case if it were not for the further contentions of the learned Vakil that this decision is in direct contravention of the ratio decidejndi of the case of Nilmony Singh v. Taranath Mukerjee decided by the Privy Council in 1882 and not referred to by the learned Judges. That was a case in which their Lordships had to consider whether a Collector could transfer a decree for rent for execution to a Civil Court in another district. The High Court had held that there was no provision for such a transfer in Act X, of 1859 and the transfer was therefore incompetent. Their Lordships in setting aside the order of the High Court say that Revenue Courts deciding suits under Act X of 1859 are Civil Courts and “there is nothing in the Act (X of 1859) which provides for any execution beyond his (Collector's) jurisdiction and there is nothing to forbid the conclusion that such executions are left to the operations of Act XXXIII of 1852 or the corresponding portion of Act. VIII of 1859.” This and other reasons given for the decision seem to leave no room for doubt that their Lordships thought that except upon points expressly provided for by Act X of 1859 the procedure of the Revenue Courts when trying questions arising under that Act must be governed by the Civil Procedure Code. It cannot be said however that the ratio decidendi of their Lordships has been uniformly kept in sight in subsequent cases. The mojority of the Allahabad Court followed up the said reasoning of their Lordships and held that sec. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code was applicable to rent suits under Act XII of 1881, the local Rent Act. This decision of the Allahabad Court was followed by our own Court in the case of Adhirani v. Raghu(11). In the case of Radha Madhub v. Lakhi Narain, the learned Judges held that sec. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply to suits before Revenue authorities. Mr. Justice Ameer Ali, as he then was, who delivered the judgment of the Court, said “we think the point has been virtually decided by the reasoning in the Full Bench decision in Nogendra Nath v. Mathura Mahun.” The latter case however was in respect of the provisions of sec. 14 of the Limitation Act, applying to rent suits in Revenue Courts.

The learned Judges said “Act X of 1859 has always been considered a Code complete, in itself and unaffected by the general laws of limitation or procedure.” The discussion was confined to the question of limitation and the case of Nilmony Singh Deo was not so much as mentioned, The expression “complete Code” must therefore be understood as complete as to matters specially provided for in the Act. In this view of the case it was not a sound basis for the judgment in Radha Madhub v. Lakhi Narain. In the next case on the point, however, Makunda Bullabh v. Bhogban Chandra(14), another Bench held the same view as to sec. 373. The learned Judges say as to the case of Nilmony Singh that it held that “there being nothing in Act X of 1859 to prohibit the Collector acting under that Act from transferring an execution case from his own file to the file of a Civil Court, the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code might be followed in the matter of the transfer of the decree for execution to some other Codes” and they distinguish it as not specifically dealing with sec. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code. With great deference to the learned Judges we may point out that the Judicial Committee in the case of Nilmony Singh does not hold that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code might be followed as if the Collector had a discretion in the matter but their Lordships say “These considerations lead to the conclusion that the Revenue Courts established by Act X of 1859 must be held to fall within sec. 284 of Act VIII of 1859 of the same year.” Sec. 284 of Act VIII of 1859 ran as follows: “A decree of any Civil Court …. which cannot be executed within the jurisdiction of the Court whose duty it is to execute the same may be executed within the jurisdiction of any other such Court in the manner following.” The result of the ruling of their Lordships is, we think, that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code must be followed in such cases. In the case of Hare Krishna v. Bhusan Chandra, Stephen and Mookerjee, JJ., express a serious doubt as to whether in view of the ruling in Nilmony Singh's case it can still be said that Act X of 1859 is a complete Code in itself in the sense of excluding the application of the Civil Procedure Code to proceedings thereunder. In the case of Ram Lochan v. Beni Prosad, another Bench of this Court relied upon the case of Nilmony Singh and the Full Bench ruling of the Allahabad Court in Madho Prokash v. Murli Monohar(17) for holding that the provisions of sec. 492 of the Civil Procedure Code as to injunctions applied to rent-decrees under the North-Western Provinces Rent Act XII of 1881 transferred for execution to a Civil Court. We think, therefore, that the cases decided in disregard or under a misconception of the ruling of the Privy Council in the case of Nilmony Singh cannot stand in the way of our holding that sec. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code was applicable to the present case and the learned Deputy Collector failed to exercise a lawful jurisdiction vested in him by law.

In the result, therefore, the orders of the Deputy Collector and the Collector are set aside. The sale is held to be ultra vires and void.

The parties are relegated to the position in which they were before the sale. The auction-purchaser will get back the amount paid by him. The decree-holder will realise his decretal amount first from the deposit made by the Petitioner under sec. 310A and any balance in due course of law. Each party will pay its own costs in connection with this proceeding in all Courts.

Rule made absolute.