Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Mt. Draupadi v. Vikram Krishna Mali

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jan 28, 1938

1. This is a defendants' second appeal against the concurring judgment of the First Additional District Judge, Akola, in Civil Appeal No. 201 of 1932, decided on 28th August 1933. One Laxman died in or about 1896 leaving him surviving two sons Ramji and Krishnaji. For a clear apprehension of the main issue in the case, it is desirable to describe the relationship of the principal parties in the form of a genealogical table as below:

2. The parties are governed by the Bombay school of Hindu law. Ramji died on 12th January 1906 survived by his widow Mt. Draupadi and brother Krishnaji. After Krishnaji's death on 27th April 1906, the only members of the joint family who were left were the widows, Mt. Tulsai and Draupadi. Tulsai being the widow of the last surviving member was in possession of the entire joint family property. Mt. Draupadi adopted Sakharam on 28th June 1907 with the alleged consent of Mt. Tulsai. Page: 425Sakharam died in 1912 and Mt. Tulsai adopted in 1930 Vikram, who has filed this suit against Mt. Draupadi and her daughter Mt. Bani and her transferees of portions of the joint family property. Mt. Draupadi resisted the suit on the ground that she had, pursuant to the authority of her husband, adopted Sakharam and that consequent on his death in 1912, she became the sole owner of his property; that Tulsai consented to Sakharam's adoption; and that her own power of adoption was exhausted, with the result that she was incompetent to adopt Vikram; and the plaintiff's claim, if any, was barred by adverse possession on the part of Draupadi as well as by her omission to set aside Sakharam's adoption within six years under Article 118, Limitation Act, and lastly that the plaintiff was bound by family arrangement concluded between Mt. Draupadi and Mt. Tulsai by a written farkatnama dated 27th July 1920, whereby Mt. Tulsai had relinquished her interest in favour of Mt. Draupadi. The transferees contended that the properties which they had acquired by transfer from Mt. Draupadi were Sakharam's self-acquired property to which the plaintiff, even if his adoption was valid, had no claim. Both the Courts below concurred in holding that Sakharam's adoption was invalid and that Mt. Tulsai was alone competent to adopt a son as she was the widow of the last male holder Rrishnaji; and negatived the pleas that Ramji had authorized Mt. Draupadi to adopt and that Mt. Tulsai had consented to Sakharam's adoption. The suit was held to be barred neither by adverse possession nor by failure to sue to set aside Sakharam's adoption. The so called relinquishment by Tulsai was found to be fraudulent and ineffective. The property which was in possession of the transferees was found to be not the self-acquired property of Sakharam but a part of the joint family estate. The lower Appellate Court, in holding Sakharam's adoption as invalid, followed a Bench decision of the late Court of the Judicial Commissioner, C.P, reported in 25 NLR 144, (1929) 16 AIR Nag 98 , 116 IC 499 , 25 NLR 144 (FB) 55 Bom 699 (1932) 19 AIR Bom 8 , 136 IC 500 , 55 Bom 699 , 33 Bom LR 1225 and 57 Bom 157. (1933) 20 AIR PC 1 , 141 IC 9 , 57 Bom 157 , 60 IA 25 (PC). The principle applied to the case was that the vesting of the estate in Tulsai, the widow of the last male holder, deprived Draupadi, who was the widow of a predeceased member of the joint family, of her power to adopt. The Rill Bench case of the late Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Nagpur, was declared in 31 NLR Sup 180, (1936) 23 AIR Nag 65 , 162 IC 571 , 31 NLR Sup 180 (FB) by a Full Bench of that Court to have been impliedly overrlued by the Privy Council decision in 12 Pat 642. (1933) 20 AIR PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) In 59 Bom 360, (1935) 22 AIR PC 95 , 155 IC 493 , 59 Bom 360 , 62 IA 161 (PC) the Board followed the view taken in that case. In the face of the pronouncements of the Privy Council in these two cases which are of paramount authority in India, it is manifestly impossible to affirm the lower Appellate Court's finding that Sakharam's adoption was invalid, but our attention has been drawn to a very important Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court which has a direct bearing on the point under consideration. That is ILR (1937) Bom 508. (1937) 24 AIR Bom 279 , 170 IC 393 , ILR (1937) Bom 508 , 39 Bom LR 382 (FB) In that case the learned Judges regarded the question from the point of view whether the effect of the two above mentioned Privy Council decisions was to overrule the dictum of Telang, J. in 14 Bom 463 (1890) 14 Bom 463 to the effect that an adoption by a widow under her husband's authority divests an estate vested in any member of the undivided family of which the husband was himself a member, but that it does not divest the estate of one on whom the property has devolved by inheritance from a lineal heir of the husband. The majority of the learned Judges including the learned Chief Justice held that if there was any implication in that case that the adoption was invalid, that case should be deemed to have been overruled to that extent by the two Privy Council decisions. Bangnekar, J. in a separate judgment propounded the view that the authority of that case was not impaired to any extent by the Privy Council decisions; while the majority were of opinion that when an adoption by a widow of a predeceased coparcener takes Page: 426place after the termination of the coparcenary, that adoption though valid for ceremonial purposes has not the effect of divesting the property which devolved on the heir of the last surviving coparcener (other than the widow) or those claiming through him or her. Rangnekar, J. was definitely of opinion that such adoption itself was invalid both for spiritual and secular purposes. With due respect, it may be observed that either view discards the ancient texts (Yathaiva Atma, Thatha Putrah Katham Anyodhanam haret—Manu 9-130, Pindam Dadyat haret dhanam—9-136, Gotrarikhtanugo Pindo — 9-142: See Kalluk Bhatta's Commentary Yaschartha haret Pindadayi—Vishnu 15-40, See Dattakamimansa Chap. 6—S. 51) which sustain the principle laid down by the Privy Council.

3. The question is a complex one but the answer is unmistakably traceable in the two Privy Council decisions. It will therefore be desirable to set forth the material facts in 12 Pat 642 (1933) 20 AIR PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) which is the leading case. In that case the plaintiff Banamali claimed an impartible zamindari by inheri tance upon the death of Baja Bibhudendra who died unmarried. The Raja's mother Bani Indumati adopted a son by name Amrendra after his death. Banamali who was descended from a remote common ancestor claimed the zamindari on the basis that it was a separate property. According to the custom obtaining in the family the females were excluded from inheritance. Banamali's contention was that when once the estate had vested in him as the heir of the last male holder Bani Indumati's power of adoption was at an end. He succeeded in the original Court as well as in the High Court but failed in the Privy Council. Before the Board, the respondent's argument was that when once the estate had vested in an heir of that last male holder other than the adoptive widow, the widow's power of adoption was extinguished. Their Lordships of the Privy Council described that argument as one which approached the question from that point of view of rights in the property. On the other hand, the appellant contended that the power to adopt was not dependent in any way on the vesting or divesting of property. Their Lordships of the Privy Council referred to certain ancient authoritative texts and judicial decisions bearing on the issue and deduced the conclusion that the foundation of the Brahminical doctrine of adoption is the duty which every Hindu owes to his ancestor to provide for the continuance of the line and the solemnization of the necessary rites, and referring to 1 Mad 69 (1876-78) 1 Mad 69 , 3 IA 154 , 25 WR 291 , 3 Sar 583 (PC) at p. 82 observed that the doctrine of devolution of property was a secondary consideration, and conveyed an admonition that great caution should be observed in shutting the door on any authorized adoption by the widow of a sonlessman. After a critical and exhaustive consideration of what were seemingly divergent currents of rulings, their Lordships enunciated the proposition that the true principle must be found upon the religious side of the Hindu doctrine. It must be particularly observed that their Lordships deduced from 43 Bom 778, (1918) 5 AIR PC 192 , 50 IC 457 , 43 Bom 778 , 46 IA 97 (PC) 1 Mad 69 (1876-78) 1 Mad 69 , 3 IA 154 , 25 WR 291 , 3 Sar 583 (PC) and 1 Mad 174 (1876-78) 1 Mad 174 , 4 IA 1 , 26 WR 21 , 3 Sar 669 (PC) the conclusion that the vesting of the property on the death of the last holder in some one other than the adopting widow, be it another coparcener of the joint family or an outsider claiming by reverter or by inheritance, cannot be in itself the test of the continuance or extinction of the power of adoption, and further pointed out that if in 43 Bom 778 (1918) 5 AIR PC 192 , 50 IC 457 , 43 Bom 778 , 46 IA 97 (PC) the actual reverter of the property to the head of the family did not bring the power to an end it would be impossible to hold in the case that was under consideration that the passing by inheritance to a distant relation could have that effect any more than the passing by survivor ship would in a joint family. Applying that principle, it was decided that Bani Indumati's power of adoption under her husband's authority was not exhausted at the death of Bibhudendra (her son). In 59 Bom 360 (1935) 22 AIR PC 95 , 155 IC 493 , 59 Bom 360 , 62 IA 161 (PC) the Board followed the view laid down in 12 Pat 642 (1933) 20 AIR PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) and reversed the decision in 56 Bom 619 (1932) 19 AIR Bom 654 , 142 IC 253 , 56 Bom 619 , 34 Bom LR 1332 on these observations:

The learned Judges proceeded upon the principle that a widow cannot adopt a son to her deceased husband if by so doing she would defeat an estate other than her own. This view cannot now be regarded as a correct exposition of the law.

4. In the penultimate paragraph of that judgment there is an observation which is Page: 427important and noteworthy: “It is clear that in his presence the plaintiff cannot inherit the estate.” The pronoun “his” refers to the adopted son. The pronouncements made by their Lordships of the Privy Council upon the principle which should determine the validity of adoption by a Hindu widow are thus clear and unambiguous. It must be borne in mind that, as their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out in 47 All 883 (1925) 12 AIR PC 272 , 91 IC 370 , 28 OC 352 , 47 All 883 , 52 IA 398 (PC) at p. 900, it is not open to the Courts of India to question any principle enunciated by the Board, which must therefore be followed irrespective of the inconvenient and embarrassing results which may attend the application of that principle. Next it is necessary to turn to 14 Bom 463 (1890) 14 Bom 463 and analyze it to discover the principle which was applied to the I particular facts of that case and to see how far that principle received the approval of the Privy Council. The facts were that Krishnaji and his two sons, Bhau and Nana, were members of an undivided family. Bhau died first leaving a widow. Then Krishnaji died. On his death Nana succeeded to the family property. Nana died survived by his widow Gojarabai who came into possession of the property. Thereafter Bhau's widow adopted Chandra as son to her husband, Bhau, and he proceeded against Gojarabai to recover the property. Telang, J. on a review of authorities evolved the rule:

An adoption by a widow under her husband's authority has the effect of divesting an estate of any member of an undivided family of which the husband was himself a member, but it does not divest the estate of one on whom the estate devolved from a lineal heir of the husband.

5. In the light of that rule the learned Judge viewed the case as follows:

When the inheritance devolved from Nana upon his widow Gojarabai, it devolved, not by succesdon, as in an undivided family, but strictly by Inheritance, as if Nana had been a separated householder. Strictly speaking, according to the view taken by our Courts, there was at Nana's death no undivided family remaining into which an adopted son could be admitted by virtue of his adoption, and on that view he concluded that Chandra's adoption was invalid. The rule enunciated by Telang J., who was a distinguished Judge and Sanskrit scholar, was followed in a long series of decisions of the Bombay High Court including 20 Bom 250 (1896) 20 Bom 250 427 and 23 Bom 327 (1899) 23 Bom 327 with reference to which Banade, J. made an observation in 25 Bom 306 (1901) 25 Bom 306 , 2 Bom LR 1101 at page 312:

The whole current of the recent decisions has been to base this limitation on the widow's power of adoption solely on the question whether the widow's act of adoption derogated from her own rights or the vested rights of others.

6. In 12 Pat 642 (1933) 20 AIR PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) at p. 653, this observation was disapproved and at p. 658, 37 Bom 598, (1913) 37 Bom 598 , 21 IC 107 , 15 Bom LR 783 which deduced its ratio decidendi from 14 Bom 463, (1890) 14 Bom 463 23 Bom 327 (1899) 23 Bom 327 and 25 Bom 306 (1901) 25 Bom 306 , 2 Bom LR 1101 was pronounced to be no longer authoritative. It is also pertinent to notice here that in 56 Bom 619 (1932) 19 AIR Bom 654 , 142 IC 253 , 56 Bom 619 , 34 Bom LR 1332 at page 653, Patkar, J. had declined to discuss the reasoning in AIR 1932 Mad 227 (1932) 19 AIR Mad 227 , 138 IC 170 , 55 Mad 581 , 62 MLJ 187 because he doubted the decision in 14 Bom 463 (1890) 14 Bom 463 and 20 Bom 250, (1896) 20 Bom 250 but the decision in 56 Bom 619 (1932) 19 AIR Bom 654 , 142 IC 253 , 56 Bom 619 , 34 Bom LR 1332 was itself reversed in 59 Bom 360. (1935) 22 AIR PC 95 , 155 IC 493 , 59 Bom 360 , 62 IA 161 (PC)

7. It may be useful to examine in some detail the course of reasoning pursued in 14 Bom 463. (1890) 14 Bom 463 At the outset, Telang, J. declares on the authority of West and Bulher that the principle that a widow cannot adopt so as to defeat a vested interest is not to be found in that form in the Hindu authorities. Then the learned Judge refers to 1 Mad 69 (1876-78) 1 Mad 69 , 3 IA 154 , 25 WR 291 , 3 Sar 583 (PC) as an authority for the proposition that an adoption under the husband's direction may divest the estate vested in an undivided coparcener of the husband. He then turns to 10 MIA 279 (1863-66) 10 MIA 279 , 3 WR 15 , 1 Suther 574 , 2 Sar 111 (PC) as an authority for the opposite view, and points out that it was explained in 1 Mad 174, (1876-78) 1 Mad 174 , 4 IA 1 , 26 WR 21 , 3 Sar 669 (PC) remarking that this judgment was delivered by Sir, J. Colville who was also the mouthpiece of the Judicial Committee in 1 Mad 69 (1876-78) 1 Mad 69 , 3 IA 154 , 25 WR 291 , 3 Sar 583 (PC) decided only a few months before. Finding that on the one hand the later judgment did not contain any reference, notwithstanding allusion to it in the counsel's argument, to the former case and that on the other hand 10 MIA 279 (1863-66) 10 MIA 279 , 3 WR 15 , 1 Suther 574 , 2 Sar 111 (PC) was again explained and followed in 8 Cal 302 (1882) 8 Cal 302 , 8 IA 229 , 4 Sar 285 (PC) and the principle deduced from it was again Page: 428applied in 10 Mad 205 (1887) 10 Mad 205 , 14 IA 67 , 5 Sar 10 (PC) and 17 Cal 122, (1890) 17 Cal 122 , 16 IA 166 , 5 Sar 379 (PC) the learned Judge concluded that the Judicial Committee did not consider the decision in 1 Mad 69, (1876-78) 1 Mad 69 , 3 IA 154 , 25 WR 291 , 3 Sar 583 (PC) as being inconsistent with the other cases mentioned above and deduced the rule of his decision. While concluding the judgment the learned Judge observes that there was no direct authority in support of his view, either of textbooks or decided cases, but that there was general tendency of the Courts from the Privy Council downwards, in favour of limiting the exercise of the power of adoption by women after the death of their husbands.

8. Now the identical cases, from which Telang, J. deduced the rule he did, have been explained, and the rule based on the principles of Hindu law governing adoptions by widows in Bombay has been enunciated in clear and positive terms by the Judicial Committee in 12 Pat 642 (1933) 20 AIR PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) at pp. 651-53. The effect of this decision is to sweep away the cobwebs of case law in India which strangled the real principle of the Hindu law.

9. It is true that in 57 Bom 157 (1933) 20 AIR PC 1 , 141 IC 9 , 57 Bom 157 , 60 IA 25 (PC) at p. 173, their Lordships of the Privy Council referred to the reason for decision contained in 14 Bom 463, (1890) 14 Bom 463 but it will not do to overlook that the controversial aspect of that case was there not material for consideration and the Board was not invited to pronounce its opinion on it. Mere reference to that case without affirmance of the correctness of the principle which is now in controversy cannot be regarded as reflecting the Board's view in favour of that principle. In view of the foregoing discussion, it will be evident that the effect in 12 Pat 642 (1933) 20 AIR PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) and 59 Bom 360 (1935) 22 AIR PC 95 , 155 IC 493 , 59 Bom 360 , 62 IA 161 (PC) is to denude 14 Bom 463 (1890) 14 Bom 463 of its authority. The case reported in 60 Bom 102 (1936) 23 AIR Bom 135 , 162 IC 133 , 60 Bom 102 , 38 Bom LR 100 contains a tacit admission of this position. In ILR 1937 Bom 508 (1937) 24 AIR Bom 279 , 170 IC 393 , ILR (1937) Bom 508 , 39 Bom LR 382 (FB) an attempt is made to distinguish 12 Pat 642 (1933) 20 AIR PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) and 59 Bom 360 (1935) 22 AIR PC 95 , 155 IC 493 , 59 Bom 360 , 62 IA 161 (PC) on the ground that a coparcenary was in existence at the time of the adoption, although it was conceded that the coparcenary was of a peculiar nature. That argument loses its force in view of 41 Mad 778 (1918) 5 AIR PC 81 , 47 IC 354 , 41 Mad 778 , 45 IA 148 (PC) at p. 783, where it was pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council that in an impartible zamindari there is no coparcenary. Further it was pointed out that inconvenient and embarrassing results are likely to follow from the application of the principle enunciated in 12 Pat 642. (1933) 20 AIR PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) The answer, in the words of Telang J., in 14 Bom 463 (1890) 14 Bom 463 is: “the possibility of such difficulties arising is not to prevent the rule of law from being enforced,” at p. 472. They are however no more so than in the case of an ordinary widow's estate and at all events they must be tolerated to maintain the true principle of the Hindu law. Such practical difficulties which may arise in exceptional cases cannot justify the destruction of the widow's paramount right to adopt. Hard cases should not make had law. Any limit to the widow's power of adoption that may be laid down to avoid practical difficulties would in its nature be arbitrary. It is therefore advisable to leave it to the Legislature to amend the law. In the meantime the limit indicated in 12 Pat 642 (1933) 20 AIR PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) may be regarded as the only limit.

10. The rule propounded in 12 Pat 642 (1933) 20 AIR PC 155 , 143 IC 441 , 12 Pat 642 , 60 IA 242 (PC) appears to be startling only because it runs counter to and unsettles the effect of a uni form course of decisions in Bombay but there is nothing in it which is repugnant to the spirit of the Hindu law. It must be observed that attaching undue importance to “coparcenary” may be misleading since that concept itself was unknown to the original Hindu law. In 43 All 228 (1921) 8 AIR PC 62 , 60 IC 534 , 43 All 228 , 48 IA 195 (PC) at p. 243, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that it would be better if the words “coparcenary” and ‘coparcenary’ had not been used and conveyed a caution against fastening the attention too much on the word ‘coparcenary.’ ‘Coparcenary.’ I as popularly understood, only expresses the rights and obligations growing out of the status of an undivided family which is the creature of Hindu law: see 9 MIA 195 (1861-63) 9 MIA 195 , 1 WR 1 , 1 Suther 501 , 2 Sar 10 (PC) at p. 237. Joint family, as pointed out by Mayne at p. 344, Edn. 9, consists of males and females who constitute a sort of corporation some of the members of which are coparceners, that is persons who on partition would be entitled to demand a share, while others are only entitled to maintenance. The male members of a joint family are entitled to claim partition and the Page: 429female members are only entitled to maintenance, although an exception ought to be made in favour of the mother who is entitled to a share on partition between her sons or her husband and her sons. Their rights spring from their being Gotraja sapindas tracing their descent from a common ancestor or connected by lawful wedlock with the male members of the family. It is apparent that joint family may consist of surviving female members only.

11. Now, attention may be directed to the law of property which may be elucidated with reference to the following illustrative pedigree:

12. A is the propositus who acquires property. On his death his property devolves on his sons B, C and D, as ancestral joint (or coparcenary) property to the exclusion of A's widow. When B begets a son E and C adopts one C, both E and C will acquire interest in that property by their birth. It will be apparent that there is a difference between the rights of A's widow and those of B, C, D and others (male members). The law expounded in the Mitakshara uses the word “Daya” as signifying the wealth which becomes the property of another, solely by reason of relation to the other. It is of two sorts: unobstructed (apratibandha), i.e not liable to obstruction, or liable to obstruction (sapratibandha). The wealth of the father or the grandfather becomes the property of his sons or his grandsons, in right of their being sons or grandsons; and that is inheritance not liable to obstruction. But property devolves on parents (or uncle) brothers and the rest upon the demise of the owner if there be no male issue: and thus the actual existence of a son and the survival of the owner are impediment to succession; and on their ceasing, the property devolves (on the successor) in right of being uncle or mother. This is inheritance subject to obstruction (Colebrooke's Mitakshara, Chap. I, Ss. 1, 3). It is now to be seen what is the nature of the rights of the male members of the family designated as coparcener. As Mayne points out at p. 344. Edn. 9, they have the right to enjoy and hold the joint property, to restrain the acts of each other in respect of it, to burden it with their debts and at their pleasure to enforce its partition. Even the father has no independent power in the disposal of this (coparcenary) property because they who are born, and they who are yet unbegotten, and they who are still in the womb require the means of support, no gift or sale should be made: Colebrooke's Mitakshra, Chap. I.S III-27.

13. To revert to the illustrative pedigree, if all male persons the excepting D and the widows of B and C, it is conceded by Telang, J. in 14 Bom 463 (1890) 14 Bom 463 that the widows' adoptions, if made during D's lifetime, confer on the adopted sons all the rights of the coparceners but denies them those rights, if their adoptions took place after D's death. The difference in the results of adoptions made before and after D's death is made to turn on the existence or nonexistence of the coparcenary. But the question may reasonably arise: Is there a joint family or coparcenary when D alone is surviving? Coparcenary denotes ownership of at least two persons; and so, to call a sole owner a coparcener and his property which is admittedly held in severalty, coparcenary property is a manifest contradiction in terms. The contradiction disappears when it is borne in mind that the sole coparcener holds a species of property which is intended for the support of those “who are born, who are yet unbegotten, who are still in the womb” and consequently he holds it on behalf of his natural born son, yet unbegotten, as well as any son who would be adopted by A's or B's widow. Why are these afternoon or after adopted (if such expression may be used) sons able to divest the estate which had already lapsed to D by survivor ship? Obviously because the property is ancestral and required for their support. It must not be overlooked that these sons derive their right not from their relationship to D but to the propositus, the common ancestor who acquired the estate or its nucleus. If that is the peculiarity of this ancestral (coparcenary) property how will its nature be altered by D's death? That it is not altered is evident from the fact that the widows of A and B still continue to have the right of maintenance in respect of that property—a right which is capable of being enforced by declaration of a charge on it. That will not be the result had the property been D's self-acquired property. It must consequently be held that on D's death, D's widow who is apparently the Page: 430sole owner, stands in precisely the same position as D did with respect to the ancestral property. It must follow that the result of the adoption made after D's death must be the same as if it had been made before his death. The result will not be different even if after D's widow's death, the property devolves on D's daughter, or other heir. When the adoption takes place after D's death, there arises a conflict be tween the rights of the adopted son and the person in whom the property remains vested at the moment. That conflict must be resolved in favour of the adopted son because the former's heritage is not liable to obstruction whereas the latter's is. His right being superior must override that of the rival. This situation reveals the significance of remark, “It is clear that in his presence, the plaintiff cannot inherit the estate” occurring in the penultimate paragraph at p. 365 of 59 Bom 360. (1935) 22 AIR PC 95 , 155 IC 493 , 59 Bom 360 , 62 IA 161 (PC) The word ‘plaintiff’ refers to the person in whom the property vested before the adoption.

14. There is nothing new or startling in the above mentioned proposition which but involves the application of the Mitakshara rule. It is in accordance with this rule that when a widow of a deceased coparcener adopts a son to her husband, he acquires his father's interest notwithstanding that it lapsed to the survivors, and an adoption by a widow of a deceased owner results in divesting the widow's estate. It is clear that a person in whom the property is vested after the death of the sole surviving member of a joint family takes it subject to defeasance in the event of an adoption by the widow of a predeceased member of the quondam joint family. The defeasibility of the vesting of such an estate is implicit in the very fiction that a widow is the surviving half of the husband. The husband becomes fully alive, for juridical purposes, in the form of the adopted son on the well recognized Vedic Doctrine. “The father is born as the son”. Consequently, the adopted son must get such interest as his father would have got had he been alive at the date of adoption. To conclude, it is the right of the adopted son and not the existence of the coparcenary that is the true criterion for determining the judicial effect of the adoption. Turning now to the present case, it must be held that Sakharam's adoption was valid so as to divest Tulsai and vest the property in Sakharam. On the view we have taken of Sakharam's adoption, it is unnecessary to consider the effect of the consent alleged to have been given by Tulsai to the adoption. The next important question is whether Vikram's adoption by Tulsai in 1930 was valid; unquestionably it would be, in view of the principle discussed above. Tulsai had no less power to adopt a son to her husband than Draupadi had to adopt a son to her own husband. She could have exercised it during the life-time of Sakharam and her adopted son would have been entitled to his appropriate share in the joint family property. Neither her consent to Sakharam's adoption nor Sakharam's death would destroy her inherent power to adopt. After Sakharam's death the estate vested in his widow on whose remarriage it vested in his mother, but it was manifestly subject to defeasance by Tulsai's exercise of her power of adoption. Vikram as Krish naji's son had obviously a superior right to the ownership of the estate to that of Sakharam's personal heirs. It must follow that Vikram after his adoption was entitled to possession of the property. The next impor tant question is whether the transfers in favour of the appellants Shankar and Trimbak are binding on the plaintiff. Shankar, is interested in field Survey No. 84 and a house. This property was purchased on 14th May 1910 by Sakharam. The Courts below are agreed in finding that this was not the self-acquired property of Sakharam as it was not proved that Sakharam had purchased it otherwise than from the income of the property which came to him as an adopted son. It must therefore be treated as an accretion to the original estate. This property was sold by Draupadi, Bani and Tulsai to Chahadu on 28th July 1920. Neither Bani nor Tulsai had any right to sell it, and Draupadi had only a widow's right in it and her alienation would be binding on Vikram only if it had been justified by legal necessity. The rights of and adopted son accrue on the date of adoption; nevertheless he is entitled to challenge alienations made by a limited owner prior to his adoption: see 41 Mad 75 (1918) 5 AIR Mad 469 , 42 IC 245 , 41 Mad 75 , 33 MLJ 387 (FB) and Mayne's Hindu Law, Edn. 9, at page 271. The appellant Trimbak's case stands on no better footing. Trimbak admits that Survey No. 9 in which he is interested came into possession of Sakharam in the wake of his adoption. That was sold by Draupadi and Page: 431Bani to Chahadu on 2nd April 1924. The sale is not proved to have been justified by legal necessity.

15. It is urged that Mt. Tulsai's right to the property was already extinguished in consequence of adverse possession on the part of Sakharam from the date of his adoption in 1907 and that her adoption in 1930 could not create any right in Vikram. As Sakharam's adoption was valid, his possession could not be that of a trespasser but that of a member of a joint family. As such it could not be regarded as being adverse to Tulsai who was a female member of that family. Granting that his possession became at any time adverse, it was from 1920, when Tulsai executed the farkatnama in favour of Draupadi as held by the Courts below. The suit is however within time as computed from that date. It must be also observed that adverse possession, if any, against Tulsai could not destroy the right of Vikram who claims as Krishnaji's son. Much capital is made of the farkatnama as having extinguished Tulsai's rights. The appellants are concluded by the lower Appellate Court's finding of fact that it was a fraudulent document and that it was not binding on Tulsai. The result is that the appeal stands dismissed with costs.

D.S/R.K

16. Appeal dismissed.