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Telecommunications Consultants India Ltd. v. Tcil Bellsouth Ltd. And Ors. S

Delhi High Court
Sep 5, 2006
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Telecommunication Consultants India Ltd. (TCIL), filed a petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956 against respondent No. 1, TCIL Bellsouth Limited (TBL), and others, concerning disputes over the management and control of TBL. The appellant and Bellsouth International Incorporated had jointly incorporated TBL, with the appellant holding 44.49% shares and respondents 3 to 5 holding 15.1%, collectively amounting to 60% shareholding supporting the appellant. Respondent No. 2, TBL India LLC, held the remaining 40% shares, having acquired them from Bellsouth International Incorporated in 2002.

The dispute arose when the appellant nominated Mr. A. K. Jolly as CEO/President following the resignation of Mr. Sudhir Saxena, but respondent No. 2 objected and unilaterally appointed other individuals to the position. The appellant alleged obstruction of their nominee from performing his duties. Concurrently, the appellant filed a civil suit seeking declarations and injunctions restraining interference with management, which remained pending without interim orders. Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition regarding bank account operations, which was also pending.

The Company Law Board (CLB) dismissed the appellant’s application for interim relief on 20 December 2005, citing the pendency of the civil suit and writ petition. The appellant appealed under Section 10-F of the Companies Act, challenging the CLB's refusal to grant interim relief.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Company Law Board was correct in refusing interim reliefs due to the pendency of a civil suit and writ petition?
  2. Whether the appellant is entitled to interim relief or injunction?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The civil suit pending concerns only a limited issue related to the appointment of CEO and does not cover the broader allegations of oppression and mismanagement under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act.
  • The Company Law Board has exclusive jurisdiction over oppression and mismanagement matters and should not abdicate its jurisdiction merely because parallel proceedings are pending in civil and writ courts.
  • The appellant and supporting respondents hold 60% of shares and were wrongfully excluded from participation and voting in the General Body Meeting held on 30 September 2005, which purportedly amended Articles 127 and 128 of the Articles of Association.
  • The appellant contended that the Company Law Board’s refusal to consider interim relief was a "touch me not" approach and legally erroneous.
  • The appellant sought interim relief to restore status quo ante, protecting its rights as the largest shareholder and preventing irreparable harm.

Respondent No. 2's Arguments

  • Objected to the appointment of the appellant’s nominee as CEO/President and appointed alternative persons unilaterally.
  • Argued that the civil suit and writ petition bar the Company Law Board from granting interim relief to avoid conflicting decisions.
  • Contended that no substantial question of law arises from the impugned order and that appeals under Section 10-F are not maintainable against interim orders.
  • Maintained that the General Body Meeting of 30 September 2005 was valid with a proper quorum and that the appellant’s representatives were not authorized to participate or vote due to lack of certified resolutions.
  • Relied on Supreme Court judgments to support the contention that interim orders are not appealable under Section 10-F.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Indian Bank v. M.S Co-operative Marketing Fedn. Ltd., AIR 1998 SC 1952 Section 10 CPC and principle of comity between courts to avoid conflicting decisions. Referenced to explain that Section 10 CPC bars trial of suits with identical subject matter but does not bar interlocutory orders; hence, Company Law Board can grant interim relief despite pending civil suit.
National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara, (2005) 2 SCC 256 Interpretation of Section 10 CPC and its limited application to civil suits, not to other proceedings. Used to clarify that Section 10 CPC applies only where the entire subject matter is identical and does not extend to proceedings before non-civil courts like Company Law Board.
Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1959 SC 148 Limits on inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC and non-application of Section 10 CPC to certain proceedings. Supported the reasoning that the Company Law Board cannot abdicate jurisdiction based on pending civil suit or writ petition.
Pukhrai D. Jain & Ors. v. G. Gopalakrishna, (2004) 7 SCC 251 Section 10 CPC is a procedural rule preventing parallel trials but does not prevent courts from deciding issues on merits where appropriate. Reinforced that the Company Law Board should consider interim relief on merits and not refuse jurisdiction solely due to pendency of civil proceedings.
The Printers (Mysore) Private, Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph, AIR 1960 SC 1156 Appellate interference where trial court acts unreasonably or ignores relevant principles. Justified appellate court’s intervention against CLB’s refusal to exercise jurisdiction and consider interim relief.
State of UP & Ors. v. Ram Sukhi Devi, (2005) 9 SCC 733 Principles governing interim injunctions and status quo maintenance. Distinguished by the court as not applicable in the present facts but cited for principles of granting interim relief to maintain status quo ante.
Dorab Cawasii Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden & Ors., (1990) 2 SCC 117 Guidelines for interlocutory mandatory injunctions including prima facie case, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience. Applied to determine that the appellant had made out a prima facie case for interim relief to prevent irreparable harm and protect shareholder rights.
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sriman Naravan & Anr, (2002) 5 SCC 760 Principles for granting interlocutory injunction balancing the rights of plaintiff and defendant. Supported the court’s balancing of interests in granting interim relief and joint operation of bank accounts.
Gujrat Bottling Company v. Coca Cola Co., (1995) 5 SCC 545 Considerations in interlocutory injunctions and balance of convenience. Referred to in assessing the balance of convenience in favor of the appellant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court critically examined the Company Law Board’s refusal to grant interim relief on the ground of pending civil suit and writ petition. It emphasized that Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Company Law Board to adjudicate oppression and mismanagement matters, which civil courts lack jurisdiction to decide. The pendency of civil and writ proceedings does not divest the Company Law Board of its jurisdiction to grant interim relief.

The court analyzed the principle of comity and rule of priority under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, concluding that these procedural rules do not universally bar concurrent proceedings, especially when the subject matter and relief sought differ. The civil suit before the District Court dealt with a narrow issue of appointment of a CEO, while the Company Law Board petition covered broader allegations of oppression and mismanagement. The writ petition concerned bank account operations, which was a separate issue. Thus, no real conflict of orders was likely.

The court observed that the Company Law Board’s “touch me not” approach was legally incorrect and that it should have examined the prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm before refusing interim relief. The appellant, holding a significant shareholding and supported by other shareholders, was unjustly excluded from participation in the General Body Meeting, and the purported amendments to Articles 127 and 128 were disputed. The court found that the appellant had made a prima facie case for interim relief to protect its rights and prevent irreparable harm.

The court also addressed the respondent’s contention that appeals under Section 10-F of the Act are not maintainable against interim orders, rejecting this submission. It clarified that Section 10-F allows appeals on questions of law arising from any order of the Company Law Board, including interim orders.

Finally, applying established Supreme Court principles on interlocutory injunctions and mandatory injunctions, the court balanced the interests of parties and concluded that interim relief was justified to maintain the status quo ante and protect the appellant’s rights pending final adjudication.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed. The court overturned the Company Law Board’s refusal to grant interim relief and passed the following interim directions:

  • The bank accounts of respondent No. 1 shall be jointly operated by nominees of the appellant and respondent No. 2. Parties may approach the Company Law Board for directions or appointment of an independent chairman if difficulties arise.
  • The appellant shall propose two names for appointment as president/CEO of respondent No. 1; respondent No. 2 shall give concurrence within two weeks. If no concurrence is given, the appellant may appoint any one of the two.
  • The Company Law Board shall appoint an independent chairperson for the next Annual General Meeting.

The appellant is entitled to costs assessed at Rs. 10,000/-. The court clarified that its observations are not binding on the Company Law Board when deciding the petition on merits under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act.

The decision directly affects the parties by restoring certain rights and status quo pending final resolution, but does not establish new legal precedent beyond the application of existing principles to the facts.

Show all summary ...

Sanjiv Khanna, J.:— The present appeal under Section 10-F of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the act) has been filed by Telecommunication Consultants India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) against the order dated 20th December, 2005 passed by the Company Law Board, Principal Bench, New Delhi dismissing their application for interim relief. The appellant herein has filed a petition under Section 397-398 of the Act against M/s TBL India LLC (hereinafter referred to as the respondent No. 2), M/s DSS Enterprises Privates Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as respondent No. 3), Mr. Satwant Singh 1 (hereinafter referred to as respondent No. 4) and Ms. Reema Satwant Singh (hereinafter referred to as respondent No. 5) in respect of a company TCIL Bellsouth Limited (hereinafter referred to as respondent No. 1 or TBL).

2. In the amended appeal, the appellant has framed as many as 10 questions of law. However, keeping in view the controversy and the questions raised, I frame the following two questions of law which require adjudication in the present appeal;-

a) Whether Company law Board was right in refusing interim reliefs as civil suit and writ petition are pending?

b) Whether the appellant is entitled to interim relief/injunction?

3. In order to decide the contentions raised by the parties, admitted facts may be noticed.

a) On 5th June, 1989 the appellant and Bellsouth International Incorporated, jointly floated and incorporated the respondent no. 1 company.

b) As per Article 128 of the Articles of Association, the President of respondent No. 1 is the Chief Executive Officer of the company, who shall be responsible for general supervision and give directions in respect of its daily affairs, subject to directions of the Board Directors. The said article further provides that as long as the appellant holds shares in the respondent No. 1, the Board of Directors shall appoint a person nominated by the appellant as President in mutual agreement with Bellsouth International Incorporated or its affiliate.

c) The appellant herein holds 44.49% shares in the respondent No. 1 and 15.1% shares are held by respondent nos. 3 to 5. Respondent nos. 3 to 5 are supporting the appellant and, therefore, the appellant and respondents nos. 3 to 5 together hold 60% shares in respondent No. 1. The balance 40% shares in the respondent no. 1 were held by Bellsouth International Incorporated. In 2002, Bellsouth International Incorporated transferred these 40% shares in the respondent no. 1 to TBL India LLC, the respondent No. 2.

d) In accordance with Article 128 of the Articles of Association, the appellant nominated Mr. Sudhir Saxena to be the President or CEO of respondent no. in July, 2003. The Board of Directors approved the above appointment in their Resolution dated 3rd September, 2003.

e) Mr. Sudhir Saxena resigned as CEO on 6th June, 2005 and in his place the appellant nominated Mr. A. K. Jolly to act as the president/CEO.

f) The respondent no. 2 objected to the appointment of Mr. A. K. Jolly as CEO/President.

g) On 27th June, 2005 the respondent No. 2 unilaterally appointed Mr. Yogender Saxena and Dr. S N Singh to look after the office of the president/CEO of respondent No. 1 and Mr. A.K Jolly it is alleged by the appellant was physically prevented and obstructed from working as president/CEO.

h) On 30th June, 2005 or in the first week of July, 2005, the appellant filed a civil suit in District Court, Delhi seeking declaration and injunction against the Respondent No. 1, Dr. Indu B. Singh and Dr. S.N Singh both Directors of the Respondent No. 1 for restraining them from interfering with the management and affairs of the respondent No. 1. An application for interim injunction was also filed but no order in favour or against any party has been passed. The defendants in the said suit have objected to jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the said suit and grant relief.

i) On 30th June, 2005, meeting of the Board of Directors of the respondent No. 1 was held for considering appointment of Mr. A.K Jolly as president/CEO. However, in the said meeting there was no consensus on appointment of president/CEO. However, as per minutes circulated it was claimed by the respondent No. 2 that various resolutions were passed; including appointment of Dr. Indu B Singh as permanent chairman of respondent no. 1, declaring that appointment of Mr. A K Jolly as CEO was null and void and he was not fit to be appointed, with advise to the appellant to furnish names of three persons with biodata for consideration and till then Dr. S N Singh, Director was authorised to look after the affairs of the company in consultation with the chairman and exercise the same powers as CEO/president. Mr. Y.K Saxena was appointed as Company Secretary and GM (Finance) and he was also given authority to write the minutes of the meeting of the Board of directors and also given power and authority to operate the bank accounts of the respondent No. 1 company.

j) The purported Board meeting dated 30th June, 2005 and the alleged resolutions passed therein are not specifically subject matter of the Civil suit. Perhaps the appellant was not aware of the purported resolutions passed by the Board on 30th June, 2005 when the suit was filed.

k) The appellant protested against appointment of Dr. S N Singh as CEO and stated that the purported resolutions passed by the board of directors dated 30th June, 2005 were null and void. They also represented to the banks of the respondent No. 1 stating that Dr. S N Singh should not be allowed to operate the bank accounts.

l) In view of the conflicting claims made, the banks stopped the operation of the bank accounts.

m) This resulted in WP(C) No. 12428/2005 being filed by the respondent No. 1 in the Delhi High Court against Union of India and the nationalised bank. Vide order dated 5th Oct., 2005, Vikarmajit Sen, J. after examining articles 121 and 128 recalled the interim order passed on 29th July, 2005 allowing operation of the bank account in terms of purported meeting of the board of directors held on 30th June, 2005, leaving it to the bank to decide, after examining Articles 121 and 128, which of the two contesting parties would have right to operate the bank account, subject to further orders being passed by the court. The learned Judge after examining the two articles specifically held as under:

“On a conjoint reading of these Articles it appears that the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, so long as TCIL holds any shares, shall be a nominee of TCIL in mutual agreement with BSI or its affiliate. Dr. S N Singh is not a nominee of TCIL. He cannot, therefore, operate as the Chief Executive Officer of the Company. Furthermore, the Board of Directors being a creature of the Memorandum and Articles of Association cannot pass resolutions contrary to any Article.”

n) An appeal was filed against this order by the respondent no. 1 but the same was also dismissed by Division Bench on 27th October, 2005.

O) Thereafter, a number of meeting of the Board of Directors have been held with the both sides taking conflicting positions. It is alleged by the appellant that on 31st August, 2005 in the absence of their nominees, the Board purportedly passed a resolutions that Dr. S N Singh shall act as CEO on permanent basis and Dr. Indu Singh will act as permanent chairman of respondent no. 1 and it was also decided that Articles 127 and 128 should be deleted and new provisions should be incorporated for post of Managing Director with specific powers.

p) It is a case of the respondent No. 2 that a General Body Meeting was held on 30th September, 2005 in which the original Article 128 of the Article of Association was deleted and new Article was enacted taking away authority of the appellant to nominate president/CEO of the respondent No. 1. Some other purported resolutions were also passed for issue of fresh capital and appointment of Dr. S N Singh as CEO for a period of four years w.e.f 1st July, 2005.

q) However, it may be relevant to state here that this court while vacating injunction order and passing directions vide order dated 5th October, 2005 in WP(C) 12428/2005 did not take cognizance of the new Article and relied upon the earlier Article 128 to vacate the interim order.

r) It is the case of the appellant that it's representative Mr. A.K Chandershekhar was not allowed to participate and vote in the Extraordinary General Body-meeting, in-spite of the fact that the said representative had produced certified copy of the resolution authorising him to vote and represent the appellant. Similarly, Mr. V Parthasarthy and Mr. A V V Krishnan were not permitted and allowed to attend and vote as proxies of Mr. G.D Gaiha and Mr. A.K Duggal. It is the case of respondent No. 2 that the aforesaid persons though present in the said meeting were not allowed to attend and vote because they had failed to produce certified copy of the resolution to represent and vote on behalf of the appellant. However, it is admitted by them that letters dated 20th September, 2005 on behalf of the appellant stating that Mr. A K Chandershekhran, Director (Finance) will attend and vote in the said meeting had been received and proxy forms had also been received from Mr. G D Gaiha and Mr. A K Duggal.

s) As per Article 68 of the Articles of Association coram of members for transacting any business in the general meeting is members present in person and holding 50% of the total voting power entitled to vote. It is the case of the respondent No. 2 that the coram was complete as respondent nos. 3 to 5 were present and together members representing 50% of the total voting power and entitled to vote had signed the attendance sheet. However, respondents 3 to 5 have taken the stand that no meeting was held and no resolutions were passed on 30th September, 2005. This stand is duly recorded by the Company Law Board. This stand has been reiterated by respondents 3 to 5 before me. If the shares of the respondents 3 to 5 are not taken into consideration, then as per Article 68 the coram for the meeting was not complete.

t) The nationalised bank on the basis of the alleged resolutions passed in the General Body-Meeting dated 30th Sept., 2005 also allowed operation of bank account. Thus the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 and 2 has virtually become infructous.

u) The appellant on 10th Nov., 2005 filed C.P No. 94/2005 under sections 397 and 398 of the Act before the Company Law Board. Interim reliefs were also prayed for including suitable direction for operation of the bank account.

4. Learned tribunal while rejecting the prayers for interim reliefs has given the following reasoning in its order dated 20-12-2005:

“I have considered the matter carefully. The foundation, for seeking the interim reliefs, which have also been incidentally sought for as final reliefs is based on Article 128 of Articles of Association. It is on record that the petitioner has already filed a civil suit claiming for the right to manage the affairs of the company in terms of Article 128 and the said civil suit is still pending. Likewise, the matter relating to bank operation is also pending before the High Court which has posted the matter for further hearing on 11-1-2006. Since both the issues are pending in other for a in proceedings instituted prior in time, to avoid conflict of decisions, I do not propose to consider the reliefs at this stage. However, since the petitioner has questioned the validity of the annual general meeting held on 30-9-2005 on the ground that there was no valid quorum and that the respondents 3 to 5 have also questioned the factum itself of holding of said meeting, I only direct that none of the resolutions passed in that alleged meeting which have so far not been implemented, shall be implemented till the petition is disposed of. Likewise the resolutions which have been implemented will be subject to final order in the petition. Earlier interim orders will continue.”

5. Learned tribunal has held that as civil suit is pending and as the question of operation of bank account is also subject matter of a writ petition, the Company Law Board cannot consider granting reliefs as it may lead to conflicting decisions. With regard to the validity of puproted General Body-meeting held on 30th September, 2005 on the ground that there was no valid coram, failure to allow the appellant to participate etc., learned Company Law Board has directed that resolutions passed in the said meeting that had not been implemented shall not be implemented till the petition is disposed of. However, this interim order is of no consequence, as it is a case of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 that all the resolutions passed in the purported General Body-meeting dated 30th September, 2005 had already been implemented, when order dated 20th Dec., 2005 was passed.

6. A bare reading of the impugned order dated 20th December, 2005 shows that instead of deciding the prayer for interim reliefs on consideration of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable harm, learned tribunal did not consider and decide the reliefs claimed. For this hands off approach, learned tribunal held that the appellants had filed a civil suit regarding right to manage the affairs of the company in terms of Article 128 of the Articles of Association and the interim relief before Company Law Board was also based on the aforesaid article. It was further held that the question of operation of bank account is pending before the Delhi High Court in WP(C) 12428/2005 filed by the respondents 1 and 2 herein and, therefore, to avoid conflict of decisions learned Company Law Board does not propose to consider the reliefs at that stage.

7. Sections 397 and 398 of the Act, relate to oppression and mismanagement of companies. By virtue of Section 10 of the Act Company Law Board has the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate and decide questions relating to oppression and mismanagement in companies. A civil court cannot go into these questions and lacks jurisdiction to decide whether or not there is oppression and mismanagement and whether any relief or interim relief can be given. Similarly, normally a writ court will not entertain a writ petition relating to allegations of oppression and mismanagement in a private company. Question of alternative remedy is a relevant consideration in such cases. Thus, Company Law Board has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to consider and decide a petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act and also has the power to grant interim reliefs on prayers made before it.

8. Sometimes, parties also approach civil courts in addition to proceedings before the Company Law Board. It is no doubt true and correct that conflicting orders/judgments should not be passed and depending on the facts proceedings before one of the forums should be stayed to avoid conflicting decisions and confusion, however. Company Law Board does not lack jurisdiction to decide an application for interim relief merely because a civil suit or a writ petition has been filed. It cannot abdicate its obligation and adjudicatory role because one party has approached civil court or a writ petition has been filed by the opposite party.

9. There is no legal statutory bar on the Company Law Board to decide prayer for interim reliefs. There was no adjudication and decision of any court that could operate as res-judicata against the appellant. Courts do apply principle of “judicial-comity”. This normally applies when courts give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another country. But this principle is not as a matter of absolute obligation. This principle is applied out of deference and mutual respect and regard, founded on identity of positions and similarity of institutions. This principle also applies when we have courts and forums within the country exercising concurrent jurisdictions. Courts in such cases apply Rule of Priority. Court that first exercises jurisdiction acquires exclusive jurisdiction to further proceed with the matter. When same subject matter is proceeded in two courts/forums, the decision in the first case controls and may be pleaded as res-judicata. The rationale behind the rule is to reduce the possibility of conflicting exercise of concurrent jurisdictions.

10. Rules of Comity and Priority are not of universal examination and are subject to exceptions and qualifications. The two Rules cannot be applied universally. The courts must examine the subject matter of the litigation and the relief sought. Orders passed by the court exercising concurrent jurisdiction should be examined. The said Rules cannot apply where the first court cannot decide questions involved in the second litigation and afford complete relief. The Rules must yield to the more important, vital and fundamental principle that a party must be granted justice and relief by a court competent to afford adequate and a complete relief.

11. Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 gives statutory recognition to the Principle of Comity of Courts. It applies when both proceedings are pending before Courts. It does not apply when one of the proceeding is pending before a foreign court. The said section applies only when the matter in issue in the subsequent proceeding is “directly and substantially in issue” in the previous suit. It is a rule of procedure and not a substantive right. The guiding principle is “expediency for ends of justice”. Section 10 does not bar institution of a suit but it's trial. It is well settled that the said section does not affect the court's power to pass interlocutory orders e.g appointment of receiver, injunction etc.(see Indian Bank v. M.S Co-operative Marketing Fedn. Ltd. AIR 1998 SC 1952).

12. Supreme Court in National Institute of Mental Health &Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara, (2005) 2 SCC 256, has observed:

“8. The object underlying Section 10 is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue. The object underlying Section 10 is to avoid two parallel trials on the same issue by two courts and to avoid recording of conflicting findings on issues which are directly and substantially in issue in-previously instituted suit. The language of Section 10 suggests that it is referable to a suit instituted in the civil court and it cannot apply to proceedings! of other nature instituted under any other statute. The object of Section 10 is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits between the same parties in respect of the same matter in issue. The fundamental test to attract Section 10 is, whether on final decision being reached in the previous suit, such decision would operate as res-judicata in the subsequent suit. Section 10 applies only in cases where the whole of the subject-matter in both the suits is identical. The key words in Section 10 are “the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue” in the previous instituted suit. The words “directly and substantially in issue” are used in contradistinction to the words “incidentally or collaterally in issue”. Therefore, Section 10 would apply only if there is identity of the matter in issue in both the suits, meaning thereby, that the whole of the subject-matter in both the proceedings is identical.

9. xxxx

10. As stated above, Section 10 CPC is referable to a suit instituted in a civil court. The proceedings before the Labour Court cannot be equated with the proceedings before a civil court. They are not the courts of concurrent jurisdiction. In the circumstances. Section 10 CPC has no application to the facts of this case.

11. xxxx

12. In the case of Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal it has been held that inherent jurisdiction of the court to make orders ex debito justitiae is undoubtedly affirmed by Section 151 CPC, but that jurisdiction cannot be exercised so as to nullify the provisions of the Code. Where the Code deals expressly with a particular matter, the provision should normally be regarded as exhaustive. In the present case, as stated above. Section 10 CPC has no application and consequently, it was not open to the High Court to bypass Section 10 CPC by invoking Section 151 CPC.”

13. Similarly in Pukhrai D. Jain & Ors. v. G. Gopalakrishna, (2004) 7 SCC 251, Supreme Court has held:

“4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records. In our opinion, the view taken by the High Court is wholly erroneous in law and must be set aside. The proceedings in the trial of a suit have to be conducted in accordance with provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 10 CPC no doubt lays down that no court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed. However, mere filing of an application under Section 10 CPC does not in any manner put an embargo on the power of the court to examine the merits of the matter. The object of the section is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue. The section enacts merely a rule of procedure and a decree passed in contravention thereof is not a nullity. It is not for a litigant to dictate to the court as to how the proceedings should be conducted, it is for the court to decide what will be the best course to be adopted for expeditious disposal of the case. In a given case the stay of proceedings of later suit may be necessary in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and harassment of parties. However, where a subsequently instituted suit can be decided on purely legal points without taking evidence, it is always open to the court to decide the relevant issues and not to keep the suit pending which has been instituted with an oblique motive and to cause harassment to the other side.”

14. The scope and ambit of the petition under Section 397 and 398 of the Act as in the present case is very wide. It is just and equitable remedy to secure justice to parties. In the present matter the civil court has not passed any order inspite of the fact that the interim application has remained pending. The interim application is yet to be heard and decided. The Company Law Board, therefore, should not have adopted “touch me not” approach but gone into the question on merits. The issue before the civil court is extremely attenuated and is related only to right of appointment of Mr. A K Jolly as CEO and the conduct of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 in appointing Dr. S N Singh as CEO. The larger and broader issue of oppression and mismanagement is not the subject matter of the civil suit. The said civil suit was filed on June/July, 2005. The petition for oppression and mismanagement was filed much later in November, 2005 and the subsequent events after filing of the suit are also subject matter of the petition for oppression and mismanagement. There is no possibility of conflict of orders as the civil court has not decided the interim application and secondly the subject matter of controversy before the civil court is only a minuscule fraction of the entire controversy, which is subject matter before the Company Law Board. Thirdly, the civil court is concerned with the rights of the parties and cannot go into and examine question of oppression and mis-management which can be gone into and examined by the Company Law Board.

15. Similarly with regard to the writ petition filed by the respondent no. 1 for operation and bank accounts, the controversy involved in the said writ petition is not subject matter of the controversy before the Company Law Board. Of course the Company Law Board should not pass any orders which conflicts with the order passed by the High Court in the civil writ petition. The main contention and issue raised by the respondent no. 1 before the writ court is that the bank could not have been affected and influenced by the dispute inter se the respondents and the appellant and the bank cannot act as an adjudicating authority and decide which party is entitled to represent the respondent no. 1 company. It is the case of the respondent No. 2 that the bank is merely expected to look into the Board resolution as placed before them to determine the authority to operate the account. This is apparent and clear from the order dated 29th July, 2005 passed in the writ petition filed by respondent no. 1. In the subsequent order passed in this writ petition dated 5th October, 2005, the learned single Judge examined Articles 121 and 128 and held that as long as the appellant holds shares in the respondent no. 1 it has the right to appoint CEO in mutual consultation with respondent No. 2. It was further held that Dr. S N Singh was not the nominee of the appellant, he cannot operate and function as CEO of respondent No. 1. Board of Directors, learned single Judge held, being creature of the memorandum and articles of association cannot pass resolutions contrary to any article. The aforesaid observations of the learned single judge in the order dated 5th October, 2005 have been quoted above. The respondents also declined the suggestion that an independent signatory can be appointed to operate the bank account. In these circumstances after recalling the order dated 29th July, 2005, it was left to the bank to decide as to who should operate the bank account. It was further observed that the bank while deciding the question will keep in view articles 121 and 128 of the articles of association which had been interpreted by the learned single Judge. Thereafter, admittedly the respondent no. 1 had filed an appeal which was dismissed and no further orders have been passed.

16. It may be pertinent to state here that the aforesaid writ petition has been filed by respondent no. 1 and not by the appellant. Therefore, no relief as such can be granted in favour of the appellant with regard to operation of bank accounts. The writ court, it is obvious, has not directed that the respondent No. 2 or his nominee can operate the bank account. On the other hand the findings of the writ court in the order dated 5th October, 2005 are to the contrary. Thus, in the facts of the present case there was no reason and cause for the Company Law Board to refuse to go into the question of reliefs prayed for and asked for by the appellant. Lastly, the bank itself has allowed operation of the account. Thus for all practical purpose the writ has become infructous.

17. Learned counsel for the respondent had argued that no substantial question of law arises out of the impugned order dated 20th December, 2005 and secondly, no appeal under Section 10-F of the Act is not maintainable against an interim order. With regard to the first contention he relied upon judgment of this court in Caparo India Ltd (UK) and Ors. v. Caparo Maruti Limited & Ors. 128 (2006) DLT 425, Mohd. Jafar v. Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd (1997) 42 DRJ 647, Bhagwati Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Ltd & Anr (2005) 128 Company Cases 444 (Cal), C. Sri Hari Rao v. Sri Ram Dass Motor Transport (P) Ltd. & Ors. (1999) 1 Company Law Journal 280, Dr. Ms, Bais Surgical and Medical Institute Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhananjay Pande & Ors. 2005 (2) Maharashtra Law Journal 1145.

18. The gist of these judgments is that an appeal under Section 10F is maintainable only on a question of law and not on a question of fact. There cannot be any dispute about the said proposition. However, in the present case, the Company Law Board has failed to exercise its jurisdiction. It has also failed to properly consider judicial implications of the so called paralle1.concurrent proceedings. Questions of law do arise in the present case.

19. In the case of The Printers (Mysore) Private, Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph AIR 1960 SC 1156, it has been held that when a trial court while exercising its jurisdiction has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant principles and has adopted an unjudicious approach, then it will be open to the appellate court to interfere.

20. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 10-F of the Act this court can certainly examine whether or not the learned Company Law Board had properly applied the principles of law for grant of interim injunction. While doing so facts as found by the learned tribunal have to be accepted as correct, unless the findings are perverse and or based on material or evidence. Here again courts have made a distinction between primary facts as found by the tribuna1.trial court and inferences drawn by the trial court by applying principles of law to the primary facts. In the latter case, question of law can arise. Similarly a question of law may be a mixed question involving both facts and law. Such questions can certainly be answered by the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 10-F of the Act.

21. While deciding the above questions this court is not disturbing any finding of fact given by the Company Law Board. On the basis of the admitted facts that this court is examining whether learned tribunal was correct in law in refusing to decide prayer for interim reliefs in view of the civil litigation and the writ petition. Therefore, to my mind, questions of law do arise in the present case and this court has jurisdiction under Section 10 F of the Act to answer the questions of law mentioned above.

22. Learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that interim order passed by the Company Law Bord cannot be made subject matter of an appeal under Section 10 F of the Act. I do not agree. Appeal under Section 10 F is maintainable against an order passed by the Board. Section 10 F does not state that appeal is maintainable only against an order finally disposing of the proceedings. The only limitation imposed by the said provision is that a question of law should arise out of the order passed by the Board. A question of law may arise, when an order decides an interim application or grants or refuses to grant interim relief. It cannot be said that no substantial question of law can emanate from an interim order, however incorrect or wrong it may be. A question of law can certainly arise out of an order deciding an application for stay, though such cases may not be frequent. The decisions relied upon by the respondent No. 2, namely Bhagwati Developers Pvt. Ltd., C. Sri Hari Rao, Dr. Ms. Bais Surgical and Medical Institute Pvt. Ltd.(supra) do not in any manner support the submission that no appeal under Section 10 F is maintainable against an interim order or interlocutory order passed by the learned Company Law Board. In the above cases the appeals filed under Section 10-F arising out of the interim/interlocutory orders were dismissed on the ground that no substantial question of law had arisen. The appeals were not dismissed for the reason that an interlocutory order or an interim order cannot be made subject matter of appeal under Section 10 F of the Act.

23. Learned counsel for the respondent had also argued that the observations made in order dated 5th October, 2005 passed in WP(C) 12428/2000 quoted above is only an observation and not a finding. This does not appear to be correct. Respondent no. 1 was/is the petitioner in the said civil writ. The appellant had relied upon articles 121 and 128 of the articles of Association. The court interpreted the said articles and gave its finding. After giving its finding the court vacated the interim injunction. The respondent no. 1 had even filed an appeal against the said order but the same was dismissed. In any case this court can always interpret the Articles of Association including Articles 121 and 128. After interpreting the said articles I have also come to the same conclusion.

24. Question No. 1 is accordingly decided in favour of the appellant and against the respondent nos. 1 and 2.

25. The question when and in what circumstances interim relief or injunction should be passed is well settled. Tribunal or court while deciding an interim injunction application has to examine prima facie case, balance of convenience and the question of irreparable injury.

26. It may be noted here that we are deciding an interim application. The requirement of law is whether the appellant herein has been able to make out a prima facie case. For this purpose, I shall not be deciding controversial or disputed facts. Neither can the company law board at this interim stage give any positive finding against or in favour of a particular party. I shall go by the facts as stated by both the parties and on the basis of the admitted factual position apply principles of law to decide whether prima facie case has been made for grant of interim relief.

27. The appellant herein admittedly owns 44.9% of the paid share capital of the respondent No. 1. The respondents 3 to 5 who hold 15.1% shares, are supporting the appellant. Together they hold 60% of the total paid up share capital. Respondent nos. 3 to 5 have stated that no resolutions were passed in the General Body Meeting dated 30th sept., 2005 amending and modifying Articles 127 and 128 of the Articles of Association. Admittedly the appellants were not permitted and allowed to participate and vote in the said meeting, though it is the case of the respondent no. 2 that proper certified resolution was not produced, which fact is, however, denied by the appellant. Similarly, Articles 121 and 128 have been interpreted by this court in favour of the appellant. It will be unjust and unfair not to allow the shareholders holding 60% of the paid up share capital not to have any say in the working of the company especially in view of Articles 127 and 128 of the Articles of Association as they originally existed. The appellant, admittedly, is a largest single shareholder having 44.9% of the total paid up share capital. The appellant cannot be sidelined and be made a complete non entity. The respondent No. 2 was aware that if the appellant participates in the general body meeting the resolutions will fail. It was not in the interest of the respondent No. 2 to allow the appellant to participate and vote. Right from the time the respondent no. 1 was incorporated the said company had worked and was managed in terms of the mutual settlement incorporated articles 127 and 128 of the articles. Normally we have cases where the majority shareholders do not allow the minority group to have any say and the minority is ousted from management. This is a peculiar case in which the minority group has completely taken over the entire company and for last more than one year, the largest shareholder, who alongwith the respondent no. 3 to 5 holds 60% shares has been reduced to a helpless “minority”. This situation requires interference by the court. Otherwise irreparable harm and injustice will be caused. Balance of convenience requires that rights of the appellant should be protected. This court cannot be oblivious to the reality that it takes years before litigations of this nature come to a final conclusion. The appellant a government of India undertaking obviously did not make the investment and purchase the shares to be a salient spectator and a non entity. Companies function in a “democratic” manner and on consensus and not by one group completely ousting the largest shareholder and contrary to the wishes of the majority.

28. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 had argued that granting any relief to the appellant would result in allowing the petition under Section 397 and 398 of the Act on the basis of an interim order. In this regard he referred to and relied upon judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of UP & Ors. v. Ram Sukhi Devi (2005) 9 SCC 733 and the order passed in LPA No. 2268/2005 on the respondent No. 1's appeal. The said judgments are not applicable to the facts of the present case. It is well settled that the courts while passing an interim order normally direct status quo to be maintained but keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a case status quo ante can also be directed. The facts stated above and keeping in view the nature of controversy, the present case justifies maintenance of status quo ante as it existed from the beginning when Mr. Sudhir Saxena was working as CEO/President of the respondent No. 1 and before the disputes arose.

29. In Dorab Cawasii Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden & Ors., (1990) 2 SCC 117, Supreme court observed:

“16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:

(1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction.

(2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.

(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief.

17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as a prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion.”

30. In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sriman Naravan & Anr. (2002) 5 SCC 760, relying upon Gujrat bottling Company v. Coca Cola Co. (1995) 5 SCC 545 it was held:

8. The decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when the exercise of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and remain uncertain till they are established on evidence at the trial. The relief by way of interlocutory injunction is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before which that uncertainty could be resolved. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial.

The need for such protection has, however, to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the “balance of convenience” lies.”

31. Accordingly, the following interim order is passed:

i) the bank accounts of the respondent No. 1 will be jointly operated by the nominee of the appellant and the respondent No. 2. In case there is difficulty in operation of bank account parties will be at liberty to approach Company Law- Board for suitable direction and for appointment of an independent chairman;

ii) The appellant will send name of two persons for the appointment as president of the respondent No. 1 to the respondent No. 2, who will then within two weeks give concurrence in respect of one name and the said person will be appointed as CEO/president of the respondent No. 1. In case respondent No. 2 does not give its concurrence, the appellant will be at liberty to appoint any one as CEO/president of the respondent no. 1.

iii) Company Law Board will appoint an independent chairperson for the next Annual General Meeting.

32. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. The appellant will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 10,000/-. It is, however, clarified that the observations made in this order will not be treated as binding on the Company Law Board when it decides the petition under Section 397 and 398 of the Act on merits.