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T.P Beepathumma v. Harry Martin D'Souza .
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner-plaintiff, a resident of Irrikkur, Kerala, instituted a suit in the Munsiff Court, Mangalore, seeking cancellation of a sale deed executed in favor of the respondent-defendant, alleging fraud and misrepresentation. The plaintiff filed an application under Order XXVI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to be examined on commission, primarily on grounds that she observes 'gosha' or 'purdah' and does not appear in public due to religious and social customs, that she resided outside the court's jurisdiction, and that she was ill. The defendant opposed the application, contending that section 132 of the CPC exempts only from appearance but not attendance as a witness, that the plaintiff could not claim residence outside the jurisdiction, that her illness was not serious, and that her attendance was necessary for observing demeanor. The Munsiff rejected the application, leading the plaintiff to challenge the order under Section 115 of the CPC.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a woman who, by the customs and manners of the country, does not appear in public, can be compelled to personally appear in a Civil Court for recording her evidence.
- The proper interpretation of the term "appearance" in section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure—whether it includes attendance in court for giving evidence or is limited to presence in court in a broader sense.
- Whether the plaintiff is entitled to be examined on commission under Order XXVI Rule 1 CPC based on her custom of observing 'gosha' or 'purdah' and exemption under section 132 CPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The petitioner, a Muslim woman observing 'gosha' or 'purdah', is entitled as of right to exemption from personal appearance in court under section 132 of the CPC.
- The term "appearance in Courts" in section 132 is comprehensive enough to include attendance for giving evidence; thus, the plaintiff cannot be compelled to attend court personally.
- The learned Munsiff erred in law by rejecting the application for examination on commission and insisting on personal attendance.
- Supported by various High Court rulings endorsing broad protection under section 132.
Respondent's Arguments
- The phrase "appearance in Court" in section 132 should be given a narrow meaning, excluding attendance for giving evidence.
- The plaintiff, being a party to the suit, cannot claim exemption based on residence outside jurisdiction.
- The illness claimed was not serious enough to justify exemption.
- Attendance in court (even if excluding the public) is necessary for the judge to observe the witness's demeanor.
- Relied on rulings from Bombay High Court (Mariambai v. V. Abdul Hamid Suleman) and Madras High Court (Mohammad Ismail Marigair v. Wazir Bibt Saiheba) supporting this restricted interpretation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Smt. Sundar Devi v. Dattatraya Narhar Rege, A.I.R 1933 Allahabad 551 | Exemption under section 132 CPC includes parties and witnesses; personal attendance means personal appearance in court; a pardanashin lady cannot be compelled to attend court personally. | The court adopted this view as authoritative, holding that section 132 mandates exemption from personal attendance and rejecting narrower interpretations. |
| Vellai Nachaiar v. Mayappa Chetty, A.I.R 1925 Madras 905 | Supports exemption of pardanashin women from personal attendance in court. | Referenced approvingly in affirming the right to exemption under section 132 CPC. |
| Re Bilasroy Sirowgee, A.I.R 1929 Calcutta 528 | Held that a pardanashin lady may be ordered to give evidence in court provided she is not compelled to become visible to the public. | Rejected by the court as inconsistent with the spirit of section 132, favoring broader protection. |
| Kissinlall Kankaria v. Purshottamdas Halwasiya, A.I.R 1942 Cal. 143 | Rejected the Calcutta High Court's narrow view in Re Bilasroy Sirowgee and preferred Allahabad High Court's broader interpretation. | Supported the broader interpretation that exempts women from personal appearance. |
| Mariambai v. V. Abdul Hamid Suleman, A.I.R 1946 Bombay 340 | Held that examination of a woman observing purdah in chambers excluding public does not violate section 132 CPC. | The court disagreed with this narrow view, finding it unsound and defeating the object of section 132. |
| Mohammad Ismail Marigair v. Wazir Bibt Saiheba, A.I.R 1951 Madras 311 | Similar to Mariambai case, supported restricted interpretation of section 132 CPC. | Rejected by the court for reasons stated regarding the broader protection intended under section 132. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by recognizing the social and religious customs of certain women, particularly Muslim and Hindu women, who observe 'gosha' or 'purdah' and do not appear in public. Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted to respect these customs by exempting such women from personal appearance in civil courts. The court emphasized that the legislature intended this provision to be imperative and mandatory.
The court analyzed the term "appearance" as used in sections 132 and 133 CPC, noting the absence of a statutory definition. Drawing on dictionary definitions and legal dictionaries, the court found that "appearance" includes "attendance," and thus a woman exempted under section 132 cannot be compelled to attend court personally for giving evidence.
The court considered the Law Commission's recommendation to delete section 132 as anachronistic but noted Parliament's decision to retain the section, affirming its binding effect.
Reviewing precedents, the court aligned with the Allahabad High Court's view in Sundar Devi, which held that women observing purdah cannot be compelled to appear in court personally, rejecting narrower interpretations that allow attendance in court chambers excluding the public. The court found the reasoning in the Bombay and Madras High Court rulings unpersuasive and contrary to the legislative intent.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court held that the learned Munsiff erred in rejecting the plaintiff's application for examination on commission and insisting on her personal attendance in court, even if excluding the public.
Given the inconvenience to the defendant caused by examination on commission, the court imposed conditions requiring the plaintiff to bear commission fees and reasonable travel charges for the defendant and his counsel if examination occurs outside the court's jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
The court allowed the revision petition, set aside the order of the learned Munsiff dated 13th September 1976, and directed that the plaintiff be examined on commission under the stipulated terms and conditions.
The decision enforces the mandatory nature of section 132 CPC, ensuring that women who do not appear in public due to customs are exempt from personal attendance in court, including attendance for giving evidence. The ruling clarifies that "appearance" under section 132 includes attendance, thereby protecting the rights of such women to be examined on commission. This decision directly affects the parties by granting the plaintiff relief and sets no new precedent beyond reaffirming existing statutory interpretation and prior High Court rulings.
Puttaswamy, J.:— Whether a woman who by the customs and manners of the country does not appear in public, can be compelled to appear in a Civil Court for recording her evidence, is the short and interesting question that arises for determination in the case. In order to appreciate and decide that question, it is necessary to notice in, the first instance, the facts that are not in dispute.
2. In O.S No. 621 of 1971 on the file of the Munsiff, Mangalore, the petitioner-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) a resident of Irrikkur, Cannanore District, Kerala State, has instituted a suit against the respondent-defendant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) for cancellation of a sale deed executed by her in favour of the latter, as vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation, which is being resisted by him on diverse grounds.
3. On 13th July 1976, the plaintiff filed I.A No. XI in the said suit under Order XXVI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) to examine her on commission primarily on three grounds viz., (i) that as ordained by religion, custom and social manners, she observes ‘gosha’ or ‘purdah’ and does not appear in public (ii) that she was residing outside the jurisdiction of the Court; and (iii) that she was suffering from fever. I.A No. XI was opposed by the defendant inter alia on the grounds viz., (i) that section 132 of the Code only exempts from appearance and not from attendance as a witness; (ii) the plaintiff being a party to the suit cannot urge that she was residing outside the jurisdiction of the Court; (iii) that the illness pleaded was not serious; and (iv) that in order to observe her demeanour, her attendance in Court as a Page: 727witness, if necessary, by excluding the public, was necessary. On 13th September 1976, the learned Munsiff accepting case of the defendant, has rejected I.A No. XI, the correctness of which is challenged by the plaintiff under Section 115 of the Code.
4. At the hearing, Shri Tukaram S. Pai, learned counsel for the petitioner confined his submission only to the first ground urged in I.A No. XI viz., the exemption available under section 132 of the Code. In the event the plaintiff succeeds on the first ground, then it would not be necessary to examine the other grounds, for which reason also they are not examined by me.
5. Shri Pai contended that the petitioner, a muslim woman who does not appear in public, according to customs and manners, as of right, was entitled to be examined on Commission and the words ‘appearance in Courts occurring in section 132 of the Code were comprehensive enough to include ‘attendance in Court’ for giving evidence and the learned Munsiff in holding to the contrary has committed an error of jurisdiction and illegality affecting his jurisdiction. In support of his contention Shri Pai relied on a catena of rulings of various High Courts in the country.
6. Shri H.J Hande, learned counsel for the respondent supported the order of the learned Munsiff and contended that the words ‘appearance in Court’ should be given a restricted meaning and cannot include ‘attendance for giving evidence’. In support of his contention Shri Hande, stronglly relied on the ruling of the Bombay High Court in Mariambai v. V. Abdul Hamid Suleman A.I.R 1946 Bombay 340 and the ruling of the Madras High Court in Mohammad Ismail Marigair v. Wazir Bibt Saiheba A.I.R 1951 Madras 311.
7. Learned Counsel for the parties have not been able to draw my attention to any direct ruling of the Supreme Court or this Court on the question and, therefore, I first propose to examine the same without reference to the authorities of the other High Courts.
8. As is well known in our country, muslim women in general and Hindu women of certain communities observe ‘gosha’, ‘purdah’ or they do not appear in public. The customs and manners of those women prohibit them from appearing in public. Normally they are Page: 728confined to their houses. Such women when compelled to move outside their houses, move abount wearing a ‘burkah’. It is in recognition of these customs and manners of such women in India, section 132 of the Code has been enacted by the legislature. The legislature has enacted that provision to respect the sentiments, feelings, customs, and manners of such women. With this back ground, it is now useful to ascertain the true scope and ambit of section 132 of the Code.
9. section 132 of the Code, provides for exemption of certain women in the country from personal appearance in Civil Courts. The section in clear and emphatic terms, declares that those women who by their custom and social manners do not appear in public or ought not to be compelled to appear in public, shall be exempt from personal appearance in Civil Courts.
10. By the use of the word ‘shall’, the legislature, prima facie, intends the provision to be construed as an imperative or an absolute provision. Secondly, a provision creating a new right, privilege or immunity will be generally construed as imperative or mandatory. Looking at the scheme and object of section 132 of the Code, the Legislature clearly intended the said provision to be construed as imperative or mandatory. If a woman by her custom and social manners does not appear in public and makes such a claim in a case before the Civil Court, which is not disputed and in case of dispute, if proved, as of right, is entitled to claim the benefit of section 132 of the Code and she cannot be compelled to appear in a Civil Court. section 133 of the Code that immediately follows section 132 which provides for exemption to certain other persons from appearance in Court is also to the same effect. Any person holding the high constitutional and public office, specified in sub-section (1) of section 133 of the Code, can as of right, claim exemption from personal appearance in a Civil Court. Whether a woman or a person specified of section 133 of the Code should claim the exemption or not is for the woman or that person alone to decide. So far as sections 132 and 133 are concerned, the only difference and distinction between them is that in the case of former the claim, if disputed, has to be proved. But, in the case of latter, a person holding the office, as long as he holds that office, can claim exemption as of right. Except for this, there is no other difference between sections 132 and 133 of the Code. With this analysis, it is now useful to ascertain the meaning of the term ‘appearance’ occurring in section 132 of the Code.
11. The word ‘appearance’ found in sections 132 and 133 has not been defined in the Code or in the General Clauses Act and, therefore, I have necessarily to ascertain its meaning from the context it occurs. Among other meanings the Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. I) defines the term ‘appearance’ as hereunder:—
“The action of coming forward into view or becoming visible.
xxxxxx
The action of appearing formally at any proceedings; esp. formal presentation of oneself in a Court to answer (or prosecute) a suit or charge; called making or putting in an appearance.”
Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law (Second Edition) defines the said term as follows:—
“Appearance: In the primary sence of the word, the parties to a proceeding or application (e.g, a petition, motion, summons, etc.,) are said to appear on it when they are present before the Court, Judge, etc., when it is heard. A party appears either in person or by his counsel or solicitor.”
Etymologically also there is really no distinction and difference between the words ‘appearance’ and ‘attendance’ and they have one and the same meaning. According to the above meanings, the term ‘appearance’ includes ‘attendance’ and there is no distinction or difference between the said terms. In this view I hold that the term ‘appearance’ occurring in sections 132 and 133 of the Code includes ‘attendance’ as a witness.
12. Accepting the recommendations of the Law Commission in its 54th report (vide Chapter-1-0 ‘Miscellaneous’ page-100), Government of India in the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Bill of 1974 (Bill No. 27 of 1974) (vide Clause No. 47 of the Bill) proposed to delete section 132 of the Code. The Law Commission recommended for deletion of the said section in these words:—
“Section 132—
1-0.2. Section 132(1) provides that women who, “according to the customs and manners of the country ought not to be compelled to appear in public shall be exempt from personal appearance in Court”. Sub-section (2) of the Section saves provisions for arrest.
1-0.3. We are of the view that section 132 is an anachronism. The law should not, in such cases, encourage exemption from personal appearance in Court. Even where the women do not appear in public according to the “customs and manner of the country” there should, in our opinion, be no exemption from attendance in Court. No serious hardship is likely to be caused by the removal of the present exemption, as social conditions have considerably changed, and this practice is getting obsolete.
1-0.3A. Today, the seclusion of women is completely inconsistent with the social philosophy on which our Constitution is founded. Section 132 is not to be treated as a concession to some aristocratic families, but is a recognition of a universally observed custom. Hence, customs and manners of the country prevailing at the present time should be the criteria, and not the customs and manners which might have prevailed years ago.
1-0.3B. Moreover, the paramount task of deciding cases on the oral evidence of an important party involves the personalised process of the Judge seeing the witness at first hand, “instead of pouring over the prolix pages of a Commissioner's record”. The Judge must have the advantage of observing the demeanour, or at least the manner of delivery, of the witness, if he is to assess her credibility justly. Recommendation to delete section 132.
1-0.4. For the reasons stated above, we recommend that section 132 should be deleted”.
But, the Joint Select Committee of the parliament that examined the said Bill, did not agree with the above recommendations of the Law Commission and recommended for the retention of section 132 of the Code in these words:
“The Committee are of the view that section 132 of the Code should be retained as the omission of this section would offend against the social custom and would enable un-scrupulous litigants to compel the personal appearance in Court of innocent and ignorant ladies who are not used to appear in public. The clause has been omitted accordingly”.
Ultimately, the parliament in enacting the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act of 1976 (Central Act No. 104 of 1976) agreed with the Joint Select Committee and retained section 132 of the Code without making any amendment. So long as section 132 continues on the statute book, the Courts are bound to give effect to the same.
13. Let me now turn to the rulings of the other High Courts. In Smt. Sundar Devi v. Dattatraya Narhar Rege A.I.R 1933 Allahabad 551 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court consisting of Niamatullah and pachhapal Singh, JJ. while examining the true scope and ambit of section 132 of the Code observed thus:
“…….. Section 132, Civil P.C, lays down that women, who, according to the customs and manners of the country ought not to be compelled to appear in public, shall be exempt from personal attendance in Court. The exemption from personal appearance under this section is a right which no Court has power to refuse, and applies to the parties as well as witnesses. In a Madras case reported in Vellai Nachaiar v. Mayappa Chetty (A.I.R 1925 Madras 905), it was held that the lower Court was clearly wrong in seeking to compel the personal attendance in Court of a pardanashin lady. I may say here that in Page: 731a Calcutta case reported as RE BILASROY SIROWGEE (A.I.R 1929 Calcutta 528) a Single Judge of that Court took the view that the word “Appearance” means that a pardanashin lady shall not be compelled to come forth into view or to become visible to the public gaze, and that the Court therefore has powers to order a pardenashin lady to give evidence in Court provided she is not compelled to become visible to the public gaze. With all possible respects to the opinion of the learned Judge, I am of opinion that the view taken by him is not correct. The words used in Section 132 Civil P.C, are that women who, according to the customs and manners of the country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public shall be exempt from persbnall attendance in Court. The words “ought not to be compelled to appear in public” are important. If a pardanashin lady observing strict parda is ordered to attend the Court, it means that she is “compelled to appear in public”. Her face may be covered or she may be wearing a burka, but all the same she is compelled to appear in public if she is ordered to attend the Court. This is against the spirit of Section 132, Civil P.C In families in which ladies observe strict parda, it is considered most objectionable for them to appear in public even with their faces covered.
I am of opinion that the words “personal appearance” used in Section 132 mean “personal attendance”. In this connection we may look to R-1, O. 26, civil P.C which empowers a Court to issue commission for the examination of witnesses who are exempted under this Code from attending the Court. Among those so exempted are women, who according to the customs and manners of the country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public. A court has no power to insist that a pardenashin lady must attend and give evidence in Court. It is the right of a pardanashin lady to refunse to attend the Court and to say that if she is to be examined, her statement should be taken on commission. If the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid case were correct, R-1, 0.26, Civil P.C would become useless. I hold that the correct view is that under the provisions of Section 132, Cl. 1, Civil P.C a pardanashin lady cannot be compelled to attend the Court either as a party or as a witness. I therefore decide that the learned Subordinate Judge acted wrongly in going against the provisions of Section 132 Civil P.C in insisting on the personal attendance of the plaintiff in Court”.
In the above case, the Division Bench has expressly dissented from the view expressed by Lort Williams, J. of the Calcutta High Court in Billasroy Sirowgee's(4) case which view has not been accepted by that Court itself in Kissinlall Kankaria v. Purshottamdas Halwasiya A.I.R 1942 Cal. 143 but has preferred to follow the view expressed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Sundar Devi's A.I.R 1933 Allahabad 551 case. The High Courts of Nagpur, Sind, Mandhya Pradesh and Patna have taken a similar view as the one taken by the Allahabad High Court. I am in respectful agreement with the above enunciation made in Sundar Devi's A.I.R 1933 Allahabad 551 case concurred by the High Courts of Calcutta, Nagpur, Sind, Madhya Pradesh and Patna.
14. In Mariambai's(1) case, Blagden, J. without accepting the distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘attendance’ has expressed that examination of an woman who observes ‘purdah’ or ‘gosha’ in chambers excluding the public would not violate section 132 of the Code. A Chamber of a presiding officer cannot be separated from a Court. Secondly, I do not see any warrant for taking such a narrow view thus defeat the right conferred by sections 132 and 133 of the Code. The reasons given and the distinction made by Blagden, J. with great respect, are unsound and would virtually defeat the object and intendment of those provisions. In Mohammed Ismail Maricair's(2) case a Division Bench of the Madras High Court speaking through Rajamannar, C.J has taken a similar view as the one expressed by Blagden, J. With great respect to the learned Judges, I am unable to subscribe to the view expressed in Mohammad Ismail Maricair's(2) case for the very reasons stated by me earlier.
15. The claim of the petitioner that according to the customs and social manners she observes ‘gosha’ or ‘purdah’ and does not appear in public which has not been denied by the defendant, has been accepted by the learned Munsiff. But, following the rulings of the Bombay and Madras High Courts, with which I have disagreed, the learned Munsiff has rejected I.A No. XI observing that she will be examined in his chamber excluding the public. For all the reasons stated earlier, in rejecting I.A No. XI, the learned Munsiff acted illegally and with material irregularity affecting his jurisdiction and the plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to be examined on commission.
16. As the plaintiff is seeking to be examined on commission which necessarily causes considerable inconvenience to the defendant, it is necessary to direct the plaintiff to bear commission fee and the reasonable charges, if any, to be incurred by the defendant and his counsel, if they are required to travel from Mangalore to Irrikkur.
17. In the light of my above discussion, I allow this revision petition, set-aside the order dated 13th September 1976 of the learned Munsiff, Mangalore, Dakshina-Kannada on I.A No. XI in O.S No. 621 of 1971 and allow the said application on the following terms and conditions:—
(a) The learned Munsiff shall appoint a member of the Mangalore Bar who has completed not less than 10 years of practice as Commissioner to record the evidence of the plaintiff;
(b) At which place the plaintiff should be examined on commission is a matter for her to decide. If the plaintiff prefers to be Page: 733examined at Mangalore, then she has to bear only the Commissioner's fee. But, if the plaintiff prefers to be examined on commission at Irrilckur of Kerala State, then she shall bear the Commissioner's fee travel charges of the commissioner, the defendant and his counsel to be fixed by the learned Munsiff and the Commission warrant shall be issued only on her depositing all such amounts within such time to be fixed by the learned Munsiff. In the event, the plaintiff fails to comply with any of the directions to be made by the learned Munsiff, then he shall treat this order as of no effect and proceed with the trial of the suit in accordance with law and dispose of the suit as expenditiously as is possible in the circumstances of the case.
(c) The costs of commission shall be exclusively borne by the plaintiff and shall not be costs in the cause.
18. Civil Revision Petition allowed.
19. As the question raised was not free from doubt, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.
20. Let a copy of this order be sent to the lower Court within a week from this day.
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