Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh v. Kunwar B.P. Singh

A.N Mulla, J.:— Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh of Tekari and four others presented this petition under Sec. 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act alleging that the 12 respondents committed contempt of court when respondent No. 1 called the tenth annual general meeting of the Hind Provincial Flying Club on the 31st of July, 1960 and the other eleven respondents attended this meeting and then passed a resolution against the earlier resolution passed by some of the members of this Club on the 15th of May, 1960. The contempt consisted in the fact that the dispute between the members of the Club was referred to the Registrar, co-operative Societies under the provisions of the co-operative Societies Act on the 23rd of May, 1960 and the Assistant Registrar to whom the Registrar had delegated his powers to arbitrate in the matter had issued an injunction as early, as the 18th of July, 1960 that no further meeting should be called and this direction was flouted and disobeyed. It was further pointed out that all the respondents from 2 to 12 when they attended the meeting held on the 31st of July, 1960 should be presumed to know that such an injunction was passed by the Assistant Registrar and also that against the decision of the Assistant Registrar which was given on the 23rd of July, 1960 respondent No. 1 intended to file an appeal and it was actually filed on the 4th of August, 1960. This should also, therefore, be presumed that all these respondents knew that an appeal was going to be filed and yet they flouted the order passed by the Assistant Registrar and held a counter meeting in order to belittle the legal importance of the order passed by the Assistant Registrar.

2. I have heard the counsel for the applicants at length. He has ably presented his case before me and he has resolved my doubts on some matters. It is true that I do not agree with some of his contentions, but at the same time I want to record my appreciation of the assistance which he tried to give to the Court. Still the matter before me is not very involved. There are only two or three questions which need be determined and it is not necessary to deal with all those aspects which were placed before me by the counsel for the applicants.

3. In a contempt of court case the main questions to be decided are whether in fact-a contempt was committed by the accused persons and whether under the law the High Court is empowered to deal with the contempt. The arguments addressed to me by the counsel for the applicants may briefly be summarized as follows:—

1. The Registrar and the Assistant Registrar of the co-operative Societies are statutory arbitrators and a dispute if it arises between the members of a registered Club must be referred to them for arbitration.

2. The Assistant Registrar who functioned as the arbitrator in this dispute was a court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act.

3. On a correct interpretation of Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, the Assistant Registrar functioned as a subordinate court to the High Court and, therefore, the Assistant Registrar was a subordinate court to the High Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act.

4. The conduct of the opposite parties mentioned in the earlier part of this decision clearly amounted to contempt of court.

4. As I have come to the conclusion that the Assistant Registrar was not a court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act and as in my opinion even if he is held to be a court, he was certainly not a subordinate court to the High Court, I need not discuss the other two points mentioned by me in the summary above.

5. The counsel in order to support his contention that the Registrar and the Assistant Registrar, co-operative Societies, are courts, placed before me certain observations in certain decisions given by the various High Courts. He also drew my attention to similar observations made by learned Judges in dealing with analogous Acts, such as the Panchayat Raj Act. In my opinion on striking a balance between the judicial authorities the contention advanced by the counsel is not maintainable. No doubt there are certain decisions which support the view advanced by the counsel for the applicants, but, with all respect to the learned Judges, I find that no line of reasoning is to be found in those decisions. On the other hand those decisions which take a contrary view pursue a line of reasoning which is acceptable to me. Then there is the decision of the Supreme Court in Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain . A.I.R 1956 S.C 66.. In this case the distinction between a Court of justice and a court of law was brought out and the learned Judges made it quite clear that the meaning of court for the purposes of granting immunity from contempt cannot be extended to a very great extent. It was observed (page 71):—

“It seems to me that the sense in which the word ‘judicial’ is used in that argument (argument advanced on the same lines as the argument addressed to me by the counsel for the applicants) is this: it is used as meaning that the proceedings are such as ought to be conducted with the fairness and impartiality which characterize proceedings in Courts of Justice, and are proper to the functions of a Judge, not that the members of the supposed body are members of a Court. Consider to what lengths the doctrine would extend, if this immunity were applied to every body which is bound to decide judicially in the sense of deciding fairly and impartially.

If would apply to assessment committees, boards of guardians, to the Inns of Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, to the General Medical Council when considering questions affecting the position of a medical man, and to all arbitrators. Is it necessary, on grounds of public policy, that the doctrine of immunity should be carried as far as this? I say not.”

6. Earlier in the same decision the learned Judge had observed (p. 70):—

“An Administrative Tribunal may act judicially, but still remain an administrative tribunal as distinguished from a Court, strictly so-called. Mere externals do not make a direction to an administrative officer by an ad hoc tribunal an exercise by a Court of judicial power.”

7. It is clear from these observations that merely the performance of judicial acts does not turn an administrative tribunal into a judicial tribunal. It does not become a court within the strict meaning of the word ‘Court’. The law of Contempt of Courts primarily applied only to the Courts of law and not to quasi tribunals which may act judicially in some matters, but which are really administrative tribunals. In my opinion the Assistant Registrar was an arbitrator according to the provisions of the co-operative Societies Act and it would be a misnomer to call him a Court. The reason why. Contempt of Courts Act has been enacted is that it is essential for the rule of law that Courts should be respected. Unless the Courts are respected there is the danger that lawlessness might prevail. The High Court is, therefore, empowered to deal with those persons who by their conduct try to undermine the dignity of the Courts of law. But the High Court would do so only to preserve its own dignity and to preserve the dignity of those Courts which are subordinate to it. If any indignity is offered to other tribunals which are administrative in character, no indignity is offered to the High Court or a Court of law and, therefore, the High Court need not extend the doctrine of immunity to such courts. If the Legislature wants that immunity should be extended even to such tribunals, it is open to the Legislature to make specific provisions in the particular enactments themselves to protect such tribunals. As a matter of fact the Legislature in some enactments had done so. As an illustration I may refer to the Arbitration Act. Sub-Sec. (2) to Sec. 43 of this Act runs as follows:—

“Persons failing to attend in accordance with such process, or making any other default, or refusing to give their evidence or guilty of any contempt to the arbitrator or umpire during the investigation of the reference, shall be subject to the like disadvantages, penalties and punishments by order of the Court on the representation of the arbitrator or umpire as they would incur for the like offences in suits tried before the Court.”

8. The terminology of this sub-Sec. (2) is extremely significant. It clearly states that the contempt committed would not be contempt of Court, but would be the contempt of the arbitrator. It further makes it a necessary pre-requisite before proceedings can be taken against an offender that the arbitrator should refer the matter to the Court concerned and then the Court would take suitable action. It is easy to infer from this terminology that the arbitrator is not a Court, but by virtue of this sub-section he would be deemed to be a Court. There is a difference between a Court and a Tribunal which is to be deemed to be a Court. While all Courts of law would enjoy immunity under the law of Contempt, only those Tribunals can enjoy this immunity about which a specific provision is made that they should be deemed to be a Court. Those Tribunals about which the Legislature has not elected to make this direction cannot be deemed to be a Court. The reason why the Legislature did not do so in the case of the Registrar, co-operative Societies, can also be understood. As observed by me above, it is the dignity of the Courts which is the primary concern of the law of Contempt. An arbitrator under the Arbitration Act would be appointed in a dispute which comes before a Court and the Court delegates its powers to that arbitrator with the agreement of the contending parties before it. I am satisfied in my mind that Sec. 43 of the Arbitration Act does not contemplate the case of that arbitrator whom the parties themselves select without going before a Court of law. As a matter of fact the observations of Bhagwati, J. in the Supreme Court decision cited by me above also point to the same direction. He has clearly observed that this immunity cannot be extended to all arbitrators and obviously an arbitrators selected by the parties themselves, without going to Court, cannot possibly enjoy this immunity. It would be absurd and not in the interests of the community to extend this Protection to such an arbitrator. Two friends have some sort of dispute of a civil nature and they ask a common friend to arbitrate the matter between them. Subsequently one of them is not Prepared to accept his arbitration because for some reason he has lost confidence in him and he wants that now the dispute should be decided elsewhere. Is it reasonable to hold that if he says anything derogatory to the person whom he had selected as an arbitrator earlier, he commits contempt of Court? Such an interpretation of law would make it impossible for persons to settle their disputes privately.

9. I am, therefore, of the opinion that only those arbitrators can be deemed to be Courts who are appointed through a Court and not those arbitrators who function without the intervention of a Court. The rule of immunity can be extended to the first group because showing disrespect to an arbitrator appointed through a Court amounts to a disrespect to the Court itself. On the other hand showing disrespect to an arbitrator not appointed through a Court does not amount to contempt of any Court. It was perhaps for this reason that no provision for taking action under Contempt of Courts Act Was made in the co-operative Societies Act. As the Registrar and the Assistant Registrar were to function according to statutory provisions and not because any Court of law has delegated this power to them, the rule of immunity cannot be extended to them. At not stage could they be considered to be the representatives of any Court, nor could their decisions be interfered With by any civil, criminal or revenue Court. They were the final arbiters of the disputes before them and no Court had any control over them. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Registrar and the Assistant Registrar, co-operative Societies cannot be deemed to be a Court of law.

10. Now I come to the second point, whether the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar can be said to be subordinate to the High Court. The counsel for the applicants relied on Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention that the Registrar is subordinate to the High Court, he placed before me several decisions. Amongst these decisions were:—

1. Jyoti Narayan v. Brijnandan Sinha . A.I.R 1954 Pat. 289.

2. Lakhama Pesha v. Venkatarao Swamirao Nazare . A.I.R 1955 Bom. 103.

3. S. Kapur Singh v. L. Jagat Narain . A.I.R 1951 Pun. 49..

11. He also placed before me a Single Judge decision of our own High Court in Sukhdeo Baiswar v. Brij Bhushan Misra . A.I.R 1951 All. 667.. No doubt there are certain observations in these decisions which support his contention, but as observed by me earlier these observations have not the backing of a line of reasoning. They are just conclusions reached without giving any reasons as to why these conclusions were reached. I also find that in most of these cases the arbitrator or the Tribunal was functioning in a delegated capacity and this delegation had proceeded from a court of law. I have already distinguished between that class of arbitrators and other arbitrators to whom no delegation is made by a Court of law. As against these decisions, there are the observations of the Supreme Court in the case cited by me above. The Supreme Court has observed (p. 69):—

“The word ‘Court’ was not defined in the Act and the expression ‘Courts subordinate to the High Courts' would prima facie mean the Courts of law subordinate to the High Courts in the hierarchy of Courts established for the purpose of administration of justice throughout the Union.”

12. The same view was expressed in a later decision of our own High Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ratan Shukla . A.I.R 1956 All. 258.. Not only this view was expressed in this decision but good and convincing reasons were given why the Assistant Registrar or the Registrar, or analogous Tribunals cannot be held to be subordinate to the High Court.

13. Under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India the word used is ‘superintendence’ and not ‘subordination.’ ‘Subordination’ and ‘superintendence’ connote different meanings and they are not synonyms. The decisions on which the counsel for the applicants relies have held that the word ‘superintendence’ is equivalent to the word ‘subordination.’ With respect to the learned Judges who came to this conclusion, I cannot agree with this view. In the Bench decision of our own High Court which I have cited above (A.I.R 1956 All. 258), it was pointed out that while the word ‘superintendence’ is used in Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, in the immediately following Article the word used is ‘subordinate court.’ If the two were synonyms there was no reason for one word being used in one Article and another word being used in the following Article. To me this argument seems to be unanswerable. The Legislature does not use words haphazardly and every word is placed in the Statute after full deliberation and fully realizing what it connotes. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the superintendence of the High Court over certain Administrative Tribunals does not make them subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act. Therefore, even if any contempt of the Assistant Registrar was committed by the opposite parties, it did not amount to contempt of Court in the first place and secondly, even if for argument's sake it is held that the Assistant Registrar was a Court within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act the contempt was not of a Court which was subordinate to the High Court. As such no relief can be given under the Contempt of Courts Act.

14. The counsel also placed before me certain decisions in which it was held by some learned Judges that in cases under the Panchayat Raj Act, the High Court could take action under the Contempt of Courts Act. His argument was that this is an analogous Act and if the Panchayats can be deemed to be subordinate to the High Court, the Registrar, co-operative Societies, should also be deemed to be a subordinate court to the High Court. In my opinion the analogy does not hold. The village Panchayats are subordinate courts to the court of the Assistant Collector or the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Assistant Registrar is not subordinate of any Court and there can only be an appeal from the order of the Assistant Registrar before the Magistrate of the co-operative Societies and this order is final. In other words no Court of law at any stage revises or hears an appeal against an order passed by the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar, co-operative Societies, while the order of the Panchayat is revisable both by the civil and criminal courts. The two, therefore, do not stand on the same footing. While the orders of one are revisable by a court subordinate to the High Court, the orders of the other are not subject to this control of any Court if the order of the Panchayat is revisable by a Court subordinate to the High Court, it would be ridiculous to hold that they are not subordinate to the High Court, itself. The counsel depended upon the provision in the Panchayat Raj Act which was to the effect that the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Assistant Collector as the case might be is final and no appeal or revision would lie against that order. From this he wanted to contend that the High Court could not entertain a revision against an order passed by the Assistant Collector or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and, therefore, when the Assistant Collector or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed an order in revision from a decision given by the Panchayat, then they were not subordinate to the High Court. It seems to me that the interpretation put by the counsel for the applicants is not warranted by the words of the Statute. Where the law lays down that a certain order is not revisable or appealable, it only means that the aggrieved party cannot seek any further redress. It does not in any way limit the inherent powers of the High Court. The High Court can suo motu act under the provisions of Sec. 561-A, C.P.C to rectify a miscarriage of justice. The counsel then placed before me a decision of our own High Court in Piarey Lai v. State . A.I.R 1955 N.U.C All. 862.. It was held in this decision that Sec. 561-A cannot be applied to cases under the Panchayat Raj Act. With respect to the learned Judge who gave this decision, I am not of the same opinion. The learned Judge came to this conclusion because as observed by him the Criminal Procedure Code did not apply to the Panchayat Raj Act and as Sec. 561-A is incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore, Sec. 561-A became inapplicable. In my opinion Sec. 561-A is no part of the Code of Criminal Procedure, though it is incorporated in it. Sec. 561-A deals with the inherent powers of the High Court and even if these powers had not been mentioned in Sec. 561-A, even then these powers could have been exercised by the High Court. These powers do not come to the High Court because Sec. 561-A is enacted, but because they are the inherent powers of the High Court. The High Court is not only a Court of law, but a Court of justice also and in the interests of justice the High Court can interfere to rectify a grave wrong.

15. Therefore, I am of the opinion that in spite of the provision in the Panchayat Raj Act that no revision or appeal shall lie against the order passed by the Assistant Collector or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the inherent powers of the High Court under Sec. 561-A, Cr. P.C are not taken away. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the co-operative Societies Act and the Panchayat Raj Act cannot be placed on the same footing.

16. As in my view the Assistant Registrar was not a Court and further that he was not a subordinate Court to the High Court, no question of committing contempt of court arises. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to discuss any other aspect of the case. I, therefore, discharge the notices issued to the opposite parties and dismiss this petition. The costs shall be borne by the parties, except that the applicant shall pay Rs. 100 (One hundred) to Sri Shri Rama, Government Advocate, who has appeared on behalf of the State, as costs to him.

Petition dismissed.