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Rambhat v. Lakshman Chintaman Mayalay

Bombay High Court
Jul 5, 1881
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Westropp, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 10 September 1856 Chintaman (alias Chinto) Mayalay, a Konkani Brahmin advanced in years and without male issue, executed a written instrument described in the document as a "bakshishpatra" in favour of Morbhat Ramkrishnabhat Upadya (a Brahmin of the same caste). The document declared that Chintaman, being old and without male issue, gave his kasba property and movable property to Morbhat; directed that Morbhat should pay Government assessment and village expenses, enjoy the property with his grandsons generation after generation, and that so long as Chintaman lived he would take the profits while Morbhat maintained him. The deed was handwritten by a Brahman, signed by the donor, attested by witnesses, registered on 4 October 1856, and possession was delivered to Morbhat, who managed the property and paid assessment receipts.

About fifteen months after execution, on 6 January 1858, Chintaman purported to revoke the bakshishpatra by a letter to the Assistant Magistrate and was restored to possession. Morbhat sued Chintaman (Suit No. 446 of 1859) in the Munsif's Court to recover the property. Before decree in that suit, on 6 June 1859, Chintaman adopted Lakshman (then about eight years old); Lakshman was not made a party to Morbhat's suit. On 2 April 1860 the Munsif decreed in favour of Morbhat holding the bakshishpatra to be valid, and Chintaman withdrew an appeal on 12 July 1860, admitting the instrument's execution and consenting to give over the property to Morbhat in accordance with the decree. Subsequent suits by Lakshman's natural father against Morbhat were defeated at multiple levels.

Lakshman, within three years after attaining majority, brought the present suit on 16 March 1874 against Rambhat (the grandson of Morbhat) to recover a moiety of the property on the ground that at the time of Chintaman's death he could not alienate more than one-half of his property as against his adopted son.

Procedural history in this opinion includes: Munsif's decree for Morbhat (1860), unsuccessful collateral litigation by Lakshman's natural father, and decrees below in the present suit in favour of Lakshman which the Court now reviews.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the bakshishpatra executed by Chintaman on 10 September 1856 was intended to operate as a deed (conveyance) immediately vesting property in Morbhat, or merely as a testamentary disposition (a will) operative only on Chintaman's death.
  2. Whether Lakshman, who was adopted after the filing of Morbhat's suit and was not made a party to that suit, is bound by the decree in Morbhat v. Chintaman (No. 446 of 1859) and by Chintaman's subsequent withdrawal of his appeal in that suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Lakshman's Arguments

  • Lakshman's pleader argued that the bakshishpatra must be regarded as a will (testamentary in character) rather than a deed.
  • Because the bakshishpatra was treated as a will, Lakshman contended he should have been entitled to the whole property (had the document been testamentary while Chintaman was a member of an undivided family), yet in the present suit he sought only a moiety.

Defendant/Appellant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The defendant (Rambhat, as representative of Morbhat's estate) relied on the prior proceedings in Morbhat v. Chintaman (suit No. 446 of 1859) and on Chintaman's admission/withdrawal of appeal, asserting the bakshishpatra operated as a deed and vested property in Morbhat.
  • Implicitly, the defendant argued that adoption after the conveyance could not disturb the rights already vested in Morbhat.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two analytical stages: first addressing the preliminary procedural question about the binding effect of the earlier suit on Lakshman, and second resolving the substantive character of the bakshishpatra (deed or will).

Preliminary procedural point:

  • The Court assumed, for the defendant's benefit, that the plaint in Morbhat's suit could have been filed before Lakshman's adoption, but emphasised that Lakshman was adopted before the hearing and decree and could have been made a party to that suit. Because he was not made a party, the Court held the decree in suit No. 446 did not bind Lakshman and he was free to re-open the substantive question.
  • The Court treated adoption pendente lite as not equivalent to an alienation pendente lite; an adopted son, like a natural born son born during litigation, obtains a vested interest at the time of adoption/birth and thus must be made party to bind that interest. The Court rejected the argument that a putative motive to defeat the bakshishpatra (i.e., an alleged collusive adoption) altered this principle: adoption by a sonless Hindu was a right and could not be treated as void simply because its motive was to affect litigation between the donor and donee.
  • The Court noted that if the bakshishpatra were held to be a will, Lakshman should have sought the whole property rather than a moiety, because as a co-parcener he would have rights against the entirety under the Hindu law applicable in the Presidency.

Substantive character of the bakshishpatra (deed vs. will):

  • Factors suggesting a testamentary character: the practical point that Morbhat could not beneficially enjoy the income of the property until after Chintaman's death, and that the document contemplated application of the income for Chintaman's maintenance.
  • Factors favouring a deed/conveyance: the document was expressly styled a "bakshishpatra" (a name suggesting a deed), it was registered within a month of execution, possession and management of the property were actually delivered to Morbhat, and Morbhat paid Government assessments and held receipts. The document contemplated active management by Morbhat and relieved the donor of management responsibilities.
  • The Court gave decisive weight to the objective acts of registration, delivery of possession, and the document's practical operation: these showed Chintaman intended an immediate vesting in Morbhat subject to a trust for Chintaman's life income. Consequently the Munsif's finding (in the 1860 decree) that the instrument was a conveyance and not a will was affirmed by the Court's reasoning.
  • Because the bakshishpatra contained no power of revocation, the attempted revocation by Chintaman in 1858 was legally ineffective; the conveyance had vested the inheritable estate (subject to a life-interest) in Morbhat on 10 September 1856.
  • The Court articulated the applicable rule of Hindu law as understood in the Presidency: a conveyance by a Hindu without male issue at its date will bind subsequently born or adopted male issue; such subsequently acquired issue take only that vested interest which existed in their father at the time of their birth or adoption. Conversely, if a conveyance were executed after a son's birth or adoption, it could not bind that son to the same extent.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Decrees of the Courts below are reversed; a decree is to be made for the appellant (the defendant), and the attempted revocation of the bakshishpatra was ineffective.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The Court held that the bakshishpatra vested the property in Morbhat on 10 September 1856, subject only to a trust in favour of Chintaman for the income necessary for the donor's maintenance during his life.
  • Because the conveyance occurred before the adoption of Lakshman, at the time of adoption Chintaman had no inheritable estate in the property that could vest in Lakshman; therefore Lakshman's suit to recover a moiety must fail and the decrees in his favour are reversed.
  • The parties are to bear their own costs of the suit and of both appeals.

Broader legal implication stated in the opinion: the decision applies the rule that an alienation by a Hindu without male issue binds subsequently acquired male issue to the extent of the father's estate at the time of the birth or adoption; this opinion does not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond that application, and the Court did not cite other precedents in the text provided.

Decrees reversed.
Show all summary ...

Westropp, C.J:— On the 10th of September, 1856, Chintaman (alias Chinto) Mayalay, a Konkani Brahmin, advanced in years, and then without male issue, executed in favour of Morbhat Ramkrishnabhat Upadya (a Brahmin of the same caste) a document, which, after describing itself as a bakshishpatra, and after stating its date and the names of the donor and donee and the name of the village of the former, proceeded thus: “Deed of gift is given in writing as follows: I have become old and have no male issue. You are a Brahmin and a fit object of charity (satpatra), and you are my protector. Up to this day you and you ancestors protected me. As I have no male issue, I have given to you, as gift and as charity (dharmast), my property at the kasba aforesaid, together with my moveable property. The particulars thereof are as follows: My own thikan (garden or field,) situate at, &c., there is my house standing thereon—a cowshed adjacent—warkas and grass land. The garden and house, &c., &c., I have given to you as gift this day of my own accord, and I have made the same over to you. You shall pay the Government assessment and village expenses, and you and your grandsons should enjoy the same property, generation after generation, and live in peace there. As long as I live I will take the profits and you should maintain me as if I were one of the members of your family. The property I have mentioned above I have given to you of my own accord, and I have made the same over to you. I have no ownership whatever therein; the ownership belongs to you from this day. This day I owe no money, &c., to anybody. Whatever property there may be after my death, other than that described above, is all given to you. No person has any claim thereto; the entire ownership belongs to you. I have given in writing this deed in sound mind and of my own accord.” This document was in the handwriting of Balaji Hari Sathye, a Brahman of the same caste as the donor and donee. It was duly signed by the donor, and attested by several witnesses. On the 4th October, 1856, it was registered. Possession was given to the donee Morbhat. He for some time managed the property, and paid the Government assessment of the garden, and held receipts for the same. About fifteen months after the execution of the bakshishpatra, Chintaman, the donor, appears to have repented his act, and he, on the 6th January, 1858, addressed a yadi or letter to the Assistant Magistrate, purporting to revoke the bakshishpatra of the 10th September, 1856, and he was, by the Assistant Magistrate, restored to possession. Morbhat brought a civil suit (No. 446 of 1859) in the Munsif's Court to recover the property. Upon the 6th of June, 1859, and before any decree was made in that suit, Chintaman adopted Lakshman (the plaintiff in the present suit) then a child in this eighth year. Lakshman was not made a party to Morbhat's suit. The Munsif made his decree on the 2nd of April, 1860, in the suit (446) of Morbhat v. Chintaman in favour of Morbhat, and found that Chintaman executed the bakshishpatra when in his full senses and that possession had been given by him to Morbhat under that document. The Munsif directed the property to be restored to the possession of Morbhat to ber held in accordance with the bakshishpatra, and ordered Chintaman to pay the coats of the suit. Chintaman appealed against that decree, but subsequently, on the 12th July, 1860, withdrew his appeal, admitted the execution of the bakshishpatra, and stated that he was willing to give over the thikan, and the rest of the property, to Morbhat in accordance with the terms of the Munsif's decree. This was done. The natural father of Lakshman then, upon an alleged mortgage to himself by Chintaman, and on the ground that Morbhat had fraudulently obtained a decree against Chintaman in his own favour, instituted a suit against Morbhat, but was defeated by him in the Munsif's Court, the Assistant Judge's Court, and the High Court successively.

Lakshman, within three years after attaining his majority, instituted the present suit, on the 16th March, 1874, to recover, from Rambhat, the grandson of Morbhat (who is dead), a moiety of the property, on the ground that Chintaman could not, as against his adoptive son Lakshman, alienate more than one-half of the property. The Subordinate Judge and the Assistant Judge have respectively decreed in favour of Lakshman.

The main question is whether the bakshishpatra was by Chintaman, at the time he executed it, intended to operate as a deed or merely as a will? The preliminary question, however, arises whether Lakshman, not being, a party to Morbhat's suit, No. 446 of 1859, is bound by the decree therein made against Chintaman and by Chintaman's withdrawal from his appeal in that suit.

The date, on which the plaint in that suit was presented, is not in evidence in this suit. Assuming, however, most favourably to the defendant Rambhat, that the filing of that plaint was (as is probable) anterior to the adoption of Lakshman, we are of opinion that, inasmuch as Lakshman was certainly adopted before the hearing and decree in that suit, and might have been made a party to it, but was not, the proceedings therein do not bind him, and that, accordingly, he is at liberty to re-open the question whether the bakshishpatra was intended by Chintaman, when executing it to operate as a deed or as a will. We cannot regard the adoption pendente lite as a in the same predicament as an alienation pendente lite(1). If a legitimate son had been born to Chintaman daring the suit, such son, to be bound by a pending suit affecting his father's ancestral property, must be made a party, and we think that a son adopted during the suit would have been in the same position. The one at his birth and the other at his adoption would take a vested interest in his father's ancestral property according to the Hindu law in this Presidency(2). Wo do not think that the circumstance, that Chintaman may have adopted Lakshman for the purpose of endeavouring to defeat the bakshishpatra, alters the case. Whatever evil motive may have influenced Chintaman, he was doing that which, as a sonless Hindu, he had a right to do, and he was not under any obligation to Morbhat not to adopt; and even if he had so contracted with Morbhat, we doubt that such a contract could affect the validity of the adoption, although the right of Morbhat to retain the property, under the bakshishpatra, if it be a deed and not a will, may not be disturbed. Lakshman, an infant in his eighth year, was an innocent party, and the ceremony of giving and taking being duly performed by persons with full authority, he cannot be relegated to the family of his natural father. Taking this view of the adoption, we permitted Lakshman's pleader to argue that the bakshishpatra must be regarded as a will, and not as a deed. If that proposition could have been maintained, we may observe that Lakshman should have sued for the whole and not for a moiety only of the property, inasmuch as Chintaman, being a member of an undivided family at the time of his death, could not have devised away any part of the property from his co-parcener, i.e his adopted son, according to the Hindu law of this Presidency(3).

The question remains to be solved—Was the bakshishpatra intended by Chintaman, when executing it, to be a conveyance by way of deed or to be only a will to operate from the time of his death? In favour its being intended to be only a will, is the circumstance that Morbhat could not beneficially enjoy any portion of income of the property until after the death of Chintaman. The true construction of the document evidently is that Morbhat was to pay the Government assessment and village expenses out of the income, and to make over to Chintaman or to apply, in his maintenance and for his benefit, the residue of the income. On the other hand, the name of the document, given in itself, “bakshishpatra”, indicates a deed and not a will. This per se is not much. If the conduct of Chintaman or the provisions of the document showed that his intentions were purely testamentary, the name of the document would not be important. But Chintaman not only caused it to be registered within a month after its execution, but actually gave over the management and possession of the property to Morbhat, who could not, indeed, pay the Government assessment and village expenses, or maintain Chintaman out of the income of the property, as the ‘document required him to do, unless Morbhat received that income for the purpose. Finding that the document contemplated the management of the property by Morbhat, and that Chintaman, being then old, should be relieved of that trouble, and that possession of the property itself was fully given to Morbhat, we think that the Munsif was right, when, in his decree of 1860, he held the bakshishpatra to be a conveyance and not a will.

Therefore, we must hold that it vested the property in Morbhat on the 10th September, 1856, subject to a trust as regarded the income, left after payment of the Government assessment and village expenses, in favour of Chintaman so long as he lived. It did not contain any power of revocation, and Chintaman's attempted revocation in 1858 was futile in law. Chintaman having in 1856, nearly three years before the plaintiff's adoption, conveyed all of his estate in the property to Morbhat except a life interest, had not, at the time of the adoption, any estate of inheritance in the property, a share of which could vest in Lakshman at the time of his adoption. A conveyance by a Hindu, without male issue at its date, will bind his subsequently born or adopted male issue. Such issue at their birth take a vested interest in such property only as is that of their father at that time. Here Chintaman had parted with his inheritance before the adoption, which in the case of an adopted son occupies the same position as birth with a natural born son. If the bakshishpatra had been executed after the adoption or birth of a son to Chintaman, it could not prevail to any extent against such a son, inasmuch as an alienation by a member of an undivided family without valuable consideration does not, in this Presidency, any more than a will, bind, even to the extent of such member's own share, his co-parceners. They, in such cases, take the whole property by survivorship. But here the adoption came after the alienation.

We must reverse the decrees of the Courts below, and make a decree for the appellant, the defendant. The parties respectively must bear their own costs of the suit and of both appeals.

Decrees reversed.