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Uttamrao v. Daulat
Full Bench Opinion — Summary (as contained in the provided text)
Factual and Procedural Background
The disputed property originally belonged to a joint Hindu family composed of Krishnaji, Ramji and Zaboo. Ramji and Zaboo predeceased Krishnaji, leaving widows Baijabai and Bainabai respectively. Krishnaji was the last surviving male coparcener; he died in 1907 and his widow Sitabai succeeded to his estate and held it until her death in 1909. Thereafter the estate vested in Bainabai (widow of the predeceased son Zaboo) under the Bombay School rules applicable in Berar. Bainabai died in 1917. The plaintiff alleged that upon Bainabai's death the estate devolved to Baijabai (widow of Ramji) who held it until her death in 1919 and thereafter to Krishnaji's mother's sisters' sons Gangaram and Janji (bhinna gotra sapindas). The plaintiff Uttamrao is an assignee (by assignment dated 19 January 1920) of Janji's moiety and sued for possession, alleging wrongful obstruction by defendant 1 (Daulat), who claimed title as an adopted grandson of Krishnaji by virtue of an adoption made in April 1917 by Bainabai with consent of Baijabai.
Procedurally, the trial Court held the adoption valid and dismissed the suit; the District Judge affirmed that dismissal on appeal. The plaintiff obtained special leave for a second appeal and the question of the adoption's validity—on which there was apparent conflict among authorities—was referred to a Full Bench for authoritative determination. The Full Bench heard extensive argument and delivered the opinion reproduced here.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the adoption made in April 1917 by Bainabai (daughter-in-law of Krishnaji) of Daulat (defendant 1) was valid in law, having regard to the sequence of succession (Sitabai the widow of Krishnaji having held the estate earlier).
- Whether, under the Bombay School of Hindu law and on the authorities cited (including Privy Council decisions), a widow's power to adopt is limited and specifically whether that power is extinguished when the estate vests in a nearer heir other than the widow (and cannot be revived later).
- Whether any of the specific grounds asserted by the plaintiff (that defendant 1 was an orphan; that Bainabai lacked authority because she did not take the estate directly as heir of her husband; that Baijabai's consent was ineffective) rendered the adoption invalid.
- Whether earlier Bombay High Court and Privy Council decisions (and the recent Bombay Full Bench decision in Ishwar Dadu v. Gajabai Babaji) must be followed by subordinate Courts in cases governed by the Bombay School of law.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The adoption by Bainabai was legally incompetent/invalid because she did not take the estate directly as heir of her husband Zaboo (she succeeded only after Sitabai had held the estate).
- Four propositions (deduced from the Bombay School authorities) were advanced to support the view that a widow's power to adopt is limited:
- Only the widow (or, in default, the mother or grandmother who takes directly) of a full owner can adopt so as to divert succession.
- The widow's power to adopt is extinguished when a nearer heir than herself takes the estate; it is not merely suspended and cannot be revived later.
- A widow cannot adopt so as to divest another person's already vested estate.
- A widow who is a gotraja sapinda can never adopt so as to deviate succession if a nearer heir exists.
- Specific factual grounds were raised to challenge the adoption: (i) defendant 1 was an orphan; (ii) Bainabai lacked authority because she did not take directly as heir; (iii) Baijabai had no authority to consent. (The record shows some of these contentions were abandoned or found immaterial during proceedings.)
Respondent's (Defendant's / Lower Courts') Arguments
- Defendant 1 (Daulat) contended he acquired title by valid adoption made by Bainabai in April 1917; Baijabai had consented and even acted as guardian and recognized the adopted son's title until her death.
- The respondent argued that a daughter-in-law's position is the same whether she inherits directly on the death of the father-in-law or succeeds after the father-in-law's widow has died; in either event she inherits as the father-in-law's heir and should be able to adopt to continue the line.
- It was also contended that adoption ought to be upheld at least for spiritual purposes (oblations and spiritual benefits), and that if valid for spiritual purposes, the vesting of estate would follow legally (relying on authorities such as Yado v. Namdeo as cited by the lower Courts).
- Lower Courts found that (on facts) defendant 1 was not an orphan, Baijabai had consented and acquiesced, and therefore adoption was valid and plaintiff's suit for possession was rightly dismissed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ishwar Dadu v. Gajabai Babaji | Reaffirmed earlier Bombay decisions; raised the question whether those Bombay decisions should be followed as precedents under the Bombay School. | Cited as part of the context showing divergence of view in Bombay decisions and the need for an authoritative Full Bench view for subordinate Courts. |
| Ganpati v. Mt. Salu | Authority of this Court holding limits on widow's power to adopt in certain successions. | Relied on by appellant to support the proposition that where a widow succeeds directly she (and not a daughter-in-law) is the proper person to adopt to continue line. |
| Ramkrishna Ramchandra v. Shamrao Yeshwant (Full Bench) | Held that a widow's power of adoption is extinguished when a nearer heir than herself succeeds and cannot be revived. | Relied on by appellant; the Full Bench in the present case expressly follows the principle that widow's power ends when estate vests in a nearer heir. |
| Bhooban Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharjee (Privy Council) | Held that where the son (last full owner) dies leaving a widow who acquires a vested estate, a new heir by adoption cannot be substituted to defeat that vested widow's estate; the rule is that succession follows the heir of the last full owner. | Treated as the leading authority establishing the limitation on a widow's power to adopt; the Full Bench regards it as a controlling principle. |
| Padma Coomari v. Court of Wards (Privy Council) | Affirmed that upon vesting of estate in a widow the power of adoption (in a mother or other) is at an end and incapable of execution. | Used to support the conclusion that a widow's adoption power is terminated when an estate vests in a nearer heir and cannot be revived later. |
| Thayammal v. Venkatarama (Privy Council) | Held that adoption by a mother after the son's death and during the lifetime of the son's widow was invalid; endorsed the broader view that the power to adopt can be at an end. | Relied on to reject arguments that the widow's power is only suspended and can be revived; used as binding precedent to hold adoption invalid where estate had vested in widow. |
| Puddo Kumaree Debi v. Juggut Kishore Acharjee (Calcutta High Court; reversed by Privy Council) | Calcutta High Court originally held adoption by mother was valid after vesting; Privy Council later reversed. | Discussed as an instance where a High Court decision was ultimately reversed by Privy Council; the Full Bench treats the Privy Council reversal as authoritative. |
| Manikyamala Bose v. Nanda Kumar Bose (Calcutta Full Bench) | Full Bench held adoption invalid where made after the death of the widow of the last male-holder; followed Privy Council authorities. | Cited as supporting the view that a widow's adoption power is not revived by later succession and so adoptions made after intermediate vesting are invalid. |
| Tara Churn Chatterji v. Suresh Chunder Mukerji (Privy Council) | Privy Council decision cited as reinforcing the rule limiting widow's power to adopt. | Invoked by the Calcutta Full Bench and cited by the Full Bench in the present opinion in support of the limiting principle. |
| Krishnarao Trimbak v. Shankarrao Vinayak (Hasabnis's case, Bombay High Court) | Held adoption by a mother who succeeded as heir (after death of son and his widow) to be invalid according to Hindu law. | Adopted as a Bombay High Court authority consistent with Privy Council rulings and used to support the conclusion that adoption was invalid. |
| Shri Dharnidhar v. Chinto (Bombay High Court) | Held that where a Hindu died leaving a widow and a daughter-in-law, adoption by the daughter-in-law was invalid once the estate vested in the widow. | Relied on to show Bombay High Court precedent that a daughter-in-law's right to adopt ends when estate vests in the widow. |
| Keshav v. Govind | Cited (by Candy, J.) for the proposition that adoption rights are not suspended and then revived; once estate vests in the widow the right of the daughter-in-law to adopt is at an end. | Used to support the conclusion that daughter-in-law's adoption power does not survive the vesting of estate in the widow. |
| Amava v. Mahadgauda | Held that a widow's authority to adopt ends when the estate after being vested in her son has passed to his widow. | Cited as further confirmation of the rule that widow's adoption power is terminated by vesting in a nearer heir. |
| Narayan v. Debidas (Local case) | Held that where a son (natural or adopted) having inherited dies leaving another heir, any power to adopt held by the father's widow comes to an end. | Cited as a local authority consistent with the Privy Council doctrine; used to support the Full Bench position. |
| Madana Mohana v. Purushothama (Privy Council) | Full Bench principle from Bombay HC (Ramkrishna) was approved by Privy Council. | Cited as confirmation that the Full Bench's formulation (extinguishment of widow's power) has Privy Council approval. |
| Pratapsingh Shivsingh v. Agarsingji Rajsingji (Privy Council) | Later Privy Council citation approving Madana Mohana (and thereby the principle limiting widow's power). | Used to show continued acceptance of the limiting principle by Privy Council. |
| Suryaprakasa v. Gangaraju (Madras High Court) | Adoption by a widow (consent of another widow insufficient) held invalid where estate had already vested in the widow; supported that consent of vested heir does not validate late adoption. | Cited in support of the proposition that consent by the person in whose favour the estate had vested does not validate an otherwise invalid adoption. |
| Lachhmi Kunwar v. Durga Kunwar (Allahabad High Court) | Cited for the view that any adoption by a widow after the estate had vested in another widow could not affect the rights of that widow who had inherited as heir. | Discussed as another high court decision interpreting Privy Council rulings in the same limiting sense. |
| Narhar Govind v. Balwant Hari | Authority that a grandmother succeeding direct to her grandson can make a valid adoption. | Used to distinguish cases where a widow succeeds directly (valid adoption) from those where succession occurs after an intermediate vesting (invalid adoption). |
| Baswantrao v. Deorao | Bench of this Court held a daughter-in-law who succeeded directly to her father-in-law could make a valid adoption. | Discussed: where succession is direct adoption may be valid; the Full Bench distinguishes that from the present facts where succession was not direct. |
| Datto Govind v. Pandurang Vinayak | Held that a widow who succeeds to an estate as a gotraja sapinda (not as husband’s widow directly) cannot make a valid adoption. | Cited as a Bombay High Court decision taken to support restricting adoption powers when the widow's succession is as gotraja sapinda; the Full Bench discusses divergence of views on this point. |
| Lullobhoy v. Gassibai | Establishes the rule under which a widow may succeed as a gotraja sapinda in some circumstances (cited as part of the reasoning in Datto Govind). | Referenced to explain the legal basis by which a widow might inherit as a gotraja sapinda and the consequences for adoption power. |
| Dattatraya Bhimrao v. Gangabai; Yeknath Narayan v. Laxmibai; Shivbasappa v. Nilava | Cases cited as representing contrary views to Datto Govind: these suggest that a daughter-in-law succeeding directly may have adoption power. | Noted to illustrate that some benches took differing views; the Full Bench evaluates the authorities and aligns with the view limiting adoption power. |
| Gopal v. Vishnu | Authority for the proposition that the widow has a superior right to continue the propositus' line by adoption compared to a daughter-in-law. | Used to support the conclusion that Sitabai (Krishnaji's widow) had a superior right over Bainabai to adopt and continue the line. |
| Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Ayyar; Tripuramba v. Venhataraman; Anjirabai v. Pandurang Balkrishna; Sheik Dallu v. Panjab (A.I.R. 1924 Nag. 344) | Authorities cited to show that a mother succeeding direct (or other direct successions) may validly adopt to continue the line. | Displayed the distinction that direct succession supports valid adoption while succession after intermediate vesting does not. |
| Yado v. Namdeo | Discussed by lower Courts in support of spiritual validity arguments for adoption (spiritual benefits and consequences). | Mentioned by the opinion but the Full Bench declined to re-open Privy Council rulings based on spiritual-purpose arguments; the case is not relied upon to overturn controlling precedents. |
| Mataprasad v. Nageshar Sahai (Privy Council) | Statement that Indian Courts cannot question principles enunciated by the Judicial Committee (Privy Council); they must follow those principles when applicable. | Quoted to stress the binding nature of Privy Council decisions and to justify following the Privy Council's limiting rule on widow's adoption power. |
| Sri Virada Pratapa Baghunadha Deo v. Brozo Kishore Patta Deo; Chandra v. Gojarabai | Cited as cases where adoption by a widow (with proper consent) during the lifetime of a surviving coparcener was valid, but similar adoption after vesting in a widow would not divest estate. | Used to show contexts where adoptions were valid (when made before vesting in a nearer heir) and to underscore the time-limit principle. |
| Bassangowda v. Budrappa | Applied Datto Govind to hold a stepmother disentitled to adopt a son to her husband when she took as nearest sagotra sapinda after other succession events. | Reinforces the application of the limiting principle to various familial relationships (stepmother in this instance). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench proceeded in a stepwise fashion:
- It set out the relevant facts and procedural history (the sequence of deaths and successions, the date of adoption in April 1917 and the fact that Sitabai had held the estate on Krishnaji's death in 1907–1909).
- It identified the central disputed legal question as whether Bainabai (a daughter-in-law who succeeded after the widow had held the estate) had legal authority to adopt a son to her deceased husband Zaboo so as to create a line that would take Krishnaji's estate.
- The Bench reviewed the authorities at length, with primary focus on the Privy Council authorities (notably Bhooban Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharjee, Padma Coomari v. Court of Wards and Thayammal v. Venkatarama) which established the principle that the widow's power of adoption is limited and comes to an end when the estate vests in a nearer heir and is incapable of execution thereafter.
- The Bench considered later High Court Full Bench and Division Bench decisions (Calcutta Full Bench in Manikyamala Bose; Bombay Full Bench in Ramkrishna v. Shamrao; various decisions from Bombay, Madras and Allahabad High Courts) and found them to interpret and apply the Privy Council rulings consistently with that limiting principle.
- It rejected the contention that the widow's adoption power is merely suspended and revivable; the opinion emphasized that the Privy Council language “the power of adoption was at an end and incapable of execution” leaves no room for revival and is binding on Indian Courts under Mataprasad v. Nageshar Sahai.
- Applying that legal principle to the facts, the Bench found that when Krishnaji died his widow Sitabai acquired a vested estate and that vesting was the limiting event which extinguished any adoption power of Bainabai (the daughter-in-law). Thus Bainabai was legally incompetent to effect the adoption in April 1917. The consent of Baijabai could not validate an adoption that was void for lack of competence.
- The Bench noted the factual findings of the lower Courts (that defendant 1 was not an orphan and that Baijabai had consented and acted as guardian) but held that these factual concessions or findings could not cure the underlying legal incapacity of Bainabai to adopt once the estate had vested in Sitabai.
- Finding no room to re-examine or reject the Privy Council principle, the Full Bench concluded the adoption was invalid and gave that as its answer to the reference. The other two judges (Findlay, J.C. and Mohiuddin, A.J.C.) concurred.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench answered the reference by holding that the adoption of Daulat (defendant 1) by Bainabai was invalid on the grounds that Bainabai was legally incompetent to make the adoption once the estate of the last male holder (Krishnaji) had vested in his widow (Sitabai). The Bench expressly relied on the Privy Council decisions (Bhooban Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharjee; Padma Coomari v. Court of Wards; Thayammal v. Venkatarama) and subsequent High Court authorities in reaching this conclusion.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: Because the adoption was invalid for legal incompetence of the adoptive mother Bainabai, defendant 1 (Daulat) acquired no title by that adoption and therefore lacked the adoption-based right to obstruct the plaintiff's possession. The opinion records that, had the adoption been invalid, succession would devolve on the nearer reversioners (Gangaram and Janji) and thus the plaintiff, as assignee of Janji, could assert title. (The opinion itself frames this as the consequence conceded by the respondent if adoption were invalid.)
- Precedential effect: The Full Bench applied established Privy Council precedent and High Court authorities to resolve the question. The opinion emphasizes that Privy Council pronouncements are binding on Indian Courts and that the case applies those principles rather than creating a novel rule. The Full Bench therefore affirms the existing line of authority limiting a widow's power of adoption and clarifies its application to the particular factual posture where a daughter-in-law inherits only after the widow.
- No broader doctrinal departure was announced: the Court adhered to the Privy Council line of decisions and the established distinction between direct succession (where adoption by the successor may be valid) and succession after intermediate vesting (where adoption power is extinguished and not revivable).
Reference answered. The three judges (Kinkhede, Findlay and Mohiuddin) concurred, and the Full Bench concluded that the adoption should be held invalid in view of the authorities cited.
Kinkhede, A.J.C:— The points involved in the case are of very great importance to the Maratha Hindu community, and particularly to those who regard themselves as governed by the Bombay School of law. There is a divergence of view on the point and it is therefore very desirable that so far as our subordinate Courts are concerned there should be an authoritative decision of a Full Bench settling the question whether the earlier Bombay decisions which have been reaffirmed by the recent Bombay Full Bench decision in Ishwar Dadu v. Gajabai Babaji(1). need be followed in our Courts, as precedents on matters of Hindu law governed by the Bombay School, according to the time honoured tradition of this Court.
OPINION
Kinkhede, A.J.C:— The following geneological tree will facilitate the understanding of the facts relevant to the decision of the question referred to the Full Bench.
2. The property in suit once belonged to a joint Hindu family consisting of Krishnaji, Ramji and Zaboo. Ramji and Zaboo predeceased Krishnaji leaving their respective widows Baijabai and Bainabai behind them. Krishnaji, who was thus the last surviving male coparcener of the joint family, died in 1907 leaving his widow Sitabai as his heir entitled to inherit his property as such widow. She held the property till her death, which took place in 1909. The inheritance next devolved on Bainabai, the widow of Krishaji's predeceased son Zaboo, who as the widow of a predeceased sagotra sapinda, was entitled to succeed, under the Bombay School of Hindu law, which is in force in Berar, to the estate of her father-in-law, Krishnaji. Bainabai died in 1917. It is the plaintiff's case that on her death the estate of Krishnaji devolved on Baijabai the widow of his predeceased brother, Ramji as widow of his sagotra sapinda; that she held it as such till her death in 1919, and then the succession went to Krishnaji's mother's sisters' sons, Gangaram and Janji as his bhinna gotra sapindas. The plaintiff, Uttamrao is an assignee, under an assignment dated 19th January 1920, from Janji, of his moiety of the property of Krishnaji. He alleges that he was wrongfully obstructed by defendant 1 in taking possession of the property purchased by him. Hence he filed the present suit for possession against him.
3. Defendant 1's principal defence is that he has a lawful title to obstruct, as a duly adopted son of Zaboo his adoption having been made, in April 1917, by Bainabai, in whom the inheritance had vested; and that it was consented to by Baijabai the next immediate reversioner. The plaintiff's contention is that, the adoption being invalid, created no rights in favour of defendant 1. The validity is challenged by him on the grounds:
(i) that defendant 1 was an orphan,
(ii) that Bainabai had no authority under law to adopt as she did not take the estate as heir of her husband;
(iii) that Baijabai had no authority to give any consent to the adoption.
4. If the adoption be not invalid for any of these reasons, it is clear that Daulat, by virtue thereof, became the grandson of Krishnaji, and as such took his grandfather's estate, from Bainabai his adoptive mother, in his own right, with effect from the date of his adoption. Thus, there would, or could be, no succession in favour of Baijabai, or, Gangaram, or of Janji the plaintiff's vendor, in their capacity of the sagotra sapinda, or, bhinna gotra sapindas, of Krishnaji. On the facts found by the Courts below, defendant 1 was not an orphan, and Baijabai had consented to and acquiesced in the adoption and even admitted the title of the adopted son to the property by acting as his guardian till her own death. The first ground is thus no longer available, and the third ground is admitted to be immaterial. It is conceded by defendant 1 also that, if his adoption were held to be invalid in law, on the ground of Bainabai's incompetency to adopt him, the succession would go to Janji and Gangaram as the nearest reversioners of the last male holder, Krishnaji.
5. The Court of first instance held the adoption by Bainabai to be valid under law and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff went up in appeal to the District Judge, who affirmed the dismissal. He has, therefore, come up in second appeal.
6. Looking to the importance of the question of the validity of the adoption involved in this appeal, and the apparent conflict of decisions on the point, the appellant moved for a reference of that question to a Full Bench; this was done and the point has been ably argued before it.
7. On behalf of the appellant it is contended that Bainabai was legally incompetent to adopt a son to her deceased husband Zaboo, as she did not get the estate directly as heir to her husband. The learned counsel deduces four propositions as laying down the view taken by the Bombay School of Hindu law by which he says this case ought to be governed.
1. That, after the death, without issues, of a full owner, the only person, who can adopt, so as to deviate the succession, is, either his widow, or, if he dies without leaving a widow who can adopt and thus continue the lineage, his mother, or grandmother, subject, however, to the proviso that she takes the inheritance directly from her son or grandson, and, not otherwise.
2. That the widow's power to adopt is limited, that limit being reached immediately there is some one else, nearer in degree than herself, to take the estate of the last full owner, and, able to continue his line. Once this limit is reached the power to adopt is extinguished and can never be revived after such extinction. In other words, the widow's power to adopt never remains in abeyance.
3. That a widow cannot adopt so as to divest another person of the property; but that this does not, in view of other limitations, mean that she can adopt, so long as she does not do this.
4. That a widow of a gotraja sapinda can never adopt so as to deviate the line of succession, even if she succeeds directly to the last full owner, much less can she-adopt if some one else has taken the property before she succeeds, the mother and grandmother being exceptions.
8. In this case it is contended that, as Krishnaji was the last full owner and his widow Sitabai succeeded to him before Bainabai took up the inheritance as his daughter-in-law, the only person who could make the adoption and continue the line of Krishnaji was his widow, Sitabai and not his daughter-in-law, Bainabai. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Ganpati v. Mt. Salu(2) in support of the first three propositions and on Ramkrishna Ramchandra v. Shamrao Yeshwant(3) which in its turn is based on the three Privy Council decisions of Bhooban Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharjee(4), Padma Coomari v. Court of Wards(5) and Thayammal v. Venkatarama(6), as supporting all the four propositions. The decision of a Bench of this Court in Baswantrao v. Deorao(7) where the right of a daughter-in-law to make a valid adoption was affirmed, is sought to be distinguished on the ground that the daughter-in-law succeeded directly to her father-in-law, and, not after the death of her mother-in-law, as in this-case. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the cases on the subject decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council as well as by other High Courts and this Court in order to find out the principles limiting a Hindu widow's power to make a valid adoption.
9. The leading case on the subject is that of Bhooban Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharjee. The facts of that case were that, one Gour Kishore died, in 1821, leaving a widow Chundrabullee and an only son named Bhowanee Kishore. In 1840, Bhowanee died, leaving no issue, but, his wife Bhooban Moyee Debia who, as his widow, succeeded to the estate left by him. In 1843, Bhooban Debia adopted a boy called Rajendro Kishore, and some time after this. Chundrabullee also, adopted Ram Kishore, as a son, to her late husband, Gour Kishore. The latter filed a suit, as the next friend of Ram Kishore, for possession of the estate left by Bhowanee, against Bhooban Debia and her adopted son Bajendro Kishore. In that suit, it was found that, Bhooban Debia had no authority from her husband to adopt, and that, Chundrabullee had been authorized by her husband to adopt a son to him. In view of these findings, it became necessary to consider whether Ram Kishore's adoption was valid, and, whether he was entitled to recover possession of the estate left by Bhowanee. Their Lordships held that Ram Kishore was not entitled to succeed, and observed as follows:
“The question is, whether the estate of his (Cour Kishore's) son (Bhowanee) being unlimited, and that son having married and left a widow as his heir, and that heir having acquired a vested estate in her husband's property as widow, a new heir can be substituted by adoption who is to defeat that estate, and take as an adopted son what a legitimate son of Gour Kishore would not have taken. This seems contrary to all reason and to all the principles of Hindu law, as far as we can collect them. It must be recollected that the adopted son, as such, takes by inheritance and not by devise. Now, the rule of Hindu law is, that in the case of inheritance, the person to succeed must be the heir of the last full owner. In this case, Bhowanee Kishore was the last full owner, and his wife succeeds, as his heir, to a widow's estate. On her death, the person to succeed will again be the heir at that time of Bhowanee Kishore. If Bhowanee Kishore had died unmarried, his mother, Chundrabullee Debia, would have been his heir, and the question of adoption would have stood on quite different grounds. By exercising the power of adoption, she would have divested no estate but her own, and this would have brought the case within the ordinary rule; but no case has been produced, no decision has been cited from the text-books, and no principle has been stated to show that by the mere gift of a power of adoption to a widow, the state of the heir of a deceased son vested in possession, can be defeated and divested.”
10. The above case is an authority for the proposition that, if a Hindu dies leaving a widow as heir, his mother, although duly authorized in that behalf, cannot, during the lifetime of her son's widow, adopt a son to her own husband, and thereby divest her (the son's widow) of the estate acquired by her by inheritance from her own husband. In this case it was not held, in so many words, that Ram Kishore's adoption by Chundrabullee was invalid.
11. Sometime after this decision, Bhooban Debia died and the estate devolved according to the Hindu law of succession upon Chundrabullee, the mother of Bhowanee Kishore. After the death of Chundrabullee, the reversionary heirs of Bhowanee brought a suit for possession of his estate, then in the hands of Ram Kishore. In this second suit, the question arose, whether Ram Kishore's adoption by Chundrabullee to her husband Gour Kishore was valid, and, whether, as such he was entitled to retain possession of the estate. The Calcutta High Court in Puddo Kumaree Debi v. Juggut Kishore Acharjee(8) held that, Ram Kishore's adoption was valid, and that, he was entitled to succeed to the estate, of Bhowanee after Bhooban Debia's death.
12. With reference to the previous decision of their Lordships in Bhooban Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharjee, Jackson, J., observed:
“What has happened, being the death of Bhowanee without having either had sons born to him or given any permission to adopt. If, therefore, Chundrabullee immediately on the death of Bhoobumoyee, had made an adoption and so divested her own estate, there would have been nothing in the judgment of the Privy Council, and nothing that we are aware of in the law, to prevent her doing that which her husband auhorized her to do, and which would certainly be for his spiritual benefit and for that of his ancestors and even of Bhowani Kishore… Then, if Chundrabullee might have adopted at the date when Boobunmoyee's death caused the inheritance to devolve on her, with the consequence of divesting her own estate, is there any reason why Ram Kishore, if we suppose him to have been regularly adopted, and those who came before him as heirs to Bhowani Kishore out of the way, should not, in that state of things, take the inheritance which the mother gives up to him, and should not, to use the words of Mr. Mayne, be rewarded by the estate for the services which he renders to the deceased? We think not…. it seems to us, that although as heir to Gour Kishore, he could not displace the widow and heir of a subsequent full owner, and as heir to Bhowani he came after the widow and the mother, he might, without objection, succeed when, by their successive deaths or surrender, he united in himself the capacities of heir of Gour Kishore and heir to Bhowani: Puddo Kumaree Debee v. Juqgut Kishore Acharjee.”
13. Against this decision, there was an appeal to the Privy Council, and their Lordships reversed the decision of the High Court and held that, Ram Kishore's adoption by Chundrabullee was invalid and that he was not entitled to succeed to the estate left by Bhowani. In doing so, they referred to their former decision in Bhooban Moyee v. Ram Kishore and observed:
“The substitution of a new heir for the widow was, no doubt, the question to be decided, and such substitution might have been disallowed, the adoption being held valid for all other purposes, which is the view that the lower Courts have taken of the judgment, but their Lordships do not think that this was intended. They consider the decision to be that, upon the vesting of the estate in the widow of Bhowani, the power of adoption (given to Chundrabullee) was at an end, and incapable of execution: Padmakumari Debi v. Court of Wards.”
14. A similar question-came up for decision before their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Thayammal v. Venkatarama. In that case, one Dorasami, died leaving his widow Thayammal and also an only son Kuttisami. Kuttisami married Thangammal and subsequently died without issue leaving his widow Thangammal, who upon the death of her husband succeeded as heir to the property. After Kuttisami's death and during the lifetime of his widow, his mother Thayammal adopted a son to her husband Dorasami with the consent of the sapindas. A question arose whether the said adoption was valid. The Madras High Court following the decision in Padamakumari Debi v. Court of Wards held that the adoption was invalid. On appeal to the Privy Council, it was contended on behalf of the adopted son that all that was decided by the Judicial Committee in Bhooban Moyee's case, Bhooban Moyee v. Ram Kishore, was that the son adopted by the mother could not recover the estate from the son's widow and that it was not held that his adoption was invalid. Their Lordships overruled this contention and observed:
“This appears to have been the view taken by the lower Courts in Padmakumari's case. But this Committee, upon appeal, held that the case went much further. Nothing can be clearer or more explicit than the language used by the Committee in that case.”
15. They also quoted with approval their own observations in Padamkumari's cases cited above and following them held that the adoption of a son by Thayammal after the estate had vested in her son's widow was invalid.
16. It is no doubt true that, in the cases of Padmaknmari and Thayammal referred to above, the mother of the propositus had adopted a son to her own husband during the lifetime of her son's widow, but a careful perusal of the judgments of their Lordships of the Privy Council in those cases will show that the adoption by the mother was held invalid not on the ground that it was made during the lifetime of the son's widow, but on the ground that the mother's power of adoption came to an end and became incapable: of execution upon the vesting of the estate in the son's widow. These cases are, in, my opinion, clear authorities for the proposition that a widow's power of adoption is limited, that the vesting of the estate in an heir of the last, male holder is the limit of the existence of such power; that once this limit is reached, the power is at an end and is incapable of execution at any future time, and that, it is not merely suspended and capable of being; revived if, after some interval, the widow happens to succeed ultimately as an heir to the last male holder on the death of the immediate heir in whom the estate had vested for the time being.
17. The above view is fully supported by the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Manikyamala Bose v. Nanda Kumar Bose(9). In that case, one Chandra Kumar Bose died in 1881, leaving his widow Manikyamala and an adopted son Akhoy. Akhoy died in 1893 after having attained majority, leaving a childless widow, Bidbumukhi, who died in July 1898. Shortly afterwards, i.e on 29th August 1898, Manikyamala adopted a son to her husband, and the question arose whether the said adoption, was valid. It was contended that as the same was made after the death of the widow of the last male holder it was valid. The Full Bench overruled this contention and following the two earlier Privy Council decisions, Bhooban Moyee v. Ram Kishore. and Padma Coomari v. Court of Wards, as also the later Privy Council decision reported in Tara Churn Chatterji v. Suresh Chunder Mukerji(10) to the same effect, held that the adoption was invalid. Mukerjee, J., in his judgment observed as follows at pp. 1315-1316:
“It is contended on behalf of the appellants that, inasmuch as the second adoption was made after the death of the widow of the adopted son and at a time, when the estate was vested in the widow of the original owner, there was no bar to the second adoption as it would divest the estate of the adoptive mother alone. It has been conceded before us, and in view of the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Bhooban Moyee v. Ramkishore and Padma Kumari v. Court of Wards it could not possibly be disputed, that the adoption would have been invalid, if it had been made during the lifetime of the widow of the adopted son, because during such period, the power of adoption was incapable of execution. The question, therefore, is reduced to this: Whether the power of adoption, vested in the widow of the original owner, which during the lifetime of her daughter-in-law was incapable of execution, became extinguished upon the death of her adopted son, when the estate vested in his widow or, whether the such power of adoption merely remained in abeyance and was revived and became capable of execution upon the death of her daughter-in-law, when the estate reverted to her. The solution of this question depends upon the principles deducible from a series of decisions of the Judicial Committee in which their Lordships had to consider the limits within which a power of adoption may be exercised by a Hindu widow.”
18. Mukerjee, J., then discussed at length the decisions of the Privy Council and of the Bombay and Calcutta High Courts on the subject and observed at p. 1319:
“Upon a review, then of the authorities, we must overrule the contention of the appellants, that the widow's death is the limit of time within which and the failure of male issue in the male line and the vesting of the estate in the widow, are the only two conditions subject to which, the power may be exercised, no matter whether the estate vests in the adopting widow just after the death of the son or after the death of the widow of the son.”
19. His final conclusion reported at p. 1321 was as follows:
“On these grounds, we must hold that the adoption of defendant 2 by defendant 1 after she had succeeded as heir to her first adopted son after his death and that of his widow, is invalid.”
20. A similar view of the Privy Council decisions has been taken by the Bombay High Court also. For example in what is known as Hasabnis's case, Krishnarao Trimbak v. Shankarrao Vinayak(11) the said High Court held that an adoption to herself and her deceased husband by a mother who has succeeded as heir to her son after his death and that of his widow, is invalid according to Hindu law. In this case, the mother had adopted on the death of her son and his widow. Again in Shri Dharnidhar v. Chinto(12) it was held that, where a Hindn died leaving a widow and a daughter-in-law (a widow of his predeceased son), adoption by the latter was invalid. Candy, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court observed as follows:
“There is no suspension of the right to adopt [see remarks of this Court in Krishnarav v. Shankarrav]. From the moment that Dharnidhar died, and his estate was vested in his widows, the right of his daughter-in-law Venubai to adopt, for the purposes of inheritance, was at an end: see judgment of West, J., in Keshav v. Govind(13).”
21. Similarly, in Amava v. Mahadgauda(14), it was held that the authority of a widow to adopt is at an end when the estate after being vested in her son has passed to his widow.
22. Again, in the Full Bench case of Ramkrishna v. Shamrao, it was held that, where a Hindu dies leaving a widow and a son and that son himself dies leaving a natural born or adopted son or leaving no son but his own widow to continue the line by means of adoption, the power of the former widow is extinguished and can never be revived. In that case, Chandavarkar, J., who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench observed at pp. 529-30 as follows:
“If Mr. Chaubal's contention be correct, a widow can adopt without any limit as to the period within which such adoption may be made and her power is never at an end—it is only suspended so long as the estate is vested in others, but directly it comes to her from those others it is revived. The language of the judgment in Bhooban Moyee's case, however, is so explicit that it is impossible to construe it otherwise than as meaning that there is a limit to the period within which a widow can exercise her power of adoption, and that once that limit is reached the power ‘is at an end.’ That language is repeated and emphasized by their Lordships in their judgments in Padma Coomari's case and in Thayammal's case. We agree, therefore with the Division Bench of this Court which decided Hasabnis's case, that the language of the Privy Council is ‘altogether inconsistent with any idea of the right to adopt being merely suspended during the widow's life.’”
23. He then discussed at considerable length the test of the principle defining the limit to the period within which a valid adoption could be made by a Hindu widow to her deceased husband, and his conclusion, after a review of the case law, was that a widow's power of adoption comes to an end and can never be revived after the inheritance has vested in some heir of her son other than the widow herself. It is significant to observe that the principle enunciated by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has been approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Madana Mohana v. Purushothama(15), and this latter decision has since been cited with approval by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Pratapsingh Shivsingh v. Agarsingji Rajsingji(16).
24. The Madras High Court has also followed the view taken in the Privy Council decisions. The case reported in Suryaprakasa v. Gangaraju(17) may be referred to on the point. In that case A and B were two undivided brothers, A having predeceased B, the family properties vested in B by survivorship, and on B's death descended to his widow. After B's death, A's widow adopted a son. It was found by the lower Court that the adoption was made with the implied consent of and without opposition from B's widow. The adoption so made was held to be invalid, the consent of B's widow not making it valid in any way, as the estate had already vested in her. Wallis, J., after discussing the Privy Council cases on the subject observed as follows: “These decisions of their Lordships have been interpreted by Full Benches of the Bombay and Calcutta High Courts in Ramkrishna v. Shamrav and Manikyamal Bose v. Nand Kumar Bose, as meaning that a widow's power is absolutely at an end once the estate has vested in the heir of her deceased son, and is not revived even if the widow herself afterwards succeeds to the estate. If the widow having once lost the right to adopt, when her son's inheritance devolves on another, does not regain it on becoming herself the owner of the estate—if, that is to say, she cannot in these circumstances by her consent as owner validate an adoption made by her as widow, it would seem to follow that the consent of the person on whom the estate has devolved by inheritance from the son is ineffective to validate an adoption made by the widow.
Now it is clear that A's widow might, with proper consent, have validly adopted a son to A during the lifetime of his surviving coparcener B: Sri Virada Pratapa Baghunadha Deo v. Brozo Kishore Patta Deo(18) and Chandra v. Gojarabai(19), but in the last case it was held that such an adoption if made after the death of the surviving coparcener and the vesting of the estate in his widow could not divest the estate, as of course it would if valid.”
25. The Allahabad High Court also appears to have taken in Lachhmi Kunwar…(Defendant); v. Durga Kunwar…(Plaintiff).*(20), a similar view of the Privy Council decisions, though the question of adoption was not directly involved in the said case. Nathmal Das and Pern Baj, who were two brothers constituted a joint Hindu family. Nathmal Das died leaving a widow, Lachhmi Kunwar, and, subsequently, Pem Raj died leaving a widow Durga Kunwar. Lachhmi and Durga executed an agreement which recited that they were entitled to equal shares in the joint family estate left by Nathmal Das and Pem Raj and the descendants then proceeded to apportion the estate between them. Disputes having subsequently arose between the widows, Durga Kunwar sued for a declaration that she had been deceived into executing the agreement, and that it was not binding on her. It was contended on behalf of Lachhmi Kunwar that she was proposing to make an adoption, and that the effect of the adoption would have been to divest Durga Kunwar of the estate, or of at least half of it, and that, to avoid this divesting of estate, Durga Kunwar entered into the said agreement. With reference to this plea, the High Court observed as under:
“The plea may be disposed of upon the ground that it does not proceed upon a correct proposition of law. It is sufficient to refer to two cases, Chandra Bin Bhau v. Gojarabai, and Adivi Suryaprakasa Rao v. Nidamarty Gangaraju, as authority for the proposition that any adoption which Mt. Lachhmi Kunwar might make, or might purport to make, to her deceased husband, after the husband and his surviving brother were both dead, could not affect the rights of Mt. Durga Kunwar who had inherited the estate as widow of Pem Raj”.
26. In short, all the four chartered High Courts have taken exactly the same view of the aforesaid Privy Council decisions. This Court has also adopted the same view as will appear from the decision of Stanyon, A.J.C in Narayan v. Debidas(21). In this local case it was held that:
“where a Hindu son whether natural or adopted having inherited the property of his deceased father, dies leaving a son or widow or any other person as his heir other than the widow of his father, any power to adopt held by his father's widow, comes to an end.”
27. The learned Judge observed that:
“The Privy Council doctrine of limitation of the power to adopt turns upon a second vesting of the estate and upon nothing else: and where such second vesting is in the widow herself her power to adopt will not be extinguished.”
28. It is urged on behalf of the respondent that the position of a daughter-in-law is the same whether she inherits the father-in-law's estate immediately after his death, or, after the death of his widow. In either case it is said she inherits the estate as her father-in-law's heir and in neither case can she make an adoption to him (the last male holder) as, under the Hindu law, a widow can adopt to her husband only. That being so, why should she have no power to make an adoption when she inherits her father-in-law's estate after his widow's death, when she may be said to have that power according to some of the decisions if she succeeds to him direct? It is further argued that the lower appellate Court's view that she is as much able to continue her father-in-law's line in the way of providing him with a grandson by making an adoption to her own husband, as her mother-in-law is by providing him with a son, is correct. Moreover, it is contended that the object of an adoption is not merely the due perpetuation of the lineage but to secure for the adoptive father and his ancestors the spiritual blessings “Pindodaka kriya hetoh nam sankeertanaya cha” as laid down by Manu in his text; and that the adoption in question should he upheld as valid at least for spiritual purposes and the vesting of the estate in defendant 1 will follow as a legal consequence thereof as observed in Yado v. Namdeo(22). It is further said that if a son adopted by a daughter-in-law, on the death of her father-in-law's widow, is as much able to confer spiritual blessing on the father-in-law, as a son adopted by her after the death of her father-in-law dying without leaving a nearer heir than herself would, why should the power to make an adoption be supposed to continue in the latter case, and deemed to have been extinguished in the former? Since under the Bombay School a sonless widow is said to have an inherent or in any case a delegated right of adopting a son to her deceased husband, it is argued that she can exercise that right at any time during her lifetime subject only to such restrictions and limitations if any, as her husband may have expressly or impliedly chosen to impose on her in that behalf.
29. In reply to these contentions it may be pointed out that if they are carried to their extreme logical conclusions, we shall have to run counter to the earlier Privy Council rulings in Padma Coomari v. Court of Wards and Thayammal v. Venkatarama, in which it has been distinctly held that an adoption made by a mother on the death of her son and during the lifetime of the son's widow is invalid; and, also to hold that a sonless widow governed by the Bombay School has, subject to the restrictions imposed on her by her husband, an unlimited right of adoption which she can exercise at any time during her life and that an adoption made by her after her son's death but during the lifetime of her son's widow, is perfectly valid. To do so would involve the ignoring of the Privy Council decisions referred to. The reason why this is not permissible is quite plain. As remarked in Datto Govind v. Pandurang Vinayak(23), it is not open to the Indian Courts:
“to consider how far the principle laid down by these cases was in accordance with either the letter or spirit of the Hindu law as expounded in the books or as understood by the Hindus themselves.”
30. The Privy Council decisions are binding on the Indian Courts, and the latter are bound to follow them as the following remarks of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mataprasad v. Nageshar Sahai(24), will show:
“In view of the peculiar course adopted by the Subordinate Judge in dealing with this case, and in order to prevent other Courts in India from falling into the same error their Lordships think it desirable to point out that it is not open to the Courts in India to question any principle enunciated by this Board, although they have the right of examining the facts of any case before them to see whether and how far the principle on which stress is laid applies to the facts of the particular case.”
31. In view of these remarks, it will serve no useful purpose to discuss the original Hindu law texts with a view to see whether, and how far the principles as to the limits of a widow's power to adopt laid down by the Privy Council are deducible from them. Neither the theory and object which underlies the conception of an adoption by a Hindu male or female to which reference is made in Sri Virda Pratapa Baghunadha Deo v. Sri Brozo Kishoro Patta Deo, nor the spiritual apart from the temporal aspect of an adoption, or its validity purely for spiritual purposes, discussed. In Yado v. Namdeo, on which the lower Courts largely depended, therefore, calls for any comment or treatment here.
32. We have seen above that the Privy Council decisions Padma Coomari v. Court of Wards and Thayammal v. Venkatarama, are based on the principle that, where the last male-holder dies leaving a nearer heir other than the adopting widow, the latter's power of adoption comes to an end, as soon as his estate is vested in the nearer heir, and is incapable of being revived at any future date. In my opinion, the words:
“the power of adoption was at an end and incapable of execution.”
as used in Padma Coomari v. Court of Wards, leave no room for doubt that this was the principle on which stress was laid by their Lordships in defining the limit of the widow's power of adoption. It is not, therefore, open to the Courts in India to question the soundness of the said principle. It is obviously based on the consideration that, when the last male holder dies leaving a widow capable of continuing the line by adopting a son, and that nearer heir does not care to continue the line, the remoter heir cannot claim to continue the line by making an adoption either during, or after, the lifetime of the former widow; because it was the right of the former widow to continue the line, and, if for any reason, she chooses not to do so, it should not be within the power of the remoter heir who succeeds to the estate to claim to exercise that power after it became extinguished.
33. It seems, therefore, clear to my mind that the principle deducible from the Privy Council rulings on the subject of the power of adoption by a widow as interpreted by all the High Courts and this Court is that, when the adopting, widow, in a joint family which has ceased to exist on the death of the last surviving coparcener, or, in a divided family, succeeds direct to the last male holder, her power of adoption remains intact, and she can exercise it by making an adoption to her deceased husband; where, however, she succeeds on the termination of an intermediate estate, her power of adoption-comes to an end, as soon as the estate vests in the immediate heir other than-herself, and is incapable of being made use of at any future date. On this principle, the cases decided by the several High Courts in regard to the validity or otherwise of an adoption made by a widow succeeding to the estate of the last male-holder either directly or after the termination of an intermediate estate, can, in my opinion, be satisfactorily explained.
34. It is obviously in accordance with this principle that it has been held that a grandmother succeeding direct to her grandson can make a valid adoption: cf. Narhar Govind v. Balwant Hari(25). This principle also applies to the case of a daughter-in-law succeeding to her father-in-law, direct, and it has been held by a Bench of this Court that an adoption made by such daughter-in-law-is valid: Baswantrao v. Deorao, similarly, where a Hindu dies leaving a son and a widow and that son dies unmarried or marries and begets a daughter and his wife and daughter die, and after them he also dies, his mother can make a valid adoption as she succeeds to him direct: cf. Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Ayyar(26), Tripuramba v. Venhataraman(27), Anjirabai v. Pandurang Balkrishna(28) and Sheik Dallu v. Panjab, A.I.R 1924 Nag. 344. Where, however, he dies leaving a widow as his heir, and also a mother and predeceased son's widow, neither of them can make a valid adoption, even after the death of his widow, as their power to make an adoption comes to an end, i.e is extinguished altogether, as soon as his estate vests in his widow, as his heir, and is not capable of being revived at any future date.
35. It has accordingly been held by this Court that, where a Hindu dies leaving a widow who could have adopted, his mother has no power to do so on her succession to the estate after the remarriage of his widow: Ganpat v. Mt. Salu. It is true that there is no case decided by this Court in which it has been held that a daughter-in-law succeeding as a gotraja sapinda to her father-in-law, on the death of his widow, cannot make a valid adoption. I am of opinion, however, that, where, she does not succeed direct, she has no such power. Her power comes to an end as soon as the widow of her father-in-law succeeds as heir to his estate, and cannot be revived after her death. The Bombay High Court has, however, clearly held that where a Hindu dies leaving a widow and a daughter-in-law, the latter on succeeding to the estate, as a widow of a gotraja sapinda on his widow's death, cannot make a valid adoption: Shri Dharnidhar v. Chinto. The same High Court has also gone the length of holding in Datto Govind v. Pandurang Vinayah that the widow of a predeceased gotraja sapinda succeeding even directly to the last male holder cannot make a valid adoption, a view not accepted in this Court in Narayan v. Debidas and Baswantrao v. Deorao : cf. Dattatraya Bhimrao v. Gangabai(29), Yeknath Narayan v. Laxmibai(30) and Shivbasappa v. Nilava(31). It may be noticed that the decision of the case in Datto Govind v. Pandurang Vinayak was sought to be based on the Privy Council decisions referred to above.
36. In that case Datte Govind v. Pandurang Vinayak it was held that a Hindu widow, who succeeds to an estate not her husband's but as a gotraja sapinda of the last male holder under the rule established by Lullobhoy v. Gassibai(32) and in consequence of the absence of nearer heirs, cannot make a valid adoption. In that case Pandurang was adopted by Parvati the widow of Sadashiv the undivided predeceased brother of Antaji the last surviving coparcener of a joint family of two brothers. Parvati succeeded to Antaji as the nearest sagotra sapinda then alive. The reversionary heirs of Antaji sued Pandurang after the death of Parvati for possession of the property urging that this adoption was invalid. The Courts below held it to be valid in law, on the ground that, though, Patvati's adoption was not one to the last male holder, still that would not make it spiritually invalid, and, a her adoption did not divest any estate vested in third parties and was derogatory of no other estate but her own, the adoption was perfectly valid. This decision was sought to be supported by the respondent in the High Court arguing that a power to adopt was inherent-in every Hindu widow and she may be temporarily incapable of acting upon it that it was in suspension during Antaji's lifetime and that it revived when she got the estate as a sapinda when her act of adoption had not the effect of divesting any estate but her own. Chaubal, J., repelled this argument by the following; observations at p. 504:
“every one of these considerations applied to the case of the grandmother in the case of Ramkrishna v. Shamrao. It may also be noticed that this was exactly the argument, urged before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee by Mr. Mayne in Thayammal's case, and was not acceded to. I do not think there is any authority for the proposition that the right to adopt is a necessary incident of inheritance.”
37. The latest case wherein the view taken in Datto Govind v. Pandurang Vinayak has been applied by the same Court was in Bassangowda v. Budrappa(33) where a stepmother was held disentitled to adopt a son to her own husband although she got the inheritance as the nearest sagotra sapinda of her stepson, after the death of his own mother who directly succeeded to him.
38. It is true that, in the present case, Krishnaji died lowing behind a widow, a daughter-in-law, who could both continue his line by providing him with a son and a grandson respectively by means of an adoption. But the right of Krishnaji's widow was superior to that of his daughter-in-law: cf. Gopal v. Vishnu(34). She could by making an adoption have provided Krishnaji with a son, who would have been in a position to offer oblations to him and to his two immediate ancestors. The daughter-in-law Bainabai could by making an adoption bring only a grandson into existence, who could offer oblations to his adoptive father Zaboo, the last male holder Krishnaji, and only one of his ancestors. That being so, there can be no doubt that the widow of Krishnaji had a superior right of continuing the line of the propositus by adoption, and when she did not choose to exercise that right, for reasons best known to herself, it was not open to his daughter-in-law Bainabai to make an, adoption in order to continue the line, as her power of adoption came to an end, and became incapable of execution as soon; as the estate vested in her mother-in-law on Krishnaji's death. I am, therefore, of opinion that the adoption of Daulat, defendant by Bainabai, in the present case, must be treated as invalid, because of her incompetency to make one. The vesting of the estate in Sitabai, on Krishnaji's death, was the limit of Bainabai's power to make an adoption to her own husband, Zaboo; and that, the limit having been reached as soon as Krishnaji's widow got the inheritance, Bainabai's power was at an end and became incapable of execution. Consequently the consent of Baijabai to the adoption of Daulat, defendant 1 could in no way validate an invalid adoption. For all these reasons my answer to the reference is that the adoption of Daulat, defendant 1, should be held to be invalid in view of the principles enunciated in the Privy Council decisions of Bhooban Moyee v. Ram Kishore, Padma Coomari v. Court of Wards, and Thayammal v. Venhatarama.
Findlay, J.C:— I have had the advantage of perusing and considering the elaborate and interesting opinion recorded by Kinkhede, A.J.C, and find myself in complete agreement therewith.
Mohiuddin, A.J.C:— I agree.
39. Reference answered.
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