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Sutlej Construction v. Union Territory Of Chandigarh

Supreme Court Of India
Dec 5, 2017
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Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent (Union Territory of Chandigarh) awarded the appellant (Sutlej Construction Limited) a contract on 05-01-1996 for excavation, loading, transportation and unloading of earth required for widening the approach road to Sukhna Choe on the Chandigarh-Kalka Road. The contract envisaged that while the appellant would excavate and transport the earth, the respondent’s own machinery would spread and compact it.

Disputes arose almost immediately: the respondent alleged slow progress by the contractor, whereas the appellant blamed the respondent’s failure to provide an accessible unloading area, remove overhead lines and poles, arrange lighting and supply adequate compaction equipment. The respondent terminated the contract on 12-11-1996 and imposed penalties.

An arbitration clause governed the contract. After the Superintending Engineer failed to appoint an arbitrator, the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Chandigarh, appointed Shri R.N. Singal (retired District & Sessions Judge) as arbitrator on 31-07-2002. On 18-12-2013 the arbitrator issued a reasoned award granting the appellant INR 10,37,185 plus 12% interest and rejecting the respondent’s counter-claims of INR 28,01,808.

The respondent’s challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 was rejected by the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh on 23-07-2013. However, a learned Single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court allowed the respondent’s appeal (FAO 1621/2014) and set aside the award, holding that the contract was rightly terminated and the penalty justified.

The appellant sought special leave. The Supreme Court granted leave and heard the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court, in a Section 37 appeal, exceeded its permissible scope by re-appreciating evidence and substituting its view for that of the arbitrator.
  2. Whether the arbitral award violated the “public policy of India” or any explicit term of the contract so as to warrant setting it aside under Section 34/37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Sutlej Construction Limited)

  • The arbitrator’s findings were based on detailed evidence showing that the respondent’s breaches (e.g., obstructed disposal area, lack of lighting, inadequate compaction equipment) prevented timely performance.
  • The High Court lacked jurisdiction to re-appraise facts; interference is permitted only on limited grounds such as patent illegality or conflict with public policy, none of which were present.
  • The award represented a plausible interpretation of the contract and was therefore immune from judicial substitution.

Respondent (Union Territory of Chandigarh)

  • The contractor worked at an unacceptably slow pace, justifying imposition of penalty and termination.
  • The contract imposed no obligation on the respondent to remove overhead lines, provide unloading areas, or supply compaction facilities; therefore the arbitrator acted contrary to the terms of the contract in accepting those grounds as breaches.
  • The award thus suffered from misconduct and patent illegality, requiring it to be set aside.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49 Scope of “public policy” ground for setting aside awards – interference only if award shocks the conscience of the court. Used to emphasise that the High Court erred in substituting its own view for that of the arbitrator where the award was plausible and not shocking.
Sudarsan Trading Co. v. Government of Kerala (1989) 1 SCR 665 Court’s limited power to interfere with findings of fact made by an arbitrator chosen by the parties. Cited to reinforce that re-appreciation of evidence by courts is impermissible.
Harish Chander & Co. v. State of U.P. AIR 2016 SC 4257 Judicial restraint in reviewing arbitral awards. Relied upon to affirm the correctness of the Additional District Judge’s refusal to revisit factual determinations.
Swan Gold Mining Ltd. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd. 2014 (4) ArbLR 1 (SC) Arbitrator as the parties’ chosen judge; deference owed to arbitral findings. Invoked to criticise the High Court for acting as a second appellate court on facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court found the arbitral award to be a fully reasoned document that took into account the reciprocal nature of contractual obligations. The arbitrator’s conclusion—that the respondent’s failure to provide an accessible unloading site, remove obstacles and supply compaction equipment constituted breaches—was characterised as a “plausible view” borne out by evidence. Importantly, the Court held:

  • The respondent’s own post-termination delay of “a couple of years” in completing what was supposed to be a 45-day project underscored its lack of preparedness and validated the arbitrator’s findings.
  • Under Associate Builders, an award may be set aside on public-policy grounds only when it “shocks the conscience” of the court; mere disagreement with factual findings is insufficient.
  • The Additional District Judge correctly respected these limits, whereas the High Court “made an endeavour to re-appreciate the evidence” and thereby transgressed the statutory boundaries of Section 37.
  • Even in a second appeal, courts examine only substantial questions of law; the High Court effectively acted as a fact-finding forum, which is impermissible.

Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no legal basis to disturb the award.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and restored the arbitral award in its entirety. The appeal was ALLOWED; no costs were imposed.

Implications: The judgment re-affirms the narrow scope of judicial interference with arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. It underscores that courts may not re-appreciate evidence or substitute their own factual conclusions for those of the arbitrator, except where the award is patently illegal or contrary to public policy in the limited sense defined by precedent. While the decision directly benefits the appellant by enabling enforcement of the award (including interest), it does not create new legal doctrine but reinforces existing Supreme Court jurisprudence favouring finality of arbitration.

Show all summary ...

Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.:— Leave granted.

2. The appellant was awarded a contract by the respondent of earth excavation work and loading into trucks and unloading for purposes of widening of the approach road Sukhna Choe on Chandigarh Kalka Road, Chandigarh vide memo No. 201 dated 5.1.1996 The earth was required to be lifted from the first source near the regulator and carried through trucks from Golf side initially. There was a second source of lifting the earth as per permission of the Superintendent Engineer but it is not necessary to go into the details of the contract for the present purposes. Suffice to say that the respondent alleges that the appellant did not fulfil its obligations while the appellant, on the other hand, alleges that what was required to be done by the respondent to facilitate execution of the contract was not so done. This resulted in the respondent terminating the contract on 12.11.1996

3. The conditions of the contract provided for arbitration and despite the appellant invoking the arbitration clause, the Superintendent Engineer failed to nominate an Arbitrator resulting in the appellant approaching the Court. In the course of the said proceedings Mr. R.N Singal, retired District & Sessions Judge was appointed as an arbitrator in terms of order dated 31.7.2002 of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Chandigarh.

4. The parties put forth their respective claims before the arbitrator. The appellant laid the claims while the respondent filed the counterclaims. The arbitrator made and published an Award dated 18.12.2013, partly allowing the claim of the appellant while rejecting the counterclaims of the respondent. The claims laid and the extent awarded as well as the counterclaims laid are as under:

Claims made by the Appellant Amounts awarded by the Arbitrator S. No. Particulars Amount (in INR) Particulars Amount (in INR) 1. Balance payment accruing from the last running bill 2,00,014 Claim No. 1 and amount deposited by way of earnest 1,20,299 32,000 2. Payment due on account of transportation or earth not measured by department 1,11,231 Claim No. 3 65,076 3. Payment due on account of less lead paid 95,400 Claim No. 4 7,74,375 4. Idle hour charges of heavy earth moving machinery and labour deployed on the machinery 31,22,280 Claim No. 6 45,435 5. Payment due on account of earth eroded by heavy rains due to non-compaction of earth and leaking water pipelines 1,69,206 -- -- 6. Payment on account of loss of profit on balance work 90,835 -- -- 7. Loss due to prolongation of work 12,80,000 -- -- 8. Litigation expenses 25,000 -- -- Total 50,93,966 Total 10,37,185

5. Interest @ 12% per annum was also allowed by the arbitrator in favour of the appellant.

Counterclaims made by the Respondent 1. Liquidated damages and the expenses incurred by it for completion of work 8,01,808 2. Loss due to delay in completion of work 20,00,000 Total 28,01,808

6. The respondent aggrieved by the Award filed objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’), which were, however, rejected by the learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh vide order dated 23.7.2013 The respondent thereafter preferred an appeal before the Punjab & Haryana High Court and the said appeal succeeded whereby the Award was set aside opining that the contract was rightly terminated and the Department rightly imposed the penalty.

7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. The Award is a reasoned one. The arbitrator has taken note of the peculiar features of the contract inter se the parties that while the work of excavation of the earth, its loading into the trucks, unloading and transportation to site of the work was awarded to the appellant as contractor, the spreading of the earth brought to the site of the work by the contractor and its compaction was to be done by the respondent Department itself. It is, thus, that the appellant claimed that even though they had taken up the work with right earnest to complete it within the scheduled period, the breaches of the respondent has caused the delay. Such breaches enumerated are:

a. Obstruction in the disposal area due to overhead lines and poles;

b. Delay in making available approached to the disposal site, want of lighting arrangement at the excavation as well as disposal sites by the respondent;

c. Inadequate compaction plant and machinery and other auxiliary equipment.

8. It is in order to cover up their own lapses it is alleged that the respondent chose to terminate the contract.

9. The respondent, of course, denies the aforesaid allegations but on the other hand contended that the work was carried on by the appellant at slow pace leaving the respondent-Department with no alternative but to levy penalty and to finally terminate the contract vide letter dated 12.11.1996

10. In the opinion of the arbitrator the performance of the contractual obligations by the appellant were dependent on reciprocal performances by the respondent. On appreciation of evidence on record it was concluded that the respondent had failed to comply with its obligations and, thus, held the contract to be illegally terminated. Thereafter the arbitrator, once again, on appreciation of evidence decided to award the amounts as specified aforesaid.

11. The learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh while dismissing the application of the respondent under Section 34 of the said Act came to the conclusion that the findings of the arbitrator were based on appraisal of evidence and it was certainly not the function of the Court to re-appreciate the evidence so long as it is not a case of completely devoid of evidence. Since the spreading of the earth and its compaction was required to be done by the respondent, the non-carrying out of that activity would naturally impede the performance of the obligations by the appellant. Accessibility to the site was obviously an important part of the execution of the contractual obligations. In fact, the contract was carried over a period of four and a half years against the original time period of 45 days, which would show the unpreparedness of the respondent.

12. The learned single Judge of the High Court, however, appears to have made an endeavour to re-appreciate the evidence and sought to come to a different conclusion than what was arrived at by the arbitrator, the objections to which were dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh. The reasoning of the learned single Judge is predicated on the absence of any contractual obligation that the spreading of the earth brought to site was to be done by the Department nor was there a stipulation that the overhead lines and poles had to be removed by the respondent to make the area accessible. The respondent-Department had not specified any space for unloading of the earth but only charges up to 5 kilometres were to be paid. Thus, the finding is that the arbitrator mis-conducted himself by acting contrary to the terms of the contract.

13. We are not in agreement with the approach adopted by the learned single Judge. The dispute in question had resulted in a reasoned award. It is not as if the arbitrator has not appreciated the evidence. The arbitrator has taken a plausible view and, an in our view, as per us the correct view, that the very nature of job to be performed would imply that there has to be an area for unloading and that too in the vicinity of 5 kilometres as that is all that the appellant was to be paid for. The route was also determined. In such a situation to say that the respondent owed no obligation to make available the site cannot be accepted by any stretch of imagination. The unpreparedness of the respondent is also apparent from the fact that even post termination it took couple of years for the work to be carried out, which was meant to be completed within 45 days. The ability of the appellant to comply with its obligations were inter dependent on the respondent meeting its obligations in time to facilitate appropriate areas for unloading of the earth and for its compacting. At least it is certainly a plausible view.

14. It has been opined by this Court that when it comes to setting aside of an award under the public policy ground, it would mean that the award should shock the conscience of the court and would not include what the court thinks is unjust on the facts of the case seeking to substitute its view for that of the arbitrator to do what it considers to be “justice.” (Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49)

15. The approach adopted by the learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh was, thus, correct in not getting into the act of re-appreciating the evidence as the first appellate court from a trial court decree. An arbitrator is a chosen Judge by the parties and it is on limited parameters can the award be interfered with. (Sudarsan Trading Co. v. The Government of Kerala (1989) 1 SCR 665; Harish Chander & Co. v. State of U.P AIR 2016 SC 4257 and Swan Gold Mining v. Hindustan Copper Limited 2014 (4) ArbLR 1 (SC)).

16. The learned single Judge ought to have restrained himself from getting into the meanderings of evidence appreciation and acting like a second appellate court. In fact, even in second appeals, only questions of law are to be determined while the first appellate court is the final court on facts. In the present case the learned single Judge has, thus, acted in the first appeal against objections dismissed as if it was the first appellate court against a decree passed by the trial court.

17. We have, thus, no hesitation in concluding that the impugned order cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside and the enforcement of the award in toto is upheld.

18. The appeal is accordingly allowed but in the given facts of the case we do not impose costs.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 14451/2015

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 01-04-2015 in FAO No. 1621/2014 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana At Chandigarh)

Sutlej Construction Limited.….Petitioner(s)
v.
Union Territory of Chandigarh.….Respondent(s)

Date: 05-12-2017 This petition was called on for hearing today.

(Before J. Chelameswar and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.)

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Tarun Gupta, AOR

Mr. Puneet Varshney, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Ms. Rimali Batra, Adv.

Mr. Ravi Prakash, Adv.

Ms. Nikita Choukse, Adv.

Mr. Chandra Prakash, AOR

Mr. U.T Chandra Prakash, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

19. Leave granted.

20. The appeal is allowed, in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

21. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.