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Kanhaiya Lal v. District Deputy Director Of Consolidation
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute originates from consolidation proceedings concerning certain plots (described as "sir" or "Khudkasht") that originally belonged to Raja Krishnapal Singh. His son Sant Bahadur Singh inherited the land and was married to Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi (the Rani). Sant Bahadur Singh died in 1947, and an arbitration award (dated 26-11-1948, with clarifications subsequently incorporated) addressed competing claims between the Rani and Sant Bahadur's brother Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh.
The Rani granted two leases in June–July 1949 in favour of the petitioners-appellants, who entered and have continued in possession. Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh brought a suit in 1955 to cancel those leases; that suit and a related second appeal abated under Section 5 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Later, Lal Pratap filed objections under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in consolidation proceedings; the Consolidation Officer initially rejected those objections, the Settlement Officer allowed them, and the Deputy Director, Consolidation, dismissed the petitioners-appellants' revision. The petitioners challenged those appellate/revisional consolidation orders by filing a writ petition, which was dismissed by the learned single judge. The present special appeal seeks to overturn that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh had locus standi (was a "person interested") to file objections under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in the consolidation proceedings.
- Whether the arbitration award/decree (and the rights asserted under it) retained any efficacy after the vesting of estates in the State under Section 4(1) and the consequences of vesting stated in Section 6 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (U.P. Act 1 of 1951).
- Whether the leases granted by the Rani in June–July 1949 were valid and binding (including whether the lessees became hereditary tenants/sirdars or acquired title by prescription or as trespassers), and whether the Rani could be compelled or was precluded from challenging those leases.
- Whether the consolidation authorities committed a jurisdictional error in entertaining and allowing objections under Section 9 when filed by a person not shown to be "a person interested".
- Whether it was permissible, in the writ proceeding, to raise (for the first time) the question of non-maintainability of the objection under Section 9 where that point had not been decided or discussed earlier by the consolidation authorities.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners-Appellants' Arguments (as advanced by Shri G.N. Verma)
- Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh (respondent No. 4) had no locus standi to file objections under Section 9; only the Rani, if at all, could have done so.
- After the promulgation of U.P. Act 1 of 1951 (the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act), the award-decree lost efficacy and could not be the basis of claims by Lal Pratap; reliance was placed on authorities including Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd. and Ratnji Dixit v. Bhrigunath.
- If the award-decree remained effective, it at least bound the Rani during her lifetime, so transactions during her life (such as the leases) could not be disturbed.
- Alternatively, if the award-decree continued effective, the Rani acted within her authority under the award in granting the leases; the transactions were prudent given the circumstances.
- The lessee became a hereditary tenant (sirdar) under Section 19 of the Zamindari Abolition Act on the date of vesting, or, if the leases were void, the lessee would be a trespasser and the Rani had two years to sue; failure to sue would allow the lessee to acquire title (citation: Yeshwant v. Walchand).
Respondent No. 4's Arguments (as advanced by Shri G.P. Bhargava)
- The learned single judge's judgment should be upheld for reasons given in that judgment.
- An error of law apparent on the face of the record cannot be asserted where a point was not raised before the consolidation authorities; reliance was placed on several precedents (e.g., Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque and others) to support that proposition.
- If interpretation of a document (the award-decree) was a matter of deep contention, the consolidation authorities' interpretation could not be treated as an error apparent on the record; the single judge upheld their interpretation and it was a permissible construction.
- The law in Ramji Dixit (and similar cases) does not apply to these facts because that case concerned transfer of bhumidhari rights; here the issue is transfer of sir lands prior to U.P. Act 1 of 1951.
- The award-decree did not lose efficacy on the coming into force of U.P. Act 1 of 1951; the Rani may have become a bhumidhar but remained subject to the award's limitations.
- The petitioners-appellants did not acquire title by prescription: their possession was permissive, and Section 10 of U.P. Act 1 of 1951 prevented acquisition of rights; under Sections 157 and 21(h) they could at best be Asamis (tenants), and only bhumidhars and sirdars have rights to be recorded by consolidation authorities.
- Lal Pratap was a person interested and could file objections under Section 9; the petitioners cannot raise the maintainability objection because no issue was framed on this point before the consolidation authorities and because it might not be a pure question of law (relying on Radharaman v. Gulab Thakur and Doongaraee Shyamji v. Tribhuwan Das).
- Several aspects of personal law, agency/authority, and provisions of Hindu Law and the Hindu Succession Act were also relied upon in support of his positions.
Table of Precedents Cited
The table lists each precedent mentioned in the opinion. Where the opinion explicitly identifies the rule or principle for which a precedent was cited, that has been recorded; where the opinion merely cites a case without specifying the precise point relied upon, the table notes that the specific principle is not expressly stated in the opinion.
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., Allahabad, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1790 | The opinion cites this case among authorities clarifying effect of vesting under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act; the specific legal principle is not separately stated in the opinion. | The Court listed it as one of several Supreme Court decisions that clarify the legal position regarding vesting and the loss of reversionary rights. |
| Ratnji Dixit v. Bhrigunath, 1968 A.L.J. 844 | Relied upon by petitioners; the opinion cites it but does not specify the precise rule relied on by them in the text. | Listed as an authority relied upon by the petitioners; the Court also later refers to Ramji/Ramji Dixit in discussing related principles and distinguishes facts. |
| Yeshwant v. Walchand, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 16 | Cited by petitioners for proposition concerning trespass and time to sue for possession; the opinion records the citation but does not elaborate further on the principle beyond the petitioners' reliance. | Noted as relied upon by petitioners in support of argument that a trespasser could acquire title if the land-holder failed to sue within the statutory period. |
| Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 233 | Cited by respondent in support of the proposition that an error of law apparent will not be found where a point was not raised before the tribunal; specific phrasing taken from precedent is referenced in the opinion. | Court considered the general principle but held locus standi (a jurisdictional point) could be raised despite not being argued earlier because it affects jurisdiction. |
| Chetkar v. Vishwanath, 1970 2 SCC 217 | Referenced by respondent among authorities on the respondent's procedural point; the opinion does not state the specific principle taken from it. | Included in the list of cases relied upon by respondent; no distinct application elaborated in the opinion. |
| Jabalpur Municipality v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 837 | Cited by respondent as part of a group of cases on procedural points; the opinion does not isolate the precise principle from this case. | Listed among authorities relied upon by respondent to resist the raising of new points at appellate/writ stage. |
| S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1680 | Cited by respondent for procedural law propositions; the opinion does not specify the precise rule extracted from it. | Used in respondent's compilation of authorities; no distinct application is recorded by the Court beyond citation. |
| Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 477 | Cited by respondent among cases on the procedural issue; specific rule not expressly set out in the opinion. | Included in respondent's list of authorities; the Court did not separately analyze its application here. |
| Bachchan Singh v. Gauri Shanker, 1972 4 SCC 257 | Cited by respondent; opinion does not identify the particular rule cited from this case. | Part of the respondent's authorities; no discrete application described in the opinion. |
| Associated Cement Co. v. P.D. Vyas, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 665 | Referenced by respondent in support of procedural propositions; the opinion does not specify the precise extract. | Listed among cases relied upon by respondent; no further use recorded in the Court's reasoning. |
| Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 137 | Cited by respondent as part of procedural law authorities; the opinion does not elaborate the exact principle taken from it. | Included in respondent's list of precedents; no distinct application indicated in the opinion. |
| Jagannath Behera v. Harihar Singh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 239 | Cited by respondent; the opinion does not specify the particular principle relied upon from this case. | Mentioned among respondent's authorities; the Court did not separately analyze it. |
| Dabal Singh v. S.T.A. Tribunal, A.I.R. 1967 All. 266 | Cited by respondent in his list of authorities; specific principle not stated in the opinion. | Part of respondent's compilation of authorities; not separately applied in the reasoning. |
| G.D. Singh v. Sub-Divisional Officer, 1966 A.L.J. 631 | Cited by respondent (Chief Justice Desai's observations used regarding pleas not raised before a tribunal); opinion quotes a relevant observation. | The Court considered the quoted observation but distinguished it on the ground that jurisdictional points (such as locus standi) may be raised even if not earlier pressed. |
| D.G. Vidyalaya Assn. v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1962 All. 187 (F.B.) | Cited by respondent; the opinion does not set out the specific rule relied on from this case. | Mentioned among respondent's authorities; no separate application described. |
| Ram Sahai v. Custodian of Enemy Property, U.P., A.I.R. 1953 All. 117 | Cited by respondent among authorities on procedural points; the opinion does not extract a precise rule from it. | Listed among respondent's citations; not separately applied in the Court's analysis. |
| Harakh Singh v. Kailash Singh, A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 581 | Cited in the context of earlier Patna High Court decisions and later Full Bench reversal; the opinion records its place in the line of authority on the effect of statute on prior alienations. | Referred to in the overview of case law dealing with effect of statutory change on rights arising under personal law; used to illustrate jurisprudential development. |
| Radharaman v. Gulab Thakur, A.I.R. 1959 Pat. 50 | Cited by respondent to support proposition that a person may file objections on behalf of another; the opinion records the citation but states it does not assist the respondent in the present facts. | The Court held that Radharaman and Doongaraee Shyamji did not aid respondent's position because facts showed Lal Pratap acted as objector claiming rights, not as agent for the Rani. |
| Doongaraee Shyamji v. Tribhuwan Das, A.I.R. 1947 All. 375 | Cited by respondent on the agency/authority point; the opinion records the citation but finds it inapposite on the facts. | The Court concluded the precedent did not assist the respondent because the consolidation records treated Lal Pratap as the objector claiming rights, not as filing on behalf of the Rani. |
| Hari Prasad v. Indrawati, A.I.R. 1958 All. 304 | Cited in the discussion of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act and early interpretations; used in historical exposition of related jurisprudence. | Part of the Court's review of how courts interpreted Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act before the Supreme Court clarified the position. |
| R.A. Missir v. Raghunath, A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 480 | Listed among early decisions interpreting Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act; the opinion uses it in background synopsis. | Referred to in the Court's review of how Section 14(1) was earlier understood; not specifically applied to the present facts beyond contextual discussion. |
| Julam Missir v. Pradip Missir, A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 115 | Used in the historical exposition of cases interpreting Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act; the opinion does not extract a discrete rule for present application. | Part of the background on the evolution of the law under the Hindu Succession Act. |
| Kutturswami v. Veeravva, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 577 | Identified by the Court as the Supreme Court decision that resolved controversy on Section 14(1) — that Section 14(1) did not enlarge rights of aliens vs. reversioners after the Act. | The Court cited it to draw a comparison and to explain that statutory change need not allow reversioners to challenge prior alienations; used by analogy in reasoning about vesting under U.P. Act 1 of 1951. |
| Collector & Deputy Commissioner v. Jagdish Pratap, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 909 | Cited by the Court among Supreme Court decisions clarifying vesting consequences; the opinion does not state a specific rule taken from it. | Listed as part of the body of Supreme Court authorities supporting the Court's view that rights under earlier instruments became extinct on vesting. |
| State of U.P. v. Trivikram Narain Singh, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 799 | Cited in the list of Supreme Court cases clarifying legal position on consequences of vesting; the opinion does not enumerate the precise extract used. | Included among authorities relied upon to show the award-decree lost efficacy upon vesting under U.P. Act 1 of 1951. |
| Mahendra Lal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019 | Cited among authorities clarifying legal consequences of the Zamindari Abolition enactments; specific principle from the case is not separately stated in the opinion. | Used as part of the precedent base to conclude that reversionary/contingent rights ceased on vesting in the State. |
| Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigunath | Cited and discussed: involved an alienation by a widow bhumidhar and the application of U.P. Act 1 of 1951; the opinion analyses and distinguishes that case from the present facts. | The Court discussed Ramji Dixit at length and concluded its facts differ but that even so it does not help respondent because reversionary rights were extinguished by vesting under Sec.4/6 of U.P. Act 1 of 1951. |
| H.S. & I.E. Board, U.P. v. Bageshwar, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 875 | Cited for the proposition that a finding based on no material or evidence is an error apparent on the face of the record. | The Court invoked this precedent to observe that the consolidation authorities' and the single judge's finding that the leases were imprudent lacked material and could constitute an error apparent on the face of the record. |
| Ghaio Mal & Sons v. State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 65 | Cited regarding the High Court's power to summon the entire record when issuing certiorari; the opinion refers to it in discussing allowance of a supporting affidavit/true copy. | The Court relied on it to justify its approach to records in writ proceedings, but ultimately rejected the late application by the Rani as unnecessary to decide the appeal. |
| C.A. Hasan v. State of U.P., 1965 A.L.J. 991 | Referenced with other authorities on the High Court's powers in writ jurisdiction; the opinion does not state the particular rule cited. | Used to support the proposition that the High Court can call for the record when entertaining certiorari; no further application was made. |
| P. Joseph John v. State, A.I.R. 1953 Travancore-Cochin 363 (F.B.) | Cited among authorities on certiorari and the High Court's power to examine records; the opinion does not isolate a specific rule from it. | Listed in support of the view that the High Court can summon entire records in certiorari proceedings. |
| Raja Jagdambika Pratap Narain Singh v. Income Tax Officer, 76 I.T.R. 619 (D.B.) | Cited among cases discussing whether new points may be raised in later fora; the opinion does not specify the excerpt used. | Mentioned in the Court's discussion on when new points may be entertained in writ proceedings or appeals. |
| Imperial Tobacco Co. v. State, A.I.R. 1971 Cal. 109 | Included in list of authorities about raising new points; the opinion does not state the precise principle taken from it. | Referred to in the broader procedural discussion; not separately applied. |
| Swami Dayal v. Ram Kishore, 1970 A.L.J. 291 | Cited among procedural authorities; specific rule not spelled out in the opinion. | Used in the Court's survey of authorities on new points being raised at appellate/writ stage. |
| Vira Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1970 Punjab 525 | Cited in the procedural context; the opinion does not specify a particular principle from it. | Part of the list of cases on when new legal points may be entertained. |
| Alembic Chemical Works v. Workmen, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 647 | Cited among authorities on procedural issues; the opinion does not single out the exact rule used. | Included in the Court's discussion on procedural permissibility of raising points at writ stage. |
| Badri Pd. v. Nagamal, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 559 | Cited as an authority in the procedural context; no specific rule from the case is described in the opinion text. | Listed as precedent in the Court's procedural review. |
| M.S.R.T. Corpn. v. B.G.R. Service Warora, 1969 2 SCC 746 | Cited in the procedural authorities list; the opinion does not explicitly state the precise rule relied upon. | Part of the Court's discussion of authorities relevant to raising new points. |
| A.V.D. Costa v. B.C. Patel, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 412 | Referenced in analogy to the limited jurisdiction of statutory authorities (Payment of Wages Act cases); the opinion cites it for the proposition that authorities' jurisdiction is limited to statutory conferral. | Used by the Court to draw analogy: the Consolidation Officer's jurisdiction under Section 9 is similarly circumscribed and cannot be invoked by a person who is not "interested". |
| Sri Ambika Mills Co. Ltd. v. S.B. Bhatt, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 970 | Cited with other Payment of Wages Act cases to illustrate limits of an authority's jurisdiction; the opinion does not give a fuller extract. | Part of the analogy employed to establish that statutory adjudicatory authority cannot proceed where jurisdictional prerequisites (a person interested) are absent. |
| Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain v. B.E.S. & I. Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 590 | Cited in the group of Payment of Wages Act precedents to illustrate limits of statutory authority; specific rule is not elaborated beyond that analogy. | Used in the Court's analogy to support the conclusion that the Consolidation Officer lacked jurisdiction to entertain objections filed by a stranger. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded along the following principal steps (as stated in the opinion):
- The Court examined the effect of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (U.P. Act 1 of 1951). It noted Sections 4(1) and 6 of that Act which provide for vesting of estates in the State and prescribe the consequences of vesting. The opinion records that estates in Uttar Pradesh vested in the State effective 1 July 1952 by notification under Section 4(1), and that Section 6 prescribes that rights of intermediaries and certain grants, confirmations and titles stand determined or cease on vesting.
- On that statutory foundation the Court held that the arbitration award/decree (and the alleged reversionary or contingent rights claimed by Lal Pratap under it) lost efficacy after the vesting in the State. The Court analysed analogous developments in the law (including the Supreme Court's treatment of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act) and concluded that, post-vesting, there was no concept of the former reversionary/residuary rights under the award-decree applicable to the present plots.
- Having held the award-decree ineffective after vesting, the Court turned to the narrower question of whether Lal Pratap could file objections under Section 9 of the Consolidation Act. It interpreted Section 9 as permitting only a "person interested" to file objections; the Court reasoned, by reference to general legal principles and analogy to other statutory adjudicatory jurisdictions (e.g., Payment of Wages Act cases), that an objector who is a complete stranger to the right in question cannot give jurisdiction to the consolidation authorities to alter the record and cause mutation against the will of the recorded tenure-holder.
- The Court examined the consolidation record and the manner in which the consolidation authorities treated the objection: there was no indication that Lal Pratap acted as an agent for the Rani or that he filed objections on her behalf. Instead, the records and the pleadings indicated that he claimed rights under the award-decree. The Court also relied on the fact that in the writ petition (para 15) it was averred that the objections were filed by Lal Pratap alleging invalidity of the leases; that averment was not denied by Lal Pratap's counter-affidavit. Thus factually Lal Pratap was the objector claiming personal rights.
- The Court addressed the respondent's procedural objection — that the locus standi point was not raised earlier — and explained that while new points of fact or mixed law/fact ordinarily should not be entertained, jurisdictional defects (such as absence of a person interested) may be raised at the writ stage even if not earlier raised because they affect the authority's power to act. The opinion distinguishes precedents relied upon by the respondent on that basis.
- The Court further observed that, even if it had been necessary to decide whether the leases were imprudent acts on the Rani's part, the appellate and revisional authorities and the single judge had taken imprudence for granted without evidential foundation. The Court regarded such a finding as potentially an error apparent on the face of the record (citing H.S. & I.E. Board, U.P. v. Bageshwar), but ultimately it did not decide the leases' substantive status because it disposed of the appeal on the preliminary jurisdictional ground.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding: The special appeal is allowed. The Court held that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh had no locus standi to file objections under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, and therefore the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to direct mutation of the Rani's name in the revenue records or to delete the petitioners-appellants' names from the records on the basis of those objections.
Immediate Consequences / Relief Ordered:
- The judgment of the learned single judge is set aside.
- The writ petition of the petitioners-appellants is allowed.
- The order dated 7-11-1967 passed by the District Deputy Director, Consolidation, Pratapgarh and the order dated 20-3-1967 passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Pratapgarh are quashed and set aside.
- The same order governs the connected special appeal No. 135 of 1969 (arising out of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 45 of 1958) because the matters and parties were identical.
Implications (Scope and Limits):
- The Court decided the case on the jurisdictional ground that the objector was not a "person interested" under Section 9; consequently, it did not finally determine other substantive questions such as whether the leases were valid or imprudent, whether the petitioners were sirdars, asamis, licensees, or whether the Rani had bhumidhari rights under Section 18 of U.P. Act 1 of 1951. The Court expressly stated that it was unnecessary to decide those further issues.
- The direct effect is that the consolidation orders that were founded on Lal Pratap's objections are annulled and the petitioners-appellants' position as recorded in the basic year (where they were recorded as Sirdars) is preserved to the extent ordered by this judgment (by quashing the orders that effected mutation/deletion).
- The Court recognised and applied the principle that jurisdictional defects (here, absence of standing of an objector) can be raised in writ proceedings even if the point was not fully argued before the subordinate authorities because such defects go to the power of the authority to act.
Result: Appeal allowed with costs; impugned consolidation orders quashed and set aside.
Mehrotra, J.:— This special appeal against the judgment of a learned single judge of this Court has been filed by the petitioner whose writ petition was dismissed by the said learned Judge.
2. The dispute arises out of consolidation proceedings. The brief facts are these: One Raja Krishnapal Singh of Umri district Pratapgarh was the original proprietor of the land in dispute. He had two sons—Sant Bahadur Singh and Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh. Sant Bahadur Singh as the elder brother inherited the property in dispute. He was married to Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi who shall, hereinafter, be referred to as the Rani. Sant Bahadur Singh died in 1947 and thereafter a dispute arose between the Rani and the said the Pratap Bahadur Singh regarding inheritance to the property left by Sant Bahadur Singh. The matter was refereed to arbitration and the Arbitrators delivered the award on 26-11-1948 which was registered and then filed in the court of the Civil Judge, Pratapgarh for being made the rule of the court. The court sought certain clarifications from the Arbitrators and the latter submitted their clarifications to the court. The clarifications were made a part of the original award. The Rani granted one lease on 29-6-1949 in respect of some, plots and another lease on 7-7-1949 in respect of certain, other plots. Both the leases were in favour of the petitioners-appellants. The plots in question were admittedly either sir or Khudkasht. The petitioners-appellants entered into possession on the basis of the said leases and have admittedly continued to be in possession throughout. The Rani is admittedly still alive.
3. Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh filed suit No. 675 of 1955 in the court of the Munsif, Pratapgarh seeking the cancellation of the aforesaid two leases and also claiming injunction. The said, suit came up to this Court in the shape of a second appeal and the suit and the said appeal both abated under Sec. 5 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act.
4. Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh filed objections under Sec. 9 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The objections were contested by the petitioners-appellants and they were rejected by the Consolidation Officer but the settlement Officer subsequently allowed the same in the appeal before him and the Deputy Director, Consolidation dismissed the revision filed by the petitioners-appellants. Subsequently, the petitioners filed the writ petition questioning the legality of the appellate order passed by the S.O.C and the revisional order passed by the D.D.C However, as stated hereinbefore, the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition and hence the petitioners filed this special appeal.
5. Before us Shri G.N Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners-appellants, made the following contentions:
(1) Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh, respondent No. 4, had no locus standi in the consolidation proceedings to question the rights of the petitioners-appellants. Only Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi, if at all, could file objections under Sec. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act.
(2) After the promulgation of the U.P Act 1 of 1951 (U.P.Z.A and L.R Act), the award-decree lost its efficacy and Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh could not set up any claim on the basis of the said award-decree. Shri Verma placed reliance on the following authorities:
(i) Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., Allahabad A.I.R 1961 S.C 1790..
(ii) Ratnji Dixit v. Bhrigunath 1968 A.L.J 844..
(3) If the award-decree continues to be effective, then during her life time at least, the transaction continued to be binding upon Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi and during her life-time, the transactions in question could not be disturbed.
(4) Alternatively, if the award-decree continued to be effective, the leases in question were valid transactions and Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi acted within the scope of her authority under the award-decree in granting the said leases. The transactions were prudent acts on the part of the Rani in the circumstances of the case.
(5) The lessee was a hereditary tenant on the eye of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and hence became a sirdar under Sec. 19 of the said Act on the date of vesting.
(6) In the alternative, if the leases were not valid transactions, then, the lessee would be a trespasser and the land-holder, Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi, had a period of two years to sue the trespasser for possession. In view of the failure of the land-holder to do so, the trespasser acquired legal title over the plots in question. Reliance was placed in this connection on Yeshwant v. Walchand A.I.R 1951 S.C 16..
6. Shri G.P Bhargava, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4, Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh, supported the judgment of the learned single Judge on the grounds contained in it. In addition, he made the following points.:—
(1) An error cannot be said to be an error of law apparent on the face of the record when a point itself was not raised before the consolidation authorities and who, therefore, had no occasion to discuss such a point. For his contention, Shri Bhargava placed reliance on the following cases:—
(1) Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque A.I.R 1955 S.C 233. (2) Chetkar v. Vishwanath 1970 2 SCC 217, (3) Jabalpur Municipality v. State of M.P A.I.R 1966 S.C 837. (4) S.R Tewari v. Distt. Board, Agra A.I.R 1964 S.C 1680., (5) Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan A.I.R 1964 S.C 477. (6) Bachchan Singh v. Gauri Shanker 1972 4 SCC 257. (7) Associated Cement Co. v. P.D Vyas A.I.R 1960 S.C 665., (8) Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun A.I.R 1960 S.C 137., (9) Jagannath Behera v. Harihar Singh A.I.R 1958 S.C 239., (10) Dabal Singh v. S.T.A Tribunal A.I.R 1967 All. 266., (11) G.D Singh v. Sub-Div. Officer 1966 A.L.J 631. (12) D.G Vidyalaya Assocn. v. State of U.P A.I.R 1962 All. 187 F.B., (13) Ram Sahai v. Custodian of E.P, U.P A.I.R 1953 All. 117. and (14) Harakh Singh v. Kailash Singh A.I.R 1958 Pat. 581..
(2) If the interpretation of a document is a matter of deep contention, then it cannot be said that the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, committed an error apparent on the race of the record in placing a particular interpretation in preference to another possible interpretation. Moreover, in the instant case, the interpretation placed by the said consolidation, authorities has been upheld by the learned single Judge. Hence, to say the least, the interpretation of the award decree by the said consolidation authorities could not be said to be an impossible construction of the said document.
(3) The law laid down in Ramji Dixit's case will not apply to the facts of the instant case. In that case the transfer of Bhumidhari rights was involved. Here we are concerned with the transfer of Sir lands prior to U.P Act 1 of 1351.
(4) The award-decree did not lose its efficacy with the coming into force of U.P Act 1 of 1951. The Rani became a Bhumidhar of the plots in question but she remained subject to all the limitations under the award-decree.
(5) The petitioners appellants did not acquire any title by prescription. For one thing, their possession was permissive. Further, under Sec. 10 of U.P Act 1 of 1951, the petitioners-appellants could not acquire any rights. Under Sec. 157 read with Sec. 21(h) of the said Act, the petitioners-appellants could only become Asamis and the latter have no right to be so recorded, by the consolidation authorities. Only the Bhumidhars and the Sirdars have a right to be so recorded.
(6) Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh, respondent No. 4, was a person interested and could file objections under Sec. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act. Moreover, the petitioners-appellants are not entitled to raise this question as no issue, was framed in the consolidation proceedings in respect of this controversy and the same cannot be raised in this Court. For, it is not a pure question of law as it was possible that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh had authority from Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi to file the objections on her behalf. Shri Bhargava placed reliance in this connection on Radharaman v. Gulab Thakur A.I.R 1959 Pat. 50. and Doongaraee Shyamji v. Tribhuwan Das A.I.R 1947 All. 375..
(7) Under Sec. 49 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act, Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh stood barred from challenging the entry in favour of the petitioner-appellant except by filing objections under Sec. 9 of the said Act.
(8) A reference was made to various sections of Mulla's Hindu Law stating the legal position concerning the alienations by a limited owner e.g by a Hindu widow or by a Karta of a joint Hindu family.
(9) Assistance was sought to be derived from Sec. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which lays down as under:—
“14. (2) Nothing contained in Sub-sec. (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument of the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.”
7. We have given our earnest consideration to the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties and we have reached, the conclusion that this appeal should be allowed.
8. So far as the last contention of Shri Bhargava is concerned, it may be stated that Sec. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act cannot be relied upon in view of Sec. 4(2) of the said Act which lays down as under:
“4(2) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any law for the time being in force providing for the prevention of fragmentation of agricultural holdings or for the libation of ceilings or for the devolution of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings.”
9. The entire approach of the consolidation authorities and the learned single Judge seems to be based on the premise that the rights of the Rani and Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh continued to be governed by the award-decree between them. They sought to determine the validity or otherwise of the transactions of lease in favour of the petitioners-appellants on an interpretation of the terms of the aforementioned award (including the clarifications thereof given by the arbitrators sub-sequently). But the said premise is fundamentally-wrong. Sec. 4(1) of the U.P Act 1 of 1951 (U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act) lays down as under:
“4(1). As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, State Government may, by notification declare that, as from a date to be specified all estates situate in Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from the beginning of the date so specified (hereinafter called the date of vesting), all such estates shall stand ??? hereinafter provided, in the State free from all encumbrances. Sec. 6 of the said Act (so far as relevant for our purposes) lays down as under:—
“S. 6. Consequence of the vesting of an estate in the State. When the notification under Sec. 4 has been published in Gazette then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or document or in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, the consequence as hereinafter set forth shall, from the beginning of the date of vesting, ensure in the area to which the notification relates, namely:—
(e) all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries:—
(i) in every estate in such area including land (cultivable or barren) grove-land, forests whether within or outside village boundaries, trees (other than trees in village abadi, holding or groves), fisheries, tanks, ponds, water channels, feries, pathways, abadi sites, hats bazar and melas other than hats, bazars and melas held upon land to which clauses, (a) to (c) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 18 apply and
(ii) in all sub-soil in such estates including right, if any, in mines and minerals, whether being worked or not shall cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh from all encumbrances;
(b) all grants and confirmations and of title of or to land in any estates so acquired, or of or to any right or privilege in respect of such land or its land revenue shall whether liable to resumption or not determine”
10. It is well known that under the notification issued, under Sec. 4(1), the estates in the U.P came to vest in the State of Uttar Pradesh with effect from July 1, 1952. After the said vesting and in view of the consequences of vesting laid down in Sec. 6, the award-decree between the parties lost its efficacy and ceased to govern the rights between the parties. In this connection, a useful comparison may be made with the consequences which followed the enactment of Sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. Sec. 14(1) lays as under:—
“14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation—In this sub-section, ‘property’ includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenances or arrear of maintenance, by gift, from any person whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhansa immediately before the commencement of this Act.”
11. Initially, the said provision was interpreted by this Court and the Patna High Court to mean a complete extinction of the rights of the reversioners to question an alienation made by a Hindu widow before the coming into effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, vide Hari Prasad v. Indrawati A.I.R 1958 All. 304., R.A Missir v. Raghunath A.I.R 1957 Pat. 480. and Julam Missir v. Pradip Missir A.I.R 1958 Pat. 115.. However, the Patna High Court in its Full Bench decision in Harakh Singh v. Kailash Singh reversed its earlier decisions. Ultimately, the Supreme Court in Kutturswami v. Veeravva A.I.R 1959 S.C 577. resolved the controversy and laid down that Sec. 14(1) did not have the effect of enlarging the rights of the aliences and the reversioners even after the new act could still question the transactions made before the said Act on the grounds on which they could question such transactions earlier. The reversioners would inherit the property if the alienations were held to be not binding even alter the corning into force of the new Act. Now can the same be said to be the position under Sec. 4 and Sec. 6 of the U.P Act 1 of 1951? It is not possible to argue that any reversionary rights have survived after the enactment of the said provisions, taking the leases created by the Rani in the instant case, can it be argued that if the transactions are held to be not binding then Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh would inherit the Sir or Khudkasht plots either as reversioner or under the award-decree. There is nothing like sir nor Khudkasht and nothing like a reversioner or claimant on the basis of the award-decree after the U.P Act 1 of 1951. In this connection, a reference may be made to the following pronouncements of the Supreme Court which have fully clarified the legal position in this respect:
(1) Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., Allahabad, (2) Collector and Dy. Commissioner v. Jagdish Pratap A.I.R 1966 S.C 909. (3) State of U.P v. Trivikram Narain Singh A.I.R 1963 S.C 799., (4) Mahendra Lal v. State of U.P A.I.R 1963 S.C 1019. and (5) Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigunath.
12. In Ramji Dixit's case, the alienation made by a widow Bhumidhar was challenged, not on the ground of personal law, but on the basis of the provisions of the U.P Act 1 of 1951 itself on the ground that a female Bhumidhar had a limited interest under the new Act. The alienation which was impugned was made after the said Act came into force. However, this difference in the facts of the said case from the facts of this case does not improve the claim of Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh. In fact, it was expressly conceded before the Supreme Court that the personal law ceased to be operative after the coming into force of the U.P Act 1 of 1551. Shah, J. observed:
“It is common ground that the personal law of inheritance of the holder does not determine the nature of the estate vested in a female bhumidhar. Counsel for the appellant says, however, that the Act contains indications that the interest of a female bhumidhar extends only to a life interest in the holding held by her.”
13. At a later stage, it was observed:
“There is nothing in the Act which indicates that when a female who inherits the rights of a bhumidhar, under Sec. 171 or Sec. 172 or Sec. 172-A, any residuary interest remains vested in any other person. Under the Act she is the owner of the property; the entire estate is vested in her. It is a fundamental rule of our jurisprudence that an estate does not remain in abeyance. If it was intended by the Legislature that the interest inherited by a female mentioned in Sec. 171 was to be life interest, there would be same indication that the reversionary or residuary interest remains vested in another person designated for that purpose. But a search in that behalf in the Act is fruitless.” Therefore, the position seems to be clear that whether the alienation was made by a Hindu widow propreitress before the U.P Act 1 of 1951 or whether it has been made by such widow after she acquired Bhumidhari rights under the said Act, it is not open to a reversioner or to any other person claiming a contingent right of succession to challenge such a transaction. In fact, as stated earlier, the reversioner or any other person claiming a contingent right of succession on the basis of a document (e.g the award-decree in the present case) lost his rights after the issuance of the notification under Sec. 4 of the U.P Act 1 of 1951. Therefore, Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh lost his rights under the award-decree or under the Hindu Law to claim any reversionary rights in respect of the plots which were leased out to the petitioners-appellants by the Rani.
14. But could the Rani herself impugn the said lease? Any executant of a deed can repudiate the document on the ground of fraud, want of capacity, durees, coercion etc. But apart from such grounds an alienation is generally binding on the limited owner during her life time though it may not be binding upon the reversioner after her death. In the instant case, either the leases would be binding upon the Rani during her life time or they would not be so binding upon her on the ground that they were completely void-transactions. At the maximum, the Rani would have acquired Bhumidhari right in respect of the said plots under Sec. 18 of the U.P Act 1 of 1951. If she were to claim such rights, she should have filed her objections under Sec. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act. Then we would have been called upon to examine whether the lessees acquired the status of hereditary tenants and thereafter became the sirdars under the U.P Act 1 of 1951, whether the Rani having become the Bhumidhar of the lease-hold plots under Sec. 18 lost her rights under Sec. 210 in view of her failure to file a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P Act 1 of 1951. All these questions really do not arise to be answered in view of the fact that the Rani did not question the lease—they were questioned by Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh who had no right to question the same. It is not necessary to decide the status of Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi or of the petitioners appellants vis-a-vis the leasehold plots — whether the Rani is the Bhumidhar of the said plots or whether the petitioners-appellants are the Sirdars or Assamis or mere licensees of the said plots. It is an admitted fact that in the basic year, the petitioners-appellants are recorded as Sirdars. Sec. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act lays down as under:
“9. Issue of extracts from records and statements and publication of records mentioned in Secs. 8 and 8-A and the issue of notices for inviting objections. (1) Upon the preparation of the records of the statements mentioned in Secs. 8 and 8-A, the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall—
(a) correct the clerical mistakes, if any, and send, or cause to be sent, to the tenure-holders concerned and other persons interested, notice containing relevant extracts from the current annual register and such other records as may be prescribed showing—
(i) their fights and liabilities in relating to the land;
(ii) mistakes and disputes discovered under Sec. 8 in respect thereof;
(iii) specific shares of individual tenure-holders in joint holdings for the purpose of effecting partitions, where necessary, to ensure proper consolidation;
(iv) valuation of the plots; and
(v) valuation of trees, wells and other improvements for calculating compensation therefor and its apportionment amongst owners, if there be more owners than one;
(b) publish in the unit the current ‘khasra’ and annual register, the ‘khasra chakbandi’, the Statement of Principles prepared under Secs. 8-A, and any other records that may be prescribed to show inter alia, the particulars referred to in Cl. (a).
(2) Any person to whom a notice under Sub-sec. (1) has been sent, or any person interested may, within 21 days of the receipt of notice, or of the publication under Sub-sec. (1), as the case may be; file before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, objections in respect thereof disputing the correctness or nature of the entries in the records or in the extracts furnished therefrom, or in the Statement of Principles or the need for petition.”
15. The objections in the present case were filed by Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh claiming his rights under the award-decree. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation, while allowing his objection, directed the name of the Rani to be mutated in the Revenue Records as the Bhumidhar of the plots in question. The Deputy Director of Consolidation upheld the order of the Settlement Officer. The basic question arises as to how Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh was entitled to file objections under Sec. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act? How can he be deemed to be a person interested under the said provisions? We have already held that after the notification under Sec. 4 of the U.P Act 1 of 1951, his rights under the award-decree became extinct and he could not base his claim on the award-decree. There is nothing like a limited Bhumidhar under the provisions of the U.P Act 4 of 1951, nothing like a reversioner nothing like a contingent right of succession. If the Rani claimed to be Bhumidhar, then she alone could object under Sec. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act as she would be the person interested to contest the entry of Sirdari existing in favour of the petitioners-appellants.
16. It may be pointed out that under Sec. 174 of the U.P Act 1 of 1951, Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh is not even an heir of Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi. We are highly doubtful if a mere heir can be deemed to be a person interested when the predecessor-in-interest is still alive. However, it is not necessary to go into the said question because Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh is not even an heir of the Rani under the provisions of the U.P Act 1 of 1951.
17. Therefore, the position which has arisen in this case is that at the instance of a mere stranger, the name of the Rani has been directed to be brought on record by the consolidation authorities. This is not permissible under Sec. 9 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. In fact, even in general law, no one can question an infirm title unless he himself has a better title. Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh was therefore, not entitled to file objections under Sec. 9 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to entertain such an objection from a mere stranger to the plots in question. We do not think that Radharaman v. Gulab Thakur and Doongarsee Shyamji v. Tribhuwan Das relied upon by Shri G.P Bhargava give us any assistance to decide the controversy at hand.
18. It was feebly sought to be argued on behalf of the respondents that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh might have been authorised by the Rani to file objections on her behalf. We do not think the said suggestion merits acceptance. If we go through the orders of the consolidation authorities, we shall find that there is not the least suggestion that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh filed the objection under Sec. 9 on behalf of the Rani. The said authorities have discussed and decided the said objections on the footing that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh had rights under the award-decree and the Rani's rights were limited by the terms of the said document. In other words, the objections were filed by Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh claiming to be entitled to the property after the death of the limited owner i.e the Rani. In para 15 of the writ petition, it was stated:
“That the O.P filed objection under Sec. 9 of Consolidation of Holdings Act alleging inter alia mainly that the leases were invalid, that the act of letting was not an act of prudent manager, that the petitioners were only licensees.”
19. The averment of this paragraph has not been denied in the counter-affidavit of Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh which means that he accepted the correctness of the said averment. If the objections were on behalf of the Rani then Lal Pratap Bahadur would have said so Moreover, if the objections were on behalf of the Rani, then an important question would have arisen as to whether in her life-time she could have questioned the document and normally there would have been a discussion of the said point in the orders of the consolidation authorities. However, as it was no body's case that the objections under Sec. 9 were on behalf of the Rani, therefore, there is no such discussion in the said orders and throughout Lal Pratap Bahadur has been treated as the objector and not the Rani.
20. In this connection our attention was invited to certain rules in the Consolidation of Holdings Rules which relate to the filing of objections under Sec. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act. The relevant rules are Rule 25, Rule 25-A and Rule 26. However, these rules do not throw much light on the controversy at hand and we have to interpret Sec. 9 as it stands without any and from the Rules.
21. Under the Civil Procedure Code, the position is that under order 6, Rule 14, every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any); Provided that there a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf now this rule speaks about the signature but says nothing about the frame of the suit. Order 3, Rule 2 speaks about recognised agents of parties who can appear, apply or act on behalf of a party to the Suit. However, it means that the party on the record will be the principal himself, not the agent—the latter will act on behalf of the former, but the suit will be in the name of the principle. Some of the old cases laid down that the agent cannot bring suits in his own name.
1882 Punj. Re. No. 20 (P. 75(76) (D.B) and various other cases detailed in Chitale's C.P.C Note 2 to Order 3, Rule 2.
22. The position does not seem to be different under the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act. Even if Lal Pratap Bahadur, holding a valid power of attorney from the Rani could sign the objections on her behalf, the objections were bound to be in the name of the Rani herself and not in the name of Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh.
23. The position, therefore, seems to be so clear be us that we do not at all feel it necessary to say anything more on the aforesaid suggestion that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh might have filed objections under Sec. 9 on the basis of some authority conferred on him by the Rani. Neither factually nor legally, the said suggestion has any merit. However, Shri G.N Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners-appellants, sought to place on record a true copy of the objection which was filed, by Lal Pratap, Bahadur. Singh under Sec. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act. The said true copy has been sought to be filed alongwith an application and affidavit of Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi. The prayer in the application is as follows:—
“It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that it is, therefore, but, just and proper that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh's objection under Sec. 9 be dismissed and the order of Settlement Officer, Consolidation and the Deputy Director, Consolidation, Pratapgarh alleged to have been passed in favour of the deponent without hearing the deponent be set aside.”
24. This application was moved on 22-11-1973 after the arguments in the special appeal had been heard. We cannot allow a prayer as made by Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi in the application dated 22-11-1973 because she has no locus standi to make such a prayer without, being first impleaded as a party to the writ petition. However, there can be no objection to the entertainment of supporting affidavit by third party. In that view of the matter if it were necessary we would have allowed the true copy of the objection under Sec. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act to be brought on record. In this connection attention may be drawn to the following cases: (1) Ghaio Mal and Sons v. State of Delhi A.I.R 1959 S.C 65., (2) C.A Hasan v. State of U.P 1965 A.L.J 991 at p. 994. and (3) P. Joseph John v. State A.I.R 1953 Travancore-Co-chin 363 F.B..
25. The aforesaid cases clearly lay down that for issuing a writ of certiorari, “The High Court is entitled to summon the entire record for the purpose of examining the regularity or the legality of the proceedings in the case as a whole.” The objection on behalf of respondent No. 1 that at such a late stage we should not allow additional evidence to be brought on the record lacks substance because in allowing a true copy of the objection under Sec. 9 to be placed on record no additional evidence will be placed on record. The said objections are part of the record of the proceedings in which the impugned orders were passed. However, as we have held that it is not necessary to do so we are by our separate order rejecting the application of Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi.
26. Now remains the question to be considered as to whether we can allow the question of the, non-maintainability of the objection under Sec. 9 by Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh to be raised in the instant appeal. Shri G.P Bhargava, learned counsel for respondent No. 4, leaned very heavily upon the observations of Chief Justice Desai in 1966 A.L.J 631 (supra). As stated hereinbefore he relied on various other decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Court. It is not necessary to discuss each and every case cited at the Bar separately. It is well known that new points should not be allowed when they raise questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. Whether a pure question of law on admitted facts should or should not be allowed to be raised in a writ proceeding when it was not raised before the subordinate authorities will depend upon the nature of the question sought to be raised. Whether in such a situation there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record may be a debatable question. However, if the question raised touches upon the jurisdiction of the subordinate authority, then such an objection can be raised even for the first time in the writ petition or in appeals therefrom. In this connection a reference may be made to the following cases.:—
(1) Raja Jagdambika Pratap Narain Singh v. Income Tax Officer 76 I.T.R 619 D.B., (2) Imperial Tobacco Co. v. State A.I.R 1971 Cal. 109., (3) Swami Dayal v. Ram Kishore 1970 A.L.J 291., (4) Vira Singh v. State A.I.R 1970 Punjab 525., (5) Alembic Chemical Works v. Workmen A.I.R 1961 S.C 647., (6) Badri Pd. v. Nagamal A.I.R 1959 S.C 559. and (7) M.S.R.T Corpn. v. B.G.R Service Warora 1969 2 SCC 746.
27. In 1966 A.L.J 631 Chief Justice Desai observed:
“If a certain plea was not raised before the Tribunal it did not commit any manifest error of law by not considering it.”
28. It is obvious that these observations only relate to the question whether there is a manifest error of law not. But it is well known that Certiorari issues also when there is a lack of jurisdiction vide Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque. Now the question about the locus standi of an objector under Sec. 9 is a question which affects the very jurisdiction of the Consolidation Officer to proceed in the matter. It is only at the instance of an interested party that he can proceed to dispose of the controversy. If a party is not an interested party then no objection can be entertained under Sec. 9 at his instance. It will be strange if at the instance of a complete stranger the name of the existing tenure-holder is removed and the name of another person is mutated even though the latter has himself not filed any objection. In the present case even though Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi did not claim any rights with respect to the plots in question, still, Her name has been directed to be entered as bhumidhar of the plots in question at the instance of a complete stranger i.e Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh. Apart from the language of Sec. 9 which speaks of a person interested, in general law such a course is not permissible. It will be almost compelling a person to be mutated as a tenure-holder even though he may not be willing to do so. In being entered as a tenure-holder certain liabilities will also come into existence. The recorded tenure-holder will be bound to pay the dues of the State in respect of the plots in question. It is inconceivable that, a party can be compelled to be subject to such liabilities at the instance of a rank stranger who has no interest in the plots in question and as such who has no locus standi to file objections. All these considerations lead to the conclusion that before the jurisdiction of the Consolidation Officer can be invoked under Sec. 9, the objector must be a person interested and only then he will have a locus standi to file objection on the basis of which the Consolidation Officer will proceed to decide the controversy between the parties. If the objections are filed at the instance of a rank stranger, the Consolidation Officer has no jurisdiction in act in the matter and to direct the name of the recorded tenure-holder to be elected. In this connection a reference may be made to the following Supreme Court cases which have laid down the law with reference to the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act:
(1) A.V.D Costa v. B.C Patel A.I.R 1955 S.C 412.. (2) Sri Ambika Mills Co. Ltd. v. S.B Bhatt A.I.R 1961 S.C 970. and Payment of Wages Inspector, Ujjain v. B.E.S and I Co. Ltd. A.I.R 1969 S.C 590..
29. It has been clearly laid down that the said jurisdiction of the Authority under the Act is limited by the terms of Sec. 15 of the said Act and that the authority has no jurisdiction to go into other questions or to exercise any other power besides what is conferred by Sec. 15 and matters which are incidental thereto. The position of the Consolidation. Officer seeking jurisdiction under Sec. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act seems to be analogous. His jurisdiction is circumscribed by the language of Sec. 9 and when the said section speaks of a person interested, it is obvious that a person who is not interested cannot give jurisdiction to the Consolidation Officer under Sec. 9. Therefore, we feel that we can allow the petitioners-appellants to raise the question of the locus standi of Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh to file and maintain the objection under Sec. 9 even though it might not have been raised at the earlier stages. There is some dispute between the parties whether the said contention was raised by the petitioners-appellats at the earlier stages—In the writ petition the contention was undoubtedly raised as will be clear from a reference to paragraphs 32 and 33 of the said petition and to ground No. 5 thereof. The point has, however, not been discussed in the judgment of the learned single Judge. However, we do not feel that the point so vital and raising the basic question of the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities can be unavailable to the petitioners-appellants merely on the ground that there is no discussion in the judgment of the learned single Judge on the said point.
30. We, therefore, hold that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh had no locus standi or competence to file the objection under Sec. 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act and the consolidation authorities, therefore, had no jurisdiction to direct the name of Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi to be mutated in the Revenue records. The consolidation authorities further could not direct the names of the petitioners to be deleted from the Revenue records on the basis of the objections which were not maintainable. In the view which we have taken, it is not necessary to discuss the other contentions which have been raised by the learned counsel. We do not feel it necessary to interpret the terms of the award-decree including the clarifications given by the arbitrators, and similarly, we do not feel it necessary to go into the question whether the transactions in question were prudent acts on the part of the Rani. We have found much substance in the contention of Shri G.N Verma that even if the interpretations placed by the higher consolidation authorities and by the learned single Judge on the award-decree (including its clarification) were correct, still, there was no evidence or material to show that the transactions in question were not prudent acts on the part of the Rani. The authorities concerned and the learned single Judge have only taken for granted that in view of the impending legislation seeking to abolish Zamindari in U.P, leases of Khud-kasht or Sir plots in June or early July 1949 must necessary be held to be imprudent transactions. The U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Bill was introduced in the Lower House on 7-7-1949 and both the impugned transactions had been put through by the said date. No one could say with certainty as to how the bill would have faired in the Legislature. There could be changes and amendments in the Bill before it was finally enacted into a statute. Therefore, if it was ought to show that in June and early July 1949 the leases in question were imprudent acts on the part of the Rani, then further details should have been placed as to how the said transactions were described to be imprudent. That would have depended upon a variety of factors and circumstances. Nothing of the kind was done by the respondent No. 4 when he filed his objection under Sec. 9. Therefore, the funding or imprudent act on the part of the Rani recorded by the appellate and the revisional authorities in that consolidation proceedings and by the learned single Judge seems to be based on no material or evidence whatsoever and it is well known that such a finding is deemed to be an error apparent on the face of the record vide H.S and I.E Board, U.P v. Bagleshwar A.I.R 1966 S.C 875.. If it were necessary we could have allowed the appeal on this ground also but not we have stated earlier, it is really not necessary to go into other contentions raised by the learned counsel as we are disposing of the controversy on the preliminary ground raised by Shri G.N Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners-appellants that Lal Pratap Bahadur Singh could not file objection under Sec. 9 and, as such the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to direct the name of Rani Vishwa Kumari Devi to be brought on record after deleting the names of the petitioners-appellants.
31. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs and the judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside.
32. The writ petition of the petitioners-appellants is allowed and the order dated 7-11-1967 passed by the District Deputy Director, Consolidation, Pratapgarh and the order dated 20-3-1967 passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Pratapgarh are quashed and set aside.
33. This order will also govern the connected special appeal No. 135 of 1969 which arose out of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 45 of 1958. Both the writ petitions were identical and between this same parties and the allegations and the relief sought are also completely identical. They were disposed of by one common judgment by the learned single Judge and we are also disposing of both the special appeals by one common judgment.
34. Appeal allowed.
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