- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
M/S. Venus Drug Centre v. Dinabandhu Hajra & Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion addresses a revisional application challenging the order dated 15th February 2014 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1st Court, Hooghly in Title Suit No. 249 of 2007. The learned court below rejected the petitioner's prayer for extension of time to deposit arrears of rent in five equal instalments under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the court allowed the plaintiff landlord's application under Section 7(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, resulting in the striking off of the petitioner's defence. The petitioner, who is a tenant, filed this revisional application questioning the legality and propriety of that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the court has the power to extend the time for depositing arrears of rent as prayed for by the petitioner under the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and the Limitation Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The court has jurisdiction to extend time for deposit or payment of rent, relying on the Special Bench decision in Krishna Gopal Ghosal v. Mihir Baran Nandy (1987 (2) CLJ 297), which held that exercise of such power requires consideration of the facts of each case.
- Reliance on Sri Ranjit Kr. Ghosh v. Manindra Chandra Saha (1995 (II) CHN 43) to support the court's jurisdiction to condone delay or extend time for payment under Section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
- Reference to Pulin Behari Choudhury v. Sachindra Mohan Bose (1978 (1) CLJ 645) to argue for granting time to pay after correcting miscalculations of arrears and interest.
- Cited the Supreme Court decision in B. P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick (AIR 1987 SC 1010) to assert that the court has discretion to condone default and extend time, and that striking out defence is directory, not mandatory.
- Relied on Jitendra Nath Nandi v. Krishnadhan Nandi (56 C.W.N 858) to emphasize the High Court's competency to set aside improper orders in revision.
Opposite Parties' Arguments
- After the enactment of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, the legal position changed, and the court is barred from granting extension of time beyond what is prescribed in the proviso to Section 7(2) of the Act.
- Relied on the Specially Constituted Bench decision in Subrata Mukherjee v. Bisakha Das (2012 1 W.B.L.R (Cal) 595), which held that the time limit fixed after adjudication under Section 7(2) is inflexible and cannot be extended by the court under any circumstances, including application of the Limitation Act.
- Supported by the decision in Sri Arup Kumar Atta v. Sri Susanta Kumar Ghosh (2013 (3) CLJ (Cal) 556), which affirmed the inflexibility of the time limit fixed after adjudication.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Krishna Gopal Ghosal v. Mihir Baran Nandy (1987 (2) CLJ 297) | Exercise of court's power to condone delay or extend time for rent payment requires consideration of case-specific circumstances under Section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. | Petitioner's counsel relied on this to argue for jurisdiction to extend time; court noted but distinguished due to change in law. |
| Sri Ranjit Kr. Ghosh v. Manindra Chandra Saha (1995 (II) CHN 43) | Court has jurisdiction to condone delay or extend time for rent payment under Section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. | Petitioner cited this to support extension of time; court acknowledged but applied current statute. |
| Pulin Behari Choudhury v. Sachindra Mohan Bose (1978 (1) CLJ 645) | Granting time to pay after correcting miscalculations of arrears and interest. | Petitioner used to argue for extension due to alleged miscalculation; court found no scope under current law. |
| B. P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick (AIR 1987 SC 1010) | Court's discretion to condone default and extend time; striking out defence is directory, not mandatory. | Petitioner cited to argue against mandatory striking off of defence; court held current statutory provisions prevail. |
| Jitendra Nath Nandi v. Krishnadhan Nandi (56 C.W.N 858) | High Court's competency to set aside improper orders in revision. | Petitioner urged this to support setting aside impugned order; court dismissed revisional application. |
| Subrata Mukherjee v. Bisakha Das (2012 1 W.B.L.R (Cal) 595) | Time limit fixed under proviso to Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 is inflexible and cannot be extended by the court. | Court relied on this to hold no jurisdiction to extend time for deposit of arrears under the 1997 Act. |
| Sri Arup Kumar Atta v. Sri Susanta Kumar Ghosh (2013 (3) CLJ (Cal) 556) | Affirmed inflexibility of time limits fixed after adjudication under the 1997 Act. | Supported opposite parties' argument; court applied this principle in rejecting extension. |
| Bina Devi Benani v. Rajesh Kumar Gupta (2015 (3) ICC 462) | Court under Section 7 of the 1997 Act lacks jurisdiction to entertain extension of time applications after expiry of stipulated period. | Court applied this precedent to affirm trial court's rejection of extension prayer. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court identified the sole issue as whether it has the power to extend time for depositing arrears of rent under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and the Limitation Act. While the petitioner relied on precedents under the older 1956 Act and the Supreme Court decision in B. P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. to assert the court's discretion to condone delay, the court clarified that the legal position changed with the enactment of the 1997 Act. The proviso to Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act explicitly prescribes a fixed time limit for payment of arrears after adjudication, which is inflexible and not subject to extension by the court. The court relied on binding decisions of specially constituted benches and other authoritative rulings, such as Subrata Mukherjee v. Bisakha Das and Bina Devi Benani v. Rajesh Kumar Gupta, to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to extend this period. Since the petitioner failed to comply with the payment schedule and sought extension beyond the statutory period, the trial court's rejection of the extension prayer and consequent striking off of the defence under Section 7(3) of the Act was justified. The revisional court found no error in the trial court's approach and declined to interfere.
Holding and Implications
The revisional application is dismissed.
The court affirmed the trial court's order rejecting the petitioner's prayer for extension of time to deposit arrears of rent and allowing the landlord's application under Section 7(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 to strike off the defence. This decision confirms that under the 1997 Act, the time limit fixed for payment of adjudicated arrears is inflexible and not subject to extension by the courts, including under the Limitation Act. The ruling has the direct effect of upholding the finality of payment schedules fixed under the 1997 Act and limits judicial discretion in condoning delay in such matters. No new precedent was set beyond affirming established principles under the current statute.
Ishan Chandra Das, J.:— Heard the learned Counsel for both the parties.
2. This revisional application has been directed against the Order no. 112 dated 15th February, 2014 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1st Court, Hooghly in Title Suit No. 249 of 2007 where learned court below while disposing of the application under Section 151 of the Present: Code of Civil Procedure coupled with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act rejected the prayer of the petitioner (who is a tenant of the original suit and hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) for extension of time for making deposit of the arrears of rent in five equal instalments and consequently allowed the application under Section 7(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, filed on behalf of the opposite parties (the plaintiff landlord of the original suit and hereinafter referred to as the opposite parties), resulting the defence of the petitioner herein to be struck off.
3. Being aggrieved by such order of rejection as noted above, the petitioner preferred the revisional application questioning legality and propriety of the order dated 15 February, 2014.
4. Whether the court has power to extend time to deposit arrears rent, as prayed for by the petitioner herein, is the solitary question involved in this revisional proceeding.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, in course of hearing, submitted that the court has jurisdiction to extend time for deposit or payment of rent. Relying on a decision of a Special Bench of this Court in Krishna Gopal Ghosal v. Mihir Baran Nandy, reported in 1987 (2) CLJ 297, he confidently urged that “for exercising the courts' power to condone delay or to extend the time for delayed deposit or payment of rent under Section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (12 of 1956), the Court is bound to take into consideration the circumstances of each particular case”. Further relying on a decision of a single bench of this Court in Sri Ranjit Kr. Ghosh v. Manindra Chandra Saha, reported in 1995 (II) CHN 43 and pointed out that the court has jurisdiction to condone the delay or extend the time for deposit or payment sums specified under Section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. With reference to the decision of this court in Pulin Behari Choudhury v. Sachindra Mohan Bose, reported in 1978 (1) CLJ 645, he further submitted that as there was a wrong calculation of arrears of rent and statutory interest the court shall grant time to make payment after proper calculation is made.
6. Clarifying the relevant provisions of the old Act of 1956, learned Counsel for the petitioner also urged relying on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in B. P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, reported in AIR 1987 S.C 1010, that the court has discretion to condone default and extend the time for payment or deposit and such a discretion is a necessary implication of the discretion not to strike out the defence. He also submitted with reference to the said decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B. P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. (supra) that striking out of defence was directory and not mandatory and the intention of the legislature shall be looked into and not upon the language in which the intent was clothed.
7. To conclude his argument he further relied on a decision of this Hon'ble Court in Jitendra Nath Nandi v. Krishnadhan Nandi, reported in 56 C.W.N 858 and submitted with a confident tune that the High Court is competent to see that proper orders are made when a matter comes up in revision and opined that the order impugned is liable to be set aside.
8. The learned Counsel for the opposite parties herein on the other hand submitted that after the enactment of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, there was a change of the total scenario with regard to condonation of delay after arrear amount has been adjudged by the court in terms of Section 7(2) of the Act. Relying on a decision of a Specially Constituted Bench to deal with the matter in question in Subrata Mukherjee v. Bisakha Das, reported in (2012) 1 W.B.L.R (Cal) 595, he emphatically submitted that the court is debarred from granting extension of time prescribed in the proviso to Section 7(2) of the Act. In support of his argument, he relied on another decision of this court in Sri. Arup Kumar Atta. v. Sri. Susanta Kumar Ghosh., reported in 2013 (3) CLJ (Cal) 556 wherein it was categorically held relying on several decisions of the Hon'ble courts including the Hon'ble Apex Court that the time limit, as fixed after adjudication is inflexible.
9. In this context, I may refer to a decision of a Specially Constituted Bench in Subrata Mukherjee & Bishakha Das (supra) wherein it was categorically held leaving no ambiguity, which is quoted below -
“41. However, the time limit fixed for payment to the landlord, after adjudication of the dispute with regard to the rate of rent with the extended time limit, as mentioned in the proviso of sub-section (2), is inflexible and this cannot be extended by the Court under any circumstances, naturally, provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable”.
10. In the case at hand, the petitioner filed the application under Section 7(2) of the Act which was allowed by learned court below by Order no. 84 dated 30 July, 2012, the petitioner was found defaulter in payment of rent since December, 1994 to September, 2007. The rate of rent was held @ Rs. 75/- per month and the arrear amount was adjudicated and the direction for payment of total arrears of rent to Rs. 15,768/- by five monthly instalments but that order was not complied with though in the application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Annexure-‘A’ to the revisional application), the petitioner prayed for time to make the deposit in favour of the plaintiffs/opposite parties, instead of raising objection with regard to mis-calculation.
11. Since the proviso to Section 7(2) of Act of 1997 does not provide any scope to extend time by way of condoning the delay for making payment of arrears of rent in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it cannot be said that learned trial court was not justified in rejecting the prayer of the petitioner herein for extension of time.
12. In a decision in Bina Devi Benani v. Rajesh Kumar Gupta, reported in 2015 (3) ICC 462, this court held that the Civil Judge exercising jurisdiction under Section 7 of the 1997 Act does not have the jurisdiction to entertain any application for extension of time to deposit the amount adjudicated by the original order passed under sub-section 7(2) after expiry of the period stipulated by the original order. Position would have been otherwise had there been the Old Act of 1956 (12 of 1956) was in operation in the field. Hence regard being had to the facts of the case, it is hereby held that the Court has no scope to entertain any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for extension of time and accordingly it cannot be said that learned trial court committed any mistake in rejecting the prayer. Consequently, the right in favour of the landlord under Section 7(3) of the Act of 1997 for striking out the defence of the petitioner against delivery of possession is accrued by operation of law.
13. In the background, I firmly conclude that learned trial court was correct in his approach and I find no reason to interfere with the decision taken by him.
14. The revisional application is dismissed.
15. Hence, the order impugned stands affirmed.
16. I make no order as to costs.
17. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis after compliance with all necessary formalities.
Alert