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Pandillapalli Singa Reddi v. Yeddula Subba Reddi
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Full Bench; Reference Opinion)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs are the sons of the daughter of Pera Reddi by his first wife. The defendant is the husband of Pera Reddi's daughter by his second wife. The wives and the daughters are deceased; the defendant's mother-in-law (the second wife) Venkatammal died in 1912. Until her death she enjoyed the plaint lands as her husband's heir; on her death the plaintiffs, as reversioners, became entitled to possession. These facts were expressly found by the Court below.
Procedurally: the plaintiffs initially instituted Original Suit No. 46 of 1911 in Venkatammal's lifetime for a declaration that a settlement deed executed by Venkatammal in December 1909 in favour of the present defendant (which allegedly contained false recitals including an illatom son-in-lawship) was invalid as against the reversioners after Venkatammal's death. Venkatammal died while that suit was pending. After her death the plaintiffs withdrew the first suit (they did not seek leave to bring a fresh suit) and then instituted a second suit for possession on the now-vested cause of action. The defendant later contended that the second suit was barred — not by res judicata in the strict sense, since the first suit was withdrawn, but by Order XXIII, rule 1(3) of the Civil Procedure Code (a statutory bar applicable to withdrawn suits).
The plaintiffs succeeded on the merits in the lower Courts as regards most properties in dispute. A point of law was referred to a Full Bench by Sadasiva Ayyar, J., sitting as a court of reference; the Full Bench (Wallis, C.J., and Napier, J., agreeing) heard argument for the parties (T.V. Venkatarama Ayyar for the appellants; S. Varadachariar for the respondents) and delivered the opinion set out below.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a second suit, instituted after the plaintiff withdrew a previous suit without liberty to bring a fresh suit, is barred by Order XXIII, rule 1(3) of the Civil Procedure Code when the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are substantially different from those in the first suit.
- Whether the rule laid down in Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair — that a plaintiff who withdraws a former suit without leave cannot, in a subsequent suit, contest the truth of the allegations constituting the defence in the first suit — applies where the causes of action and reliefs in the two suits are substantially different.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments
- The defendant's counsel did not press the merits; instead he relied on a technical point of law — contending that the plaintiffs' second suit was barred by the withdrawal of the earlier suit under Order XXIII, rule 1(3) (i.e., that the second suit was in respect of the “same subject-matter”).
- The defendant relied on earlier decisions (in particular Machana Uajhala Dikshatulu v. Gorugantulu Yaggamma and Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair) as authority that a plaintiff withdrawing a suit without liberty to file a fresh suit cannot, in the subsequent suit, contest the defence allegations made in the first suit.
Respondents' (Plaintiffs') Position
- The plaintiffs withdrew the first suit after Venkatammal's death because their status changed from contingent to vested reversioners, giving them a new and different cause of action (entitled to possession) that did not exist at the time of the first suit (which sought only declaratory relief against the widow's alienation).
- They did not seek leave to file a fresh suit because, having become vested, they considered it appropriate to sue for possession directly; implicitly they contended the second suit was founded on a materially different cause of action and relief and therefore not within Order XXIII, rule 1(3)'s statutory bar.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair | The proposition (as stated in that decision) that where a plaintiff withdraws a suit without liberty to bring a fresh suit, he cannot in a subsequent suit contest the truth of allegations which constituted the defence in the first suit. | The Court examined the scope of that rule and distinguished between cases where the causes of action and reliefs are the same and where they are substantially different. The Full Bench held that the decision ought to be overruled insofar as it was taken to mean that defence allegations in a withdrawn suit are incontrovertible in a subsequently brought suit based on a different cause of action or different reliefs. |
| Machana Uajhala Dikshatulu v. Gorugantulu Yaggamma | Applied Achuta Menon to a factually similar situation (withdrawal of suit and subsequent suit for possession), and treated the second suit as barred by the corresponding provision. | The Court considered this decision to have been followed from Achuta Menon; the Full Bench evaluated its applicability and concluded that Machana (as following Achuta Menon) must be overruled on the point where it extends the doctrine to cases of substantially different causes of action/reliefs. |
| Sennava Reddiar v. Venkatachala Reddiar | Held a second suit barred by Order XXIII, rule 1(3), following Achuta Menon and Machana. | The Court noted that Sennava had followed Achuta Menon and Machana; Sadasiva Ayyar expressed doubts about Sennava, and the Full Bench concluded that the authorities following Achuta Menon should be overruled to the extent they bar a second suit founded on a different cause of action or different reliefs. |
| Gopal Chandra Banerjee v. Purna Chandra Banerjee | Principle that mere identity of the property is not sufficient to make two suits the same matter where the state of facts and reliefs claimed are different; the second suit may not be for the "same matter." | The Full Bench expressly relied on and followed this decision: it supported the conclusion that where cause of action and relief differ, the second suit is not in respect of the same subject-matter under Order XXIII, rule 1(3). |
| Pullayya Dikshatulu v. Yagnamma | Reported facts similar to the present type of controversy; in that instance the Court (Ayling and Tyabji, JJ.) followed Achuta Menon and dismissed a suit as barred by Order XXIII, rule 1(3). | The opinion reviewed the printed papers and noted their similarity; the Full Bench used the discussion of that line of authority to explain why it would depart from that earlier approach in the present case. |
| Damodaran v. Theyyanakan | Referred to as a recent case where Sadasiva Ayyar (and colleague) followed Sennava Reddiar; in that case the first and second suits were found substantially identical and the defendants' defence pleas pleaded in the first suit could not be controverted in the second; relief was given to the plaintiff on the basis of the facts pleaded in the first suit. | The present opinion distinguishes Damodaran on its facts (where causes and reliefs were substantially identical) and notes that Damodaran did not dismiss the second suit but granted relief on the basis of the defence facts pleaded earlier. |
| Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal | Privy Council decision recognized that a contingent reversioner has a special cause of action to bring a suit to declare a widow's alienation invalid; such suits are brought on behalf of all possible contingent reversioners. | The Court cited this decision to support the proposition that a contingent reversioner's declaratory suit is of a different character from a suit by a vested reversioner for possession after the widow's death. |
| Syed Siliman Sahib v. Hussain Sahib | Held that a suit for declaration by a person out of possession is a different cause of action from a suit for possession on the same title. | The Court relied upon this to reinforce that a declaratory suit by a contingent reversioner differs in essential respects from a subsequent possession suit by a vested reversioner. |
| Kamini Kant Roy v. Ram Nath Chuckerbutty | Held that where causes of action were different, the repetition of the same defence and the withdrawal of the first suit without liberty did not preclude the plaintiff from controverting that defence in the second suit. | The opinion cited this as supporting authority for permitting contest of defence allegations where causes of action differ. |
| Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vythinatha Ayyar | Discussed meanings of expressions like "subjects in dispute" and "subject-matter" under the old Code and emphasized that "subject in dispute" signifies the jural relation or cause of action rather than requiring uniting all possible claims to the same corpus. | The Court relied on this exposition to argue for a narrower, cause-of-action oriented construction of statutory bars and "subject-matter" language. |
| Kaveri Ammal v. Sastri Ramier | Used the phrase "object-matters" in the context of res judicata discussions (as cited). | Cited as part of the survey of differing expressions used in res judicata and related provisions; the opinion used it to show variety of terms and to caution against overly broad constructions. |
| Krishna Behari Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdranee; Ummatha v. Cheria Kunhamed; Alluni v. Kunjusha | Establish the settled proposition that where causes of action are different, even a dismissal of the first suit after contest is no bar to a second suit on a substantially different cause of action, even though defences may be the same. | The opinion invoked these authorities to support the view that a plaintiff who withdraws a suit should not be put in a worse position than one whose suit was dismissed after contest, when the causes of action differ. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds in two interlinked strands: (1) interpretation of the statutory bar in Order XXIII, rule 1(3) (and comparison with the corresponding language in the old section 373), and (2) application of that interpretation to the facts of this case and to the line of authorities that had previously applied Achuta Menon broadly.
Sadasiva Ayyar, J., first set out the factual matrix (withdrawal of the first suit after the widow's death, plaintiffs' change in legal character from contingent to vested reversioners, and the consequent change in relief available — from declaration to possession). He observed that the defendant's plea was not strict res judicata (the first suit was withdrawn), but a statutory bar under Order XXIII, rule 1(3). He traced the line of authority applying Achuta Menon and noted that some Judges had extended Achuta Menon to hold defence allegations in a withdrawn suit incontrovertible in a later suit even where the cause of action changed.
Justice Sadasiva Ayyar accepted that where the causes of action and reliefs are substantially the same the rule in Achuta Menon applies (i.e., Order XXIII will operate to bar a fresh suit in respect of the same matter). However, he rejected the broader obiter dictum in Achuta Menon which purported to make the defence allegations in the first suit incontrovertible in a second suit even when the causes of action and reliefs were substantially different. He illustrated by a hypothetical extreme example to show the unfairness and impracticality of extending that doctrine so far.
He emphasized several points taken from authorities and statutory language:
- The change from contingent reversioner (able to sue for declaration) to vested reversioner (able to claim possession) is a change in the character of the cause of action; the widow's death is a material, dispositive event.
- The language used across different statutory provisions ("matter", "subject-matter", "subjects in dispute", "cause of action") varies and must be read carefully; prior cases that equated "matter" too broadly were being pushed beyond their proper scope.
- There is authority (including Privy Council and High Court decisions) supporting the proposition that a declaratory suit by a contingent reversioner is different in character from a later suit for possession by a vested reversioner, and that where causes of action are different the statutory bars and res judicata do not operate to preclude the second suit.
The matter was referred to a Full Bench with the specific question whether Achuta Menon should be applied where the causes of action and reliefs in the two suits are substantially different. Wallis, C.J., delivering the Full Bench opinion (with Napier, J., concurring), agreed with Sadasiva Ayyar that the terms "subject-matter" and "the same matter" in Order XXIII, rule 1(3) should be strictly construed in a provision of penal character. They held that where the cause of action and relief in the second suit are not the same as those in the first suit, the second suit cannot be regarded as brought in respect of the same subject-matter; consequently the plaintiff in the second suit is not debarred from contesting the allegations made in the defence in the first suit.
The Full Bench expressly relied on Gopal Chandra Banerjee v. Purna Chandra Banerjee for the proposition that identity of property alone does not make two suits the same matter when causes and reliefs differ. On that basis the Bench concluded that Achuta Menon and the decisions that followed it in applying the broader doctrine must be overruled.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench held that the second suit was not barred by Order XXIII, rule 1(3) because the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit were not the same as those in the first suit; accordingly the plaintiff in the second suit is not debarred from contesting the defence allegations made in the first suit. The Court concluded that the decision in Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair and the subsequent decisions following it (including Machana Uajhala Dikshatulu v. Gorugantulu Yaggamma and Sennava Reddiar v. Venkatachala Reddiar) must be overruled to the extent they applied a broader rule to cases where causes of action and reliefs differ.
Immediate consequences for the parties:
- The plaintiffs' second suit (for possession after the widow's death) is maintainable and the plaintiffs are permitted to contest the defence allegations previously set up in the withdrawn suit.
- The defendant's technical objection based on Order XXIII, rule 1(3) fails on the facts and legal analysis articulated by the Full Bench.
Wider implications noted by the Court (as expressed in the opinion): the statutory expressions relating to res judicata and withdrawn suits must be construed with attention to their language and penal character. The decision narrows the scope of the rule that had been read broadly in Achuta Menon and associated cases so that that rule will not, in future, be applied to bar second suits founded on substantially different causes of action or seeking different reliefs.
Counsel and Court: T.V. Venkatarama Ayyar for the appellants; S. Varadachariar for the respondents. Opinion delivered by Wallis, C.J., with Napier, J., agreeing; Order of reference and initial opinion by Sadasiva Ayyar, J.
Sadasiva Ayyar, J.:— The defendant is the appellant. The plaintiffs are the sons of the daughter of Pera Reddi by his first wife. The defendant is the husband of the deceased daughter of Pera Reddi by his second wife. The wives and the daughters are all dead, the second wife who was the defendant's mothers in-law having died in 1912. Till her death, she was entitled to enjoy the plaint lands as her husband's heir. After her death, the plaintiffs as reversioners are entitled to possession. These are the facts found. The plaintiffs' case succeeded on the merits in the lower Courts as regards most of the properties in dispute. The defendant's learned vakil Mr. T.V Venkatarama Ayyar did not and could not seriously argue on the merits, the illatom son-in-lawship set up by his client having been found against by the lower Courts.
The learned vakil therefore based his strenuous contentions on a technical question of law. To understand that question, a few further facts have to be stated. The plaintiffs had brought-Original Suit No. 46 of 1911 during the lifetime of the defendant's mother-in-law, Venkatammal, against the present defendant (as the first defendant) and against Venkatammal (as the second defendant) for a declaration that the alienation by a settlement deed made by Venkatammal in December 1909 in favour of the present defendant (then first defendant) making several false recitals as to the defendant being an illatom son-in-law and so on, may be declared invalid and not binding on the reversioners after Venkatammal's death. Venkatammal died in 1912 during the pendency of that suit. The present defendant set up the very same false defences on the merits which he hasset up in this suit. During the pendency of that suit Venkatammal died. Then the plaintiffs withdrew that suit as, from having been merely contingent reversioners, they became vested reversioners on her death and had become entitled not only to sue for a declaration of the invalidity of Venkatammal's acts after her death but also to sue for possession itself of the lands. They did not ask for permission to bring a fresh suit on the freshly acquired cause of action for fresh reliefs; evidently they thought it would be unnecessary, to do so (see Exhibit IXa) The defendant contended at a late stage of the trial of this suit in the first Court that the suit was barred as res judicata by the withdrawal of the former suit. It was clear that there could be no res judicata in the usual and strict sense of that term as the first suit was not heard and decided and was only withdrawn from the adjudication of the Court. What the defendant meant by the plea of res judicata however appears to be that the suit was, barred by rule 1(3) of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code. This statutory bar cannot, in my opinion, be called res judicata.
In the lower Courts, Machana Uajhala Dikshatulu v. Gorugantulu Yaggamma(1) was relied upon by the defendant. That case was almost but not quite on all fours with the present suit. The plaintiffs there were also reversioners who had first sued for a declaration that the alienations by the widow were invalid, withdrew that suit against some of the defendants and as against some properties in the possession of those defendants without obtaining liberty to bring a fresh suit and then brought a second suit after the death of the widow against those defendants for possession of those properties. The judgment of the learned Judges (Munro and Sankaran Nair, JJ.) is contained in the following sentence: “Following Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair(2), we dismiss the Second Appeal with costs.” The Subordinate Judge in his judgment refers to this decision as follows: “There are no reasons given in the judgement which is very brief. It merely follows Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair. The full facts have not been given. It is very probable that the plaintiff who proceeded to trial in respect of some property in the previous suit was held not entitled to maintain a second suit with reference to the property as to which he withdrew the claim. But in the present case, the plaintiffs did not proceed to trial at all as the widow died. They withdrew the entire suit and instituted this fresh suit for possession of the entire property.” I am unable to concur with the learned Subordinate Judge that the fact that the first suit was not withdrawn in its entirety in Machana Uajhala Dikshatulu v. Gorugantulu Yaggamma could make any difference in principle, having regard to the language of section 373, corresponding to the present Order XXIII, that language making no difference in the result between the withrawal of a portion or the withdrawal of the whole of a suit as regards the effect of such withdrawal on the suit or the portion of the suit as the case may be. Then the learned Subordinate Judge says in paragraph 52 of his judgment that in Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair, the first and the second suits, were both suits for the relief of ejectment and that the titles setup in the two suits were also substantially the same and that the general observations in Achuta Menon v. Aahutan Nair, namely, that where the first suit was withdrawn without liberty to bring a fresh Suit, the plaintiff cannot contest in the second suit the allegations which constituted the defence or part of that defence to the claim made in the first suit, must be confined to cases where the causes of action for the two suits and the reliefs claimed in the two suits are substantially the same.
The learned District Judge in paragraph 20 of his judgment says: “The only case on which the appellant can rely is Machona Uajhala Dikshatulu v. Gorugantulu Yaggamma but I find it difficult to apply this case in the absence of a full report of the facts.” I have perused the printed papers in Pullayya Dikshatulu v. Yagnamma(3) and I find the facts are not so different in material particulars as to affect the applicability to this case of what I must hold to have been the principle of the decision in Sennava Reddiar v. Venkatachala Reddiar(4) Ayling and Tyabji, JJ., held themselves bound by the decisions in Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair and Machana Uajhala Dikshatulu v. Gorugantulu Yaggamma and dismissed an absolutely similar suit to the present one as barred by Order XXIII, rule 1(3), of the Civil Procedure Code. In that case also, the widow died during the pendency of the first suit. The learned Judges held that the slight difference in language between section 373 and Order XXIII, rule 1(3) (the word “matter” being substituted by the words “subject-matter”), did not make any difference. Tyabji, J., says: “In the face of the above” two “decisions,” “there is no room for any further discussion of the law.” I am free to confess that I feel grave doubts as regards the decisions in Sennava Reddiar v. Venkatachala Reddiar is concerned, my learned brother and myself followed it recently in Damodaran v. Theyyanakan. But in that case, the cause of action for and the relief claimed in the first suit were found for the purposes of that decision to have been substantially identical with the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit and we held that the facts mentioned in the defence in the first suit cannot be controverted in the second suit. We did not, however, dismiss the second suit but gave relief to the plaintiff on the basis of the truth of the facts pleaded by the contesting defendants in the first suit: Mr. Varada Achariyar wished to attack Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair on the ground that on the facts of that case the second suit could not be held to have been on substantially the same cause of action as the first suit and hence that decision itself was wrong. I do not think when dealing with a question of law such as this we could go behind the statement of the learned Judges as ta the nature of the relationship between the causes of action in the two respective suits. At page 39 the learned Judges say: “In our opinion it cannot properly be said that there is no integrate connection whatever between the plaintiff's allegations in the two suits, that there is a complete difference between the cause of action alleged before and that alleged now, and that the transaction of 1893 between the plaintiff and the present Zamorin, which is the only distinguishing circumstance relied on, imposed on the defendants a duty wholly or to any extent different from that to which they were subject before that transaction took place.” Then, no doubt, they go on to say “suppose, however, that the plaintiff's cause of action in the previous suit was different from, that in the present suit,” and to express the opinion that even in that case the plaintiff would be barred from controverting the defence allegations in the first suit.
While I am prepared to follow the ruling in Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair where the causes of action for the two suits are substantially the same, I regret that I cannot follow the obiter dictum, that even if the causes of action are substantially different, the facts stated in the defence in the first withdrawn suit cannot be controverted in the second suit. If the causes of action are the same and if the reliefs claimable (though not claimed) are the same, then also Order XXIII will apply, read with Order II, rule 2. Where the causes of action are substantially different and a fortiori, where not only the causes of action are different but the reliefs claimed are different and still more, where not only the causes of action are substantially different, but the reliefs claimed are bound to be different, I do not think that the defence pleas in the first suit are made incontrovertible in the second suit by the provisions of Order XXIII. Nor do I think that the difference in language by the substitution of the word “subject-matter” [(which is the word used in the Order XXIII, rule 1(3)], for the word “matter” (which was the word used in paragraph 2 of section 373) can be held to make any difference in the scope of the two provisions. While paragraph 1 of section 373 used the word “subject-matter” paragraph 2 used the word “matter” and this was corrected in the new Code for the sake of uniformity. I might further respectfully point out that no authority is quoted for giving such a very wide interpretation to the word “subject-matter” or “matter” in Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair, that is, so as to include the defence allegations in the first suit even where the second suit is brought on a different cause of action. Let me take an extreme case to show the length to which we would have to go if the obiter dictum in Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair is followed. Suppose A brings his first suit against B, a trespasser who trespassed on the plaint lands one year before suit, A claiming title as purchaser from C whom he treated as the heir of D, the admitted former owner. B sets up a false claim of ownership in himself as heir to D (the admitted owner who died two years before suit) in preference to the plaintiff's vendor C. During the course of the suit, A finds that neither C nor B is the real owner but E is the owner as the real heir of D. He therefore withdraws his first suit against B without permission to bring a fresh suit. He then gets a conveyance from E and within three years of the death of the admitted owner D, brings a second suit against B basing it on the title obtained by the purchase from F. Can it be argued that his second suit based on the purchase from E the real owner is barred by the incontrovertibility of the false defence raised by B in the first suit, though the plaintiff honestly and properly withdrew his first suit which he brought through his mistaken notion that C was the heir of D and which suit was bound to fail?
I am further clear that the suit for declaration brought by a contingent reversioner who has really no title in the eye of the law [see section 6, clause (a) of the Transfer of Property Act and section 60, proviso clause (m) of the Civil Procedure Code] and who is given a special cause of action by the current of decisions in the Privy Council to bring a suit to declare the widow's alienation invalid as against the reversioners and whose suit as recently decided by the Privy Council in Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal is brought on behalf of all the possible contingent reversioners, is brought by him in a quite different character from a suit brought by the same person in whom the inheritance became fully vested on the death of the widow to recover possession of the property from the widow's alienee. The fact of the widow's death is a most important fact which thoroughly changes the nature of the cause of action and which vests the cause of action in a particular defined person and not in the whole body of possible contingent reversioners. Further while in the contingent reversioner's suit he cannot claim the relief of possession but only the relief of declaration (and reliefs appurtenant to that declaratory relief), in the second suit he cannot claim the relief of declaration as a substantial relief or as the only relief but can and ought to claim the relief of possession; see Syed Siliman Sahib v. Hussain Sahib which is a still stronger case in favour of the plaintiff because it was held but a suit for declaration by a person out of possession was on a different cause of action from that on which a second suit for possession on the same title was based. Again in Gopal Chandra Banerjee v. Purna Chandra Banerjee, Banerjee, J., says: “The mere fact of two suits being in respect, of the same property would not be sufficient to make the latter suit one for the same matter as the former, when the state of foots leading to the two suits and the reliefs claimed under them are different.” In Kamini Kant Roy v. Ram Nath Chuckerbutty, Banerjee and Rampini, JJ., held that where the causes of action were different, the fact that the defence was the same in both suit and the first suit was withdrawn without liberty to bring a fresh suit did not prevent the plaintiff from controverting in the second suit the defence made in the first suit and repeated in the second.
In section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code which treats of bar by res judicata the word used in the section in explanations 3 and 4 is “matter.” In the statutory bar prescribed in Order II, rule 2, the expressions used are “subjects in dispute,” “cause of action” and “claim.” In the statutory bar enacted in Order XXIII the word is “subject-matter.” In Kaveri Ammal v. Sastri Ramier the word “object-matters” is used (see line 2) when considering the question of res judicata. In Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vythinatha Ayyar, Sir Bhashyam Ayyangar considers fully the provisions of the old Civil Procedure Code corresponding to the provision of section 11 and Order II of the new Code. At page 763 he says: “The first contention is mainly based on the argument that the phrase ‘the subjects in disputes’ occurring in section 42 connotes the corpus or object-matter of the claim and that, therefore, all possible claims to the same should necessarily be offered for decision in the suit. In our opinion the expression ‘the subject in dispute’ signifies the jural relation between the parties to the suit, for the determination of which the suit is brought. In other words, the object of section 42 is to require the plaintiff to bring forward his whole case as to the matter of litigation on the question of right involved in the suit and not to require him to unite all the causes of action which he may have against the defendant in respect of the corpus or object-matter of the suit.” Then at page 766 he says: “It is clear that the expression ‘subjects in dispute’ means the cause of action or the subject-matter of litigation, that is, the right which one party claims as against the other and demands the judgment of the Court upon.” At page 768, he refers to Mr. Justice Holloway's decision where the expressions “matter of litigation,” “question of right,” “particular bind of claim” occur.
It may be that there are subtle and refined distinctions between the meanings of the different expressions “subject-matter,” “corpus,” “object-matter,” “cause of action,” “matter,” “transaction” [a word used in some places in Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vythinatha Ayyar], “ground of claim” and so on. I do not mean to venture upon a discussion of such differences. In Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair, the word “matter” in section 373 was held to include the question which is raised in the allegations of the defendant. The expression “fresh suit for the same matter” was considered as meaning a fresh suit which involves the truth of the allegations of the defendant forming part of the matter to be decided in the former suit. It may therefore be that the word “matter” has a larger meaning than “cause of action.” But can the “matter” in the second suit be held to be the same when the cause of action is substantially different though the defence is the same? In respect of the bar by res judicata, it has now been settled by the decisions in Krishna Behari Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdranee, Ummatha v. Cheria Kunhamed, Alluni v. Kunjusha(5) and Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vythinatha Ayyar that, where the causes of action are different, even a dismissal of the first suit by the Court after contest on the merits is no bar to the maintainability of a second suit on a substantially different cause of action, even though the defences may be the same in the two suits. Is a plaintiff who, honestly in order to save the time of and trouble to the Court, withdraws the first suit instead of allowing it to be dismissed on the unsustainability of the rights set up by him, to be in a worse position by his said honest withdrawal than if he had delayed the disposal of that suit and obliged the Court to give its opinion on the merits of his first cause of action?
I would therefore refer to the opinion of the Full Bench the following question:—
Whether the rule laid down in Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair (that a plaintiff who has withdrawn a former suit without permission to bring a second suit is prevented from agitating in the second suit the truth of the allegations which constitute defence in the first suit) applies in the present case where the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are substantially different from those in the first suit.
Napier, J.:— I entirely agree. It seems to me that there must be a distinction in a case like this where the first suit would not give the plaintiff all that he became entitled to when the death of the widow gave him a new cause of action; unless he got leave to amend, he would necessarily have to bring a second action founded on the declaration given in the first, and it is more reasonable that he should withdraw the first suit and bring a consolidated suit for possession.
The case came before the Full Bench.
T.V Venkatarama Ayyar for the appellants.
S. Varadachariar for the respondents.
The following Opinion of the Court was delivered by
Wallis, C.J:— We agree with the conclusions of Sadasiva Ayyar, J., in the Order of Reference.
The question is whether the second suit can be regarded as brought in respect of the same subject-matter as the first suit within the meaning of Order XXIII, rule 1(3) of the Civil Procedure Code. The terms “subject-matter” and “the same matter” which occurred in the corresponding section 373 of the old Code have not been defined, and must, we think, be construed strictly in a penal provision of this character. Without attempting an exhaustive definition of all that may be included in the term “subject-matter” we are of opinion that where, as in the present case, the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are not the same as the cause of action and the relief claimed in the first suit, the second suit cannot be considered to have been brought in respect of the same subject-matter as the first suit. This was expressly decided in Gopal Chandra Banerjee v. Purna Chandra Banerjee with which we agree. It follows that the plaintiff in the second suit is not debarred from contesting the allegations made by the defence in the first suit. We think that the decision in Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nair and the decisions which followed it, viz., Machana Uajhala Dikshatulu v. Gorugantulu Yaggamma and Sennava Reddiar v. Venkatachala Reddiar must be overruled.
C.M.N
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