Sukhder Singh Kang, J.:— At issue, in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Shri Ramesh Chander Chug, petitioner, is the legality and validity of the orders of his suspension as Sub-Divisional Officer and directions requiring him to mark his attendance in the office daily, and his entitlement to the annual increment in his pay.

2. Facts giving rise to the filing of the writ petition may be recapitulated briefly:

A departmental inquiry was initiated against|Ramesh Chander Chug, petitioner, and 14 other officers/officials of the respondent Haryana State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) for various acts of omission and commission in relation to the construction of a Power House on the Western Yamuna Canal. The Inquiry Officer was appointed on 28th December, 1982. The inquiry is still in progress and has not been completed as yet.

On 23rd February, 1985, the petitioner was suspended under the orders of the Secretary of the Board. In the month of August, 1985, the Chief Accounts Officer of the Board issued orders that the petitioner shall be granted subsistence allowance only if he reported himself for duty daily at his headquarters fixed by the competent authority. The petitioner made a number of representations to the Chairman and the Secretary of the Board against the orders of his suspension, but did not receive any reply. Although the rules and regulations applicable to the petitioner required that the cases of all the officials of the respondents-Board under suspension should be reviewed every six months. Yet the case of the petitioner was never reviwed by the competent authority. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the orders of his suspension and directions for making attendance daily and withholding of his annual increment.

3. The respondent-Board das resisted the writ petition and has filed written statement broadly controverting the main pleas raised in the writ petition. It is averred that the allegations against the petitioner and other officers/officials contained charges of very grave nature resulting in a loss of Rs. 20 lacs due to wrong levelling for excavation work of about 18 Kms. of Hydel Channel. It is pleaded that the petitioner was suspended by the orders dated 23rd Feb., 1985, with the prior approval of Member Administration of the Board and not by the Secretary of the Board. The Member Administration has been invested with the powers of inflicting minor punishment including the issuance of warning etc. to officers/officials upto the rank of Executive Engineer, Senior Accounts Officer and other officers of equivalent rank/statute, vide office order No. 1049.HSEB-62, dated 24th September, 1984, issued by the Chairman of the Board. The petitioner was holding the post of Assistant Engineer and hence was below the status of Executive Engineer. The Member Administration being the punishing authority of the petitioner for purpose of infliction of minor punishment was competent to place him under suspension. The suspension order was communicated by ‘the Secretary of the Board. The petitioner and some of the other officers were making persistent efforts to delay and stall the inquiry proceedings and had been able to delay it considerably. Since the charges against the petitioner and his colleagues were of serious and they were obstructing the smooth and expeditious conduct of the inquiry, the petitioner and other four officers/officials were suspended in the interest of speedy inquiry which was for the benefit of all concerned. The petitioner was required to report himself daily at the headquarters fixed with Executive Engineer (Operation), City Division, Rohtak. This condition was incorporated in the order dated 23rd February, 1985, for the reasons that even during suspension period, the relationship of master and servant subsists and the officer under suspension is duty bound to abide by the lawful orders of the employer. Further, it was urged that according to Haryana Government instructions, duly adopted by the respondent-Board on 2nd June, 1971, the suspended employee can be required to mark daily attendance during his suspension. A copy of these instructions is appended as Annexure R-3 to the written statement. In accordance with rule 7.2 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume I. Part I, the authority which makes the suspension order of an employee is to be satisfied that the suspended employee is not engaged in any other employment, business, profession or vocation. This satisfaction can be achieved if the suspended employee comes present once for a while is the day in the office to which he is attached. This attendance is, therefore, necessary for the satisfaction of the competent Authority. It was further averred that the case of the petitioner for reinstatement had been kept pending so that the inquiry can be concluded expeditiously. The Haryana State Electricity Board has been constituted by the Haryana Government under Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (for short ‘the Act’). Under Section 15 the Board has been empowered to appoint a Secretary and such other officers and employees as may be required to enable the Board to carry out its functions under the Act. Section 78 of the Act authorises the State Government to frame rules to give effect to the provisions of the Act. Under Section 79 of the Act, the Board has been invested with powers to frame regulations in relation to the matters specified therein. In exercise of the powers conferred on it by Section 78 of the Act, the Punjab Government framed Punjab State Electricity Board (Chairman's Powers) Rules, 1959 (for short, ‘1952 Rules’) to define and regulate the powers and functions of the Chairman of the Board. rule 14 of the 1959 Rules empowers the Chairman to distribute duties and functions between Members. Secretaries and other officers of the Board. It reads as under:—

“R. 14. Distribution of Duties and Functions:

Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Chairman shall distribute the duties and functions between members, secretaries and other, officers of the Board and matters partaining to the disposal of the case work in the secretariate of the Board on such subjects that are not to be included in the agenda of the Board's meeting.”

4. The Chairman, vide office order No. 1049.HSEB/62, dated 24th September, 1984, assigned, inter alia, the following functions and duties to the Member Administration:

“1. Administration and Establishment:

The following nature of cases upto the rank of Xen/Sr. Accounts Officers and Officers of equivalent rank/status shall be disposed of finally by the Member Administration:—

(i) xxxxxxxxx

(ii) xxxxxxxxx

(iii) xxxxxxxxx

(iv) xxxxxxxxx

(v) Inflicting of minor punishment including issue of warning after investigation inquiry and a copy of this is to be placed in CR file except Under Secretaries/Administrative Officers or any Non-Technical Officers of corresponding rank/status. However, Member Administration would be the appellate authority for Under Secretaries/Administrative Officers etc.”

5. According to Regulation 4(1)(a) of the Haryana State Electricity Board Employees (Punishment and Appeal) Regulations, 1980 (for short, ‘the Regulations), framed under Section 79 of the Act, the appointing Authority or other higher Authority to which it is subordinate or the punishing Authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the Board by general or special order, may place an employee under suspension. By office order dated 24th September, 1984, Member Administration has been made the Punishing Authority of the Assistant Engineer's for the purpose of inflicting minor punishments. The Member Administration was, therefore, fully competent to pass orders of the petitioner's suspension. The plea of Shri. Malik, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that no inquiry is necessary for inflicting a minor, punishment and, consequently, there was no occasion for the member Administration to order the petitioner's suspension, cannot be accepted. Clause 1(v) of the office order dated 24th September, 1984, reproduced above, talks of investigation/inquiry. So, in cases where inquiry is initiated, the order of suspension can be passed by the Member Administration in order to facilitate an expeditious and fair inquiry unhindered by the influence or mechanisation of a delinquent officer/official in office.

6. Shri Malik had strenuously argued that the powers to suspend an Assistant Engineer had been delegated by the Board to the Chairman. The Chairman as a delegate could not further delegate these powers to the Member Administration. There is a fallacy in this argument. The Chairman had not delegated these powers to the Member Administration under the Regulations. He had passed the office order in exercise of statutory powers invested in him under rule 14 of the 1959 Rules. The 1959 Rules had specifically and clearly authorised the Chairman to distribute any of the duties and functions of the Board or the Chairman amongst the Members, Secretaries or officers of the Board. Member Administration was admittedly a member of the Board. He could be assigned any of the functions of the Board or the Chairman under rule 14 of the 1959 Rules. This will not amount to delegation of powers of the Board by the Chairman to his delegate. When the Chairman assigns duties and functions to a Member or an Officers under rule 14 of the 1959 Rules, he performs duties and obligations placed on him by the Rules. He does not delegate the powers belonging to the Board or the Chairman. The Board is an enormous undertaking with thousands of employees on its rolls. “It would be virtually impossible for the Board to carry on its functions, if every time every minion under it, were to be subjected to disciplinary action only by the Board, which is the op-body acting as a Corporate entity. We do not think that the, provisions of the Act can be interpreted into an impossible position for the Board. On the other hand, a more viable construction is what we have indicated above”. These observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in U.P State Electricity Boar v. Abdul Sakoor Hashmi etc, (1980) 3 SCC 278 : AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1708 squarely apply to the present case. In that case Regulations framed by the U.P Electricity Board under sub-sections (c) and (k) of Section 79 laying down the mode of appointment to various posts, the appointing Authority competent to terminate their services were held to be not invalid on the ground that the Board had no power to delegate in that regard. It was held: “Section 79(k) is a residuary provision, which embraces the power to make Regulations in regard to tike functions of the Board. Concerned “anguage used in this clause is sufficient to cover making up of provisions to terminate employment. Section 79(k) takes within its sweep the power to maintain or to take disciplinary action.” So, the Member Administration had been validly invested by the Chairman with powers to take disciplinary action against certain category of officers including Assistant Engineers for inflicting minor punishments. He was also competent to suspend the petitioner, who is an Assistant Engineer, during the course of disciplinary enquiry.

7. It is indeed true that the Chairman had been clothed with the powers of punishing Authority mentioned in 1980 Regulations/corresponding provisions of Punjab Civil Services (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1952, in relation to disciplinary cases of Gazetted Officers for major punishments vide office order No. 5.REG-22.L-1, dated 27th July, 1981. This, however, is in no way in derrogation to the powers of the Chairman derived from the 1959 Rules. In exercise of those powers, the Chairman had specifically assigned Member Administration the duties and functions of taking disciplinary action for inflicting minor, punishment on the Assistant Engineers. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. By office order No. 5, ibid, the powers to take action against Gazetted Officers including Assistant Engineers for inflicting major punishments have been conferred on the Chairman of the Board. The Chairman while exercising powers under rule 14 of the 1959 Rules can legally and validly confer these powers on the Member Administration. This power flows from statutory rules and the principle that the Delegatee cannot further delegate its powers, cannot negate the exercise of this statutory power.

8. It was then argued by Shri Malik that the Authority had issued charge sheet to 15 officers/officials. Only 5 out of them have been suspended. The charges against the petitioner were similar to those/against certain other officers, who had not been suspended. The action of the Board in picking and chosing officers for suspension is discriminatory and liable to be quashed. The argument has not appealed to us. The Authorities have taken conscious decisions regarding the suspension of the five officers. It has been explained in the written statement that these officers were employing dilatory tactics and were not allowing the inquiry proceedings to progress. The same was pending since 1983. The charges against the petitioner and his colleagues who had been suspended were of serious nature. The petitioner and others have been suspended in order to make it possible for the inquiry to be completed expeditiously and fairly. It is not disputed even by Mr. Malik that a delinquent employee facing charges of misconduct, attracting a penalty can be suspended in contemplation of or during the pendency of departmental inquiry. So, there is no discrimination.

9. It was then argued that the orders of the Chief Accounts Officers (Annexure P. 5) directing that the petitioner shall be granted subsistence allowance only if he reported himself for duty daily at the headquarters is wholly arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. It is urged by the learned counsel that with the suspension of the delinquent officer, the relationship between the employer and the employee is suspended. The employer could not issue any directions in the nature of Annexure P. 5 to the delinquent employee. Such an employee cannot be asked to perform any duties or to attend the office. The employer does not pay full pay and allowances to the delinquent officer. Only a subsistence allowance, which is just sufficient to keep the body and soul of the concerned official together is paid during the course of the inquiry. The employer cannot take any work out of the suspended employee nor can be insist on the latter's attendance in a office daily. There is merit in this contention. An order of suspension of a government servant, does not put an end to his service under the Government. He continues to be a member of the Service in spite of order of suspension. The real effect of the order “of suspension is that though he continues to be a member of the government service he is not permitted to work and further during the period of his suspension he is paid some allowance—called substance allowance, which is normally less than his salary—instead of the pay and allowance, he would have been entitled to it if he had not been suspended, (See in this connection Khem Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R 1963 S.C 687 and V.P Gindroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1970) 1 SCC 362 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1494). After the suspension of the relationship of master and servant, the suspended employee cannot be asked to perform any official duties or to appear in and attend any office daily. If such an officer is required to be present in the office, it will amount to issue orders to him and asking him to perform certain duties which will not be permissible during the period of suspension. The, matter is not res integra. In Zonal Manager, Food Corporation of India v. Khaleel Ahmed Siddiqui, 1982 (2) S.L.R 779, it was held:—

“………………We fail to understand how when an employee is debarred temporarily from service, he could be compelled to attend office and mark his attendance daily and also be visited with penalty if he does not mark, his attendance. The instructions, in our view cannot be regarded as merely filling up the gaps in the regulations when they are inconsistent with the rules. It is unnecessary to refer to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court which have held that it is not open by way of administrative instructions. In this connection, it has to be noted that the person under suspension is entitled to all allowances referred to in Reg. 66(6) other than conveyance allowance. This clearly indicates that a person under suspension is not expected to attend office or claim conveyance for his attendance………………………………….”

10. The same view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in Chitranjan Ghose v. I.G of Police W.B, 1979 (2) S.L.R 194. It was held: “that during the course of his suspension), pending an inquiry, a government servant is not liable to render any service or perform any duty. The police officer, while under suspension cannot be compelled to attend roll-call. This case is closest to the case in hand. The Karnataka High Court also has taken a similar view in Gangavathi S.S v. Chairman and M.D Karnataka Land Army Ltd., 1984 (3) S.L.R 493.

11. The plea of the respondents that the competent Authority had to be satisfied that the employee under suspension is not engaged in any other trade, business or profession during the course of suspension and has to issue a certificate and that without physical presence of the employee before such Authority, it will be impossible to issue such a certificate, cannot be accepted. Simply in order to facilitate the competent Authorities in the discharge of his duties an employee under suspension cannot be forced to undergo harassment of attending office daily and incurring expenses on his journey to and from the place of his residence. For this purpose, the competent Authority has to devise some other proper and legal method. So, we are of the considered view that directions of the Chief Accounts Officer directing the petitioner to attend the office alt his headquarters daily is without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.

12. It was then urged by Shri Malik that under rule 4(6) of the 1980 Regulations, the case of every suspended employee has to be reviewed every six month. It has not been pleaded in the written statement that for some exceptional circumstances, it was necessary to keep the government servant under suspension for a period beyond six months. So the order of suspension is vitiated. We are not impressed. Despite the use of word “shall” the rule is only directory. It is not mandatory. It does not provide for any consequences for non-compliance thereof. There has been a substantial compliance with this rule. It has been averred in the written statement that the case of the petitioner was considered in August, 1985 and his subsistence allowance had been increased from 50% to 75% of his pay. This clearly shows an application of the mind. The competent Authority wanted the inquiry to continue and the petitioner to remain under suspension. The petitioner cannot raise any grievance on this score. It was lastly contended by Mr. Malik that the petitioner was entitled to annual increment which was due as a matter of course on 31st July, 1985, and the same has been with-held under the Service Rules, but with-holding of an increment is a punishment. This could not be inflicted without following the procedure prescribed under the 1980 Regulations. The argument has not commended itself to us. No order has been passed with-holding the increment. Since the petitioner is under suspension so the question regarding increment has not been decided one way or the other. This will be taken up after the completion of the inquiry and may depend upon the result thereof. So, the claim of the petitioner for the grant of annual increment during the pendency of the suspension cannot be granted.

13. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is partly allowed and the order of the Chief Accounts Officer (Annexure P. 5) requiring the petitioner to mark his presence at his headquarters daily is quashed. The order of suspension is sustained. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

14. Petition partly allowed.