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Chandrashekhar v. Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal & Ors.

Debts Recovery Tribunal
Jul 8, 2005
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Tribunal's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The present appeal challenges the order dated 2 February 2005 of the Recovery Officer (M.A. No. 17/2004 in R.P. No. 150/2003 arising from O.A. 185/2001) which disallowed the appellant-objector's objection. The appellant claimed to be in possession of immovable property known as "Shivaji Mangal Karyalaya" as lessee from 1 November 1998 under a Deed of Lease executed by respondent Nos. 4–10 for an annual rent of Rs. 1.50 lakhs. On or about 3 November 2004 respondent No. 3, accompanied by several persons, asserted that he had purchased the property in an auction conducted by the Recovery Officer and held a sale certificate following confirmation of the sale. The appellant thereupon filed an objection under Rule 11 of Schedule II to the Income Tax Act, 1961 seeking an order restraining respondent No. 3 from interfering with his alleged lawful and peaceful possession.

The Recovery Officer heard the objection, considered the evidence and circumstances on record, and disallowed the objection—ordering the appellant to deliver vacant possession within 15 days and directing forcible dispossession thereafter. The Recovery Officer's findings included that the property had been mortgaged in 1987, that the alleged lease was executed much later (1 November 1998) without the mortgagee bank's knowledge, that the lease deed was unregistered and therefore not a legal document, and that no mention of the lease was made during the recovery proceedings despite proclamations having been pasted on three occasions. The appellant appealed that order to the Tribunal. The Tribunal heard arguments, reviewed the record and issued the impugned appellate decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Recovery Officer rightly disallowed the appellant's objection under Rule 11, Schedule II of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by finding that the appellant was not in rightful possession.
  2. Whether the Recovery Officer exceeded her jurisdiction by effectively adjudicating the appellant's right to possession and ordering physical delivery of possession (rather than limiting relief to symbolic possession), contrary to the legal position governing tenants in execution proceedings.
  3. Whether the appellant's evidence (principally the Deed of Lease dated 1.11.1998) was sufficient under Rule 11 to establish rightful possession deserving protection from dispossession in execution.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant asserted that he was in possession of the property as a lessee since 1 November 1998 under a Deed of Lease executed by respondent Nos. 4–10 and that this placed him in lawful physical possession.
  • The appellant contended that respondent No. 3's entry claiming title following auction threatened his possession, and that the Recovery Officer should have protected his possession under Rule 11 by directing only symbolic delivery of possession to the purchaser rather than physical dispossession.
  • The appellant argued that the Recovery Officer had no jurisdiction to decide the substantive right of possession and therefore should not have ordered physical dispossession.

Respondent No. 2's Arguments

  • Respondent No. 2 contested the appellant's possession and contended that the Lease Deed was a sham document executed to defeat respondent No. 3's execution and frustrate recovery of the bank's dues.
  • Respondent No. 2 supported the Recovery Officer's order disallowing the objection and maintained that the appellant's claim to possession was not believable on the record.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ganpati Ram Bhanade v. Baliram Raghunath Jadhav, AIR 1974 Bom. 155 Illustrates under Order 21 CPC that in execution the purchaser is entitled to symbolic possession where the property is in possession of a tenant; a tenant cannot be evicted except by due process of law. The Tribunal acknowledged this principle but held it inapplicable on the facts because the appellant's possession was not proved; therefore the protection the precedent offers to a tenant did not arise.
Paul Brothers (Tailoring Divn.) v. Ashim Kumar Mondal; Phani Bhusan Ghosh v. Ashim Kumar Mondal, (1990) 3 SCC 726 : AIR 1991 SC 796 Authority under Order 21 CPC supporting that a purchaser in execution gets symbolic possession if the property is in the possession of a tenant enjoying statutory protection. Cited by appellant; Tribunal noted the holding but concluded the appellant had not established possession so the cited rule did not alter the outcome.
Anwarbi v. Pramod D.A. Joshi, (2000) 10 SCC 405 Another authority under Order 21 CPC concerning rights of tenants in execution proceedings and entitlement to symbolic possession. The Tribunal treated it as persuasive on the general principle but found it inapplicable because the appellant's possession was not shown on the record.
Puran Chand v. Ganeshi Lal Tara Chand, 88 (2000) DLT 863 (DB) : AIR 2001 Del. 175 Decision under Order 21 CPC addressing purchaser's entitlement to symbolic possession where tenant is in possession. The Tribunal acknowledged the principle but held that since the appellant's possession was not believable, the precedent did not protect the appellant.
Ratan Lal Jain v. Uma Shankar Vyas, I (2002) SLT 585 : (2002) 2 SCC 656 Decision under Order 21 CPC on the rights of tenants in execution proceedings (symbolic possession principle). Cited; Tribunal noted the principle but did not apply it to grant protection because the appellant failed to prove possession under Rule 11.
H. Seshadri v. K.R. Natarajan, 2004 (1) Civil LJ 238 (SC) Authority under Order 21 CPC, again touching on treatment of tenants in execution proceedings. Recognised by the Tribunal as part of the body of authority on symbolic possession, but found irrelevant to the result given the lack of credible proof of possession by the appellant.
Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (No. 2) v. Tax Recovery Officer, ITR (Vol. 177) 176 (Bombay High Court-Nagpur Bench) Addresses the power of the Tax Recovery Officer to examine possession in recovery proceedings; the officer's jurisdiction includes examining possession though not finally adjudicating the right. The Tribunal relied on this line of authority to confirm that the Recovery Officer may and must examine possession under Rule 11; applied to uphold the Recovery Officer's investigation and conclusion that possession was not proved.
Tax Recovery Officer II, Sadar, Nagpur v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade, (1998) 6 SCC 658 : VII (1998) SLT 466 Affirms that a Recovery Officer's jurisdiction extends to examining possession and that a lawful tenant cannot be ousted by the Recovery Officer; the officer cannot declare a transfer valid or invalid finally. Tribunal treated this as establishing the scope of Rule 11 enquiries but held that where possession is not believable, the protective rule for tenants does not apply; thus the Recovery Officer's disallowance was sustained.
Industrial Security Agency v. Union of India (A. Stephen Samuel, Proprietor), III (2003) BC 469 (DB) Part of the line of authorities concerning the scope of the Tax Recovery Officer's power to examine possession in recovery proceedings. Used to reinforce that the Recovery Officer must examine possession; Tribunal held the Recovery Officer properly exercised that function and the appellant failed to satisfy Rule 11 requirements.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Tribunal's analysis proceeded in a structured manner, applying the statutory framework of Rule 11, Schedule II of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and examining the factual evidence before it.

  1. Interpretation of Rule 11: The Tribunal reproduced and analyzed sub-rules (3) to (5) of Rule 11, observing that the claimant/objector must adduce evidence to show interest in or possession of the property at the relevant date, and that the Tax Recovery Officer (and by extension the Recovery Officer) must investigate such claims and either release property from attachment if satisfied or disallow the claim if the property was in defaulter's possession as his own. The Tribunal summarized the legal position: if the objector's possession is rightful, the purchaser gets only symbolic possession; if not believable, the purchaser is entitled to possession because possession follows ownership.
  2. Review of evidence offered by appellant: The Tribunal noted that the appellant relied almost exclusively on one piece of evidence—the Deed of Lease dated 1.11.1998 stamped on Rs.100. The document purported to create a lease (variously described in the deed as yearly, monthly, terminable by six months' notice, etc.) for an annual rent of Rs.1.5 lakhs. The Tribunal examined the deed in the context of Section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act (governing a mortgagor's power to lease) and observed that Section 65A(2)(e) restricts duration of mortgagor leases to not exceed three years; the subject deed was not for a specified period and thus conflicted with that statutory limit.
  3. Credibility and corroboration: The contesting respondents challenged the lease deed's veracity, pointing to inconsistent covenants (monthly vs yearly references) and characterizing the lease as a sham. The Tribunal found these points forceful. It further noted absence of independent corroborative evidence (e.g., electricity/water bills, property tax payments, municipal entries) that would normally exist if the appellant had been in possession for the claimed period and using the premises commercially. The Tribunal concluded there was no independent or credible evidence to believe the appellant's possession.
  4. Application of precedents: The Tribunal considered authorities cited by the appellant (Order 21 CPC cases) which generally hold that tenants should not be evicted in execution and that purchasers are entitled to symbolic possession when a tenant is in rightful possession. The Tribunal accepted the correctness of that general principle but explained it could not be applied here because the appellant's possession was not established on the facts. The Tribunal also relied on authorities (including Gangadhar Ranade and related decisions) establishing that the Recovery Officer's jurisdiction includes examining possession under Rule 11; the Tribunal held that the Recovery Officer had done so and applied her mind correctly.
  5. Conclusion of analysis: Because the appellant failed to prove possession within the meaning of Rule 11, the Tribunal found there was no basis for protecting the appellant as a tenant and therefore no legal bar to awarding possession to the purchaser. The Tribunal held that the Recovery Officer did not commit an error in disallowing the objection.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISALLOWED (the appeal was dismissed) and the Recovery Officer's order disallowing the objection was upheld. The Tribunal ordered the appeal to be dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's objection was held to be without merit; the Recovery Officer's direction to deliver vacant possession (and ultimately permit forcible possession) stands. The purchaser (respondent No. 3) is entitled to pursue possession in accordance with the Recovery Officer's order and the confirmed sale.
  • On precedent and broader law: The Tribunal reiterated established principles that a tenant in rightful possession is generally entitled to protection (symbolic possession in execution) and that a Recovery Officer must examine possession under Rule 11. However, the Tribunal made clear that where possession is not credibly established, these protective rules do not apply. The opinion does not purport to create new legal precedent beyond applying the existing principles to the facts of this case.

Appeal dismissed. (As recorded in the opinion: "The appeal is disallowed with costs. Appeal dismissed.")

Show all summary ...

K.J Paratwar, Presiding Officer:— The order passed on 2nd February, 2005 by learned Recovery Officer (Smt. H.D Gajbhiye) of this Tribunal disallowing M.A No. 17/2004 iri R.P No. 150/2003 (arising from O.A 185/2001) has aggrieved the appellant-objector, who had taken out the said application.

2. The appellant's case in this appeal (as also in the M.A before the learned Recovery Officer) has been that he is in possession of the property commonly called as ‘Shivaji Mangal Karyalaya’ as lessee since from 1st November, 1998. It is the appellant's case that respondent Nos. 4 to 10 executed Deed of Lease with yearly rent of Rs. 1.50 lakhs and put the appellant in possession. On, or about 3rd November, 2004 respondent No. 3 along with 10-15 persons came over the property and claimed that he had purchased it in auction conducted by Recovery Officer of this Tribunal and that the sale certificate has been issued in his favour pursuant to confirmation of the sale. Thus the appellant's possession was seriously threatened. That was why the appellant took out objection under Rule 11 of 2 Schedule to Income Tax Act, 1961 seeking order directing the respondent No. 3 not to interfere in lawful physical and peaceful possession.

2. The respondent No. 2 contested the objection. The appellant's possession, muchless legal, is contested. The Lease Deed is said to be sham and bogus document.

3. The learned Recovery Officer, after taking into consideration the evidence and circumstances on record and on hearing the learned Counsel for the parties was pleased to disallow the objection and direct the appellant to deliver vacant possession within 15 days failing which forcible possession was directed to be taken. The learned Recovery Officer found that the property was mortgaged way back in 1987; that the certificate debtors allegedly leased the property much thereafter (1.11.98) without knowledge of the mortgagee-respondent No. 1 Bank. The Lease Deed being not registered, is not legal document. No one had pointed out in that recovery proceedings during the course of one year when the proclamation was pasted on 3 occasions about the lease between the appellant and respondent Nos. 4 to 10. That is how the learned Recovery Officer had turned down the contentions taken up by the appellant while disposing of the objection.

4. The impugned order is said to be bad inter alia because the learned Recovery Officer exceeded her jurisdiction inasmuch as she went on to disallow the appellants claim of being tenant. That was in contravention of the legal position that the Recovery Officer cannot go into the question of appellant's right of possession. The appellant's contention is that no sooner the learned Recovery Officer was shown that the appellant is in possession, she should have directed delivery of only symbolic possession. The direction to give physical possession contravenes the appellant's statutory right of remaining in possession. The order, therefore, is said to be unsustainable and is sought to be struck down in this appeal.

5. The respondent No. 2 filed the reply at Ex. 12 and has set out events from the beginning till end. It is reiterated that lease is nothing but eye-wash for depriving the respondent No. 3 from coming into possession and in fact frustrating the execution of Recovery Certificate. The respondent No. 2 had filed reply to the stay application (Ex. 14) which was considered to be say to the appeal. He has also contested the appellant's claim and has supported the order passed by the learned Recovery Officer.

6. I have heard arguments of learned Counsel representing the rival parties. I have gone through the relevant record as necessary for disposal of the appeal.

7. There is unanimity amongst the parties that the objection/claim taken out by the appellant before the Recovery Officer was required to be considered as per provisions of Rule 11, Schedule II under the Income Tax Act, Sub-rules 3 to 5 of which are reproduced for ready reference

“(3) The claimant or objector must adduce evidence to show that-

(a) (in the case of immovable property) at the date of the service of the notice issued under this Schedule to pay the arrears, or

(b) (in the case of movable property) at the date of the attachment, he had some interest in or was possessed of, the property in question.

(4) Where, upon the said investigation, the Tax Recovery Officer is satisfied that, for the reason stated in the claim or objection, such property was not, at the said date, in the possession of the defaulter or of some person in trust for him or in the occupancy of a tenant or other person paying rent to him, or that, being in the possession of the defaulter at the said date, it was so in his possession, not on his own account or as his own property, but on account of or in trust for some other person, or partly on his own account and partly on account of some other person, the Tax Recovery Officer shall make an order releasing the property, wholly or to such extent as he thinks fit, from attachment or sale.

(5) Where the Tax Recovery Officer is satisfied that the property was, at the said date, in the possession of the defaulter as his own property and not on account of any other person, or was in the possession of some other person in trust or in the occupancy of a tenant or other person paying rent to him, the Tax Recovery Officer shall disallow the claim.

The provision thus is made for protecting the settled and rightful possession of a party and ensuring that none should be dispossessed except in accordance with Law.”

8. The position emerging from the provision is that in case the objector/claimant is found to be in possession of the property and that such possession is rightful, the Recovery Officer cannot dispossess such party and the purchaser of the property would have to be given only symbolic possession. If in the investigation done under Rule 11, the objector's/claimant's possession is not believable, he would not be entitled to protection as a result of which the party who has purchased the property in the recovery proceedings would be entitled to possession since in law the possession flows with the ownership.

9. It is undisputed that the property in question was mortgaged by respondent Nos. 4 to 10 in favour of the respondent No. 2 Bank way back in the year 1987. On account of default in repayment, the Bank filed Spl. Civil Suit 475/97 in the Court of Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., Nagpur which on establishment of DRT, Mumbai transferred there, being O.A 916/99 and after establishment of this Tribunal was retransferred here and registered as O.A 185/2001. My learned predecessor while disposing of the O.A by judgment dated 21.8.2003 declared that the Bank's outstandings are secured by the property in question. The property has been sold in the execution of recovery certificate issued by this Tribunal the ownership of respondent No. 3 cannot be and is not questioned.

10. Keeping in mind the above legal position, I would now look into the evidence in support of appellant's possession. The appellant relies on solitary evidence viz. Deed of Lease dated 1.11.1998 on stamp folio of Rs. 100/- executed by respondent Nos. 4 to 10. It seems to be lease in perpetuity on yearly rent of Rs. 1.50 lakhs, which (rent), however, was payable in two instalments each of Rs. 75,000/-. The document also recites that the lease was monthly which commenced from the day of execution but was terminable by 6 months' prior notice, apart from that the lessor had put the lessee (appellant) into possession of the property. It is this document which probed for the limited purpose of possession. Since the Deed was executed in respect of mortgaged property, the mortgagor's power to lease was within Section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act and not unqualified as that of the owner. Section 65A(2)(e) lays down that the duration of lease by the mortgagor shall not exceed 3 years. The Deed of Lease (even if the Deed of Lease is believed to be genuine document) in question is not for a specified period and is, therefore, in contravention of the aforesaid provision of law. Yet, for the completeness I would thrash out other contentions.

10A. The contesting respondents have seriously disputed the document and the appellant's possession on the basis of the document. On behalf of the contesting respondents it was urged that the covenants in the Deed of Lease are bizarre in the sense that from the covenant to the effect that the rent agreed is yearly and lease deed is terminable by 6 months, it would appear that it is yearly lease. But the document mentions that it was monthly lease. I find considerable force in this submission. The aforesaid observations have been made for limited purpose as to whether the appellant's possession over the property can be believed on the basis of the said document. There is no independent evidence to believe in the appellant's possession. If the appellant is in possession for more than six years as he claims, there would have come into existence several other pieces of evidence e.g electricity connection/bills, water bills, property tax payments, if any, made by the appellant, entries in the property tax register of the municipal corporation showing the appellant's possession (which may have been recorded because the appellant is claiming to be using the premises for commercial purpose in which case the higher property tax is payable). But there arc no such circumstances on the record to believe the appellant's possession.

11. Since the appellant's possession itself is not proved within the meaning of Rule 11, the question of protecting the same does not arise. The learned Counsel for the appellant has relied on following citations:

(i) AIR 1974 Bom. 155, (Ganpati Ram Bhanade v. Baliram Raghunath Jadhav)

(ii) (1990) 3 SCC 726 : AIR 1991 SC 796 [Paul Brothers (Tailoring Divn.) v. Ashim Kumar Mondal-with-Phani Bhusan Ghosh v. Ashim Kumar Mondal].

(iii) (2000) 10 SCC 405, (Anwarbi v. Pramod D.A Joshi).

(iv) 88 (2000) DLT 863 (DB) : AIR 2001 Del. 175, (Puran Chand v. Ganeshi Lal Tara Chand).

(v) I (2002) SLT 585 : (2002) 2 SCC 656, (Ratan Lal Jain v. Uma Shankar Vyas).

(vi) 2004 (1) Civil LJ 238 (SC), (H. Seshadri v. K.R Natarajan).

12. I have carefully gone through the citations which are under Order 21 of C.P.C which does not in terms apply to the proceedings before this Tribunal. However, even if the spirit in the ratio in said cases is considered, what Their Lordships have held was that in the execution a purchaser is entitled to symbolic possession of the property if the same is in possession of tenant. There cannot be any quarrel about this legal position which is founded on the basic law that no one should be evicted except in due course of law and as such a tenant enjoying the statutory protection cannot be dispossessed without recourse to the law under which he is enjoying the protection. Thus a party in possession with right to be in possession cannot be dispossessed in execution merely because certain property has been purchased. But this legal position cannot be applied to the facts of this case in which I have indicated that the appellant's possession itself is not believable.

13. Mr. Mokadam, learned Counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on following citations:

(i) ITR (Vol. 177) 176 (Bombay High Court-Nagpur Bench), Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (No. 2) v. Tax Recovery Officer.

(ii) VII (1998) SLT. 466 : (1998) 6 SCC 658, Tax Recovery Officer II, Sadar, Nagpur v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade.

(iii) III (2003) BC 469 (DB), (A. Stephen Samuel, Proprietor, Industrial Security Agency v. Union of India).

Their Lordships have while, considering the power of Tax Recovery Officer (In case of proceedings before this Tribunal Recovery Officer) held that his jurisdiction extends to examining possession and only incidentally question of right to possession claimed by the objector. It has been held that lawful tenant of defaulter (Certificate debtor in the recovery proceedings before the Recovery Officer) cannot be ousted by the Recovery Officer who cannot declare the transfer (in this case lease) valid. The above said legal position is also well settled. But, I have already indicated that the appellant's possession itself is not believable. If that be so, the question of the appellant getting protection as tenant does not arise. None of the aforesaid authorities lay down that a person (on the basis of simplicitor claim to be in possession through the mortgagor) should not be ousted. The very fact that the question of possession is required to be gone into by the Recovery Officer under Rule 11 implies that the learned Recovery Officer has to consider and apply mind and find out whether the person is really in possession. The position would be absurd if the things were not so, as that would result in Recovery Officer becoming mute and blind spectator on a person claiming however such claim be bald to be in possession. That indeed cannot be (and is) not the position in law.

14. In view of the above, I hold that the objection was rightly held by the learned Recovery Officer to be without merit. I do not find that the learned Recovery Officer committed any error in disallowing the objection. The appeal thus, is devoid of any merit and is liable to be disallowed.

The appeal is disallowed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.