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Nalam Ramalingayya H... v. The Commissioner Of ...

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Dec 31, 1969
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Factual and Procedural Background

This batch of 102 writ petitions was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by hereditary trustees or persons in management of religious or charitable institutions challenging the constitutionality and validity of various provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act (Act XVII of 1966). The petitioners sought declarations that certain sections of the Act were unconstitutional and ultra vires. The petitioners include institutions claiming to be private and others admitted as public. Some petitioners claimed status as religious denominations under Article 26 of the Constitution, asserting rights to manage their religious affairs and properties without interference. The respondents contended that the institutions are public, fall under the Act’s jurisdiction, and that the Act is intra vires and valid. The case also involved detailed examination of the historical background and scheme of the Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the office of hereditary trusteeship is property within the meaning of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution?
  2. Whether any material provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act (Act XVII of 1966) are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 25, 26 or 31 of the Constitution?
  3. Whether the Act applies to petitioners claiming to be private institutions or religious denominations or societies registered under the Societies Registration Act?
  4. Whether the institutions or endowments of the petitioners are private or public in character?
  5. Whether the Arya and Lingayat communities and their institutions are religious denominations within the meaning of Article 26?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The office of hereditary trusteeship constitutes property under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution.
  • Provisions of the Act, especially sections 15 and 27, confer arbitrary and wide discretion on functionaries to appoint non-hereditary trustees and executive officers, reducing hereditary trustees to non-entities and violating fundamental rights.
  • Some petitioners claim to be religious denominations entitled to manage their affairs and properties without State interference under Article 26.
  • Institutions registered under the Societies Registration Act claim exemption from applicability of the impugned Act.
  • The Act’s provisions allegedly allow arbitrary exercise of power without guidelines, violating Article 14.

Respondents' Arguments

  • All petitioners’ institutions are public and fall within the Act’s scope.
  • None of the institutions qualify as religious denominations within Article 26.
  • The office of hereditary trusteeship is not property within Article 19(1)(f).
  • The Act is valid, intra vires, and does not violate Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 25, 26, or 31.
  • The actions challenged are justified in law and fact, and no grounds raised by petitioners merit relief.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner, H.R.E v. Lakshmindra Teerthaswamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, A.I.R 1954 S.C 282 Sections of Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act declared unconstitutional; interpretation of trusteeship and property rights. Used to analyze nature of hereditary trusteeship and confirm constitutional validity of certain provisions.
Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar, A.I.R 1922 P.C 123 Distinction between Hindu and English law trusts; trustees as mere custodians under Hindu law. Clarified that Hindu religious trusts are not trusts in English law sense; trustees hold management, not ownership.
Srinivas Chariar v. Evalappa Mudaliar, A.I.R 1922 P.C 325 Distinction between Dharmakartha and Shebait or Mahant trusteeship; property rights. Distinguished the nature of different trustee roles and their proprietary interests.
K.M Narayana Nambudiripad v. State of Madras, A.I.R 1954 Mad. 385 Hereditary trusteeship is property under Article 19(1)(f) even without emoluments. Confirmed that hereditary trusteeship is protected property right under the Constitution.
Tilkayat Shri Govindalalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R 1963 S.C 1938 Management of temple property is secular and subject to reasonable legislative regulation under Article 19(5). Distinguished religious rights from secular management; upheld regulation of secular property management.
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, A.I.R 1962 S.C 853 Recognition of Dawoodi Bohras as religious denomination under Article 26; management of religious affairs protected. Clarified scope of Article 26 rights related to religious denominations and property administration.
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Mr. Justice S.R Tendolkar, A.I.R 1958 S.C 538 Presumption of constitutionality of legislation; burden on challenger to prove violation. Applied presumption favoring validity of the Act's provisions against claims of arbitrariness.
Moti Das v. S.P Sahi, A.I.R 1959 S.C 942 Reasonable restrictions under Article 19(5); regulation of religious trusts. Upheld provisions regulating administration of religious and charitable institutions as reasonable.
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, A.I.R 1952 S.C 75 Invalidation of arbitrary legislative discretion violating Article 14. Distinguished from present case; no arbitrary discretion found in the Act’s provisions.
Purshottamdas Govindji Halai v. B.M Desai, A.I.R 1956 S.C 20 Legitimacy of summary recovery of public dues; not violative of Article 14. Supported validity of recovery of contributions as public revenue under the Act.
Charanjit Lal v. Union of India, A.I.R 1951 S.C 41 Right to hold property includes right to possess and enjoy benefits. Supported broad interpretation of property rights under Article 19(1)(f).
Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, A.I.R 1958 S.C 255 Definition of "matters of religion" under Article 26(b). Confirmed protection of religious practices, rituals, and ceremonies under Article 26.
Commissioner of Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments, Mysore v. U. Krishna Rao, Civil Appeal No. 2312 of 1966 Distinction between tax and fee; fees valid when correlated to services rendered. Upheld validity of contribution levied under the Act as a fee for government services.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a detailed and methodical analysis of the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966, focusing on the key legal issues raised. It examined the nature of hereditary trusteeship under Hindu law, distinguishing it from English trust law, and reviewed extensive case law establishing that hereditary trusteeship, even without emoluments or beneficial interest, constitutes "property" under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution.

The court held that the Act’s provisions regulating the administration and management of religious and charitable institutions do not infringe fundamental rights as they impose reasonable restrictions under Article 19(5). The appointment of non-hereditary trustees and executive officers, the powers of the Commissioner and subordinate functionaries, and the procedures for administration and audit were found to be constitutionally valid and intended to ensure better and efficient management in the public interest.

The court rejected claims that the Act interfered with religious denominations’ rights under Articles 25 and 26, clarifying that the Act regulates only secular aspects of property management and administration, not religious practices or rituals. It emphasized that caste or community affiliation alone does not constitute a religious denomination under Article 26, requiring a distinct common faith and organization.

Regarding institutions registered under the Societies Registration Act, the court found that if their objects are charitable, they fall within the Act’s ambit as public charitable institutions. The court also upheld the levy of contributions as a fee for government services rendered, distinguishing it from a tax based on established legal principles.

The court further held that procedural safeguards, including rights of appeal, revision, and review, and quasi-judicial procedures for dispute resolution under the Act, ensure fairness and prevent arbitrariness. The provisions empowering recovery of dues as arrears of land revenue were also upheld as reasonable and in public interest.

Finally, the court noted that questions of fact such as whether an institution is public or private or constitutes a religious denomination are mixed questions of law and fact and not appropriately determined in writ proceedings, recommending such matters be adjudicated in competent civil courts.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966, and its challenged provisions are valid, intra vires, and constitutional.

The office of hereditary trusteeship, even without beneficial interest, is protected property under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution. The Act’s provisions imposing reasonable restrictions on the management and administration of religious and charitable institutions do not violate fundamental rights. The Act applies to public institutions, including those registered under the Societies Registration Act with charitable objects, but not to private institutions, the status of which must be determined on facts.

The Act regulates secular aspects of property management without interfering with religious affairs protected under Articles 25 and 26. The levy of contributions is a valid fee for services rendered by the government. Procedural safeguards and rights of appeal ensure fairness. The decision dismisses all petitions with costs and clarifies that factual disputes regarding status of institutions or religious denominations should be resolved in appropriate civil forums.

No new precedent altering legal principles was established; the decision reinforces existing jurisprudence on trusteeship, fundamental rights, and regulation of religious and charitable institutions.

Show all summary ...

Kondaiah, J.:— This batch of applications by the hereditary trustees or persons in management of religious or charitable institutions, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is to declare the provisions of Sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 12, 14 to 17, 20 to 22, 25 to 29, 35, 36, 38 to 40 and 50 to 56, 77 and others of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act (Act XVII of 1966) (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) as unconstitutional and ultra vires.

2. There are as many as 102 petitions which are now before us for consideration. It is expedient to make a brief statement of the various allegations in the several affidavits filed in support of the petitions. It may be noted at the very outset that some of the institutions or endowments in question are admittedly public. The others of course, are claimed to be private in character. These alleged private institutions, endowments and societies are registered under the Societies Registration Act and on that account it is averred that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to them. Some claim to be religious deonominations within the meaning of Art. 26 of the Constitution as they profess and follow the tenets are philosophy of Vasavi, otherwise known as Kanyakaparameswari, and as such claim that they are entitled to manage their own affairs of religion and the properties of the institutions and endowments without any interference. The Lingayats in some of the petitions set up a like claim on a similar basis. There are hereditary trustees and other persons who are in charge of the management of the institutions or endowments. All the petitioners claim that they are entitled to manage the institutions and their properties in their own right without any interference Page: 427from the functionaries under the Act and that they are continuing in management hereditarily since generations and managing the institutions efficiently and diligently without giving room for any adverse comment or imputation of charges of mismanagement, mis-appropriation or malfeasance and, in fact, they have improved the institutions and funds to a great extent. They allege that the respondents are illegally trying to interfere with their management by asking them to produce accounts and records, requiring them to get the institutions registered under the provisions of the Act and making efforts to notify the institutions or endowments under section 6, to appoint non-hereditary trustees and executive officers and to constitute Boards of Trustees even though their management is found to be good and efficient. They aver that the office of hereditary trusteeship is property within the meaning of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and that the material provisions of the Act are unconstitutional and ultra vires as the same are hit by the provisions of Arts. 14, 19(1)(f), 25, 26 and 31 of the Constitution of India Hence these writ petitions. The respondents countered the material allegations in the affidavits filed by the petitioners, contending inter alia that all the petitioners-institutions are public and none of them private in character, that they are religious and charitable institutions and endowments within the meaning of the Act and are amenable to the jurisdiction of the functionaries under the Act, that none of these institutions or endowments are religious denominations or a section thereof within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution, that none of the hereditary trustees in the State has any beneficial interest in the institutions of endowed properties except a bare right to manage the affairs of the institutions and secular matters, that the office of hereditary trusteeship is not property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f), that none of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners has been infringed, that the Andhra Pradesh State Legislature is competent to enact the impugned Act, that all the provisions of the Act are valid and intra vires and none of the provisions is hit by Art. 14, 19(1)(f), 25, 26 and 31 of the Constitution, that the action of the respondents complained of in these applications is justified in law as well as on facts, that there is no merit in any of the grounds raised by the petitioners and that these applications merit dismissal.

3. The questions that arise broadly for decision are:

(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances, the office of hereditary trusteeship of the petitioners is, or is not, property within the meaning of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution?

(2) Whether all or any of the material provisions of the Act (XVII of 1966) are hit by Arts. 14, 19(1)(f), 25, 26 or 31 of the Constitution of India?

(3) Whether the Act is applicable to all or any of the petitioners who claim to be private institutions or religious denominations or societies registered under the Societies Registration Act?

(4) Whether the institutions or endowments of the petitioners are private or public in character?

(5) Whether the Arya community or Lingayat community and the institutions in question founded by them are religious denominations within the meaning of Art. 26?

4. For a proper appreciation of the respective contentions of the parties, it is necessary to set out briefly the historical background and the scheme and object of the Act.

5. It is a matter of common knowledge that even from times immemorial, religious and charitable institutions and endowments in India were under the special protection and management of the Hindu kings and rulers. Their management was regulated by a sort of customary law, ultimately to be enforced by the ruling authorities. After the advent of British rule, as a large number of religious and charitable institutions and endowments were found to be mismanaged and the funds mis-spent and misappropriated by the persons in their charge, Regulation XXX of 1810 in Bengal and Regulation VII of 1817 in Madras were passed under which the Government had to keep a strict watch over the religious trusts and endowments by exercising efficient and strict control through the State officers Then came Act XX of 1863 which was repealed by the Act of 1923 which ultimately appeared in the shape of Madras Act II of 1927. This Act was amended by not less than ten Acts of the Madras Legislature viz., Madras Act I of 1925, V of 1929, IV of 1930 XI of 1931, XI of 1934. XII of 1935, XX of 1938, XXII of 1939, V of 1944 and X of 1946. The next Act that was passed by the Madras Legislature was the Madras Hindu Religious and Chartible Endowments Act (XIX Page: 429of 1951) which repealed the earlier enactments on the subject. Sections 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56, 63 to 69 and 76(1) of that Act were declared unconstitutional and void in Commissioner, H.R.E v. Lakshmindra Teerthaswamiar of sri Shirur Mutt A.I.R 1954 S.C 282. The aforesaid sections were substituted by the amending Act of 1954. The Madras Act XIX of 1951 as amended by the amending Act of 1954, and the Andhra Pradesh (Telangam Area) Wakf Regulation, 1349 Fasli were in force in the Andhra and Telangana areas respectively until December 5, 1966. With a view to secure uniformity of law throughout the State of Andhra Pradesh and to consolidate and amend the law relating to the administration and governance of charitable and Hindu religious institutions and endowments, the present Act XVII of 1966 has, been enacted. The Act having received the assent of the President on November 28, 1966, came into force on December 6, 1966 Shortly stated, this is the historical background of the Act.

6. We shall now examine the scheme and intendment of the impugned Act, consisting of 113 sections in 15 chapters and three schedules.

7. Chapter I relates to the title, scope and application of the Act and the definitions, Chapter II, commencing from section 3 and ending with section 13, deals with the appointment, powers and functions of the Commissioner, Joint Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner. Chapter III beginning with section 14 and ending with section 37 provides for administration and management of Hindu religious and Charitable institutions and endowments. The functioneries under the Act are empowered under section 15 to constitute Board of Trustees and under section 27 to appoint Executive Officers, whose powers and functions are specified in the several provisions of the Act Chapter IV, which begins with section 38 and ends with section 41, prescribes the procedure for registration and preparation of the list of Hindu religious and charitable institutions and endowments Chapter V consisting of sections 42 to 48 relates to maths and specific endowments attached then to Section 49 embodied in chapter VI speaks of Dharmadayam. The procedure for preparing budgets and maintaining accounts and the manner of audit of those accounts relating to the institution, have been set out in Chapter VII consisting of sections 50 to 58. Page: 430Sections 59 to 66 embodied in Chapter VIII provide for the levy, assessment and collection of contribution not exceeding 7% of the annual income from the institutions. Chapter IX consisting of sections 67, 68 and 69 refers to the surplus funds and utilisation thereof. Chapter X, which begins with section 70 and ends with section 74, provides for the granting of leases and alienation of immovable property and resumption of inam lands belonging to a religious or charitable institution or endowment. Chapter XI, consisting of section 75 and 76, deals with encroachments by persons on lands or buildings belonging to charitable or religious institution or endowment and the eviction of such encroachers. Chapter XII provides for the enquiries into and decision of disputes and matters relating to charitable or religious institutions and endowments Chapter XIII consisting of sections 80 to 84, provides for appeals, revisions and review in respect of the matters specified therein Chapter XIV deals with the administration of Tirumala-Tirupathi Davasthanams and their properties specified in the First Schedule. Chapter XV, commencing from section 92 and ending with section 113, provides for other miscellaneous provisions to which we shall refer in detail while considering the validity of those sections. The second schedule prescribes the scale of remuneration to archakas whereas the court fee payable for documents has been prescribed in the Third Schedule. This, in brief, is the scheme and intendment of the Act.

8. We shall first take up the principal contention raised by learned counsel, Sarvasri D. Narasaraju, A. Bhujanga Rao, G. Balaparameswari Rao, N.C.V Ramanujachari, D.V Reddi Pantulu A. Gangadhara Rao, K. Venkatramaiah and others, appearing for the petitioners that the office of hereditary trusteeship of a religious or charitable institution or endowment is ‘property’ within the meaning of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution, and that the provisions of sections 15 and 27 conferring on the functionaries under the Act arbitrary and wide discretion without any guidelines to appoint non-hereditary trustees and Executive Officers, read with sections 6, 8, 17, 21 to 23, 26, 28, 31 to 36 and 51 to 56, reduce the hereditary trustees to a non-entity or nullity, abridging their fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(f) and 14 of the Constitution.

9. The question of unconstitutionality of any Act or any of its provisions arises in two ways(1) if it is beyond the Legislative competence and (2) if it is violative of any of the fundamental rights Page: 431guaranteed under the Constitution. The exercise of legislative power may be open to attack on any of the three grounds-Viz. (1) excessive delegation, (b) legislature abdicating its rule-making authority and (c) an Uncontrolled wide comprehensive power being created in favour of the executive authority. Indisputably, the Andhra Pradesh State legislature is Competent to enact the present Act by virtue of the entry No. 28 in the concurrent list of the Seventh schedule to the Constitution which empowers the State Legislature to make any law relating to the subject “Charities and charitable institutions, charitable; and religious endowments and religious institutions.” The words employed in the entry are to be liberally construed for legislative purposes. However wide the legislative powers may be within their allotted field, the laws passed in order to be valid, must necessarily conform inter alia to the provisions of Chapter III of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights. Article 13 of the Constitution is categorical in this behalf. Further, the legislature will be abdicating its functions if it delegates the essential legislative power to any other agency, such as the executive. Its laws will be open to serious attack if they allow unbridled and naked power to the executive in administering law without providing any guidelines or laying down policy. With these preliminary remarks, we proceed to examine the grounds raised in these cases.

10. The grounds raised are mainly under chapter III of the Constitution. The contravention complained of is of Articles 14, 19, 25, 26 and 31 of the Constitution. We have already set put the points which arise for determination in these cases. The first point is whether or not hereditary trusteeship is property within the meaning of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution.

11. Trusteeship is of two kinds. (1) hereditary and (2) non-herediatary. Section 2(28) defines “Trustee” as “any person whether known as mathadhipati, mahant, dharmakartha, mutwalli, mutazim, or by any other name, in whom either alone or in association with any other person, the administration and management of a charitable or religious institution or endowment are vested; and includes a Board of Trustees. “Under Sec. 3(15), “hereditary trustee” means “the trustee of a charitable or religious institution or endowment the succession to whose office devolves according to the rule of succession laid down by the founder or according to usage or custom applicable to the institution or endowment or according to the law of succession for the time being in force, as the case may be.” Therefore, a trustee is a person in whom either alone or in association with any other Page: 432person, whether called mathadhipati, mahant, dharmakartha; mutwalli mutazim or otherwise, the administration and management of a religious or charitable institution or endowment are vested; and includes a Board of Trustees. The succession to the office of hereditary trustee may devolve according to the usage and custom applicable to the institution or endowment or according to the law of succession, as the case may be.

12. As observed by the Judicial committee in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar A.I.R 1922 P.C 123, 48 Ind. App. 302

“a ‘trust’ in the sense in which the expression is used in English law, is unknown in the Hindu system, pure and simple. Hindu piety found expression in gifts to idols and images consecrated and installed in temples, to religious institutions of every kind, and for all purposes considered meritorious in the Hindu social and religious system; to brahmins, goswamis, sanyasis etc.”

13. Thus, the legal incidence of trust as known to Hindu law is not the same as in English law. The legal estate in the trust property vests under the English law in the very trustee who holds it for the benefit of cestui que trust, whereas in the case of a Hindu religious or charitable endowment, the ownership of the dedicated, gifted, or endowed property vests in the deity or the institution itself, as the case may be as a juristic person. The Mahant, Shebait or Dharmakartha otherwise known as trustee is a mere custodian or manager. That apart, there can be a religious trust of private character under Hindu law which is not possible in English law.

14. In the case of Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal A.I.R 1922 P.C 123, 48 Ind. App. 302 referred to above, the judical committee, while dealing with the powers of a Mathadhipathi, said;

“These men had and have ample discretion in the application of the funds of the institution, but always subject to certain obligations and duties, equally governed by custom and usage.”

15. A distinction between a Shebait, Mathadhipati and Dharmakartha of a trust was succinctly brought out by Lord Shaw who spoke for the Judicial Committee in Srinivas Chariar v. Evalappa Mudaliar A.I.R 1922 P.C 325 at 331 thus thus;

“The position of Dharmakariha is not that of a shebait of a religious institution, or of the Mattar of a Mutt. These functionaries have a much higher right with larger power of disposal and administration, they have a personal interes of a beneficial character.

“In the very learned Judgments delivered in Vidyapurna Tirthaswami v. Vidyanidhi Tirthaswami (1904) 27 Mad. 435 , 14 M.L.J 105 the distinction between those functionaries is explained. But a Dharmakartha is literally and no more than the manager of a charity, and his rights, apart, it may be in certain circumstances, from the question of a personal support, are never in a higher legal category than that of a mere trustee.”

16. The position of a Mahant was summed up by the Supreme Court in Shilrur Mutt Case A.I.R 1954 S.C 282 thus.

“……in the conception of Mahantship, as in Shebaitship, both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest are blended together and neither can be detached from the other. The personal or beneficial interest of the Mahant in the endowments attached to an institution is manifested in his large powers of disposal and administration and his right to create derivative tenures in respect to endowed properties: and these and other rights of a similar character invest the office of the Mahant with the character of proprietary right, though anomalous to some extent, is still a genuine legal right.”

17. Hence the position of a trustee, popularly known as Dharmakartha in Southern India, cannot be equated to that of a Mahant or Mathadhipathi as in the case of the former, there is no beneficial interest whereas in the two latter Cases, there is inevitably a sort of personal interest of a beneficial character having a higher right with a larger power of disposal and administration.

18. It is settled law that the office of Mahant and Shebait which carries with it some beneficial and proprietary interest is property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f) of the constitution. Equally settled is the law that the trusteeship whether hereditary or otherwise, coupled with a beneficial interest either in the corpus or the Page: 434usufruct of the properties of the institution or endowment is “property” within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f).

19. The question then is whether or not an office of hereditary trusteeship, without any emoluments or beneficial interest, is property within the meaning of Article 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution.

20. It is proper at this stage to consider what exactly is mean by the expression ‘Property’ as used in Article 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution of India. The word ‘property’ is not defined any where in our Constitution. Cooley on constitutional law says:

“That is property which is recognised as such by the law, and nothing else is or can be. ‘Property’ and law are born and must the together. Before the laws, there was no property; take away the laws, all property ceases. “……………….. Whatever a man produces by the labour of his hand or his brain, whatever he obtains in exchange for something of his own, and whatever is given to him, the law will protect him in the use, enjoyment, and disposition of.” (page 392)

“Property in its broader sense is not the physical thing which may be the subject of ownership, but is the right of dominion, possession and power of disposition which may be acquired over it; x x x The property which each one has in his own labour is the common heritage,…………” (page 281)

21. Weaver, in his book on Constitutional Law at page 374 states.

“Property is ownership x x x

Property includes not only real estate and personal property, but also incorporeal rights such as patents, copy rights, leases, accounts and choses in action, and every other thing of an exchangeable value which one may have”.

22. The word ‘property’ in palcitum (xxxi) is of the widest connotation………………… “Vide Nicholas on the Australian Constitution, page 201.)

23. In Minister of State for Army v. Balsiel5 Rich. J. observed at page 285.

“The meaning of property in such a connection (i.e S. 51 p. xxxi) must be determined upon general principles of jurisprudence, not by the artifical refinements of any particular legal system or by reference to Sheppard's Touchstone, x x x. It extends to any acquisition of any interest in any property.”

Mukherjee, J. who spoke for the court in the well-known Shirur Mutt case (A.I.R 1954 S.C 282 at 288 and 289) observed.

“There is no reason why the word ‘property’ as used in Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, should not be given a liberal and wide connotation and should not be extended to those well recognised types of interest which have the insignia or characteristics of proprietary right.”

24. The word ‘property’ used in Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution refers to tangible as well as intangible property including incorporeal rights, (see Dwarakdas v. Sholapur S. & W. Company, (A.I.R 1951 Bombay 86).

25. The Supreme Court, in Charanjit Lal v. Union of India A.I.R 1951 S.C 41 had assumed the right to hold property as right to possess it and enjoy all the benefits ordinarily attached to the ownership of property. The Supreme Court and the High Court have proceeded all along on the assumption that Art. 19(1)(f) applies equally to concrete as well as abstract rights of property. (See Swami Motor Transports (P) Ltd. v. Sri Sankaraswamigal Mutt A.I.R 1963 S.C 864 Therefore, the expression ‘Property’ occurring in Art. 19(1)(f) and 31(2) should be given a liberal and wide connotation extending to the well recognised types of interest having characteristics of proprietary right.

26. We shall now examine the case law on the subject, relating to hereditary offices, and in particular trusteeship. The earliest cases where the standard text books on Hindu law had been referred to for the purpose of showing that in the Smrithis and Commentaries the Page: 436hereditary office was equated to immovable property, are Krishna Bhat Hiragange v. Kapabhat Mahalbhat et al (1869) 6 Bom. H.C.R 137 at 139 and Balvantrav T. Bapaji v. Purshotam Sidheshvar (1872) 9 Bom. H.C.P 99 In Krishna Bhat Hiragange v. Kapabhat Mahal Bhat et al (1869) 6 Bom. H.C.R 137 at 139 the office of hereditary priest to a temple was held to be immovable property. It was observed therein:

“Mr. Colebrooke says, that if an office in a family be bereditary, the dues or profits appertaining to it must be subject to be shared; but in such case it classes with immoveable… the classing hereditary offices with immoveable property in sec. 1 of Reg. V. of 1827 was in consequence of the custom amongst Hindus to consider them as such; Although therefore, the office of a priest in a temple when it is not annexed to the ownership, of any land, or, held by virtue of such ownership, may not, in the ordinary sense of the term, be immoveable property but is an incorporeal hereditement of a personal nature, yet being by the custom of Hindus classed with immoveable property, and so regarded in their law,……”

27. In Balvantrav T. Bapaji v. Purshotam Sidheshvar (1872) 9 Bom. H.C.P 99 it was observed.

“……Colebrooke and Strange treated hereditary offices, corodies, land, and slave attached to it, as in the same class, namely, immoveable property.”

28. In Maharana Fatteshsangji v. Dessai Kallanraiji Hekoomut Raiji (1873) 1 Ind. App. 34 at 51 the judicial Committee held that a hereditary right to toda giras payable by an inamdar out of the rents of a village was an interest in immovable property. It was observed:—

“……Hindu texts were legitimately used to show that, in the contemplation of Hindu law, hereditary offices in a Hindu community, incapable of being held by any person not a Hindu, were in the nature of immoveables.”

29. In Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi Y. Velu Pandaram (1899) 27 Ind. App. 69 at 78 where the sale of hereditary right of management and transfer of endowed property by hereditary trustees of a religious endowment were held to be null and void in the absence of a specific custom, the Judicial Committee said:

“In Tagore v. Tagore11 it was held by this committee that all estates of inheritance created by gift or will, so far as they are inconsistent with the general law of inheritance, are void as such, and that by Hindu law no person can succeed thereunder as heir to estates described in the terms which in English law would designate estates tail……In their Lordship's opinion the ruling in Tagore v. Tagore11 is applicable to an hereditary office and endowment as well as to other immovable property.”

30. Lord Thankerton, who spoke for the judicial committee, in Ganesh Ghunder v. Lal Behary Dhur (1936) 63 Ind. App. 448 reiterated the same view expressed by the Judicial committee in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram (1899) 27 Ind. App. 69 at 78.

31. The Judicial Committee in Bhabatarini Debi v. Ashalata Debi (1943) 70 Ind. App. 57 at 63 said.

“The effect of that case Manohar Mukherji v. Bupendra Nath Mukherji (1932) I.L.R 60 Cal. 452 and of the Board's decision which confirmed it in Ganesh Chunder Dhur v. Lal Behary Dhur (1936) 63 Ind. App. 448 was, however, to emphasize the proprietary element in sebaiti right, and to show that though in some, respects anomalous, it was an enomaly to be accepted as having been admitted into Hindu law from an early date.”

“(at page 66)” “It must now be taken that the sebaiti property, that is not a catena of successive life estates Page: 438(Gnanasambanda's case (1899) 27 Ind. App. 69 , (1899) I.L.R Mad. 271 but is heritable-property which in the first instance is vested in the founder.”

32. In Manathunalnatha Desikar v. Gopala Chettiar I.L.R 1943, Madras, 858 at 869 while considering whether a non-herediatary office of trusteeship or Dharmakartha in a South Indian temple or religious endowment was or was not property, Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J. who spoke for the Court, said.

“A hereditary office, being something which is capable of being inherited, necessarily involves the idea of property and must accordingly be left to be governed by the general law of inheritance. We are conscious that the decision of the Privy Council in Ramanatham Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti I.L.R (1906) 29 Mad. 283 (P.C) might be interpreted as recognising the partibility of the office of managership of a public temple. But there the office was admittedly hereditary and was therefore a species of heritable property to which the Tagore Case (11) would be applicable; vide Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram”

33. Satyanarayana Rao, J. who spoke for the court in Sri Shirur Mutta v. Commissioner H.R.E Board 1952-I M.L.J 557 at 582 while considering this aspect of the case, observed thus.

“If there be however an instance where the dharmakartha has no beneficial interest of any sort but is a mere manager with hereditary rights, there is no reason to exclude such a hereditary right of management even from the scope of property,”

34. The earliest decision in which it was categorically held that the office of hereditary trusteeship is property under Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution is that of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Chief Justice Rajamannar and Justice Venkatarama Aiyar in K.M Narayana Nambudiripad v. State of Madras A.I.R 1954 Mad. 385 (at 394 & 395) In that case, while considering the validity of some of the provisions of the Madras Act XIX of 1951 and whether hereditary trusteeship Page: 439was property, Venkatarama Aiyar J. who spoke for the court, after reviewing the case law on the subject ruled;

“The nature and incidents of the office of hereditary trusteeship are well settled by authority. It descends like partible property on the heirs of the trustees. Even females will be entitled to the office if they happen to succeed as heirs vide Annayya Tantri v. Ammakka A.I.R 1919 Mad. 598 (F.B). When emoluments are attached to that office they are divisible among the co-heirs. When there are no emoluments, even then the joint rights of the co-heirs can be exerised by all of them under an arrangement providing for management by turns………”

………there is ample authority for the view that trusteeship where hereditary, is in the nature of property……..We are accordingly of opinion that hereditary trusteeship is within the protection afforded by Art. 19(1)(f), even though there was no emoluments attached to the office. We may add that the allegations in the affidavits in support of these petitions disclose that the petitioners have also beneficial interests in the endowments. In the result, we must hold that the provisions in the schemes in so far as they encroach upon the rights of the petitioners as hereditary trustees are void under Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.”

35. The Madras High Court has consistently followed the same view in later cases (see Sankaram Nair v. Govindan A.I.R 1955 Mad. 120 and R. Venkataramani v. Madras H.R & C.E Board 1967 1 M.L.J 40 A Division Bench of the Madras High Court, in S.D Pandara Sannadhi v. State of Madras 1952 (2) M.L.J 67 has held that hereditary trusteeship without any beneficial interest or emoluments is property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.

36. A Full Bench of the High Court of Tranvancore-Cochin in Nambooripad V. C.D Board A.I.R 1956 T.C 19 at 21 (F.B) had held that the right of a hereditary trustee of a temple as an Ooralan constituted property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and observed.

“………there is ample support for the view that trusteeship where hereditary is in the nature of property and that Page: 440hereditary trusteeship is within the protection afforded by Article 19(1)(f) even in cases where no emoluments are attached to the office.”

37. (see also Kumaran Nambudiri v. Cochin Devaswom Board A.I.R 1954 Travancore-Cochin 515 (F.B)

38. In Monohar Mukhrerjee v. Bhupendra Nath Mukhrerjee14 a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court, after reviewing the entire case law on the subject, held that Shebaitship, to which no emoluments are attached, was a kind of property in the eye of Hindu law and not a mere right to office.

39. A Full Bench of this court in the case of Kanteti Sastrulu v. Madupalli Venkateswara Rao 1959 A.L.T 1 while considering the scope of the term ‘property’ occurring in section 7 of the Guardians & Wards Act (VIII of 1890) held that the office of hereditary trusteeship was recognised as property for the purpose of Hindu law.

40. In Smt. Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullicks A.I.R 1951 S.C 293 at 296 Mukharjee, J., while considering the exact legal position of a shebait, observed:

“Even where no emoluments are attached to the office of the Shabait, he enjoys some sort of right or interest in the endowed property which partially at least has the character of a proprietary right. Thus, in the conception of shebaiti both the elements of office & property, of duties & personal interest, are mixed up and blended together; and one of the elements cannot be detached from the other.”

41. The Supreme Court, in Shirur Mutt Case A.I.R 1954 S.C 282 at 288, said:

“It was held by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court; Vide-Manahar v. Bhupendra14 that Shebaitship itselfis property and this decision was approved of by the Judicial Committee in Ganesh v. Lal Behary A.I.R 1936 P.C 318 , (1936) 63 Ind App. 448 and Page: 441again in Bhabatarini v. Ashalata A.I.R 1943 P.C 89 , (1943) 70 Ind. App. 57. xxxx “This view was adopted in its entirety by this court in Angurabala v. Debabrata A.I.R 1951 S.C 293”

42. In Raj Kali Kuer v. Ram Rattan 1955 An. W.R (S.C) 303 the Supreme Court has held that the right of a hereditary priest or ‘Pujari’ in a temple amounts to property where emoluments; are attached to such an office: In that case, Jagannadbadas, J. who spoke for the court, observed thus:

“That religious offices can be hereditary and that the right of such an office is in the nature of property under the Hindu law is now well-established. xxxxx On the view of that ‘Shebaiti’ is property, this court has also recognised the right of a female to succeed to the religious office of ‘Sbebaitship’ in the as case reported as Smt. Angurbala v. Debabrata A.I.R 1951 S.C 293 where the question as to the applicability of Hindu Women's Rights to property Act to the office of ‘Shebaitship’ came up for consideration.

xxxxxx

…………there can be no doubt that while in one sense the right to such a religious office is property it involves also substantial elements of duty.”

43. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Sambudamurthi Mudauar v. The State of Madras Civil Appeal No. 1671 of 1966 dt/15-8-59 white considering whether the appellant therein was a hereditary trustee within the meaning of section 6, sub. S. (9) of Madras Act 16 of 1951 substituted by Madras Act 22 of 59. Ramaswami, J. who spoke for the court, observed:

“It is now well-established that the office of a hereditary trustee is in the nature of property. This is so whether the trustee has a beneficial interest of some sort or not. See Ganesh Chander Dhur v. Lal Behari and Bhabatarini v. Shalata.

44. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Tilkayat Shri Govinda lalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan A.I.R 1963 S.C 1938, and Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa A.I.R 1964 S.C 1501, 1964 (2) S.C.J 682 and of the Privy council in Srinivas Chariar v. Evalappa Mudaliar A.I.R 1822 P.C 325 on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate General and the Second Government Pleader in support of their plea that the office of hereditary trusteeship is not property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, are distinguishable from the fact of the present case.

45. In the Tilkayat's case (A.I.R 1965 S.C 1628 at 1656), on the consideration of the entire facts and circumstances and in particular, the material clauses of the Firman issued by the Rana of Udaipur in 1934, it was held that the Tijkayat was “merely a custodian, Manager and Trustee of the property of the Shrine Surinathji and that the Udaipur Darbar has the absolute right to supervise” and that the office of Tilkayat was not recognised to be hereditary solely the depending upon the succession as a matter of right. In those circumstances, Gajendragadkar J. (as he then was), who spoke fox the Court, summed up the position of Tilkayat thus:

“………It is not open to the Tilkayat to claim that he has rights of a mahant or a Shebait; his rights are now defined and he cannot claim any higher rights after the Firman was issued. There can be no doubt that the right have the custody of the property such as the custodian, has, or the right to manage the property such as the Manager possesses, or the right to administer the trust property or the benefit of the beneficiary which the Trustee can do, cannot be regarded as a right to property under Article 19(1)(f) and for the same reason, it does not constitute property under Article 31(2). If it is held that the Tilkayat was no more than a custodian, Manager and Trustee properly so called, there can be no doubt that he is not entitled to rely either on Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31(2). Therefore, on this construction of clause 1 of the firman, the short answer to the pleas raised by the Tilkayat under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) is that the rights such as he possesses Page: 443under the said clause cannot attract Article 19(1)(f) or Article 31(2).

46. In Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa A.I.R 1964 S.C 1501 , 1964 (2) S.C.J 682 the Raja of Puri claimed two distinct rights with respect to Shri Jaganoaiha. Temple, viz., (1) as adya sevak having certain rights, privileges and perquisites and (2) right to sole management over the secular estate of the temple. Shri Jagannatha Temple Act, 1954 deprived the Raja of his right to the sole management of the temple and vested the same in a committee of which he is the chairman, but preserved his other rights as adya sevak. On a consideration of the statement in the preamble and the fact that the then Raja of Puri was by Regulation IV of 1809 entrusted with the management of the affairs of the temple and its properties as superintendent subject to the control and supervision of the ruling power, it was found that the Raja had only the bare right of superintendant over the secular estate and hence, the provisions of that Act were not hit by Art. 19(1)(f) or 31(2) of the Constitution Wanchoo, J., (as he then was), who spoke for the court, said:

“In these circumstances if the secular management of the temple was taken away from the sole control of the appellant and vested in a committee of which he still remains the chairman, it cannot be said that the provisions contained in the Act for that purpose are hit either by Art. 31(2) or by Art. 19(1)(f).

47. The decision of the Privy council in Srinivas Chariar v. Evalappa Mudaliar A.I.R 1922 P.C 325 was a case where a distinction was drawn between the position of a Dbarmakartha or trustee and that of a shebait or mahant and it has no application to the case of a hereditary trustee.

48. For these reasons expressed, we are unable to agree with the contention of the respondents that the aforesaid three cases are authorities for the proposition that the hereditary trusteeship with bare right to management but without any beneficial interest is not property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f) or 31(2) of the Constitution.

49. The aforesaid discussion yields the following results:

(1) The expression ‘trust’ and ‘trustee’ in the sense in which they are used in English law are unknown to the Hindu system, pure and simple. The legal estate in the trust property vests under the English law in the very trustee who holds it for the benefit of cestus qua trust, whereas the ownership of the property vests in the deity or institution as a juristic person, in the case of a Hindu religious or charitable institution or endowment.

(2) Trustees or Dharmakartas in South India are of two kinds, viz. hereditary as defined under section 2(15) and non-hereditary within the meaning of section 2(28) of the Act XVII of 1966.

(3) The expression ‘property’ occurring in Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution should be given a liberal and wide connotation so as to extend to those well-recognised types of interest having the insignia or characteristics of proprietary right.

(4) The position of a trustee, otherwise popularly known as Dharmakarta in South India, being no more than the custodian or manager of a religious or charitable institution or endowment without any personal benefit, it cannot be equated to that of a Shebait of a religious institution or Mathadhipati or Mahant who admittedly possesses much higher rights with larger power of disposal and administration coupled with personal interest of a beneficial character.

(5) The bare right of a trustee or manager to administer and manage the properties belonging to the charitable or religious institution or endowment, or to create a lease of a property for and on behalf of the institution or endowment, or to alienate a property for the purpose and benefit of the institution, without any personal interest of beneficial character of any kind is not property within the meaning of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution.

(6) Mahantship, or shebaitship in which both the elements of office and property are blended together, or trusteeship whether hereditary or non-hereditary coupled with personal interest of a beneficial character either in the corpus or usufruct of the properties of the religious or charitable institution or endowment, admits of no doubt to be termed as property within the meaning of Article 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution.

(7) The office of hereditary trusteeship which devolves on the successsor according to rule of succession laid down by the founder, or according to usage or custom applicable to the institution or endowment, or according to the law of succession, as the case may be, without any personal beneficial interest such as emoluments, share in the proprietary right or usufruct of the properties of the institution or endowment, is property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.

50. True, as contended for on behalf of the learned. Advocate General, that none of the hereditary, trustees of the institutions, now before us have claimed to have, except bare right, to manage and administer the secular estate or the institution or endowment in question, any proprietary or personal beneficial interest either in the corpus or the usufruct of the estate. But where the trustee is admitted or found to be hereditary within the meaning of sec. 2(15) of the Act his right to the office of hereditary trusteeship coupled with the right to management of the secular estate without personal beneficial interest of any sort, must, on the application of the aforesaid principles, be held to be property guaranteed to him under Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.

51. When once it is held that the office of hereditary, trusteeship is property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, it becomes necessary to consider whether or not the various provisions of the Act now complained of, put only reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Art. 19(5) of the Constitution. In this connection, the true scope and effect of sections 15 and 27 of the Act, read with other material provisions done up for consideration for, according to the petitioners, the position of hereditary trustees by reason of the said provisions has been reduced to a non-entity.

52. The administration of the charitable and Hindu religious institutions and endowments included in the list prepared and published under clauses (a) and (b) of Sec. 6 shall, according to section 8 read with the relevant provision in Chapter II, shall be under the general superintendence and control of the Commissioner who can himself exercise the powers conferred on him and perform the functions entrusted to him by or under the Act or delegate his powers either to the Deputy Commissioner or Asst. Commissioner, as the case may be. The functionaries under the Act are empowered under Sec. 12 to enter and inspect institutions and endowments. The power of general superintendence can be exercised by the Commissioner and his Page: 446subordinates only with a view to ensure that the institutions and endowments are properly administered and their income is duly appropriated for the purposes for which they were founded or they exist. The object and intendment of the Act itself being to provide for better and efficient management and administration of the public charitable and religious institution and endowments, the power hitherto exercised by the then Government in the early days is conferred under Chapter II on the functionaries under the Act.

53. Then we come to the crucial provisions in Chapter III. Under sec. 15, the functionaries under the Act can constitute a Board of Trustees by appointing non-hereditary trustees even though there is a hereditary trustee or trustees to an institution or endowment. His position as a hereditary trustee as well as his right to preside over the meetings of the Board of Trustees as its Chairman have been nevertheless safeguarded. Sec. 17(2) makes it abundantly clear that it is only the hereditary trustee who shall be the chairman of the Board of Trustees and if there are more than one hereditary trustee, one of them may be nominated by the functionaries under the Act by rotation to be the Chairman and if the hereditary trustees decline, then alone a Chairman will have to be elected from the non-hereditary trustees. The substance of the right of a hereditary trustee is thus well protected. Sec. 20 clearly safeguards the right of succession to the office of the hereditary trustee in case it falls vacant due to any disqualification or removal or resignation, as the case may be. The person who is to succeed according to the rule of succession laid down by the founder, or where it is not there, according to usage or custom applicable to the sect or sampradaya to which the institution or endowment belongs, or according to law of succession for the time being in force, would certainly be chosen as the hereditary trustee for the vacancy caused in the office of the hereditary trustee. Sec. 21 empowered the trustee or the Board of Trustees, of which the hereditary trustee shall be the chairman, to administer the affairs and manage the properties of the institution as a man of ordinary prudence would deal with such affairs, funds and properties as if they were his own. He is also entitled to exercise all powers incidental to the prudent and beneficial administration of the institution and to perform the functions entrusted to him. The duties of the trustee requiring him to be responsible for the custody of hooks, accounts returns and funds are prescribed under sec. ??? in the interests of the general public. Sub-section (3) Page: 447S. 22 enjoins that he should obey all lawful orders issued by the functionaries under the Act. This is a reasonable restriction on the exercise of his power to ensure efficient administration. He is bound to carry out the orders passed by the functionaries as per the provisions to the Act and according to law. The provisions of sec. 23 for fixation of dittam according to the usage and sampradaya of the institution in consultation with Sthanacharya or the archaka are reasonable, restrictions within the meaning of Art. 19(5) of the constitution. The provisions of Sec. 26, empowering the functionaries under the Act to suspend, remove, or dismiss a hereditary or non-hereditary trustee, if he fail to discharge, the duties and perform the functions of a trustee, or disobeys, any lawful order, commits any malfeasance or misfeasance or breach, of trust or misappropriation in respect of the properties, of the institution or, endowment, or is dis qualified, or ceases, to profess Hindu religion, or refuses or fails to hand over property and records to his successor, are reasonable restrictions made for the better and proper administration, to the institution and are in the interest of the general public. The provision under sec. 26(3) to suspend the trustee pending enquiry, is necessary, reasonable and justified. (see the decision of the Supreme Court in Sri Digyadarsan Rajendra Ramadessji Varu v. State of Andhra Pradesh*. Before the trustee or the hereditary trustee is subjected to the penalties he is afforded sufficient opportunity to make his representation and also adduce evidence. Thus it is plain that these provisions do not impose any unreasonable res rictions so as to fall outside the manadata of Art. 19(5) of the Constitution.

54. We shall now consider the contention that the appointment of an executive Officer under sec. 27 would reduce the hereditary trustee to a non-entity. The provision is explicit in its terms that the executive officer, appointed under section 27 shall be under the administrative control of the trustee and shall be responsible for carrying out all lawful directions issued by such trustee from ??? to time, as is clear from sub-sec. (4) to sec. 27. The executive Officer can, institute or defend any legal proceeding, in the name of the institution or endowment but only with be prior approval of the trustee. Sec. 31 clearly says that it is the trustee that is empowered to appoint officer-holders or servants in every case where the office or service is not hereditary. Sec. 32 makes it abundantly clear that it is that trustee or the Board of Trustees, of which the hereditary Page: 448trustee is the chairman, that can punish any office-holder servant of the institution or endowment, except in the case of Stanacharya or archaka with regard to whom the trustee has to send up a report to the Commissioner or joint Commission for removal or dismissal. Where even the Executive Officer is empowered to punish the officeholders or servants, the right of appeal is provided to the trustee or Board of Trustees. The trustee is permitted to prefer an appeal against any order of the Commissioner or joint Commissioner passed under the proviso to sec. 32(1). Under sec. 32(6)(a) the trustee may direct the executive officer to take action under sub-section (2), failing which he may exercise his powers under sec. 32(1) after following the procedure. The provisions under sec. 33 empowering the functionaries under the Act to take any appropriate action against the office holders if the trustee or Board of Trustee fail to take action under sec. 32, can, by no stretch of imagination, be held to be an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of the right of the hereditary trustee. They are provided for proper and efficient administration of the institution. The provisions of sec. 35 empowering the executive officer not to implement the orders or resolutions of the Trustee or the Board of Trustees, if the same are not passed in accordance with law or in excess or abuse of powers conferred on them, or if implemented, are likely to cause financial loss to the institution, danger to human life health, or safety, or likely to lead to Safety or breach of trust, or, if they are not beneficial to the institution, are indeed essential and reasonable restrictions warranted by article 19(5). It is significant to note that under the provisions the executive officer has to place the orders made or resolution passed by the trustee or the Board before the Trustees or the Board of Trustees along with his note pointing out the objections to the order or resolution and requesting the trustee or Board of Trustees to reconsider the order of resolution. This enables the Board to rectify its own mistakes and can therefore be in no way construed as unreasonable curtailing the powers or lawful rights of the hereditary trustee. It is further of importance that in case the trustee or the Board of Trustees stick on to their original stand, all that the executive power has to do is to refer the matter to the functionaries under the Act whose decision shall ultimately be final and binding on the trustee or the Board of Trustees and the executive Officer. It admits of no controversy that such a provision is conducive to the Efficient administration of the institution.

55. Our attention is invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in S.D.C Pandarasannadhi v. Madras State A.I.R 1965 S.C 1683 at 1688 where he was held that the introduction of an executive officer in the modified scheme practically displaced the trustee and reduced him to nothing. In that case the Supreme Court had to consider the provisions of the Madras Act prior to the amendment of 1959 where there was no specific provision under the Act for appointing an executive Officer unless there was mismanagement justifying the appointment of an executive Officer. In fact, the learned Judge Subba Rao J. (as he then was), who spoke for the court observed.

“We are deciding this appeal on the basis of the circumstances obtaining in the year 1951 when the suit was filed. It may be that under the new Act the Commissioner has higher powers than he had under the 1951 Act and subsequent events may call for the exercise of those powers. Our judgment will not preclude the commissioner to take any action under the new Act as, the circumstances demand.”

56. Sec. 50 requiring the trustee to prepare and submit a budget as provided thereunder to the functionaries under the Act, and the executive Officer to maintain accounts under sec. 51, and the provision made in Chapter VII for proper auditing of the accounts and the duty under sec. 58 of the trustee to give all assistance and facilities to the auditors, can, by no stretch of reasoning, be called unreasonable restrictions on the exercise of right of the hereditary trustee. Similarly, assessment of contribution as provided under sec. 60, liability of the institution or endowment to pay costs under sec. 61, the payment of contribution, costs charges and expenses by the trustee of the institution under sec. 62, cannot be said to be unreasonable as they as are certainly in the interests of the institution and the public at large. The provisions of sec. 56 and sec. 63 empowering the Revenue Divisional Officer to recover surcharge and contribution etc. as arrears of land revenue in summary proceedings are also not unconstitutional as the same have been provided to safeguard the public revenue.

57. We are unable to agree with the contention of the petitioners that the power of the functionaries under the Act to appoint non-hereditary trustees or executive Officer where there is already a hereditary trustee, notwithstanding that there is no mismanagement at Page: 450all would amount to deprivation of the fundamental right to hold property guarnteed under Art. 19(1)(f). The Legislature, for the purpose of ensuring better and efficient administration and management of the institution or endowment, thought it fit to associate non-hereditary trustees with the hereditary trustee to constitute a Board of Trustee. The hereditary trustee is not removed from his office on account thereof. All that can be said is that he is managing and administering the affairs of the institution in collaboration with other non-hereditary trustees constituting a Board of which he is the Chairman. As a Chairman, he is still in control of business. In matters of religion such as pujas, dittam, rituals etc. there is no interference whatsoever. On the other hand, the provisions of the Act are categorical that the same be continued to be performed according to Agama Sastras or usage or custom prevalent in the institution. Thus there has been no interference whatsoever with the matters purely religious. It is the secular aspect that has been concentrated upon and that is done in the interests of better and efficient administration; for after all the institutions to which the Act has been made applicable are the public institutions, the maintenance and good administration of which is the concern of the State in the interests of the general public. What all the Legislature has taken upon itself is but the regulation, on dependable basis, of the administration and management of the properties of public institutions by the Board of Trustees of which the hereditary trustee is the chairman. There is ample authority for the view that the legislature can impose reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right of the trustees in the interests of the general public and good administration of the public institution. The regulation of the administration and management of the secular estate of the institution can in no event be said to be an unreasonable restriction not warranted by Article 19(5). (Vide Motidas v. S.P Sahi A.I.R 1959 S.C 942 at 948, 949.

58. In Tilkayat Shri Govindalalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan A.I.R 1963 S.C 1638 at 1658 Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was), who spoke for the court, observed.

“……we may add that even if it was held that these rights constituted a right to hold property their regulation by the relevant provisions of the Act would undoubtedly be protected by Art. 19(5). The temple is a public temple and Page: 451what the legislature has purported to do is to regulate the administration of the properties of the temple by the Board of which the Tilkayat is and has to be a member x x x The restrictions imposed by the Act must, therefore, be treated as reasonable and in the interests of the general public.”

59. See also Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa 1964 (II) S.C.J 682 at 689, A.I.R 1964 S.C 1501.

60. Thus the provisions of Chapter III and in particular sections 15 and 27 read with the other material provisions referred to above would not, in our judgment, amount to unreasonable, restrictions on the exercise of the right of the hereditary trustee so as to be hit by Art. 19 of the Constitution. They do not reduce the hereditary trustee to a non-entity.

61. We may then consider the question whether the provisions of the Act are in any way violative of Article 31(2) of the Constitution. The said Article provides against compulsory acquisition and requisition of the property save for a public purpose and under the authority of a valid law which conforms to the conditions stated in that Article. It is not a case of acquisition of the property wherein the interests of better management non-hereditary trustees are associated with the hereditary trustee to constitute a Board of Trustees of which the hereditary trustee is the Chairman. The hereditary trustee continues to have his hand in the management administration of the affairs of the institution as the Chairman of the Board. Construed in whatever manner, neither it is an acquisition of property nor such acquisition if any can be at all said to be by the state. In no manner whatsoever Art. 31(2) can be atracted. In the case of Tilkayat A.I.R 1963 S.C 1638 at 1659 on which reliance is placed the Supreme Court in fact negatived the contention of the Tilkayat that there was deprivation and acquisition of property by constituting a Board of Trustees:

“Deprivation of property, falling under the latter category of cases cannot be effected save by authority of law; this; court has held that the expression ‘save by authority of law’ postulates that the law by whose authority such deprivation can be effected must be a valid law in the sense that it must not contravene the other fundamental rights guaranted by the Constitution.

x x x In the present case, the Act extinguishes the Mahant's rights and then creates another body for the purpose of administering the properties of the temple. In other words, the office of one functionary is brought to an end and another functionary has come into existence in its place. Such a process cannot be said to constitute the acquisition of the extinguished office or of the rights vesting in the person holding that office.”

62. The same view has been expressed in Jagannath temple case 1964 (II) S.C.J 682 at 689, A.I.R 1964 S.C 1501 In this view of law, we have no Hesitation to hold that none of the provisions of the Act are hit by Article 19(1)(f) or 31 of the Constitution.

63. We shall now examine the contention raised by Sri A. Bhujanaga Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioners in M.P 2102/67; that the ??? community as the devotees of Sri Vasavi, otherwise known as Sri Kanyakaparameswari, professing a distinct faith and having a particular mode of worship, is a particular religious sect, and the institutions founded and maintained by the members of such ??? community for the benefit of the community are religious denominations entitled to manage their own affairs of religion as well as secular estate.

64. This contention of the petitioners is founded upon Art. 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Art. 25(1) of course, subject to certain conditions, vouchsafes to all persons freedom of conscience and also the right to profess, practise and propagate religion freely Art. 6 likewise guarantees to every religious denomination or any section there of the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion and administer its property in accordance with law.

65. The first question that falls for consideration is whether the Vysya community or the institutions, religious, or charitable and endowments founded by the members of that community for the benefit of the members of that community are religious denominations within the meaning of Art. 26. In Hindu religion, three are mainly four “Varnas” otherwise known as castes, viz. Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vysya and Sudra. Each caste in its turn is divided and sub-divided into sub-castes, and sects. For example, if one takes the case of Brahmins, be will find that there are various sub-castes or sects therein such as Vaidiki, Niyogi etc. Amongst Sudras, there exist various sub-castes like Kammas. Reddys, Velamans, Telagas Page: 453Kapus, Harijans etc. Vysyas are admittedly Hindus. The Lingayats are not out of Hindufold as they are governed by Hindu Law in matters of various description. Can they then be said to constitute various religious denominations within the meaning of Art. 26? The expression “denomination” according to Oxford Dictionary means “a collection of individuals classed together under the same name; a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinct name” A “religious denomination” as used in Article 26 of the Constitution is not determined by reason of mere caste or sub-caste of a Hindu religion. “Nor is its scope circumscribed by considerations of faith in any one particular god or goddess as is worshipped by them. It is of common knowledge that every Hindu will formally have his or her family deity or deities such as Lord Venkateswara, Lord Narasimha, Lord Siva, Lord Rama, Lord Krishna etc. In the same way, it is well-known that Vysyas are having Sri Kanyakaparameswari as their Ilavelupu’ or family deity. It is not correct to state that the Vysyas as a community do not believe or worship deities other than Sri Kanyakaparameswari. The mode of worship and the rituals performed in the temple of Sri Kanyakaparameswari are admittedly according to Agama Sastras just as in other Hindu temples, Even assuming that a particular type of pujas or rituals are done in that temple, it will not in any way convert the worshippers or that community into a distinct or separate religious denomination. To hold that there exists a religious denomination, there must exist a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name. If the plea of Mr. Bbujangarao is given effect to, it would mean that every caste or sub-sect of a Hindu religion, which castes and sub-sects are admittedly innumerable, is a religious denomination within the meaning of Art. 26. Of course, any sects or sub-sect professing certain religious cult having a common faith and common spiritual organisation, such as Vaisbhavites, Madhwites, Saivites, may be termed as religious denomination but certainly not any caste, sub-caste or sect of Hindu religion, who worship mainly a particular deity or god.

66. Mukherjea, J. who spoke nor the court in the Shirur Mutt Case A.I.R 1954 S.C 282 at 289 said.

“It is well-known that the practice of setting up Maths as centres of theological ??? was started by Shri Sankaracharya and was tollowed by various teachers since Page: 454then. After Sankara, came a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded the different sects and sub-sects of the Hindu religion that we find in India at the present day.

“Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be called a religious denomination, as it is designated by a distinctive name—in many cases it is the name of the founder—and has a common faith and common spiritual organisation. The followers of Ramanuja, who are known by the name of Shri Vaishnabas, undoubtedly constitute a religious denomination; and so do the followers of Madhwacharya and other religious teachers….. As Art. 26 contemplates not merely a religious denomination but also a section thereof, the Math or the spiritual fraternity represented by it can legitimately come within the purview of this Article.

67. The religious teachers and philosophers who founded different sects and sub-sects of Hindu religion have not made a caste or a particular deity worship by a particular community as the basis or foundation for their religious denominations. The Hindus who believe in Ramanuja Matham may belong to different castes, sub-castes and sub-sects of Hindu religion. A Brahmin, a Vysya, a Sudra and a Kshatriya can as well become the foll were of Sri Sankara or Sri Ramanuja having belief in the teachings and philosophy founded on common faith and common, spiritual organisation by the great teachers. Thus it is the distinct common faith and common spiritual organisation and the belief in a particular religious teacher, or philosophy on which, the religious denomination is founded or based that is the essence of the matter but not any caste or sub-caste or a particular deity worship by a particular caste or community. In this view we are of opinion that merely because of connection with a particular community or the institutions founded by the members of that community, it can not be readily held that the Vysya community is a religions denomination within the meaning of Art. 26. At any rate, the material before us is so scanty that it is not possible to agree on the basis thereof with Mr. Bhujanga Rao.

68. Also we find ourselves in respectful disagreement with the view expressed by the learned judge, Venkatadri J. of the Madras. High Court in Writ Petition No. 911 of 1963, decided on December Page: 4556, 1966, if that be construed to mean that the Arya Vysya community as such, wherever it be, is a religious denomination. In fact, the learned judge did not intend to lay down any such broad principle. That is clear from his own observation which is in the following terms.

“On a review of the case law and the facts mentioned above, it is clear that the Arya Vysya community in the city of Madras is a religious sect or denomination, and that Sri Kanyaka Paratneswari Devasthananv is denominational in character.”

69. That shows that in the circumstances as it is placed in the City of Madras, Arya Vysya community is a religious sect or denomination. Whether a certain community, as such has adopted fop itself a religious cult so that on the basis thereof it may be treated as a religious sect or denomination must depend on the particular facts of that case. The material on record is so scanty in this case that it is rather difficult for us to reach the conclusion that the Vysya community and the institutions founded by them in this State of Andhra Pradesh are religious denominations within the meaning of Art. 26. We may not be able to express our final opinion in view of the scanty material made available to us as regards the institutions founded by the Lingayats who are evidently governed by Hindu law and the Act. See also Somasekhar v. Mahadeva A.I.R 1936 P.C 18.

70. The decision of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 379 and 380 of 1951 (See. Shirur Mutt v. Commissioner, H.R.E Boards (1952) I M.L.J 557 at 597 where Podu Dikshidars, consisting of about 250 families, in whom the management of the Saivite temple at Chidambaram was vested, have been held to be a religious denomination, has no parallel with the facts of the present case. In that case, every married male member of Dikshitara was entitled to have his say and control over the management of the temple. Such a right enures to him by reason of birth and marriage. The worship in the temple is performed according to vedic rites and not in accordance with Agama Sastras as is performed in other temples. Further, the Podu Dikshidars, in whom the management of the temple was vested, are both managers and archakas and the pogada is practically treated as their property. The temple has many a distinctive feature of its own. As observed by Satyanarayana Rao J., who spoke “for the court;

“The Dikshitars, therefore, are collectively and individually entitled to beneficial interests in the offering made to the God and in the collections made for the archanas and the other aradhanas. Some of the collections are the joint property of the communities of Podu Dikshitaras while the others are their individual income.”

71. The other decision of the Madras High Court in Muthia Asari v. Madasani Asari (1965) 2 M.L.J 220 relied upon by the petitioners, is concerned with Pancha Brahma Amibika Mutt Sri Subramania Swami Temple situate in Settankulam Kasba which was admittedly denominational in character.

72. Similarly in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State Of Bombay ; A.I.R 1962 S.C 853 it was not in dispute that Dawoodi Bohras who form a sub-sect of the Shia sect of Muslims, is a religious denomination within the meaning of Art. 26 of the Constitution. Further the question there arose under Art. 26(b) with regard to management of affairs in matters of religion and not under Art. 26(d) which guarantees the right to administer property in accordance with law. Hence, the decisions relied upon by Sri Bhujanga Rao, Sri S. Ramamurthy Sri Ramanujachari and Sri K.B Krishnamurthy are distinguishable from the facts of the present case and they are not applicable to the present controversy in these applications.

73. Assuming without holding that the Arya Vysya Community and Lingayat community and the institutions founded by them are religious denominations or sections of such denominations within the meaning of Art. 26 of the Constitution, the petitioners cannot succeed in these applications unless they establish that the impugned provisions of the Act interfere with any of their affairs in matters of religion or that the provisions of the Act in relation to the administration of the property of the institution are ultra vires the powers of the State legislature.

74. We have already noticed that none of the provisions of the Act interfered with any affairs in matters of religion, namely, religious practices, rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes of worship. It is not even shown or pointed out that any provision of the Act seeks to utilise the property or funds vested in or belonging Page: 457to the institution or endowment for purposes other than those indicated by the respective founders or those established by custom or usage obtaining in any given institutions. Indeed, the provisions of the Act seek to implement and advance the purposes for which the institutions or endowments were founded or exist preventing waste and misappropriation of their funds. The appointed province of the Act is to provide for better administration and governance of the Hindu religious and charitable institutions and endowments. It is worthy of note that the Act, consistent with the safeguards provided in chapter III of the Constitution of India, has not sought to interfere in any manner with affairs essentially religious. It is the secular aspect that has been touched by the Act and that only in the interests of better administration and management of the property. That is because any religious denomination or any section thereof has the right if at all to administer the property of the institution only in accordance with law. That is what is provided in Art. 26(d) of the Constitution of India. It is not the case of the petitioners that the respondents are now trying to interfere with the management of their affairs in matters of religion, such as worship, rituals, pujas or other practices obtaining in their institutions or endowments, which are protected under Art. 26(b); but the complaint of the petitioners is that the functionaries under the Act are trying to interfere with their right to administer and manage the properties of the chartiable or religious institutions. But so long as these functionaries are acting under the provisions of a valid law, the institutions cannot legitimately complain of the same. The State is certainly entitled to make a law regulating the management of the secular estate of a religious denomination within the meaning of Art. 26 as well as of religious or charitable institutions or endowments in order to ensure more efficient administration of the funds and properties of the institution and endowments. This it has to do in the interests of the community or of the general public. The Act in question is such a law. The said law is intended to sub-serve and advance the objects and purposes of the institution. The wishes of the founder or usage or customs have to be of necessity honoured and given effect to. The functionaries under the Act are not empowered to act in a manner inconsistent with the said objects. They have power to give instructions but only for ensuring proper administration of the religious institution or endowment in accordance with law governing such institutions; See Moti Das v. S.P Dahi A.I.R 1959 S.C 942 Where the Page: 458founder of a religious or charitable institution or endowment has laid down specifically as to how the puja or rituals as well as administration of the properties have to be done, the functionaries under the Act cannot alter or change the same. If a philanthropic Vysya had dedicated his valuable properties to an institution, religious charitable, founded by him, prescribing the beneficaries and the way in which the management of religious affairs as well as secular estate has to conducted, it is incumbent on the functionaries under the Act to have due regard to the founder's wishes. They have to bear this in mind while making appointment of non-hereditary trustees or executive officers as well. If the founder had made it clear that the management should be in the hands of a particular family or families hereditarily, due regard has to be given to the same. The functionaries under the Act even while appointing non-hereditary trustees must necessarily take care that as far as possible persons from that community as are best suited to the office are selected. When the very object and wish of the founder was to benefit the Vysya community in particular, and the public at large, the functionaries cannot ignore the object or the wish of the founder. If they appoint non-hereditary trustees from outside that particular community, such an appointment cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of Sec. 15(4) of the Act. The association of non-hereditary trustees with the hereditary trustee or trustees so long as the hereditary trustee is in control of the business as a Chairman cannot be said to militate against the wishes of the founder. Nor by reason of such association which is effected in the interests of more efficient administration can it be said that the right of religious denomination to administer the secular estate of the institution according to law is interfered with. Indeed the State has a duty, may a right, to enact a law by which the efficient administration of the secular estate of a religious denomination or a section thereof is ensured. That is enacted in the interests of the institution and also of the general public.

75. In Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swatniar of Sri Shirur Mutt A.I.R 1954 S.C 282, the Supreme Court held that the expression “matters of religion” as is used in Art. 26(b) of the Constitution embraces not merely matters of doctrine and belief pertaining to the religion but also the practices of Page: 459it, such as observances, pujas, rituals etc. The same view has been reiterated by Venkatrama Aiyar J. In Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore A.I.R 1958 S.C 255.

76. In Tilkayat Sri Govindlalji Maharaj's case A.I.R 1963 S.C 1638 referred to earlier, the Supreme Court rejected the plea of denomination of the followers of Vallabha as well as Pushtimaragiya Vaishnava Sampradaya and held that the provisions of the Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act (XIII of 1959) are hit by Article 25(1) and 26. In that case, the management of the secular affairs of the religious denomination alone was sought to be regulated by that Act, but none of the matters relating to religious affairs were touched or interfered with by the Act. The Supreme Court held that the restrictions imposed by regulating management of the secular estate do not amount to infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the religious denomination of Vallabha cult of Pushtimaragiya Vaishnava Sampradaya followers. The Supreme Court observed at page 1661:

“It the practice is a religious practice or the affairs are the affairs in matter of religion then, of course, the right guarateed by Art. 25(1) and Article 26(b) cannot be contravened.

x x x x The only right which, according to the denomination, has been contravened is the right of the Tilkayat to manage the property belonging to the temple. It is urged that throughout the history of this temple, its properties have been managed by the Tilkayat and so, such management by the Tilkayat amounts to a religious practice under Article 25(1) and constitutes the denomination's right to manage the affairs of its religion under Article 25(b). We have no hesitation in rejecting this argument. The right to manage the properties of the temple is a purely secular matter and it cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as a religious practice so as to fall under Article 25(1) or as amounting to affairs in matters of religion. It is also true that the Tilkayats have been respected by the followers of the denomination and it is also true that the management has remained with the Tilkayats, except on occasions like Page: 460the minority of the Tiikayat when the Court of Wards stepped in. If the temple had been private and the properties of the temple had belonged to the Tiikayat, it was another matter. But once it is held that the temple is a public temple, it is difficult to accede to the argument that the tenants of the Vallabha cult require as a matter of religion that the properties must be managed by the Tilkayati x x A distinction must always be made between a practice which is religious and a practice in regard to a matter which purely secular and has no element of religion associated with it. Therefore, we are satisfied that the claim made by the denomination that the Act impinges on the rights guaranteed to it by Article 25(1) and 25(b) must be rejected”

77. While dealing with the contention of the denomination and the followers of Vallabha on the basis of Art. 26(d), the learned Judge, Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) observed at page 1662:

“Matters relating to the administration of the denomination's property fall to be governed by Art. 26(d) and cannot attract the provisions of Art. 26(b). Article 26(b) relates to affairs in matters of religion such as the performance of the religious rites or ceremonies, or the observance of religious festivals and the like; it does not refer to the administration of the property at all. Article 26(d) therefore justifies the enactment of a law to regulate the administration of the denomination's property and that is precisely what the Act has purported to do in the present case. If the clause “affairs in matters of religion” were to include affairs in regard to all matters, whether religious or not, the provision under Art. 26(d) for legislative regulation of the administration of the denomination's property would be rendered illusory”:

78. Similarly, the contention of the denomination that by the constitution of the Board in which management vests, the denomination has been wholly deprived of its right to administer the property within the meaning of Art. 25(d) was also repelled on the ground that the Board was constituted to ensure that the denomination should be adequately and fairly represented on the Board. The aforesaid reasoning and decision would apply on all fours to the present case’

79. For all the above reasons, we hold that none of the provisions of the Act contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed to every religious denomination under Art. 25 or 26(b) or 25(d) of the Constitution of India.

80. It is next argued by Mr. A. Bhujanga Rao, that an institution registered as a society under Section 20 of the Societies Registration Act is governed only by the Societies Registration Act but not by the impugned Act. An institution may be a registered society, but at the same time it may be a charitable one if all or some of its objects are for “charitable purpose”. Hence, it is necessary to find out whether the petitioner society as well as others registered under Section 20 of the Societies Registration Act, are charitable institutions within the meaning of Sec. 2(4) of the Act. It is pertinent to notice that some of the objections of the petitioners institutions are fop “charitable purpose” within the meaning of sub-sec. (5) of Section 2 of the Act. When once all or some of the objects of the society are for charitable purpose, the institution, through registered under the Societies Registration Act, would certainly come within the definistion of “charitable institution” under Section 2(4) of the Act which takes in any establishment, undertaking, organisation, or association formed for charitable purpose and includes a specific endowment, Explanation to clause (a) to sub-sec. (3) of Section 1 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the expression “public charitable institutions and endowments” occurring in that clause shall include every charitable institution or endowment, the administration of which is for the time being vested in any department of Government or Civil Court, Zilla Parishad, Municipality or other Local Authority or any company, society, organisation, institution or other person. The petitioners institutions the administration of which is vested in the societies registered under Section 20 of the Societies Registration Act, in our judgment admit of no doubt to be held as public charitable institutions within the meaning of Sec. ???(3)(a) and hence, they snail come within the purview of the provisions of the Act. In this view we must hold that there is no substance in this contention of the petitioners.

81. It is next contended by the petitioners that sections 1, 2, 6, 8, 12, 14, 15, 21(1), 22(3), 33, 35, 38 to 41, 50 to 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 and 77 of the Act give scope for arbitrary, exercise of powers, wide and unlimited, as they are as conferred or the functionaries under the Act without any guidelines for the exercise thereof and are hit Page: 462by Art. 14. Before we deal with this question certain principles which are well settled must now be noticed. The first principle relates to presumption as to the constitutionality of an enactment. S.R Das, C.J who spoke for the Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Mr. Justice S.R Tendolkar* A.I.R 1958 S.C 538 at 547 & 548 when considering the constitutionality of the Act attacked as discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 laid down the following principles:—

“(b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles;

(c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds;

(d) that the Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest;

(e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation:

82. The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Moti Das v. S.P Sahi A.I.R 1959 S.C 942 at 947 and P.J Irani v. State of Madras A.I.R 1951 S.C 1731.

83. Then there is another principle which is equally well settled and it is this: if the legislature indicates with certainty in the material provisions of an Act the policy and purpose of the enactment, merely because the legislature has left the implementation thereof without further guidelines to the authority in charge of administering the law, the provision conferring such power cannot be legitimately or successfully assailed on the basis that there has been on account Page: 463thereof an excessive delegation of legislative power amunting to abdication of legislative functions by the legislature, or the discretion vested is arbitrary and unbridled without any guidelines giving scope to invidious discrimination. See Jyoti Pershad v. Union Territory of Delhi A.I.R 1961 S.C 1602 and K.L Gupte v. Corporation, Greater Bombay A.I.R 1968 S.C 303.

84. In this State of law let us now examine the constitutional validity or otherwise of the material provisions of the Act which are sought to be struck down by the petitioners. We may notice at the outset that the preamble of the Madras Religious Endowments Act (II of 1927) in terms became the preamble in the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (XIX of 1951) and also the present Act XVII of 1955, which was made to consolidate and amend the law relating to the administration and governance of charitable and Hindu religious institutions and endowments in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The intendment of the present Act, according to the preamble, is to provide for better management and administration of Hindu religious institutions and endowments. The need for a better management and administration may not necessarily mean the existence of mismanagement or mal-administration. The Act, be it noted, is made applicable to all public charitable, and Hindu religious institutions and endowments. The explanation to sub-section (3) of Section 1 gives a very wide meaning to the expression “public charitable institutions and endowments”. It takes in all charitable institutions and endowments irrespective of the fact whether their administration is vested in any Department of Government Civil Court. Zilla Parishad, Municipality or other Local Authority, or any company, society, organisation, institution or other person. By this explanation it is manifest that the Legislature intended to bring all charitable institutions and endowments of the above description within the ambit of the Act. If it is claimed by anyone that a particular institution is out of the operation of the Act for a particular reason, the onus certainly lies on him which he has to establish satisfactorily. The explanation referred to above is confined to the public charitable institutions. It is not applicable to religious institutions. Section 2 is but a definition section and the legislature having regard to the intendment and object of the Act defines the terms and material expressions used in the serval previsions of the Act, There can be nothing Page: 464wrong or objectionable with regard to this process. Nor can sections 1 and 2 be open to attack as being unconstitutional on account thereof.

85. Then the next section for consideration is Section 6. It enjoins that the Commissioner shall prepare and publish in the prescribed manner three lists classifying the charitable institutions and endowments and the religious institutions and endowments other than maths on the basis of income being (1) above rupees one lakh, (2) below one lakh but above twenty thousand and (3) below twenty thousand. Section 6 corresponds to Sec. 38 of the 1951 Act and the rules made under Sec. 38 of the repealed Act are applicable for the purpose of preparing lists under Sec. 6 Sec. 38 was held by the Supreme Court as constitutionally valid. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Sec. 6 are valid.

86. Under Section 7 the Commissioner, for all practical purposes, is constituted as a corporation sole. That is because there must be some one capable of suing and being sued as a legal person representing and acting for and on behalf of any charitable or religious institution or endowment. Section 7 is therefore constitutionally valid.

87. Then comes section 8 which is impugned as giving wide powers of superintendence and control to the Commissioner over the institutions and passing any order for their proper administration. Section 8(1) indeed confers on the Commissioner general power of superintendence and control over the administration of all charitable and Hindu religious institutions and endowments to ensure proper administration of the endowments and the institutions and utilisation of their income in an appropriate manner for the purpose for which the institutions were founded or exist. It is at the same time subject to the provisions of the Act. Sub-Section (1) to section 8 is similar to section 29 of the 1951 Act which was found to be intra vires and valid by the Supreme Court in the Shirur Mutt case A.I.R 1954 S.C 282 at 292 (Para 24). Similar section in the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939 was found to be valid by the Supreme Court in Sri Jagnnath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa A.I.R 1954 S.C 40 at 402 (Para 6). The general powers under Sub-Section (1) have to be availed of only for the purpose of ensuring proper Page: 465administration of the institutions and utilisation of their income for the purposes for which they were founded or exist Sub-sec. (2) to sec. 8 empowers the Commissioner to exercise his powers conferred under the Act in respect of institutions and endowments included in the lists prepared and published by him under sec. 6(a) and (d) of the Act. Sub-sec. (3) of that section provides for the delegation of any of the powers conferred on the Commissioner, other than those under sections 6, 8(1), 15, 44, 45, 50, 80, 82 and 92 to the Deputy Commissioner or Assistatant Commissioner, and such delegation is perfectly valid. Similar provision under Section 10(1) of the 1951 Act was not struck down by the Supreme Court on that very basis. Sub-section (4) gives similar power to the Commissioner to delegate to an Assistant Commissioner in respect of institutions in his sub-division or charge; The provisions of Sub-sections (1), (2), (3) and (4) of Section 8 therefore are not unconstitutional or bad.

88. The next section that is attacked is section 12, This section empowers the Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner or an Assistant Commissioner having jurisdiction or any other person authorised by the Commissioner to inspect and also enter the premises of, any charitable or religious institution or endowment or any place of worship for the purpose of exercising their powers conferred and duties entrusted by or under the Act, provided reasonable notice to the trustee, head or archaka of the institution is given. The persons so empowered shall, while making the inspection or entry have due regard to the religious practices and usages of the institution or endowment. They shall not enter places of worship like sanctum sanctorum or other places held specially as sacred unless they are persons authorised by such custom or usage in that behalf. The defects pointed out by the Supreme Court in the Shirur Mutt case A.I.R 1954 S.C 282 while striking down the unamended section 21 of the Madras Act XIX of 1951 have been rectified in the present section referred to above. Hence, we told that this section is valid.

89. The legislature deemed it meet in the interests of the institution and of the general public to enact section 14 in the present Act vesting the property statutorily in the institution. Like provision does not find a place in any one of the previous Acts. Such a vesting in the institution itself rather than in the individual or corporal body indeed furthers the objects and interests of the charitable nr religious institution or endowment.

90. While conferring powers on the functionaries under the Act in respect of appointment of non-hereditary trustees or regulating the exercise of such powers under various sections, the legislature has taken care to provide also for certain guidelines in that behalf. The end and aim of all these provisions, as already noticed, is but to provide for better administration and management of the secular affairs of the institutions and due observance of the rules governing religious affairs. Indisputably there is no interference whatever with the management of matters of religion. It is plain therefore that the above provisions cannot be open to attack either on the ground that they create invidious discrimination between one institution and the other or give scope therefor. Take for example the so called arbitrary powers of the functionaries to appoint non-hereditary trustees as conferred under section 15. It cannot be said that the discretion vested under section 15 in appointing non-hereditary trustees is unfettered. The functionaries under the Act, even if they so choose, cannot appoint any person who is disqualified under section 16. Nor can they act in this behalf contrary to the intentions of the founder or against the wishes of the religious denomination or any section thereof for the benefit of which the institution or endowment has been founded, as is clear from sub-section (4) of section 15. Besides while making a choice from amongst the eligible candidates or the applicants in that behalf, it is incumbent on the functionaries to exercise their discretion judicially, fairly and reasonably. That is warranted by the provisions of Sub-sections (1) to (4) of Sec. 15, of the Act. It is the tenor, purport and content of the provision that determines the obligation of an Administrative Tribunal to act judicially in a matter before it. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) while speaking for the Court in Nageswara Rao v. A.P.S.R.T Corporation A.I.R 1959 S.C 308 at 322 ruled thus.

“……whether an administrative, tribunal has a duty to act judicially should be gathered from the provisions of the particular statute and the rules made thereunder, and they clearly express the view that if an authority is called upon to decide respective rights of contesting parties or, to put it in other words, if there is a lis, ordinarily there will be a duty on the part of the said authority to act judicially”.

91. See also Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand A.I.R 1965 S.C 1767 at 1770

92. The functionaries under the Act have to invite applications for appointment of non-hereditary trustees and consider the respective claims of the eligible applicants and appoint suitable persons; Suitability has to be, of necessity, determined having regard to the interests of better administration of the institution. It is the interests of the institution and of the public at large which should be the prime guiding factor. It is significant to note that any orders made under sub-sections (2) and (i) of sec. 15 in this behalf are open to revision and review. They are subject to revision under section 82 by the Commissioner either suo matu or on an application. Similarly the orders passed by the Commissioner under clause (b) to sub-section (1) of sec. 15 are revisable by the State Government under sec. 83. Sec 84 gives power to review to the Government. It follows that any errors committed by the original authority, whether procedural or on merits, are open to correction by the competent authorities. That means that the proceedings must be regular, proper, legal and free from any vitiating circumstances. The revising authority should be in a position to gather from the order that they are so. The order must therefore be a speaking order amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 225 or 227 of the Constitution, and the proceedings fair and just. The functionaries under the Act no doubt occupy in this regard the role of administrative Tribunals but they are bound to act quasi-judicially. They are vested with a duty to act fairly and judicially in considering the claims and appointing non-hereditary trustees. They should apply their mind not only to the need of appointment but also the right type of parsons. Their orders must not only contain the reasons but the reasoning and conclusion should be based on relevant facts and not extraneous consideration. As already observed, the better administration and the interests of the institution or of the general public must be foremost in mind and certainly not the political consideration. Mere membership of Parliament, State Legislature or of any political organisation would certainly in that context be an irrelevant and extraneous consideration for the appointment of a trustee to a religious or charitable institution or endowment. Only such of the eligible applicants or other persons as are interested in the welfare and betterment of the institution and have an aptitude, mind and time to evince their zeal in safeguarding, improving and benefiting the institution and its funds may be appointed. That is the intendment of the provision. That is how it should be given effect to. And that is the reason why powers of revision and review have been given to ensure Page: 468that the powers are correctly exercised. In this state of law, it is idle to rely on the mere possibility of abuse of discretion by an individual officer as a ground for holding section 15 or section 8 violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.

93. The following observations of the Supreme Court in Shirur Mutt Case A.I.R 1954 S.C 282 at 292 would be a short answer to such an objection:—

“An apprehension that the powers conferred by this section may be abused in individual cases does not make the provision itself bad or invalid in law”.

94. To the like effect was the observation of S.K Das, J. (as he then was) in Mahant Mott Das v. S.P Sahi A.I.R 1959 S.C 942 at 949. It was stated therein:

“The power to give directions to the trustee is also subject to a similar restriction, namely, the directions must be for the proper administration of the religious trust in accordance with the law governing such trust and the wishes of the founder in so far such wishes can be ascertained and are not repugnant to such law. The keynote of all the relevant provisions of the Act is the due observance of the objects of the religious trust and not its breach or violation”.

95. It follows, therefore, that the argument that sections 15 and 8 are violative of Art. 14 is unsustainable.

96. In this connection we may also refer to the argument of Mr. Narasa Raju based on the words ‘may’ and ‘shall’ used in the section. It is argued that where as it is incumbent on the functionaries under the Act to constitute a Board of Trustees in case where there is no hereditary trustee or trustees, it has been left to their discretion to constitute such Board where there is hereditary trustee. This the learned counsel contends, is a sort of invidious discrimination between institution and institution and hence violative of Article 14. The distinction crude between the two institutions is founded on reasonable classification and his a nexus with the object of the Act. The hereditary trustee is entitled to the management of the affairs in his own right. Therefore, the legislature has given discretion to the function aries to constitute a Board only if the interests of better Page: 469find efficient administration so warrant. They need not constitute a Board of Trustees if the management is being carried on sound lines. That is the reason why the would ‘may’ is used. In cases where there are no hereditary trustees at all to run the management, the statute has laid a duty on the functionaries to constitute a Board. The question of discretion does not arise at all. That is a mandate which they should carry out as there can be no other alternative, consistent with the provisions and the object of the Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that one institution is discriminated against the other. Even where the discretion is given, the authorities cannot act arbitrarily in coming to the conclusion that it is in the interests of the institution to appoint non-hereditary trustees. Such a conclusion can be reached only after giving notice and a reasonable opportunity to the hereditary trustee or trustees to make their representation for it is they who are interested in the matter of the management and better administration of the affairs of the institution. The non-hereditary trustees will not be imposed on them unawares but only after considering their objections as to the need for a Board of Trustees. Entitled as they are to carry on the management, their right cannot be easily trifled with. Further it is the intention of the statute, that the hereditary trustees should be diligent and fully conscientious of their duties and at least for fear of introduction of Board of Trustees. Thus the discretion has to be exercised only in fit and proper cases and after being fully satisfied of the need in appropriate manner. The contention of the learned counsel, therefore, is devoid of merit.

97. We may now consider the question regarding the powers of the Executive Officer. The need of appointment of an executive officer for the management of the institution really arises owing to the fact that it is not generally possible for trustee's, whether hereditary or otherwise, to look after the day to day management of the institutions relating to the pujas or rituals or other particulars as well as the day to day management of the secular estate as efficiently as can be expected. The appointment of an executive officer, however does not unduly undermine the powers of the trustees for after all he is in law under the control of the trustee or the Board of Trustees. He has to carry on their lawful directions. Of course he may not be bound to implement certain orders and resolutions, but the limits of his sphere are determined by specifying such cases in sec. 35, in the interests of the institution. It is significant to note that when the executive Officer brings to the notice of Page: 470the Board of Trustees about the alleged irregularities or illegalities, there is every opportunity for them to reconsider the same and suitably modify their earlier decision or resolution. If they choose to differ, on the report of the Executive Officer, the same comes up for decision on merits before the functionaries under the Act. Such a step laid down by law is evidently conducive to the well being of the institution and efficient administration of the estate.

98. The constitutionality of sections 21(1) and 22(3) which make it obligatory on the part of the trustee to carry out the lawful orders issued by the functionaries under the Act is attacked simply on the ground that the Act has not defined what is meant by lawful orders. But the infirmity of such a ground is obvious and requires no elaborate argument.

99. The legality of Sec. 36 is questioned on the basis that it has an overriding effect on the schemes framed by Courts or the decisions of Civil Court. The intendment, of course, is to bring the scheme quite in conformity with the new corresponding provisions. Sub-section (9) relates to matters not governed by the provisions of that Chapter. Such schemes can be modified or cancelled as provided by the provision by resorting to the remedy in the specified manner. The schemes quashed by civil Courts however are not allowed to be modified under sec. 36. Any order passed under Sec. 36 be it noted is appealable under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of sec. 36 to a competent civil Court or to the High Court; as the case may be. We do not think in these circumstances that sec. 35 can be said to be beyond the competence of the Legislature.

100. The validity of the provisions of the sections 38 to 41, which relate to the registration of institutions, is not challenged. We need not deal with Chapter V relating to maths and specific endowments attached thereto, as none of the case before us relates to a math.

101. Sec. 49 deals with Dharmadayam charged or collected which vests in the trustee in relation to which an account has to maintained and submitted in due form. No question of invalidity or unconstitutionality can arise in relation to this provision.

102. Chapter VII deals with Budget, accounts and audit. The only ground taken in relation to the provisions in this chapter is that these provisions in relation to the appointment of auditors and engineering staff and defraying their salaries or meeting their Page: 471expenses account for an unnecessary drain on the resources of the institution and hence they are invalid. This argument is untenable as these are necessary expenses for efficient management of and due administration of the estate: Further no institution can complain of any burden as it is charged only on account of the expenses incurred for the services taken from the engineering staff and its subordinates as well as auditors.

103. Now, we come to Chapter VIII. Learned counsel Sri D. Narasaraju calls in question the constitutionality of levy of contribution at 7% of the annual income of the institution on the ground that it is a tax and not a fee Indisputably, the State legislature is empowered under entry 28 read with 47 in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, to levy a fee for rendering service relating to or in connection with the maintenance, supervision and control over religious or charitable institutions and endowments. What Sec. 59 directs is payment in this behalf not exceeding 7% of the annual income, within the meaning of Sub Sec. (3) to the institution. The contribution payable thereunder, be it noted, has to be assessed by the Commissioner after due notice to the trustee of the institution and any order of assessment passed under Sec. 60 is appealable under Sec. 80 and revisable by the High Court under Sec. 81. No grievance can therefore be made that the institution is arbitrarily subjected to this levy. The only point then to be considered is whether this levy in its nature is a tax or a fee. The distinction between a tax and a fee is well settled. It is not so much the name given to it but its true nature and character that clinches the issue. The question for consideration is whether this contribution by its nature is a tax Mr. Narasaraju, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the Shirur Mutt Case A.I.R 1954 S.C 282 has argued that it is a tax. In that context the matter has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. We may first note the opening words of Sec. 59 which are as follows:—

“In respect of the service rendered by the Government and their employees”.

104. That must clearly show that contribution has to be levied for the services rendered by the Government and their employees. When we look into the counter-affidavit it would appear that the Page: 472amount sought to be levied is shown to be only in lieu of the services rendered by the Government brought within the purview of the Act. Then again, the amount so collected is set apart. It is paid into the Fund called “Endowments Administration Fund” and it vests in the Commissioner who has to repay to the Government the sums mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 64. A fund called Common Good Fund” for the purposes of renovation, preservation and maintenance of institutions, and Veda Pathasalas and schools is also created under Section 65 by the Commissioner out of the payments made by the institutions or any persons. But the “Common Good Fund” vests in a committee constituted by the Government and any surplus funds are utilised as provided under Section 67. Thus it may be seen that there are two distinct funds, one vesting in the Commissioner, and the other in the Committee. The Supreme Court in the Shirur Mutt Case A.I.R 1954 S.C 282 had struck down Sec. 76(1) of the Madras Act XIX of 1951 on the ground that the amount sought to be collected therein was a tax and not a fee. Thereafter the section was amended by adding the words “The contribution so paid shall be kept and administered as a separate fund”. The amendment was made by Act IV of 1954 and subsequently sub. Sec. (1) was substituted by a fresh sub-section by Act XIII of 1955. A Division Bench of this Court in Basavalinga Swamy v. Commissioner, H.R & C.E 1959 A.L.T 794 and later a full Bench in Gopalaswami Temple v. H.R & C.E 1960 A.L.T 658 had upheld the validity of the amended or substituted provision. In Sri Jagannth Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa A.I.R 1954 S.C 400 at 403 while upholding the validity of a similar provision in the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, Mukherjea, J. who spoke for the Court, laid down the following tests to distinguish a tax from a fee.

“A tax is undoubtedly in the nature of a compulsory exaction of money by a public Authority for public purposes the payment of which is enforced by law. x x x x The taxes collected are all merged in the general revenue of the State to be applied for general purposes. x x x x

105. Thus, in fees there is always an element of ‘quid pro quo which is absent in a tax. Two elements are thus essential in order Page: 473that a payment may be regarded as a fee. In the first place, it must be levied in consideration of certain services which the individuals accepted either willingly or unwillingly. But this by itself is not enough to make the imposition a fee, if the payments demanded for rendering such services are not set apart or specifically appropriated for that purpose but are merged in the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes”.

106. Applying the aforesaid tests, the learned Judge observed:

“……………the contribution that is levied by S. 49 of the Orissa Act will have to be regarded as a fee and not a tax. The payment is demanded only for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the Commissioner and his office which is the machinery set up for due administration of the affairs of the religious institution. The collections made are not merged in the general public revenue and are not appropriated in the manner laid down for appropriation of expenses for other public purposes. They go to constitute the fund which is contemplated by S. 50 of the Act and this fund, to which also the Provincial Government contributes both by way of loan and grant, is specifically set apart for the rendering of services involved in carrying out the provisions of the Act”.

107. Indeed, in Sudhandra Thiriha swamiar v. The commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Mysore, A.I.R 1963 S.C 966 (968) the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the amended sections 76 and 82 of the Madras Act 19 of 1951 as per Madras Act 27 of 1954 to levy a fee called contribution for the services rendered with retrospective effect. In that case, Shah, J. who spoke for the Court, succinctly brought out the difference between a fee and a tax and the true nature of contribution exigible under Section 76(1) of the Madras Act analogous to the provisions of section 59 of the present Act, in the following passage:

“A levy in the nature of a fee does not cease to be of that character merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct relation to the actual services rendered by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of the service. If with a view to provide a specific Page: 474service, levy is imposed by law and expenses for maintaining the service are met out of the amounts collected there being a reasonable relation between the levy and the expenses incurred for rendering the service, the levy would be in the nature of a fee and not in the nature of a tax. It is true that ordinarily a fee is uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities of different recipients. But absence of uniformity is not a criterion on which alone it can be said that it is of the nature of a tax. A fee being a levy in consideration of rendering service of a particular type, correlation between the expenditure incurred by the Government and the levy must undoubtedly exist, but a levy will not be regarded as a tax merely because of the absence of uniformity in its incidence, or because of compulsion in the collection thereof, not because some of the contributories do not obtain the same degree of service as others may”.

108. The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in a recent judgment in Civil Appeal No. 2312 of 1966, dt. 17-10-69 in the case of Commissioner of Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments, Mysore v. U. Krishna Rao. Thus the validity of sec. 59 and the dispute as to the nature of contribution, whether it is a fee or tax, has been concluded by the authorities. The further contention of Mr. Narasa Raju that there is no correlation between the services rendered for individual institutions and the contribution levied thereon also is devoid of force. A like contention was repelled by the Supreme Court in the case referred to above) Shah, J. who spoke for the Court, observed:

“Under the Act a fee though levied for rendering services of a particular type is not to be correlated to the service performed for each individual who is intended to obtain the benefit of the services. The correlation must be between the expenses incurred by the authority levying the fee for generally providing the service and the aggregate of the levy from persons who are to be made subject thereto…………

The Act does not contemplate separate rules to be made in respect of each religious institution……The rules under the Act have to be general…………

If services are provided, assuming that the Venkataramana temple either does not need the Services or dues not obtain the benefit of the services, the contribution would still be recoverable. We are also unable to accept the argument raised that because rules were framed at a time when several different kinds of services were intended to be rendered and the Court latter struck down certain provisions on the Act, under which services were to be rendered, the rules framed in 1955 were rendered inapplicable.”

109. The aforesaid case is an authority for the proposition that it is sufficient if the correlation is between the expenses incurred by the authorities and the aggregate of levy on persons who are subjected thereto. It is not necessary that it should be correlated to the services to be performed to each person or institution. The ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above applies to the present case. It is manifest that the levy of contribution under sec. 59 of the Act has to be made in lieu of the services rendered by the Government and their employees to the religious and charitable institutions and endowments and the same is set apart as a separate Endowments Administration Fund as Provided under Sec. 64 without mixing the same with general revenues of the State. From, and out of the Endowments Administration Fund, the Government is paid to the extent of the services rendered by them and their employees and the surplus if any is to be used for the “Common Good Fund” as provided under the Act. Hence the contribution sought to be levied under Sec. 59 of the Act is in substance and effect a fee for the services rendered to the institutions by the Government and their employees, and not a tax.

110. The next submission of Mr. Narasa Raju is that sections 56, 63 and some other sections, while making the trustees liable for the arrears of any contribution or amounts and costs due to the Government, enable the authorities to collect the same as if they were arrears of land revenue. It is argued that the provision enabling the authorities to resort to any of the remedies at their discretion is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, especially when recovery by way of arrears of land revenue is a ??? and a more drastic method than a suit which is always open to the authorities. It is further contended that as the exercise of thus discretion is not regulated by any rules of guidance, it is likely to result in invidious discrimination between one institution and another similarly circumstanced, for while in case of one ???, remedy of a suit may Page: 476be resorted to, in another like case recovery by way of arrears of land revenue may be deemed expedient at the arbitrary will of the authority. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in State Of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, A.I.R 1952 S.C 75 and N.I Caterers Ltd. v. State of Punjab A.I.R 1967 S.C 1581. In one of the cases, the provision of section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act (X of 1950) was in question as the State. Government thereunder was entitled to pick and choose for trial of cases, under a special procedure as distinct from the ordinary procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code, any individual or class of individuals. Their Lordships struck down the provision as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the other case section 5 of the Punjab public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) (Act XXXI of 1959), whereunder the Collector was given discretion either to file a suit or evict under sections 4 and 5 of the Act any public tenant, was struck down as being bit by Art. 14 of the Constitution. These cases have no parallel in the cases with which we are concerned. The authorities have no such discretion of picking and choosing for this purpose from amongst the institutions similarly circumstanced and making discrimination among them. The provisions empowering the-Revenue Divisional officer to collect the arrears due to the Government as arrears of land revenue are made really in public interest and are not liable to be struck down. See Purshottamdas Govindji Halai v. B.M Desai* A.I.R 1956 S.C 20 at 23 Collector of Malawar v. Erimmal Ebrahim Hajee A.I.R 1957 S.C 688 at 691 Manna Lal v. Collector of Jkalawar A.I.R 1961 S.C 828 at 831 Lachhman Das v. State of Punjab A.I.R 1963 S.C 222 and N.I Caterers Ltd. v. State of Punjab A.I.R 1967 S.C 1581 We have held recently in Writ Petition No. 3630/1969 dt. 31-10-1969, following the said decisions, that the recovery of Public revenue and public dues by a summary proceeding is certainly in public interest and the Revenue. Recovery Act amply safeguards the interests of the aggrieved party by making a provision in Section 59 of that. Act to file a regular suit against any order or proceeding under that Act. Hence, we reject this contention, of the petitioners.

111. We shall now turn to the attack of the petitioners on sections 50 to 55 of the Act. Section 50 makes it obligatory on the part of the trustee of every charitable or religious institution or endowment to submit a budget showing is probable receipts and disbursements Page: 477during the following year making adequate provision for the due maintenance of the objects of the institution and others specified in Sub-section 2(a) thereof to the commissioner, the Deputy commissioner or the Ass. Commissioner, as the case may be, 90 days before the close of every financial year, Section 70 of the Madras Act XIX of 1951 corresponding to Sec. 50 of the Present Act was upheld in Shirur Mutt Case, A.I.R 1954 S.C 282 at 294 (Para 37) Sec. 51 enjoins the Executive Officer to keep and maintain regular accounts of all receipts and disbursements for each financial year separately, which are subject to audit by the concerned authority. Under Sec. 52, the auditor shall after completing the audit for any financial year or for and transaction or series of transactions, send a report to the commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner or the Assistant. Commissioner, as the case may be. By Section 53, the auditor has to specify in his report all cases of irregular, illegal or improper expenditure or failure to recover monies or other property due to the institution, or of any loss, waste of money caused by neglect, misc induct or misappropriation, fraud or breach of trust on the put of the trustee or any other person. Section 54 provides for rectification of defects in audit. Under sec. 55 the functionaries under the Act are empowered to proceed against the trustee or any other person in charge of the institution, guilty of illegal expenditure or of causing loss or waste of money or other property by misconduct, misapplication, collusion, fraud or breach of trust or misappropriation of the funds. None of the sections 51 to 55 can therefore be said to be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution on the supposed ground that the authorities, while exercising their powers may make descrimination between one institution and the other. The functionaries are expected to be fair and just in performing their statutory duties. At any rate, as already discussed, the provision cannot be said to be invalid merely because the individual officers may act wrongly or abuse their power. There are, as discussed already, correctives provided in the Act. The provisions in question are made for the purpose of ensuring proper, better and efficient administration of the institutions charitable or religious, or endowments, and in public interest.

112. We are unable to agree with Mr. Narasa Raju that sections 60 to 63 are unconstitutional. The provisions of Sections 60, 62 and 63 correspond to section 78 of the Madras Act XIX of 1951. Similarly section 61 of the present act corresponds to sec. 77 of the old Page: 478Act. Sections 60 to 63 must be held to be valid as the corresponding sections in the old Act were found to be constitutional by the Supreme Court in the Shirur Mutt case (1). Section 67 deals with the utility of surplus funds of an institution after providing for all the objects, needs, requirements or improvements of the institution for purposes of propagation and for establishment of schools for the training of archakas, adhyapakas and vedaparayanikas, etc. specified therein. In fact, sec. 31 of the Madras Act XIX of 1951, corresponding to sec. 67 of the present Act, was upheld by the Supreme Court in Ratilal v. State of Bombay A.I.R 1954 S.C 388 and Tilkayat Shri Govindlalj Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan A.I.R 1963 S.C 1638. Section 68 which provides for the determination and application of properties of defunct institutions and section 69 which refers to the appropriation of endowments are not shown to be bad or unconstitutional.

113. The provisions of Chapter X relating to the alienation of any immovable property and resumption of inam lands are not called into question as unconstitutional. Under Section 70, any lease for a term exceeding six years and any gift, sale exchange or mortgage of an inam land granted for the support or maintenance of the institution or for the performance of a religious or public charity or service, is null and void unless it is made with the prior sanction of the Government which can be accorded only when such transfer is found to be necessary or beneficial and consistent with the objects of the institution and the consideration is reasonable and proper. Section 71 empowers the Revenue Divisional Officer to resume, either suo motu or on application of a trustee of an institution, the whole or any portion of any inam land referred to in Section 70 on the ground that the holder of the inam has entered into a transaction which is null and void under Section 70, that the institution has ceased to exist or the charity or service has become impossible of performance and that the holder of the inam land has failed to perform the service in accordance with the custom or usage after due notice to the trustee, to the Commissioner, to the holder of the inam land, to the person in possession of the inam land or to the alienee, of course, after considering the objections, if any, in the enquiry. The resumption proceedings under Section 71 are appealable under Section 72 to the District Collector. Section 73 prohibits the purchase of immovable property for and on behalf of the institution by the trustee without the prior sanction of the Commissioner who Page: 479accords his sanction only when it is necessary or beneficial to the institution. Section 74 makes any alienation of immovable property belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of any charitable or religious institution or endowment as null and void unless any such transaction, not being a gift, is effected with the prior approval of the Commissioner. The provisions of Chapter X, in our considered opinion, are valid and there is no illegality or unconstitutionality in them. The provisions are really intended to protect and safeguard the interests of the very institution and its properties.

114. The provisions of Sections 75 and 76 in Chapter XI relating to the action to be taken against the persons who encroached upon the lands and properties belonging to the institution, are really in the interests of the institution. The Chapter relates to encroachments. For the purpose of this Chapter Section 75(1)(ii) introduces a fiction by including the person or institution who continues to remain in the land or building of the religious or charitable institution after the expiry or termination or cancellation of the lease granted to him in the definition of encroacher sub-sections (2) to (6) of Section 75 prescribes the procedure for determining the encroachment and directing removal thereof and Section 76 provides for the mode of eviction in case of such encroachments. Section 76(2) in terms says that the aggrieved is not prevented from instituting a suit though there is limitation in this behalf in relation to certain category of persons. These provisions which are designed to further the objects of the Act do not snack of arbitrariness nor offend any provisions of Chapter III of the Constitution.

115. Then we come to Section 77 in Chapter XII. It is concerned with the powers of the Deputy Commissioner to decide certain matters and disputes as specified in that section. The validity of this section is called in question on the ground that while conferring powers on the Deputy Commissioner to inquire into and decide the said matters, no procedure was sought to be laid down to regulate these inquiries. It is assailed also on the ground that when the Deputy Commissioner, who has powers of deciding the matters and disputes is subordinate to the Commissioner, it is vain to expect that in the matter relating to preparation and publishing lists under Section 6, which is exclusively prepared by the Commissioner, he will go against the decision of the Commissioner.

116. The powers of the Deputy Commissioner, as already noticed, are specified by the provisions of the Act. Whether an institution Page: 480or endowment is a charitable or religious one, whether trusteeship is hereditary or not, whether any property is an endowment or specific endowment or charitable or religious endowment, whether any office-holder or servant is holding or has held his office of service hereditarily, and whether any office or service is of hereditary nature, etc., are all matters within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner who would decide the same. The inquiry into and decision by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 77 is a matter quasi-judicial in nature. His inquiry is regulated by the rules duly framed. He has to decide the matters or the disputes after giving due notice in the manner prescribed under the rules to the persons concerned and enquiring into the disputes. Rule I made under this section reads thus.

“When the Deputy Commissioner propose to take action under sub-section (1) of Section 77 or suo motu or on an application from any person or trustee, notice of the inquiry shall be sent by registered post, acknowledgment due in the form appended to these rules.

(a) to the persons concerned or the petitioner or the applicant,

(b) to the respondent(s),

(c) to their advocates as per the address given in their application in relation to any dispute in respect of the matters stated therein.”

117. Rule 2 provides for publication of the notice by affixture on the notice boards of the office of the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area in which the institution is situate and such publication is deemed to be sufficient intimation to the persons having interest within the meaning of clause 18 of section 2 of the Act. Rule 3 provides for the communication of the decision under Section 77(3) to the concerned parties by registered post, acknowledgment due, and for publishing the same as specified in rule 2. The avowed object of notice is to give opportunity the to persons concerned to be heard. Giving of decision and communication of the said decision make the quasi-judicial process complete. In this state of law it is idle to contend that no procedure is provided, for hearing of the disputes. Under the procedure prescribed it is obvious that any person interested or a trustee Page: 481can move the Deputy Commissioner under Section 77 for adjudication of any dispute specified therein. The authority of necessity has to follow the same procedure as is prescribed for enquiry and decide the dispute. Section 104 provides for the procedure and powers in relation to enquiries under the Act. By this section, the Deputy Commissioner conducting an enquiry relating to any dispute under Section 77(1) has to follow the same procedure applicable to the trial of suits under the Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and the Indian Oaths Act are made applicable to such enquiries. Sub-Sections (3) to Section 104 nukes it abundantly clear that the Duputy Commissioner holding an enquiry under the Act must be deemed to be a person acting judicially within the meaning of the Judicial Officer's Protection Act, 1850. Thus it is plain that the Act having conferred ‘powers on the Deputy Commissioner’ for inquiry into and decision of disputes has also provided for the procedure to be followed in, such inquiries. The plea taken therefore must be held untenable. The other plea raised in relation to the nature of decision also is devoid of force.

118. We have already dealt with the provisions of Sections 80, 81, 82, 83 and 84 contained in Chapter XIII providing for appeals, revisions and review against the orders passed by or proceeding of any functionary under the Act. It is not necessary to deal with these sections at length as the same are not challenge. Suffice it to say that they provide sufficient safeguards to the aggrieved parties against the decisions of the functionaries under the Act.

119. Chapter XIV relates to the management and administration of Tirumala-Tirupathi Devasthanarns with which we are not concerned in these applications.

120. Section 92(1) empowers the Commissioner to transfer any proceeding pending before a Deputy or Assistant Commissioner, either to his own file or to the file of another Deputy or Assistant Commissioner, as the case may be, for disposal. Sub-Section (2) gives a right of appeal to the aggrieved party against an order passed under section 22(1) to the State Government. This section is not shown to us to be invalid or unconstitutional.

121. Section 93 makes it obligatory on the extrustee, hereditary or otherwise, and Executive Officer or servant, who ceases to be so either on account of expiry of the term of his office or by reason of his suspension, removal or dismissal, to land ever charge of his Page: 482office and deliver possession of records, accounts, properties including cash, etc., belonging to the institution, to his successor-in-office Failure to comply with the same is punishable with fine upto Rs. 1,000/-. The provisions in this behalf are enacted in the interests of all and to safeguard and protect the institution and its properties. The prohibition under Section 94 to a trustee or an Executive Officer or anyone in charge of the administration of the institution from lending or borrowing on behalf of the institution except with the prior approval of the concerned authority and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed under the rules, is indeed a valid provision made to protect the interests of the institution.

122. Then we come to section 95 which empowers the State Government to dissolve any Board of Trustees which failed to perform its functions or has exceeded or abused any of the powers conferred upon it by or under the Act resulting in material loss or loss of prestige to the institution. The power so conferred is not unregulated so that it may be said that the provision smacks of arbitrariness. The very section postulates exercise of such power only when the Board of Trustees has failed to perform its functions or exceeded or abused any of its powers conferred on it by or under the Act resulting in loss or loss of prestige to the institution. A notice has to be issued and any representation or explanation given by the Board of Trustees has to be considered before the power of dissolution is exercised. The right of hereditary trustee to continue as a trustee is however unaffected. Section 95, judged in any manner, does not suffer from any of the vices.

123. Section 108 empowers the State Government to exempt from the operation of any of the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder, any charitable institution or endowment, the administration of which is vested in the Government either directly or through a Committee, or in the Official Trustee or in the administrator-General; or any charitable institution or endowment founded for educational purposes; or any religious institution or endowment. It may also likewise vary or cancel such exemption. This kind of exemption clause delegating the executive to make exemptions from all or any of the provisions of an Act in a particular case or class of cases depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, is generally found in statutes. The exemption clause provided in section 108 cannot per se be held to be invalid as offending Article 14 of the Constitution.

124. Section 109 deals with the repeals and savings. By that section the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951, and the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Wakf Regulation, 1349 Fasli, are repealed. By sub-sec. (2), all rules made, notifications or certificates issued, orders passed, decisions made, proceedings taken, and other things done by any authority or officer under the repealed Act or Regulation, as the case may be, shall in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act, be deemed to have been made, issued passed, taken, or done by the appropriate authority or officer under the corresponding provisions of this Act and shall have effect accordingly until they are modified, cancelled or superseded under the provisions of this Act, Sections 8 and 18 of the Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1891, have been made, under sub-sec. (3), applicable despite the fact that certain matters are specifically mentioned in sub-section (2)(a) of Section 109.

125. Section 110 says that the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Endowments and Escheats Regulation, 1817, the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890, the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920, and Sections 92 and 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall cease to apply to charitable institution and Hindu Religious Institutions and the endowments thereof to which the present Act applies, Section 8 of the Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1891, shall apply as if these enactments had been repealed by an Andhra Pradesh Act. By reason of sections 92 and 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, being made inapplicable to the charitable and religious institutions and endowments that come within the purview of the Act, any person interested in any institution or endowment relating to any matter of dispute must seek his remedy only as per the provisions of the Act even with regard to any scheme, settled or modified by the functionaries under the previous Act, or by a civil court. Any person aggrieved by the decision or order passed by the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner has a right of appeal within thirty days from the date of receipt of such order to the Court within the meaning of sub-section (8) to Section 2, or to the High Court where it is passed by the Court as provided under Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 36 of the Act.

126. The validity of sections 112 and 113 is not questioned.

127. On an examination of the entire provisions of the Act, it is thus clear that the provisions of the Act do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity as a result of which they or any of them may be struck down. The material provisions of the Act are only intended to regulate and ensure proper, efficient and better administration and management of the institutions, and the discretionary powers vested in the functionaries under the Act are intended to serve this purpose.

128. The various previsions of the Act, read with the policy, purpose and intendment of the Act, do not, as discussed above, abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed to the hereditary trustees or the charitable or Hindu religious institutions or endowment or any one interested in them, under Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 25, 26 or 31 of the Constitution of India. Hence we hold that the Act and its provisions are valid and intra vires and Constitutional.

129. The Act is applicable only to public Hindu religious and charitable institutions and endowments and not to private institutions. Some of the petitioners, therefore, have raised a contention that their institutions are private in character and hence they are not governed by the provisions of the Act. Whether a particular Hindu religious or charitable institution or endowment is public or private, is a question of fact and, at best, a mixed question of law and fact and has to be decided on merits of each case. The Supreme Court in Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar A.I.R 1957 S.C 136 at 136 has held that whether the Thakurdwara of Sri Radbakrishnaji at Bhadesia is a public endowment or a private one is one of mixed question of law sand fact. In Moti Das v. S.P Sahi A.I.R 1959 S.C 942 at 951 while considering whether the trusts are public or private, S.K Das, J. (as he then was), who spoke for the Court, ruled thus.

“………..the questions whether the trusts are public or private or trust properties are questions which involve investigation of complicated facts and Recording of evidence and such investigation could not be done in writ proceedings.”

“The distinction between a private and a public trust” said Venkatarama Ayyar, J. who spoke for the Court in Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar A.I.R 1957 S.C 136 at 136 is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific individuals, in the latter they are the general Page: 485public or a class 1 hereof. While the former the beneficaries are persons who are ascertained or capable of being ascertained, in the latter they constitute a body which is inapplicable of ascertainment.”

130. The Supreme Court reiterated the same view State of Bihar v. Smt. Charusila Dasi A.I.R 1959 S.C 1002 S.K Das J. (as he then was), who delivered the opinion of the Court in Ram Saroop Dasji v. S.P Sahi A.I.R 1959 S.C 951 at 956 has succinctly brought out the distinction between a private and a public trust thus:

“…………the essential distinction is that in a public trust the beneficial interest is vested in an uncertain and fluctuating body of persons, either the public at large or some considerable portion of it answering a particular description in a private trust the beneficiaries are definite and ascertained individuals or who within a definite time can be definitely ascertained. The fact that the uncertain and fluctuating body of persons is a section of the public following a particular religious faith or is only a sect of persons of a certain religious persuasion would not make any difference in the matter and would not make the trust a private trust.’

131. That, with respect, is the distinction between the public and private trust. As it all turns upon the facts of each which have to be investigated, the writ remedy is the most inappropriate remedy for the purpose. The petitioners have an effective and efficacious remedy under Section 77(1) of the Act. Similarly such of those petitioners who claim to be hereditary trustees may seek the remedy under Section 77. They have also a right of suit to the District Court in case they are aggrieved, by the order of the competent authority under the Act.

132. Likewise, whether a particular religious or charitable institution is or is not a religious denomination for any section thereof within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution, is also a question of fact or, in any event, a mixed question of fact and law which can be more satisfactorily and effectively adjndicated upon in a competent civil Court. Whether the Vysya and Lingayat communities and the institutions, religious or charitable, founded by the members of those communities are religious denominations or not, are questions which should be determined in a proper forum. Resort to the Page: 486writ remedy in the first instance is inappropriate and misconceived. The petitioners who claim that their institutions are religious denominations are at liberty to establish the same in a competent civil court. We are unable to accede to the request of the learned counsel Mr. Bapiraju to issue a direction to the Deputy Commissioner not to dispossess such of those petitioners who claim to be hereditary trustees pending disposal of the applications for adjudication of their rights under Section 77. Sub-Section (2) to Section 77 empowers the Deputy Commissioner to pass such order as he deems fit for the administration of the property or custody of the money belonging to the institution or endowment pending his decision under Sub-section (1). Hence they may approach the Deputy Commissioner in this regard.

133. For all the reasons expressed above, the Writ Petitions merit dismissal. They are accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 50/- in each.

134. K.R.S